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Roosevelt Study Center, for awarding me a research g ant and their warm welcoming 
during my stay in Middelburg.  
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helping me during the initial stages of my research and for his continuous 
encouragements and advice. A deep personal acknowledgment must also go to Dr. Lewis 
Fischer, University of Newfoundland, for his assistance with some of my first 
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the Ghent University for the working space, and all the people of the Department for the 
warm comradery during the final months of writing this PhD. In particular, Stephane 
Hoste, Frank Caestecker and Stephan Vanfraechem must be thanked for exchanging ideas 
and their advice throughout the project. 
 Fortunately my friends made sure that I didn’t gettoo absorbed by the research. 
Therefore thanks; Bram, Gunther, Karl, Christophe, J roen, Justine, Ward, Frederik, 
Thomas, Dominiek, Pieter, Manuel, Dieter, Valerie, Jimy, Lorre, Jelle, Lode, Maud, 
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thank for their unconditional supported in all the choices I have made in life and for their 
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Introduction 
 Main thesis question, geographic delimitation and periodization 
The sauces used to spice up the thesis 
A business approach to international migration: the various levels of analysis 
 
PART 1: State policies and their influence on the connections between 
maritime and migration networks 1830-1870 
 
Chapter I: The competition for the migrant trade in the Hamburg-Le Havre range 
up to 1860 
 
1) Maritime networks and migration: love at first sight 
2) Balancing between a threat for welfare systems to a lucrative commodity stimulating 
trade: early migration policies 
2.1) The rush to Amsterdam but whereto? 
2.2) Le Havre and the cotton triangle 
2.3) The raise of Bremen as ‘the’ migrant gateway to the New World 
 
3) Coming out of the shadows of the ‘Dam’ ports: the Belgian independence and the 
revival of Antwerp 
3.1) Positioning Antwerp among the migrant gateways to the New World 
3.2) Increased efforts of the Belgian government to remain competitive 
4) The economic crisis and assisted migration through Antwerp 
 
4.1) New Flanders as a security valve for ‘Old’ Flanders: the foundation of 
agricultural colonies with government support 
4.2) Giving beggars criminals and ex-convicts a fresh start in America 
5) New York as ‘the’ nodal point for the American Foreland 
5.1) Chain-migration patterns and transport networks 
5.2) American migration legislation, and the rise of Nativism  
 
Chapter II: Was Antwerp; “the frog in the table, wh ich wished to reach the size of 
an ox?”: the keen competition to open up transatlantic steamship lines 
 
1) A British Queen in service of Belgian authorities: the beginnings of transatlantic 
steam-shipping 
1.1) The Dutch and Belgian maritime policies compared 
1.2) The British Queen: the first Continental transatlantic steamship line  
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2) The American challenge to the British dominance: Some fine old German wines for 
American subsidies 
2.1) The diplomatic corps, commercial opportunities and migrant transport 
2.2) The Dutch North Atlantic trade relations hitting rock bottom, the American 
subsidies-issue as a first wake-up call 
2.3) The Bremen versus Antwerp lobby and their bidsti host the American 
steamship line 
3) The end of Cunard’s dominance and the breakthroug  f migrant transport on 
steamships 
 
3.1) The Anglo-American rivalry and the beginning of migrant transport by steam 
3.2) The emergence of migrant transport by steam in continental ports within  
the Hamburg-Le Havre range 
3.2.1) Rotterdam’s awakening from commercial nostalgia  
3.2.2) Was Antwerp much like a frog or was it an ox t  be reckoned with? 
3.3) The second empire and the Pereire brothers: first steps in Le Havre’s 
de-Americanization 
3.3.4) Bremen versus Hamburg: The rivalry among the Hanse cities for 
 the North Atlantic trade 
 
Conclusion Part 1 
 
Part II: Full steam ahead: from cut-throat competition to the formation 
of shipping cartels, 1870-1895 
 
Chapter I: The establishment of the Holland America Line: New York as a nodal 
point for the migrant trade. 
 
1) The rise of Dutch passenger liners powered by steam 
1.1) The transition from sail to steam and the formation of joint-stock companies 
with limited liability 
1.2) The steamship boom in the Low Countries early 1870s 
2) Where all passenger liners meet: New York as ‘the’ nodal point for the migrant traffic 
 2.1) The American foreland and migrant transport 
2.2) The Big ‘Migrant’ Apple 
2.3) The opening of the Holland America Line’s head-agency in New York 
2.4) The internal rivalry between the ‘Dam’ ports 
3) Red Star Line: ‘Belgian Royal and United States Mail Steamships sailing every 
Saturday between New York and Antwerp’ 
3.1) Antwerp’s decline and new legislation  
 7




Chapter II: ‘We got prepaid and return tickets to r ide’: chain migration patterns 
and the network of migrant agents in the United States. 
 
1) The Dillingham Commission, Larsson brothers and migrant legislation as primary 
contemporary sources for migrant-agent activity 
1.1) The Dillingham Commission 
1.2) The Scandinavian sources   
2) The myriad of names defining the various links in the agent-network: migrant agents, 
brokers, expedients, subagents, runners, peddlers, subagent’s subsidiaries, recruiters, 
Yankee’s, Newlanders, etc. 
2.1) The migrant broker  
2.2) Migrant agents, subagents, newlanders and runne s 
2.3) European laws regulating the agent-network in continental countries with 
important migrant gateways 
 
3) The Holland America Line and its agent-network: the organization of the sale of 
prepaid and return tickets in the US 
3.1) The sale, distribution and organization of prepaid and return passages 
3.2) Taking matters into own hands: The appointment of W.H van den Toorn as 
HAL New York head-agent 
3.3) New York, capital of transatlantic passage sals: immigrant banks and their 
interests in the ocean passage market 
4) Conclusion 
 
Chapter III: Competition and collusion: the growing pains of shipping conferences. 
 
1) Introduction: Price fixing and price fluctuations on the North Atlantic 
2) Shipping conferences on long distance routes: thir real origins? 
 
3) The establishment of the New York Continental Conference and the organization of 
the American third class passage market 
 
4) The working of the Continental Conference up to the formation of the N.D.L.V. 
4.1) Harmonizing the external pressures 
4.1.1) The connections between British-Scandinavian, Continental and 
Mediterranean markets 
4.1.2) Outside rivals on the Continent: Thingvalia nd French Line 
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4.1.3) The network of migrant brokers and agents: the concentration in 
New York 
4.1.4) The dependence of stability of other conferences 
4.2.) The internal pressures 
4.2.1) Internal mistrust, duration of agreements and constant 
renegotiations 
4.2.2) The lack of homogeneity of product: various services, destinations 
at different rates 
4.2.3) Moving the competition from ocean rates to railroad rates 
4.2.4) The take-over of the pre-paid market by migrant brokers 
4.3) An evaluation of the first seven years of the Continental Conference 
 
5) Pooling the traffic, the tonnage clause and the impact on the Conference Agreements 
5.1) The formation of the Nord-Atlantischer Dampfer-Linien Verband 
 5.2) The British-Jewish Hamburg Connection: the conference’s Achilles Heel  
5.3) Remaining internal and external pressures and the outbreak of a general rate 
war 
6) Steerage price formation and shipping conferences on the North Atlantic: a complex 
story 
  
Chapter IV: The nationalization of American migrati on policies: the influence of 
shipping companies in immigration legislation and enforcement thereof 1870-1895 
 
1)The Civil War and proactive measures to attract migrants 
 
2) Reaching an international consensus on migrant tsport legislation: From the 
Emigrant ship Convention to the Passenger Act of 1882 
2.1) The Emigrant Ship Convention 
2.2) The 1882 Passenger Act 
 
3) The labour Unions as a lobby group and the ‘Alien contract labour law’   
 3.1) Labour organizations and the new wave of migrant sojourners 
3.2) The European reaction on the Alien Contract Labour Law 
3.3) The conflict of interest between Labor Unions a d shipping companies  
 
4) The resurgence of the nativist movement and its opponents The Immigration 
Restriction League versus the Pro-Immigration Leagu 
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4.1) Intellectualizing the restrictive movement up to the foundation of the 
Immigration Restrictive League 
4.2) The passage of Migration Inspection under federal supervision.  
  4.2.1) The Immigrant Bills of 1891, 1893 and the ir implementation 
 
4.2.2) Assisted migration and Paupers: the efforts of he shipping 
companies to make them look not so likely to become a public charge 
 
4.2.3) “John Smith’s followers travel second class”; Guion and Holland 
America Line’s special service to Utah  
 
4.2.4) Temporary impositions of Remote Control measure  through 
consuls and health inspectors 
 
4.3) The Shipping Lobby and the pro immigration league 
 
5) Corporate liberalism and the progressive era: The rise of the ‘Third House’ or the 
‘Assistant Government’ regarding immigration issues 
 
 
Part III: The consolidation of transatlantic shipping companies and 
their efforts to protect the steerage market during the Progressive Era 
 
Chapter I: Consolidation, success and failures of passenger conferences during the 
Anti-Trust Era: 1896-1914 
 
1)  Expansion and consolidation of the North-Atlantic continental conference agreements 
between 1896 and 1904. 
1.1) Releasing the competitive pressures in other trade departments 
1.2) Rising the Eastbound steerage rates to Westbound levels 
 1.3) The NDLV-headaches caused by the solitary course of the CGT 
1.4) The vendetta of C. B. Richard& Co: Anti-Trust laws and interference from 
the Mediterranean 
1.5) Remaining Internal pressures among NDLV members 
1.6) Price evolutions  
2) Taking horizontal combinations a step further: The IMM Merger 
2.1) The HAL at crossroads 
2.2) The formation of the IMM 
2.3) The HAL and ‘foreign control’ 
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3) The non-inclusion of the Cunard Line in the IMM and the revival of the British 
pioneer 
3.1) The reaction of the British authorities towards the IMM combine  
3.2) Cunard Line’s withdrawal and its effect on theContinental Market 
4) The attacks of the Russian Volunteer Fleet and the Uranium Line on the ‘holy pool 
territory’ 
4.1) The Russian Volunteer Fleet and the first test ca es against shipping cartels 
4.2) Price fluctuations 1903-1908 and the foundation of the Atlantic Conference 
4.3) The continued fight for the Russian market and the Mediterranean Pool  
5) The Anti-trust storm reaches the shipping cartels 
5.1) Impacts of the uncertain legal situation of shipping conferences in the US 
5.2) The defense of shipping cartels and conclusions of the Alexander Committee 
6) The success story of the continental passenger conference  
 
Chapter II: The rise of Immigrant Banks: The sale of prepaid and return tickets 
through the American migrant agent network 1896-1914 
 
1) The foundation of the New York City Agents Association 
 
2) The implementation and violation of the conference rules: the relations between 
shipping companies and the agent-network 
2.1) The credit-system and sale of tickets through peddlers  
2.2) The problem of outside agents 
2.3) The circulation of European cash orders in the US 
2.4) Interference of the Mediterranean market: the case study of Zotti & Co 
2.5) From Cattlemen passages to delimiting the busines  area 
 
3) Joint Ticket Offices 
 
4) Immigrant Banks: the story as told by the Dillingham Commission and the HAL 
travelers’ reports 
4.1) The profile of the Immigrant banker or Migrant gent 
4.2) The variety of extra services offered 
4.3) Advertisements  
4.4) Banking methods 
4.5) Legislation 




Chapter III: The ‘visible hand’ of the shipping lobby on US maritime and migration 
policies: the ship-subsidy and educational bills 
 
1) The immigration problem: ‘Tant de bruit pour une omelette’ or ‘a great and perilous 
threat for the very fabric of the American race’? 
1.1) ‘Literates Only’: The Educational bill as a means to sift European immigrants 
according to various degrees of whiteness 
1.2) The Immigration Protective League: Shipping companies’ involvement in the 
organized protest of various ethnic and nationality groups 
 
2) The merchant marine problem: The rise of American jingoism and the need for a 
strong national fleet to back it up  
 2.1) The American versus Foreign shipping lobby  
 2.2) The Spanish-American War 
2.3) The American Ship-Subsidy Bill  
 
3) From Washington to New York, from theory to practice: The immigration policies as 
implemented at Ellis Island 
3.1) Powderly – Fitchie: The era of increased healt inspections but also of 
mismanagement at Ellis Island 
3.1.1) The imposition of an effective system to keep out contagious and 
loathsome diseases 
3.1.2) The era of corruption, blackmailing and physical abuses at Ellis 
Island 
 
3.2) Sargent – Williams/ Watchorn: Implementing the law by the letter 
3.2.1) The iron fist of William Williams and the clean sweep of Ellis 
Island 
3.2.2) A quick loop back to Washington: The Immigrant Act of March 3 
1903 
3.3.3) The implementation of the law by the Commissioner General of 
Immigration F. Sargent and the Ellis Island immigration commissioner W. 
Williams 
4) Setting-up the foundations of the global wall against poor immigrants 
 
Chapter IV: The Dillingham Commission and Immigration Legislation: between 
Progressivism and Corporate Liberalism  
 
1) The fragile equilibrium of shipping cartels and its impact on maritime and migration 
policies 
1.1) The failed attempt of the Hungarian government to control emigration  
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1.2) The last convulsions of the American pro ship-subsidy lobby 
 
2) The Southern States: from liberals to restrictionists 
2.1) Go West, Go South! with a little help from the shipping companies 
2.2) South Carolina and its Department of Agriculture, Commerce and 
Immigration 
 
3) The Immigration Problem revisited: the formation of the Dillingham Commission as a 
last resort to prevent a literacy test 
3.1) Increasing agitation in the popular press and academic journals 
3.2) The House taken hostage by some anti-restriction s s  
3.3) The minority wins again 
 
4) In the meantime at Ellis Island… 
4.1) Closing back doors and intensifying health checks  
4.2) Refining the Deportation procedures 
5) From the Dillingham Commission to the Dillingham-Burnett bill 
5.1) The European Tour 
5.2) Are there limits to the assimilating powers of the American Melting Pot? 
5.3) “The reading and writing test as the most feasible single method of restricting 
undesirable migration 
  
6) Beware of the Gatekeeper: Williams’ second term at the Island of Tears 
 6.1) The ‘financial test’: raising the entrance fes to the New World 
6.2) See you in Court: place of predilection where Williams and shipping 
companies met 













Main thesis question, geographic delimitation and periodization 
 Why, yet another study on the long 19th century European mass-migration 
movement to the US, when during the last decade migration historians have encouraged a 
shift away from the Atlanto-centrism and Modernization-centrism that has dominated the 
sub-discipline (Lucassen and Lucassen, 1996, 28-30; Hoerder, 2002, 10-18)? For many, 
the topic seems saturated, yet one particular and reoccurring question has not yet received 
a satisfying answer: how did the migrant trade evolve and influence the relocation of 
approximately thirty five million migrants across the Atlantic, of whom an ever 
increasing percentage returned and repeated the journey during the steamship era? More 
than half a century ago Maldwyn Jones, Frank Thistletwaite, and Rolf Engelsing drew 
attention to the fact that transatlantic migration was determined by trade routes (Jones, 
1956, Engelsing, 1961; Thistletwaite, 1960). Migrants essentially became valuable cargo, 
on a shipping route made up of raw cotton, tobacco or timber from the New World; a 
route that had room to spare on the return leg of the journey. Rolf Engelsing in particular 
documented how the maritime business community reacted to this trade opportunity, by 
erecting inland networks, directing a continuous flow of human cargo to the port of 
Bremen during the sailship-era. Marianne Wokeck later s ressed the Atlantic dimensions 
of these networks, by dating the origins of non-colonial mass migration movements to the 
18th Century (Wokeck, 1999).  
A comprehensive analysis of the further development of he trade during the 
steamship era -when the movement gained intensity and the foundations were b ing laid 
of what Aristide Zolberg described as the great global wall to protect industrious nations 
from the invasion of the world’s poor- is still absent. This explains why migration 
historians, such as Dudley Baines, or maritime historians, as Michael Miller, have 
observed that: “we know very little about the activities of shipping companies and 
shipping agents” and that “oddly enough, migration historians and maritime historians 
have often written about transoceanic crossings like two ships passing in the night” 
(Baines, 1991, 48; Miller, 2007, 175). As Miller has pointed out, maritime historians 
havealso failed to pick up on the early observations f Robert Greenhalgh and Engelsing 
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regarding the influence of human freight trade on port activities (Greenhalgh-Albion, 
1939; Engelsing 1961). Despite the pioneering role f the North-Atlantic passenger 
business in introducing both technological and organizational innovations to the shipping 
industry, few maritime historians have broached the topic. The exceptions who have - 
like Robin Bastin, Francis Hyde or Birgit Ottmüller-Wetzel- limited their analysis to one 
port or company (Bastin, 1971; Hyde, 1975; Ottmüller-Wetzel, 1986).  
Frank Broeze underlined that the restricted scope of most maritime studies fails to 
address the overall dynamics of port competition, which propagated the expansion 
international maritime networks. He encouraged new studies to adopt transnational, 
comparative, multi-disciplinary and multi-thematic approaches (Broeze, 1994, 1995 and 
1998). This research aims to answer this call by integrating the work of migration 
historians with that of their maritime colleagues who have failed to find a common 
ground, despite the interrelationship between maritime and migration networks which 
converged in ports. Moreover, the connections betwen both are further underlined by the 
fact that the business did not leave the authorities unaffected, especially as the trade 
greatly influenced the development of the merchant marine. As central governments 
gained power throughout the century, the urge to control migration was not only 
motivated in controlling the quality and quantity of migrants, but also in using the 
movement to stimulate the fleet under the national flag. The study is centered on the 
evolution of Rotterdam as a transatlantic migration gateway within the Hamburg-Le 
Havre range, and on the Holland America Line as a member of the wide web of shipping 
conferences regulating the North Atlantic passenger trade. Yet, this port did not stand 
alone in being in direct competition with its continental rivals within the Hamburg-Le 
Havre range, and indirectly with the British migration gateways. 
 The competition greatly influenced the delimitation f both hinterland and 
foreland which these ports connected and from where these companies tapped migrants. 
In order to underline the Atlantic dimension of these networks, there will be a focus on 
the foreland -the American market of prepaid and return tickets- and on how it helped 
shaping the expansion of the hinterland towards Eastern Europe and the Orient. This 
analysis of European mass migration between 1840 and 1914, as an international 
maritime business, will shed more light, on the onehand, on the development of shipping 
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conferences which sustained the growth of passenger liners into vast multi-nationals. On 
the other hand, it will demonstrate the impact of these companies on the path dependency 
and the legal framework of migration in the Atlantic World. 
 
The sauces used to spice up the thesis 
   Alfred Chandler encouraged the treatment of business history as an institutional 
history by promoting the use of non-quantifiable data based on letters, periodicals, 
memoranda and general accounts; which often provide tools for analyzing economic 
change as effectively, and in greater depth, than by the compilation and the manipulation 
of numbers. Chandler supported John Higham’s endorsement of a history that is less 
concerned with motives than with structure and process, by allowing for a better 
understanding of how groups and agencies such as political parties, corporations and 
communities have molded behavior and regulated distribution of power (Chandler, 1988, 
301-302).  
By using qualitative, rather than quantitative data, this research will try to 
improve upon our understanding of how people moved -rather than why they moved- by 
reconstructing the visible hand of steam-shipping companies in the transatlantic 
migration process. Diplomatic correspondence from countries with economic interest in 
transatlantic migrant transport was used to analyze the attempts of ports, within the 
Hamburg-Le Havre range to both lure migrants and to open steamship connections with 
the US for the period 1840-1870. Consuls constituted an important source of information 
on trade opportunities and established contacts with local authorities and businesses in 
order to promote trade relations with home-based shipping enterprises. Especially for 
new developing markets, for which uncertainties and thus transaction costs were 
considerably high, consuls played a vital ‘pre-conditioning’ role in developing these new 
markets located far away from the home country (Muller, 2002; Muller and Ojala, 2002).  
Research on the correspondence of representatives in New York and Washington 
in the French Diplomatic Archives (Nantes); Dutch national archives (The Hague); the 
Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affaires (Brussels) and State Archives of Hamburg and 
Bremen produced mixed results. A lot depended on practical problems, such as whether 
the correspondence had been preserved or whether permission in using a digital camera 
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was granted, and it also depended on the quality of inf rmation sent through by the 
consul and by the interests of the government on the issue. The Belgian archives, in 
particular revealed a lot of information on views from local and national authorities on 
the migrant trade.  
With regards to shipping company archives used to analyze the period between 
1870 and 1914 a similar strategy was deployed in uncovering the primary source 
materials of the Continental lines. Archive material on the Compagnie Générale 
Transatlantique can be found at the Centre d’Archives du Monde du Travail in Roubaix 
and the French Line Archives in Le Havre- both contain similar documents consisting 
mainly of official reports on the various meetings with shareholders, boards of 
administration, boards of directors, and which  reveal little on the organization of the 
traffic. The fate of the archives of the Antwerp-based Red Star Line remains a mystery.  
Neither the local archives in Antwerp nor the national archives in Brussels carry these 
records and it seems that these documents did not survive. The North German Lloyd 
archives were destroyed, yet the Bremen State Archives kept primary source material of 
migrant brokers. This source was not used here, yet it could reveal new information on 
the company. Unfortunately access to the Hamburg America Line archives was denied. 
Based on the inventory, it appears that more documents were preserved there than by any 
of the other companies, yet the majority of the documents held seem to be annual reports 
which were available to the public.  
Conversely, the Holland America Line collection at the community archives of 
Rotterdam stands out for both its accessibility as well as for the wealth of materials that 
are preserved there. Only for the first decade of its operations is the information scarce 
and from midway through the 1880s the complete lettr books of directors and agents on 
all sorts of operating issues can be found. Furthermore, the collection contains the 
conference agreements concluded between the shipping companies; minutes of the 
conference and sub-conference meetings; and correspndence of the conference secretary 
with the members, etc.  
This research is based predominantly on the letters s nt from the New York head-
agent of the company to the directors. As all the North-Atlantic passenger lines had their 
most important foreign offices in New York, the correspondence not only reveals crucial 
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information on the company operations but also on that of its competitors. It is divided 
into two series, one labeled as general correspondence in which dates from 1884, and the 
other as passage correspondence, running from 1889 onwards. The general 
correspondences are made up of weekly to daily reports on the pressing issues regarding 
freight, passage, infrastructure, personnel, political situation, etc. The even more regular 
passage correspondence deals exclusively with all aspects of first, second and third class 
passenger traffic. Despite being records which are f i ly complete, there are some gaps 
(of about two month periods of time) when the head-agent returned for a visit to 
Rotterdam; this occurred every three years initially, and seemed to have become a yearly 
event towards the end.  
Both sets of records also contain the coded telegrams received by the head-agent, 
and attachments such as newspaper articles or pamphlets, and sometimes include replies 
of directors or letters of third parties. Of the last category, series reports n the 
congressional activity on migration and maritime issues of the shipping lobbyist Claude 
Bennett provide extra information on the industry’s lobbying strategies in Washington. 
To complement the information drawn from the letters various other files were 
consulyted for information pertaining to the earlier years. Furthermore, the various 
conference agreements and minutes of the meetings were analyzed, and especially those 
of the New York Continental Conference through which the members organized the 
traffic, the migrant-agent network, and set the ocean passage rates for the American 
market.  
The minutes of the Continental Conference are on hand from 1885 to 1902 and of 
the Continental Standing Complaint Committee from 1896 till 1907. A brief comparison 
with the Cunard Line Archives (Liverpool), from whic  some material was drawn for this 
research, underlines the value and completeness of the HAL archives which still have a 
lot to reveal. Finally, some electronic resources facilitated access to valuable 
contemporary documents. Firstly, the Harvard University on-line Open Collections 
Program provided easy access to government documents and correspondence of the 
Immigration Restriction League in their fund ‘Immigration to the United States 1789-
1930’. The outline was completed with the help of the e-library program of Stanford 
University, for some volumes of the Dillingham Commission which are not yet available 
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on the Harvard website. The final very practical source which helped in reconstructing 
contemporary debates was ‘The New York Times’ online archive.  
The initial intention of the research was to compare two ports and companies. But 
the disproportionate amount of archive material, and especially the way migration 
business was organized as the primary sources revealed, indicated that the transnational 
entangled histories approach was more appropriate. As Jürgen Kocka and David Thelen 
demonstrate entanglements are inherent to migration nd transnational commerce studies 
and these topics had a pioneering role in the development of this method. Therefore it is 
unsurprising to note that a study on both transnatio l commerce and migration confirms 
the far reaching mutual interaction which governed the competitive nature of the migrant 
business. The major advantage of the stategy is that the multidimensional and dynamic 
approach allows for abinding together of the micro and the macro levels of analysis- the 
need for which has been underlined by both maritime and migration historians alike 
(Haupt and Kocka, 2004, 33; Kocka, 2003 42-43; Thelen, 1999, 970-973; Werner and 
Zimmerman, 2003, 11-16). 
 
A business approach to international migration: the various levels of analysis 
 Over the last fifty years the models of analysis of transatlantic migration 
movements have expanded and contracted. The studies focu ing on the impact of the 
movement on the receiving country at one end, and on the sending country at the other 
end, led to the ‘push and pull’ model attempting to establish the point of the spectrum 
that determined the flows. Subsequent researchers sugge ted amplifying the scope from 
the national to the international level, focusing on the interactions between both ends of 
the the trajectory and the formation of an ‘Atlantic World’ in which both parts converged. 
This legacy, which we are indebted to Brinley Thomas in presenting, culminated with the 
works of Gould, Kevin O’Rourke, Timothy Hatton and Jeffrey Williamson. Globalization 
studies and the neglect of other long distance migration movements moved Dirk Hoerder 
to broaden the scope to ‘world-systems’. In the meantime, other models developed which 
criticized the broad top-down perspectives for failing to consider the individual migrant 
and the non-quantifiable social, cultural and political aspects of the movement. Many of 
the migrants made their decision to leave within the context of the family economy and 
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relying on personal networks to obtain; information  opportunities abroad, means to 
make the crossing, secure employment, etc.  
These bottum-up micro studies allowed for reconstructing chain migration 
patterns, which are based on: “interpersonal ties connecting migrants to former migrants, 
and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship and 
shared community origin.” These constitute a form of social capital stimulating the 
movement by reducing the costs, fears and risks of migration. Around these migration 
networks institutions, organizations and entrepreneurs with particular interests developed 
and tried to profit from and influence the moves (Massy, 1999, 43-47). The discipline’s 
biggest challenge remains in developing a system-based pproach, connecting micro and 
macro levels of analysis (Boyd, 1989, 641; Fawcett and Arnold, 1987, 456; Facewett, 
1989, 672-675; Moch and Jackson, 1996, 60-68; Morawsk ; 1996, 186-187). To bridge 
this gap Hoerder put forward social and human capital approaches, on a meso-level of: 
“mediating networks and interacting segments, including mental maps of the world 
systems, offering a more comprehensive perspective on migration process”  (Hoerder, 
1996, 84; 2002, 10-18).  
Some, like Portes, suggest that the meso-level is the only functional level of 
analysis in the study of international migrations like transnational communities (Portes, 
1999, 21-33).  David Gerber later suggested a higher lev l of analysis in linking the meso 
with the macro level; taking up Nina Glick Schiller’s concept of ‘transnational social 
fields’ connecting the individual networks that do the planning and make the resources 
available to the institutions, business and agencies facilitating the movement and 
encompassing the influence of governments, businesses and public agencies on how 
networks take shape and evolve. Scholars such as Gerber and Glick Schiller underline the 
need for comprehensive studies including the social, economic and political processes 
that shape transnational migration (Glick Schiller, 1999, 97-98; Gerber, 2006, 231-238).  
Taking up Salt and Stein’s suggestion of viewing inter ational migration as a 
business, dating back to the nineteenth century North-Atlantic movement, the pivotal role 
of shipping companies as mediators between networks and  segments on one hand and 
governments, business and public agencies on the other hand regulating the migration 
process, becomes explicit (Salt and Stein, 1997, 46-68). This study locates itself on the 
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‘transnational business field’, linking the macro with micro from top-down- previous 
efforts have tended to do this from the bottom up. Analyzing the competition between 
companies to acquire and increase their migrant busines  does not only reveal new 
information on relations between migrants and business, but also between migrants and 
potential migrants and between migrants and the government. It is important to be 
reminded that in this transnational process nations a d nation-states continued to be 
important constituent elements (Gabaccia,1999, 1117-1118). 
Shipping companies headed the big business networks which developed around 
the movement consisting of migrant brokers, agents, labor recruiters, charity and 
philanthropic organizations, railroad companies and banks. These networks as Miller 
pointed out: “provided the organization means and often initiatives by which the great 
transoceanic migration flows of humanity occurred” (Miller, 2006, 190). The networks 
that extended to both sides of the Atlantic provided the shipping companies with a direct 
link to the purchasers of the ticket- either the migrant himself, a padrone or a charity 
organization in Europe or friends, relatives and various third parties in the US.  
How did these systems reinforce chain migration patterns, and how did it allow 
people traveling outside these chains to make the crossing? As managers of these 
networks, shipping companies were key links in thissy tem, but how did they administer 
these functions? Kristian Hvidt, Birgit Brattne, Amoreno Martellini, Odd Lovoll and 
Agnes Bretting have all investigated the role of migrant agents in the transatlantic 
migration process from a European perspective, yet as Hvidt underlined the lack of 
information on the steamship companies managing them obstructs far reaching 
conclusions on their true impact (Brattne, 1976; Bretting, 1991; Hvidt, 1978; Lovoll, 
1993; Martellini, 2002; Morner, 1992)  
Much of the research in maritime history has focused on the relations between 
shipping lines and shippers who provided the companies with goods. On the relation 
between passenger lines and the network of migrant brokers and agents supplying the 
companies with passengers, the literature is practically inexistent. By filling this gap for 
the American market of ocean passages sales, includg prepaid and return tickets this 
study reconstructs how the shipping lines were linked to the individual networks of the 
migrant. It sheds more light on the profile of migrant agents and brokers, on the 
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marketing strategies used to promote ocean passage ales, and on the variety of services 
rendered to the migrants etc. To what extent did ethnicity play a role in this? How was 
the passage organized once a prepaid ticket was sold? How far was railroad transport 
included? What was the relationship between shipping companies and railroad 
companies? To what extent did the business evolve into an integrated transport system, 
providing a door-to-door service? What about padrones, labor agents philanthropic and 
charity organizations assisting the migrants on their way and after arrival? Did they deal 
with companies directly or through the agent network? How did American and European 
authorities try to regulate ocean passage sales?  
The organization of the network connecting the shipping companies to the 
individual migrant can only be fully understood by analyzing how shipping lines ‘battled’ 
each other for the migrants. The second half of the nin teenth century was marked by the 
rise of big business which in the shipping industry led to the formation of joint stock 
companies which spurred the adoptions of technological innovations closing the distances 
between old and new worlds (Boyce, 1995, Keeling, 1999). The North-Atlantic passenger 
lines led the way in technological, and as will be argued organizational, innovation. The 
keen competition between steamship companies pushed them to collude and to form 
cartels, known as shipping conferences, which are still the most common form of 
organizing overseas trade routes today. In these conferences, the companies tried to 
relieve the market from the fierce competitive pressures, both internal and external. The 
theoretical framework supplied by maritime historians on shipping cartels regulating 
cargo traffic will be applied to the steerage market.  
First, the transition from sail to steam and the impact of the rise of big joint-stock 
companies on the organization of the traffic will be analyzed. How did a passenger line, 
such as the Holland America Line, structure the business on both sides of the Atlantic? 
How did it outlive the keen competition of other companies and acquire membership of 
the wide web of conference agreements regulating the traffic? The HAL’s position as a 
core member of the ‘Nord-Atlantischer Dampfer-Linien Verband’ allows an in depth 
analysis of the success and failures of these agreements for the European continental 
market. What were the main internal pressures of the agreements and how did the lines 
try to neutralize these? How did the Continental lines manage to fend off external 
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pressures from other sub-markets and prevent penetration into the market of new lines? 
On a broader scale, to what extent can the success or failure of these horizontal 
combinations and the way the traffic was organized, explain the contrasting business 
structures compared to other contemporary industries, such as railroad companies which 
showed stronger tendencies towards vertical integraion. Simultaneously, the impact of 
these agreements on the individual migrant will be tested. Special focus goes to how 
these were used to gain control over the migrant-brokers and agent network imposing 
rules regulating the sales. It will also be tested as to what extent the companies managed 
to control the routing of the migrants through those agreements.  
Last but not least, a price series of the ocean crossing from Rotterdam to New 
York, for the period 1885 until 1914, will be reconstructed. Economic historians long 
underlined the dramatic importance of declining transport costs, due to technological 
innovations in the late nineteenth century, for the ov rseas freight traffic accelerating the 
Atlantic convergence (North, 1958; Harley, 1988, Williamson et. al., 1994, 25, 214). The 
lack of information on passenger rates made research rs, until recently presuppose that 
these followed the same trend. Drew Keeling, a notable exception who shares an interest 
in both maritime and migration history, reconstructed quarterly averages indicating that 
the passenger rates actually increased. This evolution was previously denoted by Knick 
Harly and Hvidt (Harley, 1990; Hvidt, 1975). The price series presented here allows for a 
refining of Keeling’s findings and to reconstruct the financial impact of the agreements 
on the migrant’s transatlantic crossing. 
 Finally, the business-centered approach of internaio l migration allows both to 
reassess the contemporary views of the authorities on the movement and the way 
shipping companies placed themselves between the migrant and the state as the latter 
tried to increase their control on the movements of the former. An analysis of the 
measures adopted to regulate the migrant transport by the authorities involved in the 
Hamburg-Le Havre range-New York route, and their efforts to support the opening of 
transatlantic steamship connections in the first half of the nineteenth century, underlines 
the primary contemporary concerns about migration. O  one hand there was the tendency 
to obstruct the flow to prevent aliens from becoming a public charge. On the other hand 
the there was the tendency to encourage the flow, because it contributed to the 
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development of the merchant marine under the nationl flag, which was of capital 
importance during military conflicts. The contrasting attitudes of the various parties 
involved in the Hamburg-Le Havre range will be analyzed. To what extent did it 
influence the routes chosen by migrants? Did it accelerate the transition from sail to 
steam? To what extent did the authorities’ interest in the migrant trade change our views 
of the State as a passive actor in the transatlantic migration movement during that period? 
How did it influence the governments’ stance towards migration in the subsequent 
period, which was crucial in the formation of nation-states?  
Only recently have migration researchers, such as Cherryl Shanks, Patrick Weil, 
James Hollifield, Carl Strikwerda and Aristide Zolberg, brought the State back into the 
debate. Not surprisingly academics from countries of immigration had tackled the theme, 
as receiving countries have been more pro-active than sending countries in developing 
means to control the movement. But have they really? Douglas Massy and Hollifield 
underlined the lack of research on government behavior in the country of origin (Massy, 
1999, 50-51; Hollifield, 2000, 173). The perception f control has, so far, been too 
restricted on one hand to the abilities of nations to regulate emigration of citizens and 
immigration of aliens, and later on the other hand o  the efforts to speed up assimilation 
or means to prevent migrants from to giving up their ome country.  
The business migration approach opens up the restrict d outlook pointing to the 
fact that between emigration and immigration countries other nations positioned 
themselves because of the economic interests involved in transporting these migrants. 
Strikwerda rightly pointed out that the boom in trade and diplomacy between nations 
greatly affected the flows despite the lack of an international migration regime 
(Strikwerda and Geurin, 1993, 10-12 and Strikwerda, 1999). What he failed to note is that 
there were efforts to create an international regim, not one aimed at regulating 
emigration of citizens or immigration of aliens, but one trying to regulate the migrant 
trade. As will be argued, understanding that migraton was, in the first place, a trade issue 
helps in locating Shanks’ observation that debates first centered on the fact of whether 
nations had the right to exclude, and later moved to how many to exclude and who? The 
fact that during the last quarter of the nineteenth century the American Federal 
Government usurped the power of local and state authorities over migration issues, 
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through Supreme Court decisions based on the argument that the matter fell under foreign 
commerce, stresses this fact. The majority of laws enacted during this period in all the 
seaboard countries concerned, dealt with the regulation of overseas migrant transport. 
As Zolberg observed it was through these laws that t e US took its first steps to 
control the quantity and quality of migrants (Zolberg, 2003; 2006). Gradually developing 
the means of remote border controls by trying to export inspections to the country of 
origin instead of arrival, an increasing amount of responsibility for these controls were 
put on the shipping companies who brought the migrants. Just like the airlines today, 
shipping companies back than effectuated the initial controls of those trying to enter the 
US. They therefore offer a first hand source of how la s were enforced and the 
consequences thereof. This work answers the call of Erika Lee for the need of refining 
research of US immigration policies for this formative period, which to date has been 
based predominantly on Nativists and Congressional debates and laws ensuing from these 
(Lee, 2006, 7-12).  
Migration researchers have pointed to the big gap between the purported intent 
and the practical effect of legislation, part of which can be explained by the difficulties of 
enforcement (Calavita, 1998, 147). As David Tichenor stated immigration policy can 
only be understood by taking into account the evolving governing institutions regulating 
migration, expert narratives which gained importance during the Progressive Era, global 
pressures and interests group alliances (Tichenor, 2002, 45). By examining the shipping 
industry in these group alliances, new light will be shed on; how the relations shifted, 
creating strange bed-fellow coalitions; the amount of expertise material about 
immigration issues produced during this period; the impact of shipping companies on the 
output and working of the changing governing institutions; and the influences of global 
pressures preceding WOI. Using Adam McKeown’s words, this analysis recognizes that 
“rather than understanding migration and its control in terms of a simple dichotomy 
between states and migrants, we need to envision a much more complex framework of 
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mobility and regulation in which transportation and business play an important and 
overlapping role”.1  
This framework will be reconstructed here on two leve s. Firstly, how did 
shipping companies influence the enactment of American migration and maritime 
regulation? In Europe a growing number of countries started to pass measures directing 
citizens or transmigrants to travel on national lines and stimulate the merchant marine 
under the national flag. As a receiving country, the US was in a privileged position to 
follow the example and revive the ever declining merchant marine- which prior to the 
Civil War had dominated the North Atlantic migrant trade. That they did never while 
nationalists and jingoist feelings were mounting is surprising. How much did the 
increased collaboration between foreign shipping lies controlling the North Atlantic 
passenger trade weigh on American maritime policies? A  Clemens underlined, how 
interest groups organize is equally important as to why (Clemens, 1997, 6). How far did 
the shipping lobby go to protect its main source of revenue, the migrant trade from being 
restricted? Especially towards the turn of the century, an increasing number of 
institutional changes opened up lobbying opportunities for pro- and anti immigration 
restrictionist who fought an intense public debate on the issue. How did shipping 
companies make use of these to prevent, obstruct, delay or amend immigration laws? As 
public opinion became ever more influential, what did they do to mobilize it? Does the 
analysis of the shipping lobby shed more light on Claudia Goldin’s observation that the 
perplexing part of US immigration restriction history is that it took so long to close the 
doors (Goldin, 1994)?  
A second level of analysis brings us from theory to practice by taking a closer 
look at the influence of shipping lines on the enforcement of these laws. How did 
gatekeepers interpret and apply them? To what extent did the opinion of immigrant 
inspectors on the racially loaded debate about desirability of the migrant matter? Did they 
consider migrants from eastern and southern Europe as being white before their arrival, 
being white upon arrival or, as in-betweens? To what extent did shipping companies try 
to reduce the increased tendencies of implementing co trols based on the various degrees 
                                                 
1 Unpublished comment on paper “The Battle for the Migrants: The evolution from port to 
company competition 1840-1914” Feys Torsten, Internatio al conference international conference held in 
Florence, Italy, 18-19 November 2005. 
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of whiteness? Did they offer means to excludables to circumvent the legislation 
prohibiting their entry? What was the impact of the information flow spread by the 
shipping companies about the growing immigration restrictions on the chain migration 
patterns of transatlantic migrants?  
In short the connections between maritime and migration history are embedded in 
social networks, economic interests and political decisions. Only an analysis of all 
aspects can come close of giving a total picture of the impact of steamshipping 
companies on transatlantic migration. After raising so many questions, it is time to get to 
the corpus of the examination; an analysis which is divided in three chronological parts. 
The first part covers the rise of steam shipping on the North-Atlantic from 1840to 1870; 
followed by a section on the formation of shipping cartels between 1870 and 1895; and 
the narrative concludes with the consolidation which took place during the Progressive 
Era from 1896 to1914. 
 
PART 1: State policies and their influence on the connections between 
maritime and migration networks 1830-1870 
 
Chapter I: The competition for the migrant trade in the Hamburg-Le Havre seaport 
range 
 
Transatlantic migrants have strongly relied on existing trade routes to make their 
move to the New World. The paths they used were imbedded in pre-existing commercial 
networks which as restrictions to migrate decreased, embraced this new trade. Merchants 
quickly observed the profitability of human cargo as the first non-colonial mass migration 
movement of Germans to the United States took place in the eighteenth century. They 
used their commercial networks to set up the Redemptioner-system facilitating the move 
of pioneers. These transatlantic networks connecting out-migration with in-migration 
regions -hinterland with foreland- converged in ports where the competition for the 
migrant trade was concentrated. This competition intensified during the nineteenth 
century as the trade gained importance due to increasing migrant flows. Ships on the 
North-Atlantic trade route bringing cotton, tobacco and timber to Europe often headed 
westbound in ballast. Migrants therefore constituted a valuable commodity drawing ships 
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to migrant gateways. As this relocation business attracted other trades, contributing to the 
general development of a port, some authorities started to work out policies to direct 
migrants via certain routes. By contrasting the case of Antwerp with Rotterdam, in the 
broader context of the Hamburg-Le Havre range, the impact of commercial networks on 
the path dependency of migrants, the organization of the transport and the influence of 
government policies will be discussed. 
 
1) Maritime networks and migration: love at first sight 
 
As Canny argued labor demand as such does not suffice to trigger in-migration. 
No major migration movement takes place, until it becomes profitable for the carriers of 
human cargo to make the connection between supply and demand (Mörner, 1992, 277). 
The eighteenth century carriers of Germans and Irish migrants used the improvements in 
shipping technology and management developed for the slave trade. The route of those 
migrants depended on the accessibility of a port, the trade connections from these ports 
and maritime policies of governments involved. The majority of the migrants came from 
southern and western Germany from where the Rhine offered an easy access to the sea. 
The pre-existing business contacts between Rotterdam, London and Philadelphia 
merchants offered a second advantage which allowed Rotterdam merchants to dominate 
the trade, keeping Amsterdam a distant second. As the movement spread to northern and 
eastern Germany, Hamburg positioned itself in the market. Merchant ties between 
Hamburg and England attracted migrants to the Hanseatic city. The English Navigation 
Acts restricting the trade to its colonies to vessels sailing under the national flag and 
obligating ships to call at English ports on their transatlantic run turned London into the 
nodal point for the traffic. 
Initially, the flow of migrants was irregular and was organized in groups. English 
ship-owners relied on information on when and how many migrants were preparing to 
make the move, obtained through English shipping agents in Rotterdam. Based on that 
information, vessels were chartered to call to Rotterdam where the shipping-agent took 
care of fitting and provisioning the ship for the crossing. The agent was also responsible 
to contract the passengers and coordinate their influx at the port according to the arrival 
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of the ship, to limit the transit costs and so as to avoid trouble with the Dutch authorities. 
To avoid destitute migrants from getting stuck at the port and becoming a public charge, 
only passengers with passports and contracts for ocean passage were allowed to enter the 
territory.  For groups a military escort had to be arranged.  
As the flow reached a climax midway through the century the competition for the 
trade intensified. Shipping agents specialized in becoming migrant brokers, diversifying 
their strategies to contract migrants. Their contacts informing them on the supply of 
migrants in the hinterland consisted mainly of boatmen working on the Rhine waterway-
system. These men started to work as go-betweens on a c mmission-basis per passenger 
with the migrant broker. As competition increased, they were joined by an expanding 
network of inland migrant-agents soliciting migrants. Overseas contacts informed the 
broker of so-called ‘newlanders’ on their way to Germany. These returning migrants 
often traveled home for American land-speculators and employers who were aware of 
their enticing influence on chain migration patterns. Migrant brokers also gave 
commissions to these recruiters guiding countrymen to the New World. Furthermore, 
contacts with border agents were used to ensure a smooth transition. The higher numbers 
during the peek years allowed new merchants into the market, despite the growing 
specialization. Some new brokers used Hamburg to avoid both transit obligations and the 
competition of the well-established Rotterdam-networks (Wokeck, 1998, 58-115).  
As a result of the increasing competition the Redemptioner migrant-system 
became dominant. Migrant brokers helped settlers in assisting friends and relatives to join 
them, by accepting payment upon arrival in Philadelphia. The price of the crossing only 
fluctuated between 5 and 8 pounds, yet the services included varied according the 
contract. If money for the ocean passage could not be retrieved from relatives there were 
enough employers who gladly paid the outstanding debt for the newcomer in exchange 
for an agreement of servitude. This system of givin credit for the crossing, by brokers to 
migrants willing to work it off and tying themselves to an employer, reflects the growing 
influence of the foreland on the market. Initially, Charleston, New York and Nova Scotia 
also tried to lure German settlers to populate the surrounding lands. However, 
Rhinelanders’ chain-migration patterns were strongest to Philadelphia because of the 
reputation of work opportunities and the strong commercial networks. More and more of 
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the new arrivals disembarked off the vessels of Philadelphia ship-owners during the 
second half of the eighteenth century. London started to lose its importance as a nodal 
point. The peek years led to a concentration of the business, as illustrated by the Stedman 
agency, the leading migrant brokers in the business. The English brothers climbed the 
ladder from being captains, and than shipping agents in Rotterdam and Philadelphia to 
their becoming the shipowners of seven ships.  
The Redemptioner-system gave more importance to Philadelphia merchants who 
gauged the demand for servitude labor and were responsible in cashing in the deferred 
payment of the passage. The Philadelphian control on the market could also be observed 
in legislation regulating the traffic. Pennsylvanian uthorities imposed stricter regulations 
on space allotment and provisions, improving the traveling conditions for the migrants. In 
the Redemptioner system, healthy migrants were worth more and the increasing cost for 
the transport could be regained through a longer period of servitude. The laws made it 
harder for sometime participants during peak periods to penetrate a highly fluctuating 
market, further enhancing the concentration of the business (Fertig, 1996, 271-290 and 
Wokeck, 1998, 58-115).  
However the German migrant trade never reached the same levels after the Seven 
Year’s War. Transatlantic migrant flows ebbed away s Germans chose Eastern 
destinations over America. Along with the decreasing numbers, the commercial networks 
enabling the move deteriorated because of falling profits. The subsequent American and 
French revolutions completely disrupted the existing maritime and migration networks. 
Rotterdam’s close ties with England had a negative impact on the trade with Philadelphia 
during the American war for Independence. Amsterdam became the port of choice for the 
reduced traffic while Rotterdam redirected its trade relations to southern states which 
offered no prospects for migrants. Trade came to a standstill during the Continental 
Blockade (Van der Valk, 1976, 150-152). The relocation of more than a hundred 
thousand Germans crossing the Atlantic in the eightenth century pioneered the networks 
through which the ninenteenth century exodus took place. Many similar patterns can be 
observed when the movement picked up again; such as expanding migration networks 
imbedded in maritime networks, port competition forthe trade on both sides of the 
Atlantic, increasing concentration of a specializing business and emerging legislation 
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regulating transit and ocean transport which Americans tried to use as a tool of remote 
control. 
 
2) Balancing between a threat for welfare systems to a lucrative commodity 
stimulating trade: early migration policies 
 
 
The end of the Napoleonic Wars ushered in a new era rele sing people from their 
ties to the land, making the subsequent transatlantic exodus possible. One of the 
consequences of this freedom of movement was that it undermined the organization of 
poor relief based on place of birth. Congestion of destitute people was apparent in cities 
and particularly in migration port-cities. Passengers lacking means to complete their 
voyage got stranded and became a public charge. Authorities faced the dilemma of 
facilitating the shipping companies to attract the rade or block the access of migrants to 
prevent them form becoming a public charge. As the migrant trade gained importance, 
some authorities actively collaborated with shipping i terests in harmonizing both aspects 
allowing ports to have an edge on rivals lacking this support.   
 
2.1) The rush to Amsterdam but whereto? 
 
The end of the wars combined with agricultural crisis triggered a new migration 
surge from the Rhinelands. Amsterdam became overflowed with people seeking passage 
to the New World. Yet sailings where very limited. Because of the long waiting periods, 
in Amsterdam many became broke before being able to mbark. Moreover, many had 
arrived with insufficient means, relying on the Redemptioner-system through which half 
to two thirds of the eighteenth Century settlers had made the crossing. However, this 
system was not organized as it used to be when Rotterdam dominated the business. 
Destitute migrants piled up in Amsterdam. The limited supply of ships and the excessive 
demand for berths inflated the cost for transport and thus the periods of servitude. 
Shippers exploited the by situation overcrowding ship  (Grubb, 1994, 803-804; Fouché, 
1992, 143-145; Van der Valk, 1976, 151 and Bade, 1997, 16).  
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While on eighteenth century crossings ships averaging 150 tons had a capacity of 
about three hundred migrants, the ship A ril left Amsterdam with more than thousand 
migrants of whom nearly half did not reach Philadelphia alive (Wokeck, 1998, 78 and 
Handlin, 1973, 50). Other ships also showed unusually high mortality rates (Bade, 2000, 
128).2 This development, combined with rumors of long servitude contracts and of Dutch 
authorities deporting destitute French and Germans across the borders, pushed authorities 
of some German states to call a halt to emigration, while the French tried to prevent the 
departure of nationals without sufficient means. The experience would put an end to the 
use of Dutch ports by German migrants as natural gateways to the New World. It also 
caused the Redemptioner-system in the United States to di appear, because of the rise of 
superior methods of financing the move. With the increasing flow chain-migration 
patterns strengthened allowing the poorest to rely on remittances instead of servitude on 
contracts (Grubb, 1994, 794-824; Fouché, 1992, 19-30; Bade, 2000, 130-134 and Van der 
Valk, 1976, 151). The events also produced indignato  on the other side of the ocean 
leading to the first federal migration law. Immigration was considered a State issue, 
however international trade regulations fell under federal authority. To prevent similar 
tragedies Congress passed an act regulating space allotments and provisions for the 
eastbound leg on all ships landing migrants in American ports. This Passenger Act was 
the first step towards a policy which Zolberg rightly defined as ‘remote border control’. 
By decreasing the capacity, and hence increasing the cost of shipping human freight, 
authorities affected both the quality and quantity of immigration (Zolberg, 2006, 99-122). 
On one hand port competition hindered the implementation of these laws, but on the 
other hand paradoxically it also contributed to its spread. 
The American economic crisis of 1819 to 1822 brought a provisional end to the 
surge. The experience of stranded migrants pushed the Dutch authorities to pass laws to 
avoid a recurrence. The laws of 1828 and 1832 prohibited the entrance of migrants who 
did not have their crossing already paid for. They also needed a passport and a special 
migrant certificate from the Dutch consul. Moreover, all responsibility for the 
maintenance of the migrant, when on Dutch soil, fel on the merchant who arranged the 
                                                 
2 On March 6th 1818 three ships sailed in New Orleans l ding only 597 passengers of the 1100 
who had embarked in Holland (Bade, 2000, 134). 
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crossing. These measures illustrate the main source of oncern of State authorities which 
marked migration policies in the Atlantic World throughout the nineteenth century; 
namely the problem of destitute aliens (Caestecker, 1998, 74-76 and 2003, 122; 
Lucassen, 1996, 241-250; Noiriel, 1988, 74). It is hard to estimate to what the extent to 
which border controls did or had the means to impleent the laws. Yet, Wokeck’s study 
pointed out that even in the eighteenth century migrants were controlled on the 
possession of passage contracts when entering the Netherlands and that the border-agents 
became an integrated part of the network through which migrant brokers contracted their 
passengers. The increased formalities hardly resulted in the developments of alternative 
routes but instead contributed to the spread of the inland migrant-agents consolidating the 
networks through which migrants traveled. However by 1815 these commercial networks 
had disintegrated. The sparse trade relations between Amsterdam and American ports 
were no longer able to support such networks. This time the measures designed to 
prevent destitute migrants from entering its territo y proved an extra incentive to drive 
the flow to rival ports. The Dutch, authorities interested only in the development of 
colonial trades, remained indifferent towards that evolution (Horlings, 1995). Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam would fall out of the developing cotton triangle which helped shape 
ninenteenth-century migrant routes to the United States.  
 
2.2) Le Havre and the cotton triangle 
 
Besides the relocation of Germans from the continen there was a parallel migrant 
movement from the British Isles. Many Irish had moved through similar networks 
directly via Irish ports (Wokeck, 1999, 168-219). In the nineteenth century this 
movement was diverted through English ports, predominantly Liverpool. Across the 
Atlantic the potential of human freight had not gone unnoticed by Boston, New York, 
Philadelphia and Baltimore merchants. They managed to attract an increasing share of 
primary goods from southern states to ship them to European ports from which they 
could tap dry goods and migrants for the return leg (Greenhalgh-Albion, 1939, 94-122). 
Liverpool, Le Havre and Bremen became the principal European axis for this trade route. 
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The freedom of movement of people accompanied by the liberalization of trade made Le 
Havre a migrant gateway.  
A new trade agreement of 1822 between France and the U.S. allowed the French 
port to become the European nodal point for the cotton trade. Coach wagons transporting 
cotton to out-migration regions such as the Elzas and Switzerland picked up migrants on 
their way back to Le Havre. The port had various advantages over its rivals. The crossing 
was shorter, more direct, and ships did not depend on favorable winds to gain access to 
the sea. Also, passport regulations were ill-observed and frequent departures limited the 
waiting periods at the port (Fouché, 1992, 150-151). The innovation of liner shipping 
further decreased transit times. The first experiments of ships leaving at set times, as 
opposed to tramps waiting for a certain amount of cargo, sailed between New York and 
Liverpool in 1818. Due to its success the practice quickly spread to routes where trade 
volume sustained liner shipping (Horan et al, 1982, 0-106). American merchants and 
shipowners dominated the New-York Le Havre trade. American migrant brokers, such as 
Washington Finlay, managed migrant and recruiting-agent networks through which they 
successfully secured passengers from the German hinterland to Le Havre. Finlay quickly 
acquired a dominant position for the German migrant transport via Le Havre using 
aggressive advertising pricing and recruiting policies (Bretting, 1991, 51, 65; Van der 
Valk, 1976, 152).  
Yet the problem of destitute migrants stranding on the French territory worried 
the Minister of the Interior. In 1830 and 1831 circulars were sent to consuls in out-
migration regions and frontier provinces stipulating that migrants heading to the U.S. 
needed to acquire a visa for their passport from a French consul. The visa could only be 
obtained if the applicant possessed 200 florins. This sum was doubled shortly thereafter. 
In 1836 the entrance to French territory was restricted to passengers with a contract for 
ocean passage or with the cash equivalent for the purchase thereof. The lack of border 
control stations hindered the implementation of these laws. Moreover, the network of 
migrant agents provided means to circumvent the regulations by smuggling passengers 
across borders or providing fake passports (Fouché, 1992, 68-72). The lack of French 
laws regulating the ocean transport or preventing migrants from abuse while the measures 
prohibiting entrance of destitute migrants, reflect the meager interest of French 
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authorities in stimulating the migrant-trade. Le Havre migrant brokers met the lack of 
support of the authorities by tightening their networks in the hinterland.  
 
2.3) The rise of Bremen as ‘the’ migrant gateway to the New World  
 
Bremen authorities were the first on the European co tinent to realize the 
importance of the migrant trade and passed laws contributing to its development. The 
early appointment of F. Wichelhausen as American consul in Bremen in 1796, one of the 
first on the European continent, reflected the growing trade relations between the 
Hanseatic city and the United States.3 Yet, the poor accessibility from out-migration 
regions impeded Bremen in competing with rival ports. The restrictive measures in other 
countries and the unstable political situation in France and the Low Countries in the early 
1830s drove the migrants to Bremen (Armgort, 1992, 15-42 and Gelberg, 1973, 10). 
During the previous decade, the control of Bremen merchants on the trade through the 
port reached an absolute low because of the lack of exports. As noted by contemporaries, 
in the exchange trade between two countries, shippers from the country with the larger 
exports had a natural advantage.  
The merchant marine, under the Bremen flag, declined dramatically. Two ships 
out of three left the Hanseatic city in ballast. American ships dropped off rice, sugar, 
coffee and tobacco but called elsewhere for their return load (Engelsing, 1963, 49-79). 
The passage of 3,500 migrants in 1830 had a far reaching impact on the further 
development of Bremen’s commerce. The migrant becam ‘the’ commodity around 
which the shipping industry developed. Aware of the geographic disadvantages, the 
merchant community invested great efforts in establishing tight networks of migrant 
agents to secure the flow from the hinterland. Agencies were opened in Frankfurt, 
Darmstadt, Giessen and further south in Mannheim, Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, Nürnberg, etc. 
to promote Bremen as a migrant gateway, sell passage  nd help the migrants on their 
way. The organization of the migrant business was strictly regulated due to a trade 
situation peculiar to Bremen.  
                                                 
3 Wichelhausen formed a partnership with Buxtorf with whom he managed a shipping line 
providing passenger service to Baltimore. 
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The lack of an industrious hinterland forced Bremen tradesmen to establish 
merchant-ship owner firms managing both trade and transport. The city’s corporate 
economic structures imposed the appointment of elected official brokers, assisting and 
supervising the freighting of ships for which they r ceived small fees regulated by law. 
They were not allowed to act their own initiative, nor to receive commission which led to 
the formation of an outside network of private entrpreneurs recruiting migrants and 
negotiating transport rates. Efforts to block out the entrepreneurs were in vain and pushed 
brokers to engage in extra-legal recruiting activities. In fear of loosing the supervision of 
the trade the authorities legalized the activities of the entrepreneurs who increased their 
grip on the business to the detriment of the brokers (Hoerder, 1993, 74-75 and Prüser, 
1964, 156).  
As a result of the close ties between the authorities and the merchant community 
of the Hanseatic city a progressive legislation rega ding migrant transport was passed in 
1832. The regulations were designed both to protect the city of the burden of destitute 
migrants and to protect the migrant from abuses on their way to the New World. 
Passengers unable to pay for the crossing would be exp lled from the city. To reduce 
waiting periods at the port migrants were encouraged to book their trip in advance. The 
American Passage Act of 1819 was used as an example to regulate the ocean leg of the 
passage. It placed the responsibility of provisioning on shipowners putting an end to the 
practice of self-provisioning. The seaworthiness of ships and provisions were controlled 
by city officials. Finally shipowners needed to carry insurance to refund the passengers in 
case of accidents (Armgort, 1992, 42-44 and Hoerder, 1993, 74).  
Despite making the travel more expensive compared to rival ports it allowed 
Bremen merchants to increase the migrant-flow through the port (see annex 1). The 
visionary merchant community realized the importance of the quality of service and 
reputation of the port. From a collective fund raised by a tax levied per passenger a huge 
advertising campaign with broadsheets, posters and newspapers ads was set up in out-
migration regions pointing to the advantages of Bremen as a migrant gateway. The 
migrant business pioneered the large scale use of nwspapers as an advertising medium. 
Word of mouth publicity was assured by the expanding network of migrant agents using 
sub-agents in small towns, usually people active in public life such as inn-keepers, 
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pastors, grocers (Armgort, 1992, 43). Letters from the New World of satisfied customers 
directed friends and relatives the same way they came (Kamphoefner, et al., 1991). The 
migrant flow through Bremen swelled reaching the 10,00  mark in 1832 and surpassing 
15,000 in 1837. It allowed Bremen merchants to take control over the inbound trades 
from the United States. The migrant business enabled th se tradesmen to quote lower 
rates for freight, mainly tobacco. Bremen quickly became the European capital for the 
tobacco business which; would remain the most important industry of the city and its 
surroundings up to the end of the nineteenth century. By 1840 the trade to the United 
States was controlled by the Bremen flag driving out American ships to rival ports such 
as Le Havre and Antwerp (Engelsing, 1963, 49-76 and Prüser, 1963, 156). 
The metamorphosis of the trade situation in Bremen illustrates the importance of 
the migrant transport on trade routes. Whereas up until that point, migrants ha mainly 
followed established trade routes, trade started to foll w migrant routes. Despite the 
geographical disadvantages and the higher costs of ocean transport the Hanseatic city 
managed to rival Le Havre as the main migrant gatewy to the United States. Bremen 
demonstrated that the choice of migrant route was not o ly based on rational economic 
factors such as lowest cost and shortest or most accessible travel route. The dynamic 
merchant community compensated the poor accessibility with progressive legislation, 
active advertising and recruiting campaigns. They understood the importance of gaining 
the confidence of those who considered taking the plunge to the New World and to 
familiarize them with means to do so. While higher authorities of rival ports feared the 
migrant, Bremen officials embraced them. The early engagement of Bremen merchants 
on the continent gave the port an edge which it would not loose until 1914. Yet the 
success story did not go unnoticed in neighboring ports. 
 
 
3) Coming out of the shadows of the ‘Dam’ ports: the Belgian independence 
and the revival of Antwerp 
  
The first port which tried to challenge the dominant positions in migrant transport 
of Le Havre and Bremen was Antwerp. Belgian authoriies tried to back up their political 
independence with an active economic policy. By establishing trade relations with other 
 37
countries the young nation hoped to create goodwill with other states to consolidate its 
independence. Antwerp which after two and half centuries managed to throw off the yoke 
of Dutch ports obstructing its development, served as nodal point for this purpose.4 
Positioning the port on the blooming North American route was one of the priorities. 
Merchants and authorities were aware of the importance migrant traffic to do this. The 
efforts of the Belgian government to lure migrants to Antwerp will be discussed. The 
success of migrant trade and its influence on migration policies of nationals will also be 
analyzed. 
 
3.1) Positioning Antwerp among the migrant gateways to New World 
 
A Belgian official Désiré Behr reported the following on the migrant transport via 
Bremen: 
 
“We know that Germany sends out thousands of emigrants to America every year. 
The city of Bremen has passed such perfect regulations for the transport of 
emigrants, that only this port organizes these transports. Once arrived in Bremen 
this cargo moves itself without extra costs and it allows the Bremen merchants on 
their way back to ship a variety of goods such as tobacco and cotton at half the 
regular price. As most of the German emigrants come from Westphalia, Thuringia 
and Switzerland it is very likely that they would prefer to travel through Antwerp 
if they would find the same conditions as in Bremen.”5 
 
Various drafts were drawn up, yet it would take another five years before the law 
regulating migrant transport was passed. The existing ones dating back to the Dutch rule 
were abrogated.6 The Bremen and American laws were clearly used as an example. The 
space requirements of two passengers per five tons were taken over from the American 
                                                 
4 The rebellion in the Low Countries against Spain and the subsequent formation of the Republic 
of the Seven United Netherlands led to the closure of the port of Antwerp. Many tradesmen moved to 
Amsterdam contributing to the economic development of the port.  Only under French rule two centuries 
later did the port regain its access to the sea. During the subsequent Dutch rule the interests of Antwerp 
remained subordinate to Dutch ports. The Netherlands refused to recognize Belgium and hindered sailings 
on the Westerscheldt, the port’s access to the North Sea. When signing the XXIV articles, recognizing 
Belgium’s independence, the Dutch preserved the right to levy toll on the Westerscheldt. To enhance the 
trade through Antwerp the Belgian government decided to refund these tolls to all ships except the ones 
navigating under the Dutch flag. (Blom and Lamberts, 1995 120-256). 
5 ABMFA, 2020, Emigration I: 1834-1848, D. Behr, Report on the Migrant Transport through Bremen, April 
5 1838. 
6 These were the ones passed by the Dutch government of 1828, yet they were not rigorously 
implemented. 
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law, while provision requirements for ninety days on the North Atlantic were copied from 
Bremen.7 A commission of city officials was established to control the seaworthiness of 
the ship, provisions, amounts of medicine aboard, accommodations and space allotment 
on the between decks.8 The law was used to set up a broad advertising campaign in 
Germany and Switzerland promoting the advantages of Antwerp as a migrant port. The 
Belgian minister of Foreign Affairs relied on the consular network to distribute the 
advertisement to local newspapers and to migration agents. Consuls also had to assist 
Antwerp ship-owners to establish solid agencies representing them in the area and 
assuring the migrant flow.9   
 The main advantage of Antwerp in securing passengers from the south-western 
German states was the opening of the Iron Rhine connecting Cologne with Antwerp as 
early as 1843. The policy of the authorities stimulating Belgium as an important transit 
country resulted in a dense railroad network, unequalled on the European continent. Prior 
to the opening of the railroad connection migrants used the cheap Rhine waterways to 
Rotterdam from where they were shipped to Antwerp.10 Getting the often voluminous 
luggage of migrants to the port of embarkation posed one of the main problems for the 
inland leg of the trip. The transport was easier via waterways than by coach wagons and 
influenced the choice of migrant routes (Fouché, 1992, 144-156). The Belgian authorities 
obtained the free transport of luggage from the railro d company and used the opening of 
the Iron Rhine to launch a new advertising campaign promoting Antwerp as a migrant 
gateway.11 It was the first port to be directly connected by railroad. Yet despite the efforts 
the flow through Antwerp declined.12  
Besides Antwerp, Rotterdam (see below) and Hamburg had renewed their interest 
in the trade. Initially, Hamburg had opposed the trade passing a law in 1832 blocking the 
entry of migrants to the port. Trade relations were centered upon Britain; hence traffic on 
the North Atlantic was sparse. The success of the neighboring Hanseatic city caused a 
                                                 
7 The laws applied to all long distance routes yet provisions varied according to the estimated 
traveling time. 
8 Pasionomie, law number 271, March 14 1843, p. 257.
9 ABMFA, 2020, Emigration I: 1834-1848, Letter of Consul M. Muhlens to Minister of Foreign Affaires, 12-
4-1843. 
10 Ibid, Letter of the Antwerp Chamber of Commerce to Minister of Foreign Affaires, 10-6-1843. 
11 Ibid,, Nachricht fur Auswanderer nach Amerika, Consul M. Muhlens, February 1844.  
12 Ibid,, Letter of Minster of Public Works to Minister of the Interio June 25 1845. 
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policy change. Hamburg ships started to call at Bremen to load migrants on their way to 
Britain (Walker, 1965, 88-89). The Irish and English migration generated great profits for 
ships operating between Britain and the U.S. Through feeder services from the continent 
British ports tried to attract part of the continental flow at lower rates, to maximize their 
capacity. The strong trade relations with Hamburg established an indirect migration 
pattern which would persist throughout the nineteenth century, to the great annoyance of 
Hamburg shippers opening direct routes to the United States. Hamburg passed legislation 
based on the Bremen model which applied only to ships sailing directly to the United 
States. Yet these were ill-observed. Migrants traveling indirectly through Hull and 
Liverpool, on the whole were exempted of these regulations. It gave the port a bad 
reputation as migrant gateway to the New World. Early 1840’s attempts to enforce the 
laws were opposed by shippers who believed that regulations undermined rather than 
stimulated the competitive position of the port. Instead, the mercantile section of the 
Hamburg Patriotic Society established a bureau to inf rm and protect migrants. The 
society planned to open branch offices inland and at popular destinations. It gathered and 
spread information of migrants abroad and on the opportunities to assist prospective 
travelers in choosing their destination. The society assisted the migrant with the 
expedition protecting him from abuse on his way to the New World.13 But the poor 
results pushed the Senate, midway through the decade, to pass and enforce regulations 
conforming to Bremen’s. Subsequently, the migration fever swelled and spread to 
Hamburg’s North and East German hinterland allowing the city to catch up with its rivals 
(Walker, 1965, 92 and Gelberg, 1973, 10-13). 
 
3.2) Increased efforts of the Belgian government to remain competitive 
 
 The intensified competition for the trade was met by increasing efforts of the 
Belgian government to promote Antwerp. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs appointed a 
special commission investigating the decline of 1844 and proposing measures to increase 
migration through Antwerp. The report reflects the various factors which influenced 
                                                 
13 If they actually did, remains uncertain. Ibid, Letter of the Hamburg Consul to the Minister of Freign 
Affaires June 28 1842. 
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migrant flows. First strong winds had hindered the access of Antwerp in April and May 
diverting American ships to Rotterdam and Le Havre whereto migrants needed to be 
forwarded. Second, a proposal to increase tariffs drove away a number of American ships 
bringing in tobacco and designed to take migrants o their way back. A third factor was 
the high death rates in the Belgian colony of Santo Thomas de Guatemala. Many 
colonists came from Germany and the event received wide coverage in the German press 
(Walker, 1965, 81). Rival migrant agents used the ev nt to advice against migrating 
through Belgium. Fourth, Bremen had built up an impressive fleet conceived of for the 
transport of migrants while Rotterdam’s connection t  the Rhine-waterways provided a 
cheap connection to the hinterland. To compete with the Iron Rhine Dutch steam-
shipping companies on the Rhine lowered their fares to Rotterdam.14 Many Antwerp-
passengers still used the waterways through Rotterdam, from where local agents often 
convinced them to leave from there. The regulations protecting the migrant received 
praise, yet a too strict an application of these rul s unnecessarily increased the costs; 
which at the time, came to 110 franks including food. The commission recommended 
giving shippers possibility of adapting the food supplies to the taste of the migrants, and 
that the quantity during spring and summer was being reduced from ninety to seventy 
five days.15 They suggested relaxing passport controls of the mariti e policy. Passports 
cost ten to twelve franks and many did not bother to acquire one.16 Infrastructure to 
handle the baggage at the port had to be improved. Cheaper accommodation at the port 
needed to be provided in a building designated by the community council. The authorities 
were advised to appoint an emigration inspector protecting migrants from abuses at the 
                                                 
14 Dutch companies offered transportation from Mayence to Rotterdam for two thalers. ABMFA, 
2020, Emigration I: 1834-1848, Letter of Minster of Public Works to Minister of the Interior June 25 1845. 
15 The Antwerp chamber of commerce pleaded to substitte rice, beans and peas by biscuit rusk, 
and potatoes, a diet which Germans are much more familiar with. The strict regulations brought the cost f 
provision at 40 franks which according the Chamber was much more than other ports. The cost of the berth 
on ships leaving on a fixed date was between 70 and 80 franks that year. In 1842 eighty franks was quoted. 
Ibid., Letter of Antwerp chamber of commerce to Ministry of F reign Affaires August 17 1842. 
16 The maritime policy refuted the claim that they required a passport from all migrants on which 
they put a visa before embarkation. The police saidto also accept birth certificates or any kind of official 
certificates. Three fourths of the migrants had no passports according to them. Ibid., Letter of the maritime 
police to Ministry of Foreign Affaires January 28 146. 
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port. Finally the cost for direct access to the port had to be reduced to prevent the 
migrants from passing through Rotterdam.17 
These events exemplify the aspects on which the competition for the migrant 
trade centered; port infrastructure and technological evolution, trade and migration 
policies, cost of inland and ocean transport, transit facilities and accessibility to the port, 
and the quality of service and reputation of the port. The developing transatlantic steam-
shipping could put an end to the dependency on winds to sail in and out of Antwerp. 
Simultaneously, the tonnage of ships was rapidly increasing forcing ports to adapt their 
infrastructure accordingly. The period is also marked by the liberalization of trade. The 
Congress of Vienna with the abolition of slave trade and the new tradition of diplomatic 
consultation created an international regime stimulating cooperation, free trade, economic 
integration and international migration (Strikwerda, 1999, 374-375). The transition from 
protectionism to free trade triggered numerous negotiati ns regarding trade and 
navigation treaties. Speculations on the outcome of these negotiations, as in 1844 and 
1845 often temporarily influenced trade routes and hence migration routes (Laurent, 
1965, 951). The price competition seemed to have brought down the basic rate for a berth 
to 80 franks excluding provisions, sleeping and cooking utensils. Shippers feared strict 
application of measures regulating migrant transport increasing the cost or hindering the 
transit of migration such as the ones regarding provisi ns and passports mentioned above. 
It is impossible to measure to which extent the laws where applied, and ship-owners and 
migrant brokers quickly found means to circumvent them. This often occurred with the 
consent of the authorities to protect the competitiv  position of the port (Spelkens, 1976, 
83-101). The competition also moved to the inland transport. To counter Rotterdam 
authorities obtained  a thirty percent reduction of the ‘Cologne Steamship Company’ for 
migrants heading to Antwerp On top of free transportation of luggage, migrants using the 
Iron Rhine also received a thirty percent reduction on the fare- which little later was set at 
fifty percent for migrants traveling in groups.18 The expanding railroad network and 
decreasing costs stimulated the direct access of Antwerp.  
                                                 
17 Ibid., Letter of the Minister of Foreign Affaires to the governor of Antwerp January 30 1846. 
18 The thirty percent reductions were introduced end of November 1844. Dutch companies offered 
transportation from Mayence to Rotterdam for two thalers or 7,50 franks. The travel with steamboats from 
Mayence to Cologne cost 5,75 franks plus 10,50 franks for the railroad leg to Antwerp totaling 16,25 
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Finally, the frequent advertising campaigns illustrate the importance of the 
information on and reputation of the port. The Belgian authorities used the consular 
network to promote Antwerp in foreign out-migration regions, mainly the German 
hinterland. All kinds of excuses varying from annoucing sailing dates, new legislation, 
the opening of railroad connections or special migrant fares were used to advertise the 
Belgian migrant route. Consuls were asked to keep an eye out for negative publicity 
appearing in the German press, such as reports on migrant abuses, shipwrecks or as 
mentioned above the failed attempt of the Belgian authorities to establish a colony in 
Santo Thomas de Guatemala. These smear campaigns were viewed as attempts by the 
German authorities to direct their nationals to Bremen and Hamburg. Consuls refuted 
rumors on mistreatment of migrants in Antwerp and eforced these claims with a broad 
publicity campaign announcing the appointment of an official emigration inspector. The 
government inspector had to protect migrants, provide them with information and handle 
their complaints (Maesens, 1978, 33). This reputation not only needed to be defended in 
Europe but also overseas. The New York Consul Henri Mali advertised the Belgian 
legislation, reductions on the Iron Rhine etc. in the American press.19 Francis Thompson, 
one of the first migrant brokers in New York enabled immigrants settled in the U.S. to 
transfer funds to friends and relatives to follow in their footsteps. The potential of chain 
migration patterns was quickly observed by migrant brokers overseas. They pioneered 
what would later develop in the sale of prepaid tickets by an expansive network of 
migrant agents across the U.S. (Greenhalgh-Albion, 1939, 339-340). Promoting Antwerp 
in the U.S. served to create goodwill with American uthorities and to convince 
immigrants to guide friends and relatives through the Belgian port. The efforts of the 
government paid off, increasing both migration rates and the maritime traffic on the 
North Atlantic (Veraghtert, 1977, LXI). 
 
4) The economic crisis and assisted migration through Antwerp 
 
                                                                                                                                      
franks. The commission urged to bring it down to 11 franks to make an end to indirect migration through 
Rotterdam.  ABMFA, 2020, Emigration I: 1834-1848, Letter of Minster of Public Works to Minister of the 
Interior June 25 1845. 
19 Ibid., Letter of Minister of Foreign Affaires to H. Mali, January 30 1844. 
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 By the time Europe was hit by the economic crisis midway the 1840’s well-
established competing networks assisting people to rel cate overseas were operative. 
Yearly arrivals in the United States quadrupled during the decade 1845-1855, in 
comparison to the previous decade with averages going from 76,675 to 309,572 (Willcox, 
1929, 399). Authorities weighed down by a growing population depending on poor relief 
started using the networks as a security valve. On the other side of the Atlantic land-
speculators, railroad companies and some state authorities sought people to cultivate their 
lands. The growing competition to populate the lands moved from the United States to 
the European continent, from where migrants were dir cted and actively recruited. In the 
wake of this movement numerous philanthropic organizations were founded claiming to 
defend the migrants’ interest, yet often with a profit motive. The share of migrants 
receiving direct assistance of recruiting agents and state authorities remained relatively 
low. Yet their impact on bringing Europe and the UScloser in the mental maps of 
Europeans, through the spread of information and reopening the migrating possibilities to 
all sections of the population, can not be overlooked. The Belgian case is used here to 
analyze the repercussions of the economic crisis and the increasing migration movement 
on migrant policies and migrant transport.20  
 
4.1) New Flanders as a security valve for ‘Old’ Flanders: the foundation of 
agricultural colonies  with government support 
  
With the economic crisis the problem of destitute migrants getting stranded on 
their way reemerged. The Prussian government asked the Belgian authorities to take 
measures preventing Germans with insufficient means from crossing the borders.21 They 
copied the procedures used by the French government requiring the possession of 200 
                                                 
20 Many opinions about migration in Belgium were also circulating in Germany where the debate 
was obviously much more prominent given the high numbers moving overseas. As in Belgium, the debate 
centered on whether restrictive, encouraging or non-i tervention policies had to be adopted. The increasing 
number of philanthropic organizations concerned with the movement held a big conference end of 1848 
successfully lobbying with the authorities to expand the programs of assisted migration or at least to 
facilitate the movement. Yet Prussia’s efforts to capitalize on the national sentiment through the Union 
scheme after the collapse of the Frankfurt Parliament r sulted in renewed attention for migration. Prussia’s 
intention to control and even restrict the movement was successfully opposed by the Hanseatic cities who 
vigorously defended their interest in migrant trade (Walker, 1965, 103-178). 
21 ABMFA, 2020, Emigration I: 1834-1848; Letter of Prussian envoy to the minister of Foreign 
Affaires January 10 1847. 
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franks by all Germans traveling through to Antwerp.22 The authorities were immediately 
submerged by complaints of migrant brokers and ship-owners. The Antwerp Chamber of 
Commerce was outraged by the lack of communication about the measure, hearing about 
it through the German press and its disruptive effect on the migrant trade. Especially 
because:  
“Often contracts between migrant brokers at the port and German migrant agents or 
communities stipulate that the payment for transportati n is to be carried out on 
installment, not by the emigrant but by the communities, agents or another designated 
third party. Such contracts which have been concluded for thousands of emigrants are 
now under review. It is impossible for the communities to give the sum to the 
emigrant because frequently they still need to sell th  migrant’s possessions to cover 
part of the cost. We would like to remind that these shippings stimulate our maritime 
trade and relations with transatlantic countries. That they multiply export possibilities 
to the advantage of our national industry, procuring a  outbound cargo for ships using 
our port these shippings lower the incoming freight rates of cotton, tobacco, cereals 
and other products. Furthermore, each migrant stays on average 5 to 6 days spending 
about seventy franks on provisions, lodging, utensils, etc. which times 13.000 for 
1846 gives the lump sum of 910,000 franks. If the berth rate is added, which at 
present amounts to eighty franks and whereto the national marine takes an important 
part, the business yields a profit of 1,950,000 franks. Tolls and taxes collected on 
ships involved in the traffic surpassed one million franks. Also despite the reduction 
the railroads are benefiting from the trade. Our trade relations with the United States 
have already increased to such extent thanks to the passage of emigrants that the 
government no longer considers the premiums favoring the navigation line to the 
United States to be needed. Moreover, only a very limited number were sent back.23”  
 
On the day of the receiving of the letter the measures were repealed while migrant 
brokers stood as surety for the crossing.24 Even if the ‘thousands’ mentioned by the 
Chamber of Commerce were likely to have been exagger ted to speed up prompt action, 
the letter illustrates how migration networks adapted o the needs of communities in 
assisting community members to relocate and this reconfirms the importance of migrant 
transportation for trade in general. This German practice stimulated the Belgian 
authorities to use the migration networks as a security valve for a growing and 
impoverished population. 
                                                 
22 Ibid., Letter of the Minister of Justice to the Minister of Foreign Affaires February 13 1847. 
23 Ibid., Reports of the Antwerp Chamber of Commerce to the Minister of Foreign Affaires January 
14 and March 6 1847. 
24 Ibid, Letters of the Minister of Foreign Affaires to the Minister of Justice March 8 and May 12 
1847. 
 45
 Yet, the fiasco of Santo Thomas de Guatemala had planted some doubts regarding 
direct intervention of authorities on emigration. The colony had been established to 
stimulate trade and to increase the political influence through territorial expansion 
backing up the ‘raison d’être’ of the young nation. Mis-management and high death rates 
left the Belgian government with a financial hangover and a blackened reputation 
(Schepens, 1976, 86-92; Stols, 1999, 234 and van den Bosche, 1997, 1-12).25 The public 
and parliamentary debates were divided between the beli f that the State always had to 
take care of its nationals, considering every migrant s a loss for the military- and 
workforce, while the Malthusian idea of overpopulation was gaining ground. As a report 
on the crisis which predominantly hit the Flemish countryside demonstrated provinces 
with the highest population density, Brabant and West-Flanders, had a ratio of one out of 
every 4.86 inhabitants and one out of 3.87 who depended on charity support. The 
province of Luxemburg, which had the lowest population density, had a ratio of one out 
of every 70.26 Exporting part of the population offered a security valve and opened ways 
of enhancing trade relations by using migrants as ambassadors and as consumers of 
Belgian products abroad.  
Politicians favoring migration envied the successful Irish and especially German 
flow passing through Antwerp, using them as example to convince opponents.27 The 
crisis over which two governments fell in as many years, called for pressing action. The 
government financed new attempts to establish colonies. Demographic motives, now 
having the upper-hand over political or economic motives, influenced both the choice of 
location as well as the kind of colony. The authorities intended to set up an exemplary 
self-sufficient agricultural colony which would stimulate local authorities and charity 
                                                 
25 This failure was mainly caused by: the hesitation of the administration of the colony weather to 
organise the settlement as an agricultural colony or as a trading company; the poor choice of the colonists; 
the many colonists who committed a breach of contract; the interference of king Leopold I in the 
appointment of the administration; the presence of Belgian militaries and the mutual distrust with the 
Guatemalan authorities. In 1845 and 1846 the death 211 out of 871 colonists in eighteen months scared off 
many Belgians for emigration.  
26 ABMFA., Emigration, 2946, III, Renseignements et documents fourni à la commission du 
travail 1886, Letter of Minister of Foreign Affaires to the  provincial governors 1847. 
27 For the parlementary debates see : Chambre de Représentants, Compte rendu de l'emploi du 
crédit extraordinaire de 1.000 000 ouvert au département de l'intérieur par la loi du 21/6/1849 séance du 
5/2/1852, (Bruxelles, 1852) and Annales parlementaires, Chambre de représentants, séance du 15-2-1845, 
p. 814-816 séance du, 31/5/1849 pp. 1522-1585 et séance du 9/5/1854,  Bruxelles, pp. 1652-1660. The 
contemporary literature reflect the different views about migration : (Cartuyvels, 1850 ; De Ham, 1849; 
Hansen, 1849; Vander Streaten-Ponthoz, 1847). 
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institutions to invest in similar projects as an alternative for the existing poor relief. The 
experience in Santo Thomas convinced initiators to ch ose a location with a similar 
climate as in Belgium, which based on the report of Auguste Van der Straeten-Ponthoz, 
fell on the United States (Feys, 2003, 10-43 and 2004, 203-204). 
The Belgian official, Van der Straeten, was in 1844 sent on an exploratory 
mission to investigate the matter of emigration to the United States, and to examine the 
opportunities the country offered for Belgian trade.28 Forty years later his report would 
still be quoted in Belgium as ‘the’ point of referenc  on the opportunities in the US. It 
was also used for propaganda abroad, in Germany and the Netherlands. Scholte translated 
the paper into Dutch and published the report for the attention of potential migrants in the 
Netherlands. Kollman did the same in Germany (Feys, 2003, 5-9; Stokvis, 1977, 126 and 
van der Straeten-Ponthoz, 1846, De Smet, 1959, 164).29 Reliable information was crucial 
for the migrant’s success and authorities recognised th  need to provide alternatives to 
the often biased information circulating in Europe through migrant agents, philanthropic 
organizations, recruiting agents for railroads or land-speculators etc. Even letters from 
immigrants were sometimes forged, the so-called bacon-letters, which were used to 
influence migrant decisions (Thielemans, 1999, 131).  
The exploratory mission complemented the consular reports and provided the 
Antwerp emigration inspector and the Ministry of Foreign Affaires with trustworthy 
information which was transferred to anyone soliciting for it. Based on the information 
which was emassed the authorities subsidized two colonies, one called New Flanders in 
Sainte-Marie, Pennsylvania and another in Kansas, Missouri. New Flanders was 
                                                 
28 The five main questions that needed to be investigated underline the purpose of the mission: (1) 
what advantages does the American government offer t  attract emigrants? (2) How are the colonists doing 
that settle in the country and what are their moral and material condition? (3) Where did they settle?  Why? 
What is the influence on the trade relations between th  country of emigration and immigration? Do the
emigrants still have ties with their home country? What are the consequences for commerce? (4) What is 
the best place for Belgian emigrants to settle for their own good and for the good of the trade relations 
between Belgium and the United States? (5) In what ay does the Belgian government need to intervene in 
Belgium and in America? Could the government in collaboration with the American government, regulate 
the emigration to protect the emigrants and to make this movement as efficient as possible? ABMFA, 
Emigration, 2020, I, Emigration 1834-1848, Letter from the Ministor of Foreign Affaires to 
Vanderstraeten-Ponthoz April 15 1844, 
29 The original publication was called: “Recherches sur la situations des émigrants aux Etats-Unis 
de l’Amérique du Nord” (Meline, Bruxelles, 1846). Translated in German by Fr. Osswald Forschungen 
über die Lage der Auswanderer in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nord-Amerika (Kollmann, Ausburg, 1846); 
in Dutch by Scholte Onderzoek naar den toestand der Landverhuizersin de Verenigde Staaten van Noord-
Amerika (Van Heyningen, Utrecht, 1847). 
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established in collaboration with the ‘American Association for the Colonisation of 
Sainte-Marie’ one of the many ‘philanthropic’ associations seeking buyers and cultivators 
for their lands.30 A government official, Victor De Ham, headed the project leading fifty 
nine volunteers who had previously depended on poor relief in their community. The 
volunteers signed a contract binding them to cultivate the lands and to contribute to the 
development of the colony for three years. In exchange, transport costs and all the 
necessary materials for the cultivation of the lands were provided for. Every year, groups 
of fifty colonists would be sent to the New Flanders by the government. A similar 
arrangement was made with Maguis Guinotte & Co who managed the colony in Kansas. 
Emigration Inspector Thielens helped to arrange transport (Feys, 2003, 28-54 and 2004, 
204-210). Contracts binding the migrants to periods f ervitude significamtly resembled 
the eighteenth century Redemptioner-system and the subsequent padrone-system. Yet 
these contracts had no legal leg standing in the US which placed colonisation associations 
in a vulnerable position in terms of breach of contract.31 Colonists took advantage of the 
fierce competition among land-speculators to move to where better conditions were 
offered. Hence, the subsistence of such colonies depended greatly on the ability to tie 
pioneers to the lands, hoping that their success would trigger chain migration patterns. 
The Belgian attempts failed to do so and forced the government to give up on the idea of 
establishing agricultural colonies.  
 
4.2) Giving beggars criminals and ex-convicts a fresh start in America 
 
This however did not put an end to assisted migration by Belgian authorities. The 
Antwerp governor Theodor Teichmann, the emigration inspector Jean-François Thielens 
and the biggest migrant broker of the port Adolphe Strauss set up a network which 
assisted beggars, ex-convicts and convicts in migratin . During the economic crisis 
beggar workhouses for beggars became overcrowded. These institutions detained people 
who had been charged with being vagabonds or for begging and being a burden on their 
                                                 
30 German and Irish had already settled on the colony’s territory in which a Belgian priest, J 
Cartuyvels had some interests.  
31 In the Redemptionist-system state authorities regist red the contracts providing a legal 
framework which protected both employers as migrants (Grubb, 1994, 797). Subsequent assisted 
movements were isolated and never reached the same scale or organization.  
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community. Not surprisingly, the Community Council of Antwerp pioneered the 
alternative strategy of paying for the ocean crossing to the United States (Boumans 1963, 
470-504 and Feys, 2004, 211-219). The governor Teichmann quickly tried to convince all 
communities, in his province, to follow the example: 
“By sending detainees of beggar workhouses, the community gets rid of miserable 
individuals who inevitably would have spread the begging to their families. The 
community offers them a new chance for a better future and to get new morals in 
a country where the salary is much higher and where the immigrant escapes from 
the shame of his past and the influence of his disruptive companions. The 
crossing, food included, costs on average between 160fr. and 180fr. per adult, 
which is only a bit more than the price of confinement for one year. This sum also 
includes the expenses for the equipment and some pocket money to get through 
the first days of their stay in the United States. The emigration inspector Thielens 
has already sent you a brochure. He keeps an eye on the embarkation of the 
beggars. Only moments after their liberation beggars et convicted again to be 
sent once more to the beggar workhouse which they consider to be a permanent 
shelter. In case of interest the communities can get dir ctly in touch with mister 
Thielens.”32 
 
The reaction of the communities varied; some needed to be reminded that the candidates 
had to volunteer, while others expressed the concern of whether they would be better off 
overseas. This concern was not totally unfounded considering their history as destitutes 
and the limited resources they were provided with in making a fresh start, consisting of: 
“a shirt, two pairs of socks, two handkerchiefs, a pair of pants, a pair of shoes, a hat, a 
cardigan, a towel, a suitcase, a brush, a comb, smoking tobacco and pipes, chewing 
tobacco, Dutch gin, white soap, cooking materials, straw mattress, pillow, blanket and 
15fr. pocket money.”33 All communities eventually corroborated. When the request came 
from a detainee whose community of residence could not be traced back, the Minsitry of 
Justice financed the move and sometimes these were forwarded to Sainte-Mary. The 
intervention of the national authorities spread thepractice to other provinces of the 
country.  
The system was even extended to exconvicts and somecri inals were pardoned 
on the condition of going overseas. The Committee for After-care and Resettlement of 
                                                 
32 PRA, Provinciaal Bestuur, Bedelaarsgestichten, 78, I, Emigratie 1850-1855. Letter from 
Teichmann to the administration of Turnhout. 
33 Ibid., Contract signed by J. Veezen, Charles Vasteneer, x, x, x, and x December 27 1850. 
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freed Prisoners assisted exconvicts in reintegrating into society by finding work for them. 
The Committee put some to work as sailors on boats le ving from Antwerp (Boumans, 
1965, 485). Therefore, it was only a small step to finance the move of exconvicts to the 
US, just like they Belgian authorities did with beggars. The Minister of Justice, Tesch 
provided everyone with a passport and a special certifi ate which masked their history of 
incarceration. Everything needed to be done in great s crecy. Teichmann handled the 
correspondence with the communities, while the emigration inspector Thielens who had 
worked for the governor as Cabinet’s Secretary arranged practical details. Most of the 
750 registered beggars, ex-convicts and convicts who migrated this way between 1850 
and 1856 did so through Adolphe Strauss. The most dominant migrant broker in Antwerp 
even signed an exclusivity contract with Thielens for these movements, in exchange for a 
fixed price of 180 franks- eighty for the berth, forty for provisions and sixty for the 
equipment.34 For the poorest communities Thielens and Strauss made special 
arrangement to get beggars positions as sailors. The costs in outfitting the beggar with the 
necessary sailor materials only amounted to 115 franks. Returns were unlikely since no 
steerage berths were available for the eastbound leg, and cabin berths cost about 500 
franks.35 Only two percent ever returned. Thielens and Strauss built a strong relationship 
which lasted nearly thirty years. The task of the Emigration Inspector was to inform and 
to protect the migrant, yet his close relations with Strauss suggest that he also had 
financial interests in business. 
Assisted relocation shows how the networks through which transatlantic migrants 
moved expanded and became increasingly complex. The organization of the transport 
centered in the hands of migrant brokers at the port of embarkation – a move which 
became increasingly institutionalized as the authorities’ concern for the wellbeing of the 
migrant, but more especially for the trade it generated, grew. The Belgian case illustrates 
that increasing contacts between migrant brokers and authorities did not limit itself to 
adapting policies according to the needs of the busines . Antwerp migrant brokers drew 
migrants from the hinterland, in collaboration with local German authorities, who paid 
                                                 
34 During the rush in 1854 prises seemed to have goneup a bit, while sometimes communities paid 
extra for inland travel in the United States.  
35 PRA, Provinciaal Bestuur, Bedelaarsgestichten, 78, I, Emigratie, 1850-1855, Letter of Thielens 
to Teichmann. 
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for the crossing of their poorest in installments. I  inspired the Belgian government to 
follow suit. Through the Emigration Inspector Thielens local and national authorities 
were directly connected to the networks sending passengers overseas. Thielens was also 
responsible for gathering and distributing information on migration opportunities, in 
which he was assisted by official exploratory mission  and consuls. Bremen and 
Hamburg copied Antwerp by appointing a government ispector with similar 
responsibilities (Gelberg, 1973, 12-13).36 The networks through which migrants moved 
expanded but not only in Europe. Maritime routes are lways the result of interplay 
between hinter- and foreland. In the case of the transatlantic migrant transport this 
foreland had an important impact on who migrated an how. 
 
 5) New York as ‘the’ nodal point for the American Foreland 
 
 While in Europe ports competed in sending over migrants, competition to receive 
the migrants occurred in the United States between the Atlantic ports of Boston, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore and New York. The Erie Canal provided New York with the best 
connections to the interior, which were complemented with extending railroad networks 
such as the ‘Erie Railroad Co’ and the ‘New York Central Railroad Co’ and coastal 
shipping. As James Bennett, the owner of the New York Herald, the city’s biggest 
newspaper underlined, infrastructure and technological innovation were key elements in 
maintaining an edge over rival ports. He advocated th  development of railroad networks 
and from 1836 onwards he pressed for New York to become the American terminus of 
transatlantic steamship lines. 
Yet, of equal importance was the port’s development as a financial capital of the 
country, allowing New York merchants to gain control of the eastbound trades. In a 
system where New York financers bought, for example, cotton before it was planted or 
flour before it was milled American planters and farmers were placed in a chronic state of 
debt. Financers collected interests in return and directed a big share of the American 
export to the port. The money they advanced also attracted the nations’ storekeepers to 
New York, where they replenished their stocks with imports and domestic products. By 
                                                 
36The information bureaus in both Hanseatic cities opened in 1851. 
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controlling these trades traffic to the port increas d and so did the migrant flow arriving 
in New York. Prior to the Civil War more than two-thirds of the migrants landed in New 
York, keeping rival ports a distant second (Greenhalgh-Albion, 1939, 94 and Crouthamel, 
1989, 92). Due to the importance of the migrant trade on the North Atlantic, the financers 
tried to gain control of the networks supplying this ‘commodity’. The lack of this control 
had driven large parts of the tobacco business into the hands of Bremen tradesmen 
(Engelsing, 1963, 66-76). This explains why American migrant brokers, such as Finlay in 
Le Havre, established themselves in Europe. But, contracting ocean transport for 
migrants was not limited to the European continent. Wi h the growing migrant stock in 
the U.S. an increased number made the crossing throug  remittances sent from the New 
World. This demand resulted in a new market of prepaid tickets -these were bought in the 
United States allowing family members or acquaintances to join settled migrants. Land-
speculators, employers, railroad companies, state authorities etc. tried to direct the new 
arrivals according to their needs. The competition among them spread to the European 
continent through the transport networks. The increasing migrant flow involved a 
growing number of regulations and opened up the debate as to whether it should be 
restricted or not. The intensifying competition forthe migrant trade, which expanded to 
the other side of the Atlantic as the American migration legislation developed, will now 
be discussed.   
 
5.1) Chain-migration patterns and transport networks 
 
The failures of ‘Santo Thomas’, ‘New Flanders’ and ‘Kansas’ pushed the 
government into a non-intervention policy regarding emigration of nationals, limiting its 
role to informing the population of opportunities. The unsubsidized migration movement 
from the provinces Brabant and Namur to Wisconsin st mulated the decision. The 
population increase, and the scarcity of land and augmenting rents, meant that more than 
of the population in the area dependent on poor relief.  A local reverend initiated a 
movement by organizing a collection to fund the crossing of ten families. State 
authorities in Wisconsin offered lands at very low rates to attract future taxpayers. To 
stimulate these efforts the authorities appointed immigration officials in New York to 
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convince new arrivals of the advantages of Wisconsin (Krabbendam, 2006, 59). The 
letters sent home about cheap and abundant lands, which could be bought on credit, were 
read with immense levels of interest. The subsequent chain migration attracted all sorts of 
interested parties. The emigration inspector Thielens and migrant broker Strauss set up a 
promotional campaign for Wisconsin in order to profit from the move. The American 
Association for Property and Land financed the return of a pioneer who would convince 
fellow villagers to settle on the lands. The pioneer, Streyckmans, received a commission 
per migrant; for whom the cost of the ocean crossing, as organized by Strauss would be 
advanced by the association. The recruiting agent easily found two hundred and fifty 
volunteers. In the wake of the pioneers a total of approximately 10,000 people relocated 
to Wisconsin between 1852 and 1857 (Thielemans 1998 23-137; De Smet 1957, 24-25; 
Ducat et al, 1986).  
This movement exemplifies various influences which steered migration. The 
sociological approach within migration history has put forward chain-migration patterns 
as principal causative for migrant flows. According to the theory, personal decision to 
migrate was predominantly taken within the family-sphere. Previously settled villagers, 
local acquaintances or family-members were the main source of information in 
instigating the departures. These individuals often advanced the money for the crossing, 
and provided new arrivals with a provisional place to stay and helped them to find work. 
This theory stresses the importance of the foreland or countries of destination on the path 
dependency of migrants. Yet what sociologists have f il d to acknowledge is that chain-
migration patterns were built around commercial networks which originated from the 
profitability of migrant transport. Because of the fi rce competition for this lucrative 
trade these networks expanded and adapted quickly to stimulate and meet the needs of the 
demand. All interested parties concerning migration were eventually connected through 
these networks which helped in shaping chain-migration patterns. The unassisted and 
largely successful Belgian migration wave to Wisconsin contrasts with the subsidized 
failures of New Flanders and Kansas. American land-speculators sent over agents to 
Europe, to direct and to even advance the cost of the transport binding customers, a 
practice which was commonly used by American businessmen in other trades. But, tying 
migrants in the ‘land of the free’ where the competition to populate property was fierce 
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proved a difficult challenge. Most of the migrants traveled outside the networks of 
government and land-speculators’ assistance and a growing number settled in cities rather 
than in the countryside. However, migrants using the assistance of family, acquaintances, 
governments, land-speculators, employers, etc. or traveling on their own initiative all had 
to pass directly or indirectly through the migrant broker at some stage. This privileged 
position allowed migrant brokers to use the various actors to their advantage. Their inside 
position in the market enabled them to quickly adapt the means of traveling to the 
changing needs of the demand. As the business became specialized an increasing amount 
of services were offered through the migrant-agent n twork, greatly facilitating the move. 
How migrant brokers developed means to stimulate new market opportunities, has 
already been illustrated with their efforts to facilitate and encourage communities 
assisting their poorest to the New World. They did the same to enhance chain-migration 
patterns. The ‘Bielefeld’ letter collection, a valuble source in uncovering the dynamics 
of chain-migration, shows that transfers occurred in both directions- underlining the fact 
that it was not only the poor who migrated (Kamphoefner et. al., 1991). Initially, the 
immigrants only way of financing the crossing for smeone joining them was by giving 
the money to people who were traveling to Europe- often shippers or captains or by 
transferring the money through banks. The banking business generated by mass-
migration remains an unexplored field, yet research indicates, that the system of 
remittances put an end to the Redemptionist-system- which according to Farley Grubb 
had financed one third of the Irish and German migrat on by 1834. This system could 
only be sustained as the flow grew, allowing regular b nking and merchant connections 
to be established. Only then could the reputation for honesty, that repeat business created, 
give enough guarantees to immigrants entrusting their money with bankers or shippers. 
The increased shipping traffic and banking connections also decreased the transaction 
costs of remittances. Finally the expansion of industrial employment made loans on 
future wages possible to finance the crossing of friends or relatives and provided jobs for 
the newly arrived to help in paying off the debt (Grubb, 1994, 816-818).  
The transition from the redemptionist- to the remittance-system explains the 
increase of migrant-brokers in the United States. New York merchants quickly noted the 
potential of expanding the market selling ocean passage across the Atlantic. The 
 54
connections between Liverpool and New York merchant houses Grimshaw and 
Thompson led to the establishment of the first Emigrat on Office in New York. Other 
businessmen followed suit, such as W. Tapscott, Douglas Robinson & Co., Rawson & 
Mc Murray and Bros & Co. specializing in chartering the between-decks of ships and 
filling them with migrants on the westbound leg of the trip. Human freight was assured 
through contacts with migrant brokers in European ports and recruiting agents traveling 
to Europe while they also offered settled migrants the possibility of paying for ocean 
passage for someone to join them (Greenhalgh-Albion, 1939, 339-341). This developed 
in the market of pre-paid tickets- a system in which at least thirty percent of the migrants 
made the crossing during the steamship era. The remittance-system seems to have 
encouraged migrant brokers and migrant agents to combine banking and passage 
business, especially in the US. The banking world pofited from the booming money 
exchanges and money transfers generated by mass-migration and again migrant brokers 
served as go-between. As the competition for the business in the US increased, networks 
of migrant-agents spread inwards to popular in-migrat on regions. This further stimulated 
the sale of tickets for inland transport in the United States, along with the ocean transport. 
Initially, frauds and abuses with these tickets were not totally uncommon, nevertheless it 
stimulated the creation of a door to door service and in the long run an integrated Atlantic 
transport network. The improved organization fueled the developing chain-migration 
patterns.   
 
5.2) American migration legislation, and the rise of Nativism  
 
Just as in Europe, ship-owners and migrant brokers had to protect their business 
from regulations which would impede its further development. What preoccupied the 
authorities was much the same as in Europe – the threat of migrants becoming a public 
charge. On one hand the division between federal and state authorities regarding 
migration matters allowed shipping interest to play one against the other. On the other 
hand just as in Europe port competition helped shipping interests to obtain concessions 
from authorities to their advantage. The supreme courts delimited the federal authority to 
regulate of migrant transport, which fell in the sphere of international and interstate 
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commerce. The responsibility to prevent the entrance of paupers and convicts was 
deemed a police matter and thus fell under state authority. Those three actors, seaboard 
states, federal government and shipping industry shaped American immigration policy 
(Zolberg, 2003, 195-220 and 2006, 99-125). As was the case in Europe, regulation of the 
trade predominated, yet through these three actors acting simultaneously the first attempts 
to control quality and quality were introduced- an often neglected fact by migration 
historians (Mullan, 1998, 30). 
 Zolberg typified the period preceding the Civil War as the ‘rehearsal of remote 
control’ era (Zolberg, 2003, 197). The best way of preventing undesired subjects from 
getting in is to prevent them from leaving. The humanitarian ideals of the Passenger Act 
of 1819 protecting the migrant from abuse, underlies the intention of increasing the cost 
of migration to block the entry of the poorest. The law had the merit of serving as an 
example for future European legislation as seen for Bremen, Antwerp and Hamburg not 
only for the North Atlantic routes but for all lines involving migrant transport. Yet the 
means of controlling the implementation of the laws ere limited while ways to 
circumvent them were numerous. For instance, controls of Belgian inspectors could not 
impede ships leaving Antwerp, from picking up additional passengers in Flushing.37 This 
indicates that in the United States, where the same measures regarding space applied, 
they were either easy to circumvent or to not apply to strictly. Out of fear that ship-
owners would send their ships to where controls were lax, allowing them to maximize the 
profits, laws were not stricltly implemented on eith r side of the Atlantic. Moreover, 
legislation was slow in adapting to the rapidly evolving technological improvements of 
ships. It took another thirty years to renew the passenger legislation. The federal 
government gathered information through their consuls on the dumping of criminals and 
paupers from Europe, yet attempts to pass legislation on the matter were blocked by the 
Supreme Court. Hence, the only way for the federal government to restrict the flow was 
by increasing the cost and therefore decreasing the capacity of ships. The Passenger Act 
of 1847 successfully did this. The miscommunication about when they became effective 
                                                 
37 ABMFA, 2020, Emigration I: 1834-1848, anonymous letter to the Foreign Minister of Foreign 
Affaires August 19 1846. 
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created confusion and delayed sailings.38 Yet, the shipping lobby managed to pass a new 
law early in 1848 adjusting capacity requirements to the old standards.  The booming 
American shipping industry increased its carrying capacity by fivefold between 1830 and 
1860 (Hutchins, 1939, 272). The growth allowed the shipping lobby to expand its 
influence on legislative bodies (Zolberg, 2006, 131). The readjustment safeguarded the 
competitive position of the narrow American ships built for speed, rather than capacity, 
which differentiated them from British vessels. It allowed the construction of three-
decked passenger ships instead of the normal two-decke , increasing the capacity of 
American vessels to up to a thousand passengers- nearly double what the 1847 
regulations permitted. This type of ships dominated the migrant trade on the Le Havre 
and Liverpool routes during the next decade. During the peak of the natavist surge 
midway through the 1850s, shipping, railroad and business interests prevented far-
reaching restrictive immigration laws. The shipping lobby also successfully obstructed 
renewed attempts in reducing the carrying capacity of ships. The adaptation of the 1855 
Passenger Act remained a dead letter because of the careless drafting of the law (Jones, 
1989, 324-326). After the Civil War, the federal government increased its grip over 
immigrant legislation and pressed for the policy of remote control using shipping 
companies to enforce their measures. In the meantime he control over the migrant 
transport gradually passed from American to European flagged ships. To prevent the US 
Congress to pass migration or maritime laws restricting the migrant flow, which 
represented their main source of revenue; shipping companies organized a strong lobby 
group and joined forces with other interest groups sharing the same interests. If 
unsuccessful they tried to find ways to circumvent r strictive measures. 
 Not every one was pleased with the shiploads of new arrivals sailing in. A 
growing part of the population saw migrants, especially the large influx of Irish Catholics 
as a threat to the values and institutions of the country. Sporadic uproar against the 
                                                 
38 In a letter of the Dutch envoy in Washington to the Minister of Foreign Affaires reported on the 
confusion regarding when it became effective. The American minister in The Hague reported that shippers 
and passengers suffered financial loss because of the miscommunication on when it would become 
effective. This was confirmed by the yearly report f the Antwerp emigration inspector in 1842. The 
Antwerp Chamber of Commerce confirmed that the prices had slightly gone up due to the American 
legislation. (M 42 Dispatches from US ministers to the Netherlands 1794- 1906 / roll 17 April 1845 - 
September 1850 and AMBZ, 2020, Emigration I: 1834-1848, Letter February 7 1842 and June 30 1847 and NA 
2.05.13, Gezantschap in de Verenigde Staten van Amerika, Letter 27 1847. 
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foreign-born population developed into an organized movement of xenophobic known as 
the Know Nothings. The movement fed on the widespread assumption that Europe sent 
their worst subjects and even assisted paupers and criminals in getting overseas. 
American consuls in Europe were asked to keep an eye out for the dumping policies of 
European governments. American State authorities drw up measures in preventing 
migrants of becoming a public charge and levied a he d-tax to cover the costs to improve 
the immigrant controls at the ports of entry. But, the constitutionality of the head-tax, 
collected upon arrival, was successfully challenged by shippers for interfering with 
international commerce. In the US, attempts by Eastern seaboard states to pass tighter 
immigration controls on national level, were countered by immigrant-hungry Southern 
and Western States. The states maintained the right to require bonds from captains 
landing passengers likely to become a public charge. Instead, a system was set-up where 
captains paid commutation fees - essentially a headtax- but competition between Atlantic 
ports soon undermined the measure. Frequently cuts on commutation fees were made to 
avoid ships unloading passengers in rival ports with lower fees (Klebaner, 1958, 272-
283). With the big influx of migrants between 1845 and 1857 calls to restrict the flow 
gained a momentum. The Antwerp case-study proved that claims of dumping paupers 
and convicts were not totally unfounded.  
The Belgian government not only used Antwerp to get rid of undesired nationals 
but it also tried to attract assisted migration trajectories from foreign authorities in order 
to increase the migrant flow through the port. Besid  attracting German assisted 
migration the Minister of Foreign Affaires asked M.De Gremus de Sturler, the Belgian 
Consul General in Bern, to direct the assisted migration of indigent Swiss to Antwerp.39 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the vigilance in spotting incoming paupers increased. In 
1847, New York State authorities appointed an Emigration Commission which was 
responsible for protecting newcomers from abuses and defrayed the costs for migrants 
who became a public charge, before obtaining American itizenship. The conviction 
grew that controls assuring good quality of service and a good reputation attracted, rather 
than discouraged the immigrants from New York. With the commutation fees and the 
                                                 
39 PRA, Provinciaal Bestuur, Emigratie, nr. 275, Landverhuizers - kolonies 1851-1860, Letter 
from Vilain XIIII to Teichmann September 5 1855. 
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help of shipping industries, several health, employment and control institutions were 
built, such as Castle Garden, enhancing the screening of incoming migrants (Erickson, 
1976, 269-272, Klebaner, 1958, 274-275). The Antwerp Emigration Inspector, Thielens, 
appointed a special agent in New York, Mr. Kiehn to welcome, direct and find jobs for 
assisted Belgians. This way Thielens wanted to avoid that they lingered in the city and 
called the attention of the American authorities. Kiehn who was related to A. Strauss and 
whose father provided the migrants with equipment ad food supplies in Antwerp, 
warned of sending large groups. He had not been able to place a group of fifty who found 
their way to the New York Consul, Henry Mali. To avoid a scandal, the consul paid for 
their transport inland, yet he strongly opposed the practice.40  
For more than a decade, the consul published the Belgian laws regulating the 
migrant transport; advertised reductions for the Iron Rhine; and announced sailing dates, 
in order to uphold the reputation of Antwerp as a migrant gateway. This was important to 
create goodwill among local authorities and to advertis  the port for the developing 
prepaid market. Mali also feared that the practice could compromise the success of the 
long-awaited steamship line connecting Antwerp with New York. The practice lasted 
until a letter implicating the provincial authorities of Liege and Antwerp regarding the 
sending of three prisoners and some beggars fell into the hands of the American press 
towards the end of 1854.41 This coincided with height of the nativist movement creating a 
diplomatic incident between Belgium and the United States. When the Rochembeau 
sailed in from Antwerp, authorities tipped off by the American consul in Antwerp 
arrested twelve passengers under suspicion of being paupers or criminals (Feys, 2003, 58-
68 and 2004, 211-220). The Emigration Commission declar d that for years they had 
suspected that Antwerp had been serving as a centre of h  shipment of the lowest class 
of emigrants coming from Belgium, Germany and Switzerland. Strauss was accused of 
specialising in the emigration of subjects who authori ies wanted to get rid of.42  
                                                 
40 Ibid., Letter from d’Hoffschmidt de Resteigne to Teichmann December 13 1851. 
41 See following articles in the New York Times; “The B lgian Convicts or Paupers” 25-12-1854, 
“The case of the Twelve Belgians” 27-12-1854, “Emigrant Paupers” 1-1-1855, “The Belgian paupers – The 
Mayor’s decision” 15-2-1855, “Commissioners of Emigration – the Belgian Convicts” 16-2-1855, “The 
Mayor and the Belgian Consul” 17-2-1855, “The imprisoned Belgians” 27-2-1855, “Communication from 
the Mayor Wood – Introduction of foreign Criminals nd Paupers” 5-2-1856. 
42 ABMFA, 2020, Emigration, IV, Letter from the Emigration Commission to Mali February 15 
1855. 
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The case received a lot of coverage in the American press and reopened the 
debates about passing laws in the House and Senate prev nting the immigration of 
criminals and paupers (Hutchinson, 1981, 39-42). But, except for the Passenger Act no 
federal laws against paupers and criminals were passed. Those detained on the 
Rochembeau were eventually released after a decision in the Supreme Court on the basis 
of habeas corpus (Boumans, 1965, 493-494). The port of Antwerp looked worse than 
ever at a very significant time. The Americans threatened to impose extra taxes on ships 
coming from the Belgian port. The vessels arriving from Antwerp after the Rochembeau 
were subjected to extra controls and were held up for long periods of time. Gall, the 
American consul in Antwerp, required that all emigrant candidates for the US would pass 
through his office. The emigrants had to pay him one frank and had to solemnly swear 
that they were not paupers or convicts. Teichamnn, the Antwerp governor, did not believe 
that Gall had received an official mandate to take th se measures, but given the 
circumstances, he did not want to lodge a complaint.43  
The measures endangered the competitive position of Antwerp as a migrant 
gateway and demanded immediate action. The sending of Belgian paupers and criminals 
was diverted to Canada and Brazil and was eventually stopped. Other authorities seemed 
to have followed suit, stopping programs of assisted migration to the United States after 
the American consuls undertook a thorough investigation of the subject throughout the 
continent.44 The Belgian authorities started a new campaign to regain the confidence in 
the United States for Antwerp as a migrant gateway. This was needed since the long-
awaited opening of a steamship line relied predominantly on migrant transport as a 
source of revenue. The transition from sail to steam h d set in. But as Cohn underlined, 
the nativist surge triggered the downfall of the first mass-migration movement (Cohn, 
2000, 361-383). The subsequent economic recession and Civil War brought the flow to a 
                                                 
43 Six months later when the storm of protest caused by the Rochembeau case calmed down 
Belgian authorities objected Gall’s doings. With support of American captains Gall was denounced to ac 
on the sole purpose of enriching himself. The use of consuls to control the migrants at the ports of 
embarkation would be a recurrent issue up to 1914. While the American authorities considered the consuls 
as an ideal tool of remote control European countries questioned the consuls’ authority affecting their 
sovereignty. Reoccurring discussions prevented the implementation of clear policy. Ibid., Letter from 
Teichmann to Vilain XIIII May 24 1855. 
44 NYT, “Communication from the Mayor Wood – Introduction of foreign Criminals and Paupers” 
February 5 1856. 
 60
practical standstill. The second mass migration wave powered by steam, built further on 
the networks established during the sail-ship era and l rgely outsized the previous one. 
 
Chapter II: Was Antwerp; “the frog in the table, wh ich wished to reach the size of 
an ox?”: the keen competition to open up transatlantic steamship lines 
 
The introduction of steamshipping on the Atlantic further reduced traveling time, 
risks and costs of migration. During the 1850s steamships started to penetrate the market 
of migrant transport. Two decades later the transition from sail to steam was complete. 
Yet, the success of steamshipping was preceded by man failures and this was despite the 
active support of governments. The apprehension among financers to invest in a capital 
intensive business experiencing the growing pains of technological innovation was 
important. Some governments intervened by supporting this new transport method to 
stimulate trade. Because of the growing importance of the North Atlantic trade, keen 
competition among ports developed to attract such a line. This was further stimulated by 
the wide coverage the race for the fastest crossing of the Atlantic received in the press, 
and quickly grew out to be a question of national prestige. In this chapter, the failures and 
successes in opening a transatlantic steamship line within the Hamburg-Le Havre range -
with special focus on Rotterdam and Antwerp- will be analyzed. This facilitates the 
comparison of diverse contemporary maritime policies and their impact on trade and thus 
migrant routes. To what extent did national governme ts support the opening up of 
transatlantic steamship lines? For what reasons, and in what way were they successful? 
Were policies of attracting migrants to national ports and the opening up of a steamship 
line related? Were there any attempts to commercialize migrant transport on steamships 
before the successful breakthrough of the Inman Line? Did those have an immediate 
effect on the organization of migrant transport by sail? By using the consular 
correspondence of French, Bremen, Dutch and Belgian d plomats in the United States 
new light will be shed in answering these questions.  
  
1) A British Queen in service of Belgian authorities: the beginnings of transatlantic 
steam-shipping 
 
1.1) The Dutch and Belgian maritime policies compared 
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The simultaneous arrivals of Sirius and Great Western in New York, from 
Liverpool, in 1838 gave rise to intense competition among European and American ports 
to open up a transatlantic steamship line (Greenhalgh-A bion, 1939, 313). Initially, 
steamships concentrated on the British-North American route. The first continental port 
to challange this dominance was Antwerp (De Boer, 1998, 8 and Laurent, 1965, 938-
952). The Belgian government believed that, like railro ds, maritime connections 
powered by steam requiring big investments needed th  financial support of the State 
which would eventually lead to the same revolution as railway transport.45 The reasons 
for this active policy are summarized in a report which convinced the parliament to pass a 
special navigation law midway through the 1840s to subsidize a line between Antwerp 
and New York:  
“With the industrial evolution the wealth of nations will greatly depend on its 
commercial importance and its ability to force other nations to trade through 
them. The geographical position of Belgium enhances her development as a nodal 
point for trade. By stimulating this, the government will give the young nation 
more political power. Nations that enjoyed the benefits of Antwerp could later be 
lobbied to push for the free navigation of the Scheldt.46 It’s the best way of 
fighting off the influence of our natural rival, the Netherlands and contesting its 
dominant position in the German transit-trade because of its natural advantages 
through the Rhine and the Meuse. If we succeed we’ll obtain the sympathy of the 
powerful German State and become less dependent of France. Moreover, strong 
trade relations with the United States will result in an important political alliance 
with the nation which is predestined to rule the waves. A steamship connection 
with New York is a complementary link to our railroad network, and vital to 
globalize our depository function in this economic transit system. The 
dependency of favorable winds to enter and leave Antwerp has hampered regular 
and fast services to the United States which are ess ntial to attract manufactured 
goods for export. Steam shipping solves this problem and will stimulate American 
and Belgian merchants to examine the opportunities for increased trade between 
                                                 
45 The intervention of the Belgian government was also stimulated by the European economic 
crisis which made credit to invest in new technology hard to obtain. This crisis had tempered the elabor te 
plans of the ‘Société Générale Belge de Bateaux à Vapeur’ organized by Antwerp merchants to build 14 
ships for lines to various European and transatlantic destinations (Laurent, 1965, 939 and Veraghtert, 1986, 
209). 
46 To enhance the trade through Antwerp the Belgian government decided to refund the tolls 
levied by the Dutch authorities on all ships except those sailing under the Dutch flag. With the increasing 
commerce, however, this started to weigh heavily on the government’s funds. Moreover, with the 
liberalization of trade there was a tendency to eliminate such tolls. The Sont and Stade toll had been ought 
out by the maritime nations, leaving the Scheldt with the only remaining toll, which the Belgian authorities 
continued to lobby against. These efforts materialized in 1863 when the Belgian government and the 
maritime nations agreed to pay 36,278,560 Belgian fr cs to make the navigation of the Scheldt free 
(Veraghtert, 1977). 
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the two nations, traveling time being reduced to tw eeks. Finally it would 
improve the competitive position of the port of Antwerp.”47 
 
If a country questioned the right of existence of the young nation by force, then 
the merchant marine under the national flag could be used to retaliate. The report clearly 
reflects the geopolitical orientation of Belgium’s trade policies. These contrasted with the 
Dutch policies. Simultaneously, a project was presented to the Dutch government to open 
a steamship line between Rotterdam and New York, with the principal revenue to be 
derived from migrant transport; although, this was never seriously considered by the 
authorities.48 Dutch maritime interests centered on the trade with the colonies in the East 
Indies. Between 1815 and 1850 these colonies came to dominate Dutch shipping, while 
the US became relatively insignificant. Government i tervention in colonial trade, 
through the Nederlandse Handels Maatschappij (NHM), offered high freight rates and 
guaranteed return cargo. The colonial trade was organized in such a way that there was 
no need for rapid transport. As a result, merchants continued to use less expensive sailing 
ships rather than investing in more costly steamers. The Dutch institutional structure 
therefore slowed the transition from sail to steam and the evolution to large-scale ship-
owning companies. Sailing ships for the colonial trde thus attracted capital flows which 
were crucial for the transport of passengers. Moreover, this colonial trade policy caused 
the Dutch business community to have an aversion to the German transit trade. The 
Dutch laws restricting the German trans-migrant movement through the country 
corroborates this aversion. It was the German states that forced that the Dutch 
government to make concessions to liberalize transport on the Rhine. This facilitated the 
transit of goods, the volume of which started to rise as early as the 1830s. The colonial 
trade brought tropical goods to the Dutch ports which were traded further up the Rhine 
and with other European ports. The focus on these staple trades delayed the transition to 
the transit traffic, i.e., from an emphasis on trade to a concern with transport. Moreover, 
NHM, favored the port of Amsterdam over Rotterdam, despite the fact that connections 
                                                 
47BGRA, I 215, no. 4052, Vaart der British Queen, eerste stoomvaart verbinding Antwerpen, 
1840-1847, “Report on the Opening of a Steamship Line between Antwerp and New York,” April 25 1840 
and presented to the Belgian Chamber of Representatives June 1 1840 by M. De Garcia de la Vega and 
Isidore Fallon. 
48 The prospectus of marine officer G. Roentgen planned to transport migrants as low as 100fr. for 
the crossing. GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 6, Letter of F.H. Nollen to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 3 
1839. 
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from the former port to the German hinterland were far inferior to those emanating from 
Rotterdam and therefore less suitable for transit traffic. For these reasons, the once 
thriving commercial relations between Rotterdam and the US deteriorated (De Nijs, 
2001, 39-53; Horlings, 1995; Blasing and Langenhuyzen, 1998, 103-126). 
This explains why migration through the Netherlands to the United States 
remained low during this period notwithstanding thegeographical advantages especially 
of Rotterdam. Many German migrants arriving in the Dutch port through the Rhine 
embarked on ships to Antwerp, Le Havre or England where sailings to the U.S. were 
more frequent. In spite of favoring Amsterdam the NHM still made sure that three out of 
eight ships coming from the East Indies stopped in at Rotterdam. This was enough to 
keep most Rotterdam merchants happy with the profits made through the colonial trade. 
Because of this colonial maritime policy Rotterdam merchants stuck to their old ways of 
doing business. Merchants preferred to do the transactions on their own as much as 
possible, avoiding having to call upon intermediaries. This prevented transition to large-
scale business. Furthermore, merchants showed an aversion to transit traffic with 
Germany, some even considered it as a threat to Rotterdam. The presidents of the 
Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce openly opposed modernization such as steamshipping 
and railroads and considered transit traffic as the archenemy. The city council shared this 
conservatism explaining the deplorable state of public services and infrastructure in the 
city (Nieuwenhuys, 1952, 48-72 and De Nijs, 2001, 42-52). This explains why G. 
Roentgen found little support among Rotterdam merchants in financing his project of 
opening a steamship line for migrant transport to the United States. 
 
1.2) The British Queen: the first Continental transatlantic steamship line  
 
Nevertheless, the plans of Roentgen and a project to onnect Le Havre with New 
York by steam spurred the decision of the Belgian government. Through the intermediary 
of the Belgian ambassador in London, van de Weyer th  British Queen and President 
were bought from the British and American steam navigation Co. At the time of the 
purchase of the steamers the government still had not concluded an agreement with a 
society to manage the line. David Colden, a New York businessman, was not deemed 
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capable of leading the project. Other Americans also picked up interest in the Belgian 
subsidies. Edward Derby, chairman of the Western Rail Association, lobbied for Boston 
through Serruys the Belgian envoy in Washington. The emerging rail connection allowed 
easy access inland for migrants and the port would provide the necessary infrastructure- 
docks, peers etc.49 Raising capital seemed to be the biggest obstacle, despite the yearly 
subsidy of 400,000 franks. The government also preferr d to leave it in Belgian hands, 
but negotiations with Antwerp merchants who initially warmly supported the steamship 
project over subsidies for sailing ships, tailed off.50 After a similar occurance in Europe, 
an economic crisis had broken out in the US, throwing the existing steamship lines into 
difficulties and hence spoiling the enthusiasm of investors.51 In the end, an agreement 
was reached with three Antwerp merchants; Jean-François Catteaux-Wattel, Jules 
Lejeune and George Jullie establishing the Belgian Steam Navigation Service Antwerp-
New York.52 Just as Roentgen’s proposal had done, the project also prospected migrant 
transport as a source of revenue. Unlike Cunard, which offered only first-class passage, a 
second class had to be available to make transatlantic passages accessible to travelers 
from all social classes.53 In order to compete with other ports, tariffs for cabin passengers 
and valuable goods had to be ten percent lower thanose of Cunard and could not 
exceed the prices of the prospective French line.  
                                                 
49 Colden was described as an integer person yet not a g od businessmen and American capitalist 
appeared to have been skeptical about him. He was not the only American to react to the law passed by the 
Belgian Government. ABMFA, 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889 letter of consul Mali and 
Letter of E. Derby to Serruys July 5 and October 9 1840.  
50 An inquiry among Antwerp merchants in 1839 had indicated that they favored a subsidized 
steamship line rather than sailing ship line to meet th  competition of England and Le Havre. The contract 
to buy steamers was signed March 17 1841 while the provisional agreement with the Antwerp business 
men was concluded on April 4 1841 and certified by royal decree on November 29 1841.  BGRA, I 215, 
no. 4052, anonymous letter to the Minister of the Interior  and ABMFA, 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp New-
York, 1839-1889 Report of M. De Garcia de la Vega and Isidore Fallon at the Belgian Chamber of 
Representatives June 1 1840 and (Laurent, 1965, 939-941).  
51 According to a report on steam-shipping of 1841 presented during a debate in the Belgian 
chamber of representatives the British government had to raise the subsidies of both the Cunard Line and 
the West Royal Mail Company to prevent bankruptcy. The Great Western who enjoyed a very good 
reputation had to dissolve.  The ‘British and American steam navigation Co’ stopped its activities. While 
the ‘Precurseur’ finished that year but never taken into service. Ibid., Séance March 10 1843 
52 The government even tried to convince the leaders of the British American Steam-shipping 
Company to open an office in Antwerp and manage the new line from there with the subsidies of the 
authorities but to no avail. Ibid., various correspondence 1841. 
53 Ibid., Vaart der British Queen, eerste stoomvaart verbinding Antwerpen, 1840-1847, BRGA, I 
215, no. 4052, navigation law of June 29 1840. 
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But, besides the economic downturn the enterprise rec ived another serious blow 
when the President sank on its way back from New York, just prior to its delivery.54 This 
seriously damaged the reputation of the sister-ship Br tish Queen of which the maiden 
voyage under Belgian banner was announced for the fourth of May 1842. Catteaux-
Wattel and Jullie resigned even before the first sailing had even taken place.55 The line 
seemed to be doomed even before the maiden voyage. To make matters worse Bischops 
Basteyns announced an agreement with one of the biggest New York merchant houses 
for the opening of a regular sail connection leaving every two weeks.56 Due to the 
economic crisis the passenger movement had dropped considerably making Lejeune 
question the nation of transporting migrants. Georg Schuyler, a New York engineer had 
studied the question of migrant transport in the United States and Europe. Applying for 
the head-agency in New York and the contract to build a ship to replace the President in 
the US, Schuyler tried to convince the Belgian company to center their efforts on 
migrants.57  
The company opted for a mixed service including cabin passengers and migrants 
which had to be absolutely separated. Contact between the two had te be avoided at all 
cost to protect the reputation of the line.  The British Queen left with fifty passengers, 
after calling at Southampton, and due to bad weather only arrived in New York twenty-
eight days later. The poor results again raised the qu stion of opening the passenger 
service to upper class migrants, such as well-off farmers or craftsmen for 10 pounds or 
400 franks, or even the lowest class of migrants for 4 pounds or 100 franks.58 For the 
second sailing, the English crew was prematurely replaced by inexperienced Belgians 
leading to many complaints of bad treatment by unsatisfied passengers.59 After a third 
                                                 
54ABMFA 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Letter June 18 1841. 
55 ABMFA, 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Report of he general council of the 
“Belgian Steam Navigation Service Antwerp-New York, February 1 1842. 
56 Ibid., February 15 1842. 
57 BGRA, I 215, no. 4052, Vaart der British Queen, eerste stoomvaart verbinding Antwerpen, 
1840-1847, Letter of G. Schuyler to Lejeune January 31 1842. 
58 ABMFA, 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Reports f the general council of the 
“Belgian Steam Navigation Service Antwerp-New York March 15 1842 and June 10 1842. 
59 As part of the agreement with the Belgian governmets the line was used to train nationals to 
manage the service. Yet to cut in the costs Captain Keene and his crew was replaced by Lieutenant 
Eyckholdt and his crew. Ibid.,1839-1889, Le Hardy de Beaulieu to MFA May 30 1847  and  (De Boer, 1998, 8). 
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loss-making crossing, and not very promising prospects of the American economy, the 
activities were suspended (De Boer, 1998, 8 and Veraghtert, 1977, III 13-25). 
Despite the failure the active policy of the Belgian uthorities produced the first 
challenge to the British dominance of transatlantic steam-shipping. But, the lack of 
connections with American businessmen, and publicity overseas, further contributed to 
the decline. The Belgian government still had not cncluded a trade treaty with the 
United States, illustrating its indifference towards overseas relations (Laurent, 1965, 941-
942).60 Although the breakthrough of migrant transport by steam only took place in the 
1850s it is clear that the first steamship projects had seriously considered migrant 
transport as a source of revenue. But as Graham underlined, the introduction of steam 
spurred the technological innovation in sail shipping in its attempt to remain competitive. 
Size and speed crept steadily upwards after the introduction of steamships (Graham, 
1956, 74-88, Greenhalgh-Albion, 1939, 333). The French consul in New York, in 
collecting information for the opening of a steamship line, observed: “Sailships 
anticipated the feared competition of steamships for the emigrant transport by lowering 
the prices from 150fr. to 120fr. and even 100fr. Moreover the accommodation on 
sailships improved considerably.”61  
Efforts by sail-shippers to protect this lucrative market by lowering the cost for 
steerage berths on sailing ships at the beginning of 1840s, has been noted by other 
scholars.62 In Antwerp, it seemed to have encouraged the establishment of packet sailing 
ships, leaving on set dates. The government stimulated these lines with premiums per ton 
of shipping space, while imposing maximum rates. This resulted in the first subsidized 
packet line to New York as early as February 1841. This policy proved to be successful 
as by 1844 Antwerp counted eight regular long distance services to New York 
                                                 
60 Belgian ships had received temporary ‘most favored nation treatment’ but due to mounting 
diplomatic tensions on the third sailing the British Queen was subject to extraordinary American tariffs on 
her tonnage (Laurent, 1965, 941-942).    
61 The exchange rate for one dollar amounted to 5,3 fr. which means that the price dropped from 
28,3$ to between 22,6$ and 18,9$. ADN, Consulats, New York, 7, Letter from the French consul in New 
York to the Ministry of Foreign Affaires, August 12 1842. 
62 Wegge and Engelsing noted a decrease in migrant crossing at the beginning of the 1840’s. 
While in 1839 the transport cost from Bremen varied from 21$ to 28$ it dropped between 14,7$ and 19,6$ 
in 1841 reaching a low in 1843 of 14$ to 16,1$ (Wegge, 1998; Engelsing, 1961). Greenhalgh-Albion stated 
that during the 1840’s and 1850’s the steerage rates ranged between 15$ and 25$ (Greenhalgh-Albion, 
1939).  
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(Veraghtert, 1986, 210-211). The increased efforts f ailing ships for the migrant trade 
lowered the cost of migration, while the service improved and may have delayed the 
transition of migrant transport to steam. Notwithstanding the success of sailing packets, 
the desire to connect Antwerp with the US by steam never ebbed away. The efforts of the 
Belgian authorities did not go totally unnoticed across the Atlantic, as the government 
became aware of the importance of overseas relations in which the diplomatic corps 
played a notable role. 
 
2) The American challenge to the British dominance: Some fine old German wines 
for American subsidies 
 
2.1) The diplomatic corps, commercial opportunities and migrant transport 
 
The importance of consuls as a source of information on legal, commercial and 
political developments abroad has only recently been stressed in maritime history. 
Consuls established contacts with local authorities and merchant communities to promote 
trade relations with shipping enterprises based in their homelands. Especially in new 
markets, where uncertainties and hence transaction osts were considerable, consuls 
played a vital role (Müller and Ojala, 2002, 23-41; Müller, 2002, 173-188 and 2004, 17-
32). In the nineteenth century two systems were adopte  to organize the rapidly-
expanding consular corps. On the one hand, there was the system of honorary consuls; 
often merchants who received no remuneration other than the fees derived from certain 
official duties. Such consuls lived off the profits from trade, while the title of “consul” 
conferred a certain prestige within the business community. The Netherlands, Belgium 
and the cities of the German Hanse employed this system, albeit with some salaried 
consuls in key locales. On the other hand; countries such as France and the UK used a 
system of salaried officials, career consuls who were forbidden to engage in trade 
(Kennedy, 1990, 72-85 and Kurgan, Tamse et al, 1981, 268-276). What follows is an 
analysis of the efforts of diplomatic representatives to convince the American authorities 
of using a national port as a European terminal for their subsidized line. This narrative is 
based on the correspondence between the Belgian consul in New York and the Dutch 
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envoy in Washington, with their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs and it is 
complemented with the use of some French and German consular correspondence.63  
 
2.2) The Dutch North Atlantic trade relations hitting rock bottom, the American 
subsidies-issue as a first wake-up call. 
 
 Of the first wave of steamship companies only one managed to keep afloat, the 
Cunard Line. With the help of considerable governmet subsidies it offered a biweekly 
service between Liverpool, Halifax and Boston which quickly expanded to New York. 
The line sailing under the ‘Union Jack’ gained significant prestige, yet a growing number 
of Americans called for an alternative flying the ‘Stars and Stripes’. The American 
government answered these calls by freeing up part of the budget to support steamship 
lines providing a mail service to Europe. Because of the big overhead-cost involved in 
steam-shipping, the laissez-faire policy temporarily moved to subsidizing navigation. The 
news quickly spread across the Atlantic triggering keen competition between various 
European ports to serve as a terminal for the line (Greenhalg, 1939, 314-335 and 
Hutchins, 1939, 325-356).   
 The ports of Bremen, Hamburg, Antwerp, Le Havre, Brest, Lisbon, Southampton, 
Bristol and Liverpool made the shortlist of the American government as potential 
terminals. The absence of Amsterdam and Rotterdam reflects the extent to which trade 
relations between both countries had deteriorated (Broeze, 1994, 86-87). It served as a 
first wake-up call for the Dutch government and merchant community who wanted to 
avoid that the chief rival, Antwerp would be chosen.64 First the migration laws of 1837 
were compared with the existing Bremen laws. The minister of Foreign Affaires 
concluded that they did not put extra costs on shipowners and that they were not less 
suitable in protecting the safety of the emigrant. The problem was the lack of publicity of 
those in out-migration regions, and that the US had been responsible for the bad 
                                                 
63The correspondence of the Dutch consul in New York has only been preserved from 1874 onwards and has 
been completed with an analysis of the correspondence of the Dutch envoy in Washington after 1840. 
 
64 Already with the service of the British Queen the Dutch authorities considered to collaborate 
with the French initiative of opening a steamship line to the US. It hoped to make use of the French 
connections to prevent Antwerp from taking over therade with Switzerland and Germany. See AMBZ 
2241, Various letters of J. de Chimay, Belgian envoy in The Hague to the Minister of Foreign Affaires June 
29 to July 5 1840. 
 69
reputation of the Netherlands as a transit country.65 Dutch consuls in German out-
migration regions frequently reported about negative publicity about Rotterdam and 
viewed them, just as their Belgian colleagues did also, as attempts by German authorities 
to direct the flow to the national ports (Stokvis; 1977, 154-170). Dutch authorities 
decided to launch a publicity campaign in the US for their ports as ideal gateways for the 
North Atlantic traffic, and thus for the opening of a steamship line.66 The Dutch consuls 
and envoys in the US were asked to redouble their effo ts when the authorities found out 
that an American delegation was on its way to Belgium to discuss the possibilities. The 
consuls published articles in the American press pointing to the advantages of Dutch 
ports, especially Rotterdam in comparison to Antwerp.67 When the attention of the 
American authorities shifted to Bremen the envoy put more stress on the advantages of 
Rotterdam over the Hanse port. Although migrant transport was not considered in the 
initial plans of the steamship line, the strategic location of Rotterdam for this trade had to 
be stressed.68 
The efforts never materialized in concrete statutes of a company with interests on 
both sides of the Atlantic and hence the Dutch ports were never considered. Yet it revived 
the Dutch interest in the North Atlantic trade in which the opening of steamship line and 
attracting the migrant flow to the port became key factors. According to the Dutch 
Minister of Foreign Affaires, the only reason why Bremen, Antwerp and Le Havre had 
                                                 
65 NA 2.05.13 Gezantschap in de Verenigde Staten van Amerika, 1814-1940, Letter from the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs to the envoy in Washington, Gevers,  October 3 1844. 
66 Amsterdam and Rotterdam were described as the most suitable, most secure and by far the most 
profitable ports for opening a steamship line for the following reasons: 1) a daily, speedy, comfortable and 
cheap steamship service connected Basel to the Dutch ports through the Rhine 2) passengers and their 
luggage could immediately be transferred on the transatlantic connection since the landing stage were 
nearby each other 3) there were regular departures of fully equipped ships to the U.S., especially to New 
York and Baltimore 4) a steam towing service provides quick access from the ports to the sea, an important 
advantage which is not to be found in any other port, 5) moreover, the Royal Decree of the 28-12-1837 
submits the ship owners, ship merchants and ship brokers involved in migrant traffic in the Netherlands to 
certain regulations. A Supervision Committee, whose m mbers are well respected people of the 
community, observes if they act accordingly and also control the ships and the provisions boarded for the 
crossing. Ibid., Letter from MFA to Gevers envoy in Washington Jau ry 11 1845. 
67 The Minister pointed out to the negative effects this could have on the Dutch trade with 
America. This while the Dutch ports have many more advantageous to offer and that a previous attempt to 
establish such line in Antwerp had failed. He stressed that the improvements of Rhine steamboats made the 
transport over water nearly as fast as over rail and that soon the railroads to the Dutch ports would be 
completed and be as accessible as Antwerp . Moreove he stated commercial legislation and tariffs in 
Belgium were much less liberal and profitable for the rade than the Dutch were. Furthermore, he referred 
to the advantageous for passenger transport. Ibid., Letter from M.F.A. to Gevers, February 18 1845. 
68 Ibid., Letter from MFA to Testa, January 20 1846. 
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attracted the biggest part of the migrant traffic was that in the Netherlands the matter had 
not received enough attention. Many migrants embarking in Antwerp came through 
Rotterdam first, preferring the Rhine boat connections over the Iron Rhine.69 The interest 
in migrant transport was also spurred by the increasing flow of nationals to the US. A big 
part of the Dutch migrants traveled through the migrant broker Johan Wambersie, the 
American consul in Rotterdam (Swieranga, 1994, 114-5 and Van der Valk, 1976, 157). 
The growing internal market led to an intensified competition. The Dutch migration 
movement was partly triggered by the intolerant religious policy after 1839, pushing 
away repressed Seceders, and by the declining economy which reached a low point 
during the potato crisis 1845-47. A growing amount of he population became dependent 
on charity (Swierenga, 2001; Hinte, 1928).  
Suggestions for state-sponsored emigration fighting poverty gained momentum 
during the crisis years. In 1846, the government supported a project to establish an 
agricultural-colony in Surinam similar to the Belgian initiative in Santo Thomas de 
Guatemala. It had the same unfortunate outcome with hig  death rates. It deterred the 
government from actively supporting emigration and thus no attempts were made to 
encourage migration to the United States. On the contrary a law was passed to strictly 
monitor the emigration of nationals so the state could intervene in case the movement got 
out of hand. Authorities even secretly stimulated anti-emigration propaganda (De Jong, 
1975, 129-153, Stokvis, 1977, 160 and Krabbendam, 2006, 58-66). The liberal opposition 
portrayed the migration of nationals as a sign of bad governance. They blamed the high 
taxes imposed by the government for the loss of compatriots to the New World (Van 
Stekelenburg, 1991, 82-86). Yet, even the increasing flow of nationals did not result in 
better protective measures for migrants. The envoy in Washington even advised migrants 
to go through Bremen instead of Rotterdam. He praised Bremen ships for taking care of 
the food supplies, which were included in the price for the passage. In Rotterdam 
migrants got exploited for these supplies; were charged a lot and received very poor 
quality in return. Also the lack of decent and affordable lodging in Rotterdam and abuses 
regarding monetary exchange were mentioned.70 The repeated calls from the Rotterdam 
                                                 
69 Ibid. 23. 
70 Ibid., Letter from MFA to Testa, December 11 1845.  
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merchant community to adapt the Dutch laws according to the Bremen model remained 
unanswered. In short, the renewed interest in the North-Atlantic trade was in no way 
powerful enough to turn the tide from the colonial maritime policies. 
  
2.3) The Bremen versus Antwerp lobby and their bids to host the American 
steamship line 
 
Antwerp, unlike Rotterdam, was a serious contender in functioning as a terminal 
for the American steamship line. The previous efforts f the Belgian government had not 
gone unnoticed across the Atlantic. Diplomatic relations between both countries 
improved and had led to a new more liberal trade agr ement. Attracting the line would 
not only boost the national economy but also the int rnational prestige of the young 
nation. The envoy in Washington, Serruys, and Henry Mali, consul in New York, were 
ordered to exert all possible influence on members of commerce and postal committees 
of Congress. They made sure that articles appeared in the American press praising the 
advantages of Antwerp over Le Havre and Bremen, the two principal rivals for the 
opening of a steamship line. Antwerp’s railroad and steamboat connections throughout 
Europe guaranteed timely redistribution of mails, goods and passengers. Bremen on the 
other hand was as being trapped within the Hanover state boarders with poor railroad 
connections and no service to London. It depended on Hamburg for the English trade, 
while contacts between the Hanse towns diminished. Moreover, ships had to cross the 
feared North Sea to reach the port. Le Havre had better connections, yet these were not as 
good as Antwerp and they did not offer the same promising prospects regarding the 
transit trade with German states. Belgium’s new trade greements with the US and the 
Zollverein opened more possibilities. The Iron Rhine offered the ideal connection for the 
German migrants.71  
The plans of the French government to open their own steamship connection to 
the US reassured the Antwerp bidders that the Americans would not pick a route with a 
newly established competitor.72 Being too confident about the rational advantages of 
                                                 
71 BGRA, 4052, Report by Serruys ‘Antwerp vs Bremen’ quoted in a report of Le Hardy de 
Beaulieu  s.d. 
72 Already early 1840’s the French supported a company to open a steamship line. The authorities 
had appointed a commission, ‘Commission de Gomer’, for that purpose. New York put free docks at the 
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Antwerp; Belgian authorities underestimated the importance of the art of lobbying 
something Bremen merchants were much more familiar with. The Hanse city dispatched 
a lobbyist-negotiator, Theodor Gevekoht, to the US authorized to deal with American 
authorities on the steamship line.73 It was not only the congressmen who needed to be 
convinced, but also the American capitalists. Steam-shipping had not proved to be a 
profit making business yet. Only the royal subsidies k pt the Cunard Line afloat and 
investors doubted that the American government would invest the same amounts. Raising 
capital for the line remained very difficult, hence oncrete proposals were few and far 
between.74 
The dynamic activity of Bremen was not surprising given its strong orientation on 
the North Atlantic which revived the trade through the port. Although unnoticed by 
Belgian or Dutch contemporaries, Bremen’s first plans to open a steamship line date back 
to 1840. Carl Keutgen projected a line transporting mail, fine goods, 1st, 2nd and 3rd class 
passengers.  Keutgen relied on the national pride of German investors to remain ahead of 
the French and Belgians.75 Five years later, the bidders for the American subsidy still 
played on the same sentiment but by then on both sides of the Atlantic. With the 
continuous migrant stream, the German community in the US gained importance. The 
community signed a petition used to support the bid for the opening of steamship line to 
the old country in Congress.76 Important German merchants in the US such as 
Schumacher, Bremen consul in Baltimore and Delrichs assisted Gevekoht in convincing 
the American authorities. A massive propaganda campaign was set up in the American 
press, where German newspapers, such as the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, had made their 
appearance.77 The booming trade relations between Bremen and the US were used as 
                                                                                                                                      
disposition of the line. AND, New York, 7, September 19 1842 and ABMFA, 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp 
New-York, 1839-1889, Letter of Mali to MFA September 27 1845. 
73 Gevekoht was a Bremen businessman who had resided ome years in the US and thus had a 
network on which he could rely upon arrival. 
74 ABMFA, 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889 Letters of Mali to MFA September 
27 1845 and letter of Serruys October 15 1845.   
75 BSA, 2-R-11, Dampschiffahrt, post- und Packetschiffa rt zwischen Bremen und V.S. 1837-
1867, Prospectus C. Keutgen October 31 1840. 
76 Ibid., Letter of Gevekoht to Duckwitz November 4 1846. 
77 The German language press revived in the 1830’s with the founding of New Yorker Staats-
Zeitung und Herold, the Saint Louis  Anzeiger des Westens and the Cincinnati Volksblatt. It boomed during 
the 1840’s, the number of German newspapers augmenting from 40 to 133 (Jones, 1992, 120). The Bremen 
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main argument for the Bremen bid. The migrant statitics of various European ports 
showed the dominance of the German port.  
The Bremen Senate increased the pressure on the Hannover to complete the 
railroad works connecting the port to Stettin, Berlin and hence Vienna, Trieste, etc. 
Connections to south-western German states would soon be opened. The Senate which 
had already made big efforts in building Bremerhaven continued to invest in a new 
landing space to harbor big steamships. A new trade agr ement between the Zollverein 
and US helped the cause. Moreover, Hannover had agreed to stop levying tolls on 
American products and to collaborate in obtaining this for the whole Zollverein, 
following the Belgian example in the competition for the bid.78 Some Bremen Senators 
feared that their independence from the Zollverein and commercial future was at stake. 
As Arnold Duckwitz put it:“If  Antwerp is chosen Bremen would probably be forced into 
the Zollverein which would be negative for the commerce with the US, would imply 
higher duties on tobacco and would lead to a  declin  of its use.”79  
The Belgian emissaries, Serruys and Mali, remained v ry active. Serruys 
negotiated with the American Secretary of State Buchanon to conclude yet another trade 
agreement based on ‘most favored nations’ principles. This agreement included a clause 
that in case a steamship line would be opened it would be exempted from all transit duties 
and pilotage expenses. He also visited Cave Johnson, the postmaster general responsible 
for the subsidies to lower the mail tariffs between both countries, favoring a future mail 
service. Serruys praised Mali for his efforts in promoting Antwerp among New York 
capitalists. The Belgian consul, running a merchant house in the city had already served 
as New York head-agent for the British Queen. He built a fortune in the US and enjoyed 
a good reputation among the American business community. Yet Serruys stressed the 
need for fellow countrymen to follow his example as the only way to strengthen the trade 
                                                                                                                                      
and Belgian lobby tried to get mentioned in the Daily Union which they considered as the voice of the 
administration.  
 78 BSA, 2-R-11, Dampschiffahrt, post- und Packetschiffa rt zwischen Bremen und V.S. 1837-
1867, Various loose newspaper articles June 10 1847, letters of Duckwitz to A Dudly Mann, American 
consul in Bremen January 17 and October 71845.  
79 Mann also lobbied in the meantime with the American authorities to appoint a chargé d’Affaires 
in Hanover. It was believed that a treaty between the US and Hanover would allow the North Sea states to 
remain independent from the Zollverein. This materilized in an agreement between Hanover and the US 
early 1846. Ibid., Letters November 10 1845 and March 26 1846. 
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relations between the countries. The envoy reported that the German community had 
joined forces to support Bremen’s candidacy and believ d them capable of raising the 
necessary capital.80 He informed the Belgian authorities of Gevekoht’s arrival and 
advised them to send someone as well.81 Gevekoht joined Dudley Mann, former Bremen 
consul, and the Prussian chargé d’affaires in Washington, Gerolt, where they all 
advocated Bremen as the terminal.82  
The lobbying activities increased as the date to file propositions with the 
postmaster general came to a close. Mann received a shipment of the most exquisite kind 
of old German wines thinking it may be useful to give the gentlemen in Washington a 
taste of it.83 The former Bremen consul lobbied with the postmaster general and also with 
the President in gaining their support for Bremen.84 Mann even convinced Henry Hillard, 
former American envoy in Brussels, and member of the House Committee which had 
charge of the project, to give his vote to Bremen instead of Antwerp.85 The Bremen lobby 
managed to sideline Antwerp, yet Le Havre became the main rival. The French envoy, 
backed by many New York merchants, and even the British envoy vigorously opposed 
the German candidacy.86  
                                                 
80 As Mali mentioned, not the whole German community supported Bremen’s bid. Some were not 
convinced of the port’s location and believed Antwerp to be more convenient, especially German from the 
Rhine districts. ABMFA 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Letter of Mali to MFA January 
26 1846. 
81 Ibid., Letters of Serruys to MFA, December 6, 27 and 28 1845, January 13 1846.  
82 Mann led the lobby campaign for Bremen. On his way b ck to the US Mann visited English 
ports to report on which could suit best as port of call for the Bremen-line. He selected Cowes as most 
secure port were vessels can touch without coming to anchor. Mails could be in London and Le Havre 
respectively 3 and 6 hours later. After a while it had become dangerous for him to make official 
communications for the Senate, probably in view of his new appointment in Trieste. This is the reason why 
Gevekoht was sent to work under his orders. Mann would later be bestowed as honorary citizen of Bremen 
for his efforts. BSA, 2-R-11, Dampschiffahrt, post- und Packetschiffahrt zwischen Bremen und V.S. 1837-
1867, Letters of Mann to Dockwitz September 30 1845 and August 18 1846. 
83 For the connoisseurs of wine the shipment consisted of eighty one bottles of 1727 Rudesheimer 
Berg Rosewein, 25 bottles of 1822 Rudesheimer Berg Ausstich Cabinet,and 50 bottles of 1783 
Johanisberger Cabinet. Letter of Duckwitz to Mann October 7 1845. A bit later a similar shipment was sent 
to the German Society of New York to create goodwill there. Ibid., Letters October 7 and November 
211845.  
84 Ibid., Letters of Mann to Duckwitz September 29 and October 14 1845.  
85 The fact that both lodged in the same house helped influencing the House Representative of 
Alabama. Even Thomas Green the American consul of Antwerp who had resided for a long period in 
Germany supported Bremen to the great annoyance of B aulieu. Only the contemporary envoy in Brussels 
Thomas Clemson helped Antwerp’s bid Ibid., letters of Mann to Duckwitz December 13 and 29 1845 and  
ABMFA 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Letter of Beaulieu to MFA April 14 1847. 
86 BSA, 2-R-11, Dampschiffahrt, post- und Packetschiffa rt zwischen Bremen und V.S. 1837-
1867, Letter January 29 1846. 
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In the end, the postmaster received four proposals from American capitalists for 
lines to Le Havre and Bremen. In the meantime, Le Hardy de Beaulieu replaced Serruys 
as envoy in Washington. He tried to convince the American entrepreneurs of changing to 
Antwerp, or at least to use it as a port of call by one of them. According to Le Hardy, 
Edward Mills the principal initiator had been forced to choose Bremen by the postmaster 
general and this to the discontent of New York merchants. Like many of his New York 
colleagues, he had contacts with Le Havre and preferred the French port, and even the 
Belgian port, over Bremen. Yet the tobacco lobby convinced Washington to go against 
the New York merchants’ interest. The Belgian envoys printed new pro-Antwerp 
pamphlets to distribute among Congressmen and wrote articles for the press. However, 
the Bremen lobby had bribed the American press to no lo ger publish pro-Antwerp 
articles.87 The authorities appointed a consul general in New York, Adolphe Moxhet, to 
help the cause. Even the Prussian consul of New York, M . Schmidt favored Antwerp 
over Bremen, but he had his hands tied because of the position of his superior, Gerolt. 
The Belgian envoy in Prussia, Nothomb, obtained guarantees from Prussian authorities to 
support the Antwerp candidacy, yet it resulted in an empty promise.88 The Belgians did 
not lack the zeal in lobbing, yet they failed in having someone to negotiate directly; and 
especially someone like Gevekoht who attracted capital in support of the bid.  
In June 1846, a dual contract with Mills’ Ocean Steamship Navigation Company 
was made official by Congress. Mills received $200,0  a year for a biweekly service to 
Bremen via Southampton; subsequently, another contract awarded worth $150.000 for a 
biweekly service to Le Havre. Unlike other American bidders, such as R. Forbers, M. 
Sloo, E. Collins, and J. Smith, Mills was virtually unknown in American maritime 
circles. Washington’s choice of Bremen and Mills received no support from New York, 
the financial capital of the country. Despite the help of Gevekoht to move the German 
                                                 
87 Pamphlets included that of Camille Le Hardy de Beauli u, Projet d’une ligne postal a vapeur 
d’Anvers a New York, Brussel, 1847, 48p. and Henry Maly Antwerp and Bremen with reference to the 
projected steamship line between US and Europe, Washington, 1846, 24p. Yet Johnson the postmaster 
general came from Virginia and was accused by Beauli u to solely defend the interests of the Tobacco 
industry. Because of their influence Beaulieu could no longer found papers willing to publish articles 
signed by important New York merchant houses favoring Antwerp. ABMFA 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp 
New-York, 1839-1889, Letters May 7 and June 24 1846. 
88 ABMFA 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Letter of Le Hardy de Beaulieu 
to MFA February 28 and June 4 1846.  
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community to invest in the shipping line, the necessarry capital could not be raised. The 
lobbyist returned home for financial support. The Br men Senate contributed $100.000, a 
sum equaled by Prussian authorities, while other German states such Sachsen, Hanover, 
Baden, Oldenburg, Frankfurt, Nassau, Darmstadt and Hessen promised an additional 
$200,000. The Washington undertook her maiden voyage in June 1847, followed by the 
Hermann the following spring.89 In intervening period, the French had opened a service 
to New York with the Union, which excelled in inefficiency and was forced to cease its 
service shortly thereafter. The inferior quality of the steamers of the Bremen Line could 
not rival the Cunard Line. Mills was unable to raise funds for the Le Havre contract 
which the American authorities assigned to Mortimer Livingstone and his Havre Steam 
Navigation Company instead. Despite the subsidies, both lines were only a qualified 
success and never induced development and expansion during their ten year existence. 
Only the subsidized Collins Line, sailing to Liverpool, boosted American hopes in 
rivaling the British fleet.  
 
3) The end of Cunard’s dominance and the breakthrough of migrant transport on 
steamships 
 
If the 1840s were characterized by the growing pains of steam-shipping and 
skeptic capitalist who refrained from investing in this branch, the 1850s marked a 
turnaround with the commercial success of unsubsidized lines drawing their revenues 
from migrant transport. The analysis of the various prospects for the opening of a 
transatlantic steamship line during the 1840s illustrated the extent to which this 
breakthrough had been anticipated. Sailing ships tred o protect this lucrative market, and 
possibly delayed the transition, but they could notprevent it. Plans for long distance 
steamship lines within the Hamburg-Le Havre range boomed because of the growing 
awareness that a lack of those endangered the competitive position of the port, especially 
since trade through Liverpool thrived because of its steamship connections. The success 
                                                 
89 The westbound prices quoted for the Washington were 120 dollar first class and 60 dollar 2nd 
class. The national pride attached to the line is reflected by the names chosen for the ships. Hermann 
alluded to the liberator of Germany from Rome like Washington did for America from England. Ibid., letter 
of Beaulieu to MFA May 10 1847and  BSA, 2-R 11, Dampschiffahrt, post- und Packetschiffahrt zwischen 
Bremen und V.S. 1837-1867, various newspaper articles 1847.  
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and failures of these ports, which will be discussed h re, had an important impact on their 
prominence as migrant gateways in subsequent periods. Moreover, with the introduction 
of steam, conference agreements made their appearanc  in the maritime world and return 
migration became conceivable. In short, the evolutin of steam-shipping during the 1850s 
helps in explaining the important repercussions it had on the second mass-migration 
movement following the Civil War.  
 
3.1) The Anglo-American rivalry and the beginning of migrant transport by steam 
 
In the wake of the efforts of the New York merchant community to open a 
steamship line to Europe the Cunard Line obtained a subsidy increase to extend its 
service with a biweekly sailing to New York.90 This decision was spurred by the 
American subsidy awarded to Edward Collins for the op ning of a line to Liverpool; in 
direct competition to the British market leader.91 The steamers of the United States Mail 
Steamship Co, popularly known as the Collins Line, managed to steal the blue ribbon -a 
distinction awarded to ships with the fastest trans-Atlantic crossing- from the Cunard 
Line. The Collins vessels also exceeded their competitors in size and the rivalry quickly 
evolved into a matter of national prestige, fueled by the popular press eagerly reporting 
on each sailing of both lines (Crouthamel, 1989, 87).92 The popular attention for the 
Anglo-American struggle for maritime supremacy was used by both lines to maintain or 
increase their subsidies.93  
                                                 
90 The Cunard Line received extra subsidies amounting to 145.000 pounds form British Admiralty 
to double its fleet to eight ships. The New York service quickly overshadowed the Boston one. 
91 Collins, operating a passenger service by sail with the Dramatic line started lobbying for 
subsidies in 1841 and saw his efforts finally rewarded by an Act of Congress passed March 3 1847 
awarding 385.000 dollars for 20 round trip sailings a year with five first class steamers, ‘capable of beating 
the Cunarders’.  
92 As Crouthamel noted with the raise of sensational popular press such as the New York Herald: 
Fires were always news, as were shipwrecks, and transatlantic steamboat races were exciting. This would 
remain so throughout the period. Bennett a keen traveler to the old continent developed a particular interest 
for steamshipping. He despised the British monopoly and fervently supported subsidy policies especially to 
the Collins Line (Crouthamel, 1989, 31, 39 and 87). 
93 Collins’ lobbying efforts in Congress, culminating in huge party in Washington for the 
inauguration of the Baltic honored by the presence of the President and 2000 other prominent officials 
resulted in an increase from 385,000  to a yearly contribution of 853,000$. Cunard used the rivalry to 
maintain his subsidy which was challenged by the establi hment of new non-subsidized British lines.  
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The rivalry spurred technological innovation, yet behind the scenes the lines 
concluded a secret agreement neutralizing the competition. A month before the first 
sailing of Collins’ Atlantic both companies established what is known as the first oceanic 
steamship cartel pooling revenues and setting minimum rates for both passengers and 
cargo. The British were the initiators of the agreem nt, wanting to avoid a rate war and 
fearing that the ambitious Americans may outrival them in cabin passenger transport.  
The statistics for 1852 proved that the fears were not unfounded; Collins carried 4,306 
passengers against Cunard’s 2,969. Yet, despite occasi nal price cuts inducing 
passengers to choose a certain line over another, t agreement was respected and it 
worked to the advantage of the Cunard Line. The contract protected the British Line from 
American ships which had a decided superiority in speed and service, and in the long run 
allowed it to consolidate its position in cabin pass ge and mail transport on the North 
Atlantic.  
The success of the fast crossings of Collins’ company in attracting passengers also 
had downsides, pushing the company into taking on increased costs and risks. The speed 
was obtained through heavy coal consumption and by straining the engines so that they 
were in need of constant repairs. More importantly, because of the rivalry the line 
suffered two shipwrecks, with heavy passenger losses.94 On the contrary, the more 
conservative Cunard Line never lost a ship prior to 1915, earning an impeccable 
reputation based on the regularity of service and safety of ships, which proved crucial for 
the passenger business. While Cunard paid out dividends to its shareholders, Collins 
never returned anything to his investors and was forced out of business by 1858. The 
failure of Collins had important repercussions on the American maritime policies, 
withdrawing their direct financial support of oceanic steamship lines. The contract with 
the Bremen Line was ended that same year and the Le Havre connections did not survive 
the Civil War. The national policies, which placed the American steamships at a 
disadvantage, in both their construction and their as application, would practically drive 
the American flag out the North Atlantic. This means that with the subsequent transition 
from sail to steam, the lucrative migrant business which had been dominated by 
                                                 
94 In 1854 the Artic collided with Vesta and sank with a loss of 300 lives including Collins’ wife, 
son and daughter. The loss of the Pacific without a trace in 1856 signified the beginning of the end for the 
American Line.  
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American sailing packet companies would be left almost entirely in the hands of foreign 
steamship companies (Hutchins 325-357, Greenhalgh 312-3 5, Sloan 83-100, Hyde 38-
52,  Safford 53-85). 
The conservative policy of the Cunard Line, to which the company owed its 
reputation as the safest vessels on the North Atlantic, delayed the adaptation of 
technological innovations used by rival lines establishing themselves on the market. The 
contract with the Admiralty, including requirements of shipbuilding, also limited the 
company’s freedom to apply innovations which unsubsidized rivals did not have to deal 
with. Unlike the Cunard Line, the management of theInman Line in inaugurating a 
steamship service on the Liverpool-Philadelphia route in 1850 experimented with new 
inventions. The use of the iron hull and screw propellers, instead of the wooden paddle-
wheel steamers used by Cunard, grew to be the proto-type for all subsequent liners. 
Wooden ships had reached a limit in size, but with the introduction of iron, ships of 
virtually any size could be built. The increased capacity of ships offered the possibility of 
lowering the prices and hence steamship travel could be opened up to the poorer class of 
migrants. The costs also decreased due to engine improvements which reduced the coal 
consumption and the space on board required for coal. In the meantime, Liverpool had 
developed into ‘the’ nodal point for the migrant traffic to the US. It did not only attract 
nationals, and the neighboring Irish, but also Germans and Scandinavians due to the good 
railroad connections to Hull where feeder services dropped off continental migrants.  
The Inman Line opened up the market of migrant transport on steamships in 1852. 
William Inman and his wife are believed to have traveled as steerage passengers on 
sailing packets several times to find out how the organization and service of the transport 
could be improved. Inmam built in separate compartments for women, men and families, 
offered individual berths for each steerage passenger, three cooked meals per day, an on-
board doctor, towels, soap and decent washing facilities. The ships where chartered 
during the Crimean War, temporarily disrupting the development of the line.95 By the 
end, of the war the migrant flow to the US had dropped yet the company stuck to its 
                                                 
95 The loss of two steamers that same year was equally responsible for the setbacks suffered in 
developing the line. The loss of the City of Glasgow the line’s founding steamer vanished that same year 
with no one of the 480 passengers surviving the event to tell what occurred. Still in 1854 the ‘City of 
Philadelphia’ also wrecked on her maiden trip yet without loss of life.  
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policy of migrant transport shifting its American terminal to New York and calling at 
Queenstown, the principal Irish migrant gateway. The service became weekly in 1860 
and twice a week six years later (Hyde, 1975, 72; Keeling, 1999b, 41, Greenhalgh, 1939, 
346 and Coleman, 1977, 25-27). Other lines soon followed, such as the Hamburg 
America Line and the Nord-Deutscher Lloyd from Bremen. When the Collins Line 
closed its books, Inman took over the sailing dates of the American company, increasing 
its revenues drawn from mail transport. The company lso gained ground on the cabin 
passenger market and id did all this without subsidie  from the British government.96 
Cunard’s monopoly faced its first lasting challenge and was forced to enter the steerage 
business in 1860, speeding up the transition from sail to steam. In 1856, only one out of 
twenty-eight migrants arrived by steam, while four years later the number climbed to one 
out of three.97 Despite charging more than sailing packets, there was no lack of migrants 
prepared to pay the difference for the many advantages it offered.98 The crossing could 
now be made in less than two weeks, while sailing packets averaged five to six weeks.99 
No longer being dependent on winds, the regularity of sailing also increased. This 
shortened the time during which migrants remained without income and reduced the risks 
of contracting disease at sea. Yet. the most important impact on migration patterns of 
Inman’s innovations –which proved steam-shipping’s profitability without subsidies 
based on migrant transport and which triggered the subsequent steamshipping boom- was 
that migration became less definitive. An increasing number of migrants started to leave 
with the intention of returning, further reducing the barriers separating Old and New 
World.  
3.2) The emergence of migrant transport by steam in continental ports within 
the Hamburg-Le Havre range 
                                                 
96 An Anonymous letter sent to Doppelaar, commissioner of a society prospecting to open a line 
from Rotterdam reported that Collins and Cunard quoting 35 pounds for first class travel greatly suffered 
from the low rates of the Inman Line, quoting only 20 pounds for 1st class passengers on the City of 
Glasgow. GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 7.   
97 In 1856, 5000 out of 141,000 migrants, in 1860 34,000 out of 108,000 (Greenhalgh 1939, 349) 
98 Keeling estimated that the initial prices of eight pounds were twice the ones charged by sailing 
ships. Midway the 1860 the price was reduced to 5 punds nearing the rates paid on sailing ships ranging 
from three to five pounds (Keeling, 1999, 42). 
 
99 The first class clippers had even reduced the crossing to three to four weeks yet during the 
sailing ship era migrant transport remained a fragmentized business. Many still made the crossing on 
chartered ships instead of liner services   
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3.2.1) Rotterdam’s awakening from commercial nostalgia  
 
The efforts of the Dutch envoy in Washington to promote Rotterdam as a possible 
terminal contrasted with the attitude of the Chamber of Commerce of the port, reflecting 
the still predominant aversion towards the German tr sit and migrant trade. On the 
efforts of the Minister of Foreign affaires the Chamber stated that the amount of trade 
with the US did not justify the opening of such a line. A report containing ‘advice to 
promote the emigration of Germans through the Netherlands and regarding the 
commercial interests of the country’ was shelved by the Chamber of Commerce (Stokvis, 
1976, 173-174). Nevertheless, not all Rotterdam merchants were blind to the promising 
prospects of North-Atlantic steam-shipping. Eventually, the Chamber of Commerce 
could be convinced of trying to let Mills’ ships call t Rotterdam.100 When the efforts 
proved unsuccessful some prominent Rotterdam merchants decided to take matters into 
own hands.101 In 1850, the Rotterdam-American Steamship Company was established 
estimating the needed capital for opening a line to New York at 1,200,000 guilders. Jan 
Willem Van Oord traveled to Scotland to negotiate th construction of two similar ships 
to the City of Glasgow of the Inman Line. The same year 750,000 guilders were raised 
but the society wanted at least one million before starting operations. Attempts were 
made to find investors abroad in Germany, England and in the US where the New York 
merchant house ‘Boonen and Graves’ was contacted.102 Yet they advised against the 
opening of the line because of the murdering competition of the Cunard Line; the lack of 
                                                 
100 NA, 2.05.13 Gezantschap in de Verenigde Staten van Amerika, 1814-1940 Various letters 
between MFA and the Dutch envoy Testa 1846-1848. 
101 A letter to the Dutch King asking support mentioned A. Plate, Dorrepaal. Bunge, Serruys, 
Phillippi, Jacobson as commissioners and Jan-Willem van Oord as president. Seeking financial help the 
society eventually only obtained the patronage of Prince Frederik. G.A.R., HAL, 3.04.16 W.A., 7 
Stoomboot Amerika 1850. 
102 The spelling of the name ‘Boonen’ was partly erased. It may just as well be Rooran. Graves 
was related to the Cunard family and the merchant house collaborated with the Havre Line underlining its 
expertise in Ocean Steam navigation. The society was approached by Baltimore merchants to convince the 
company to use that port as a terminal. The completion of the Baltimore Ohio Railroad connections to Saint 
Louis and Cincinnati offered the best prospects for the migrant trade. In Baltimore the company would 
receive much more support from local authorities than in New York and would not have to deal with 
competitors. C.G. Baylon, American consul in Amsterdam on the contrary tried to convince the company to 
use Norfolk, Virginia to throw the trade with southern states of the yoke of Liverpool and New York. GAR, 
HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 7 and 10-3. 
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support from the Dutch government; and the limited volume of valuable German and 
Dutch mercantile goods making the enterprise too dependent on the steerage passenger 
business.103 The repeated applications for subsidies from the Dutch government, and the 
local authorities of Rotterdam, remained unsuccessful. The company even turned to the 
Prussian government, which refused because it would conflict with the significant 
support it had given to Bremen. After five years, only 860,000 guilders were raised and 
the plans were shelved (Mees, 1883, 5-6; De Boer; 1998, 7-10).  
As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, the colonial trade policies had taken 
away the incentive to invest in steam shipping. The ostrich trade policies lead to the 
decline of the once so preeminent Dutch merchant marine. It was only during the 1850s 
that the Dutch woke up from the commercial nostalgia of the Golden Ages and the 
economic stagnation. The government started to invest h avily in infrastructure to 
facilitate the transit trade from Germany which worked as a catalyst for the Dutch 
industrialization. The government contributed to modernizing port facilities and to 
expanding the railroad-network; two aspects in which the Netherlands seriously lagged 
behind their neighbors. Yet, the evolution from commercial traditionalism with the 
hostile attitudes towards transit trade to modernization was a slow process. During the 
1850s, the liberalization of trade policies occured. The decades of disputes between 
Prussia and Holland over the free Rhine trade came to an end with a new treaty in 1851 
granting the Germans their liberal demands (Blasing a d Langenhuyzen 102-108 and 
Horlings, 1995, 194-197). It was only during the early 1850s that Testa negotiated a new 
trade agreement with the US. Gever had repeatedly urged for this ten years before; 
pointing out that the high tariffs harmed trade relations between the countries.104 Yet, his 
advice had been completely ignored up to 1853, when t  protective barriers were taken 
away -long after the neighboring countries had lifted hem. Tolls for using the Voorne 
channel decreased considerably. Publicity was to be given to this in the American press 
to encourage new trade between the countries.105  
                                                 
103 GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 7 letter of merchant house Boonen and Graves to J.W. van 
Oordt May 14 1851. 




Also in 1853, Dutch authorities finally made work of reviewing the laws 
regulating the migrant passage through the Netherlands yet it would take eight years 
before the proposal was enacted. The new law, based on the Belgian and German rivals, 
significantly simplified the conditions of admission. Passports or other certificates were 
no longer needed. The law also subjected the lodging to controls while inspection of 
ships was increased. The requirements imposed on ships were based on the American 
laws. New Committees of Supervision were created. They also had to handle the 
complaints of the migrants and to provide them information. The main occupation of the 
Committee was to improve the reputation of Rotterdam abroad (Van der Valk, 1976, 159-
160). Dutch consuls frequently published the laws, and the yearly reports of the 
Supervision Committee in German out-migration regions, during the years that 
followed.106 But, as the Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce noted, th  laws were too little 
too late. Direct migration to the US had come to a complete standstill. In 1863, only 39 
out of the 938 migrants registered by the Supervision Committee passing through 
Rotterdam had traveled directly. In 1864, the ratio mounted to 542 out of 3,161 and in 
1865 it was 752 out of 3,983. Most of the transit mgrants traveled on to London or 
Liverpool. The chamber did not expect any direct effect of the laws, since the migration 
flows had completely shifted to other ports and redirecting them to Rotterdam would be a 
long process. As will be seen in the following chapters, these predictions were not 
unfounded. The lack of transatlantic steamship connections would be felt. The migrant 
flow through Rotterdam eventually revived yet it would never catch up on its German 
and English rivals. 
 
3.2.2) Was Antwerp much like a frog or was it an ox to be reckoned with? 
 
Conversely to the Netherlands, the Belgian government had heavily invested in 
port infrastructure and railroad connections during the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Their orientation to the German hinterland paid off, drawing twenty-seven percent of the 
volume of transport to the German hinterland (Blasing and Langenhuizen, 1998, 108-109 
                                                 
106 NA, 2.05.10.04, Nederlands Gezantschap in duitse Bond Fankfurt, Nassau, Hessen en Keur-
Hessen 1816-67, NR 14 Nassau Ingekomen en minuten van uitgaande brieven 1830-66; Numerous letters 
from the MFA to the consuls in the region 1861-1866. 
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and Horlings, 1995, 208). The efforts to attract migrants to Antwerp were also rewarded 
with a steady increase of the flow, yet it continued to trail behind Le Havre and Bremen 
(see annex 1). The active subsidy policy supporting maritime lines to the US exerted a 
pull on some sailing packets yet the French and German port still had far superior 
connections. The Antwerp governor stressed the fact that the commercial future of the 
port heavily relied on the decent organization of migrant transport. He pleaded for 
investment of the money given to maritime lines in extra measures to attract migrants, 
claiming that steerage passengers made subsidies sup rfluous as they served as a magnet 
for shipping lines.107  
However, the Belgian government continued with its active policy and the 
opening of a steamship line remained a priority. Slowly the conviction grew that Mills 
did not need to be convinced to alternate his Bremen service to Antwerp one out of every 
two crossings, but that the port should rely on its own strength and take initiative. When 
the French government announced their service, it was no longer a question as with the 
acquisition of the British Queen to be ahead of the competitors, yet it was a matter of not 
falling behind to become a second rate port and loosing its position on the German 
hinterland.108 Belgian diplomats in the US often blamed the Antwerp merchant 
community for their lack of initiative. According to Beaulieu, the Bremen merchants 
were much more supportive of the lobbying efforts of their officials, which were 
contributing to their success.  
Yet, the Antwerp merchants seemed to let go of the failure of the British Queen 
and took a more active stance. Continuous efforts were made through the Belgian 
                                                 
107 They did not have the first class packets as sailing from Antwerp and the subsidy to the sailing 
service to New York was even withdrawn in 1847 because of the lack of regularity. ABMFA, 2020, 
Emigration, II,  Letter of the Teichmann to MFA Janu ry 14 1847 and ABMFA 2241, Steam-shipping 
Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Letters of Moxhet to MFA October 17 and November 9 1846.  
108 Ibid., In a letter of May 20 1847 the Antwerp Chamber rported to the MFA that the 
government would open the New York service on May 30. The steamship Chritophe Colombe, Canada, 
Darien and Ullowa would provide the service. First class cabin passage amounted to 1000 Franks, second 
500fr. and third 300fr. including food and wine. The line never operated at full force yet there is very little 
information available on the beginning of French steam shipping starting with the Précurseur built in 1841 
for a New York service but apparently never put in use. If the information of the Chamber of commerce is 
right the line seemed to have inaugurated the steamship crossing for migrants. Yet the line did not operate 
for long, never at full force and it is unknown if they carried out their intentions of transporting 3rd class 
passengers. The French Line eventually operated with other ships than the ones mentioned by the chamber 
of commerce namely; the Union, New York, Missouri and Philadelphia and initially sailed from Cherbourg 
before moving to Le Havre. Further investigation should shed more light on the obscure beginning years of 
French steam shipping.  
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emissaries in Germany to obtain the support of the R ine States and Prussia, for a line 
from Antwerp.109 This resulted in a prospect backed by Antwerp and Rhine merchants 
Compagnie Belge-Rhéneane de navigation transatlantique. All possible ways were 
explored. The Belgian envoy in Washington established contacts with the Danish envoy 
and Mr. Hanson planned to open a service from Gluckstadt to New York with the 
financial support of the Danish King. The envoy discu sed the possibility of establishing 
a Belgian-Danish company, with alternating a servic between Antwerp and Gluckstadt 
to New York.110 Both possibilities faded away however with the outbreak of the 1848 
revolution. That same year, an Antwerp emigration agent, Antoine Laane, backed by 
English investors planned to open The Belgian Transatlantic Steamship Navigation 
Company with four small slow steamers specialized in the transport of migrants and 
complemented with some goods. He inquired for possible subsidies, from the 
government, or at least a guarantee of interest in capital to attract investors.111 J. Claes, 
traveling on a Belgian subsidy to promote trade connections with Belgium, reported on 
yet another possibility. The Neptune Ocean Steamship Company projected a line also 
aimed at migrant transport financed by both the American and Belgian government. 
Antwerp also fitted into the plans of the American, Ambrose Thompson, in his trying to 
obtain governmental support for a line to China ando e between Phildalphia and Norfolk 
with the Belgian port.112 Even C. Vanderbilt showed interest in opening a line to 
Antwerp. However the poor results of the Bremen Line tempered the enthusiasm of the 
American authorities for more lines.  
The project of Laane gained the favor of Antwerp merchants applying for 
government assistance. Laane contended with competition from Adolphe Le Hardy de 
Beaulieu, who was backed by French and English financers.113 Yet the economic crisis of 
                                                 
109 Ibid., various letters, especially in 1847 and 1848 and GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 7, 
statutes of the enterprise.  
110 Ibid.,. Letter of Beaulieu to MFA March 8 1848 
111 The price for a migrant berth was set at 150 franks. Ibid., Letter Antoine Laane to MFA 
September 7 1849.  
112 He met among others Gordon Bennett editor of the New York Herald which already had a 
circulation of 36,000 asking him to publish more articles on the young nation. In his prospect Claes planned 
to charge 200fr. for migrants not including food. This had to enable them to compete with sailing packets 
charging 100 to 120 franks while food for ninety days at 1,5 franks per day needed to carried along 
bringing the price between 235 and 255 Franks Ibid.,  letter November 22 1849. 
113 Ibid., Letter of A. Le Hardy de Beaulieu January 19 1850. 
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the 1840s had left the Belgian government with a very small budget to distribute, while 
all prospects dealt with the same difficulty - raising capital. Laane and Le Hardy joined 
forces to improve their chances. Promoters traveled through Europe and the US to find 
investors willing to invest but to no avail. The Belgian Minister of Foreign Affaires kept 
on receiving other prospects.114 The migrant stream and the transit trade through Antwerp 
were declining, pushing the authorities to take measures (see annex 1). A draft proposal 
was drawn up by the different ministries to see the conditions under which and the 
manner in which they could support a steamship line.115 The authorities realized that they 
would not to being able to compete for mail and passenger service with the fast first class 
steamers of the Liverpool lines. Hence, they opted for a slower and smaller line, focusing 
on migrant and freight transport considered a fast service with first class steamers.116 
Antwerp merchants started to file propositions again.  
The proposition which eventually enjoyed the support of the Belgian government 
came from E Weber, C. Spillaerdt and G. Nothomb. It wass representative of the other 
proposals of the time and it clearly illustrates the ongoing shift to migrant transport by 
steam.  The capital required for the venture was set at five million Belgian franks. Five 
small ships of 1,200 tons, equipped with engines of two hundred horse power, would 
provide a fortnightly service.  The company requested a subsidy of 1,200 franks per 
voyage and a guarantee of interest on the capital to ttract investors. The ships would 
accommodate fifty first class passengers, have limited room for freight transport, but the 
main commercial object was migrant transport, providing for five hundred steerage 
passengers. The price estimates included food costs, estimated at 10 franks and the head 
tax hospital, and New York port costs estimated at another 30 franks (see table 1).117 
Table 1: Price averages for the crossing including food provisions 
 
                                                 
114 One of the French entrepreneurs, M. Leduc dated June 10 1851; another of German 
businessmen residing in Antwerp Dienziger and Diesch December 1 1851. Through the intermediate of Le 
Hardy de Beaulieu traveling in the US anumber of prposition were formulated such as one from American 
capitalist Rhodes January 18 1852, another from Philadelphian entrepreneur E.Licoln. He also aroused th  
ineterst of English investors such as  A. Lelievre, E.W. Morris, G. Rennie en Co planning to open a line for 
migrants charging 10 pounds for second class and 6 pounds for third class berths. 
115 ABMFA 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Correspondence between 
ministries January 22 1852. 
116 Ibid., Correspondence between various ministries March nd April 1853. 











January 100 115 125 14375 
February 100 115 250 28750 
March 120 130 500 65000 
April 150 180 500 90000 
May 130 150 500 75.000 
June 120 130 500 65000 
July 120 130 375 48750 
August 130 150 500 75.000 
September 135 155 500 77500 
October 120 140 500 70000 
November 110 125 250 30000 
December 100 110 125 13750 
 
The big competitive advantage of steamships over sailing ships was their speed 
which reduced the cost for provisions. In most ports, sailing ships needed to provide food 
provisions for 90 days. To avoid potential abuses of captains, withholding food 
provisions and selling them on arrival in New York, laws were passed obliging them to 
distribute the remained of the food supplies among steerage passengers after the trip.118 
These laws were not adapted to include steamships, giving them an important advantage 
in  undercutting on the price. The table also reflects that prices fluctuated according to the 
season of travel, which peaked during spring and summer. After having been approved 
by the Chamber of Representatives, the Minister of Foreign Affaires defended the project 
in the Senate claiming that migrant transport had become one of the catalysts of maritime 
business:  
“There are few things that are so well understood as the keen battle between the 
ports to contract migrant illustrates.  The number of migrants embarking in 
Antwerp is growing yet we are far from reaching theamounts passing through our 
rival ports. While Antwerp’s last year total was limited to 14,900, Le Havre 
numbered 60,000, Hamburg 30,000 and Bremen 58,500. This proportion can and 
has to be modified. Some very interesting propositins have been made to boost 
                                                 
118 This was so in Belgium yet it can only be guessed to what extent these were implemented. The 
laws were adapted to include steamships in 1855 stating that steamships needed to carry provisions for 35 
days which was lowered to 20 days in 1858. The minium price was said to be 105 franks would lower 
than the Inman line rates. 
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the emigrant passage through Antwerp from the moment that the port will be 
connected by steam navigation to New York.”119 
 
The Senate overwhelmingly approved the propositions t  upport the project.120 
Thielens, the Antwerp emigration inspector, was appointed as government commissioner 
of the company while Henry Mali, the New York consul, represented the line in the 
US.121 The Antwerp merchants took 1,500 stock options, while t e Belgian bank, Société 
Générale, bought another -1,000 enough for half of the capital which allowed the Belgian 
Royal Transatlantic Steam shipping Company to begin its operations. The consular corps 
was asked to promote the opening of the line in their region. Yet again the project failed. 
The construction of the ships was entrusted to Amsterdam shipbuilders, rather than the 
more experienced British builders. The delivery of the first two ships suffered long delays 
and they proved to have serious shortcomings on their maiden voyages. The costs had 
been seriously underestimated, and the company soonwas making significant losses. 
After the Crimean War, many vessels returned to transatlantic service, depressing the 
demand for shipping capacity. As a result, the company folded in 1858 before the last 
two vessels could be launched.122 With this failure, the decline of Antwerp as a migrant 
gateway to the New World set in. Despite the efforts of the authorities the port was not 
able to take a prominent position on the North Atlantic trade route. De Mann’s 
assessment of Antwerp being ‘the frog in the table, which wished to reach the siz  of an 
ox’, seemed to be confirmed, for the time being.123  
 
                                                 
119 ABMFA 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Summary of parliamentary 
debates 10 June 1853 and BGRA, TO 74, Correspondence 1853. 
120 The Senate was only apprehensive on how. Especially the guarantee on capital had never been 
accorded before and they feared to create a dangerous precedent for other industries. In the end all port
dues were lifted, a subsidy of 1200 franks per shipand 4% guarantee on capital were given. 
121 Mali was promoted as consul general of New York to facilitate his tasks. He was responsible to 
contract freight for the eastbound leg and received a 2,5% commission for each passenger ticket sold.  
ABMFA, Consuls et Consulats, New York, pers. 623; Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Henri Mali, 
consul, New York. 
122 Again, the construction of the five vessels took much longer than planned. The company only 
began operations on 29 December 1855, but the first crossing of Belgique tuned into a fiasco. Due to 
serious leaks the vessel had to call three times at English ports for repairs; after its last call on 24 January 
1856, the crossing to New York was cancelled, and it took eight months before the ship could be put back 
into service. Although Belgique was joined by Constitution and Leopold J, the company folded in 1857 
before the next two vessels built on Belgian shipyards could be launched. 
123 BSA, 2-R-11, Dampschiffahrt, post- und Packetschiffa rt zwischen Bremen und V.S. 1837-
1867, Letter of De Mann to Duckwitz December 13 1845. 
 89
3.3) The second empire and the Pereire brothers: first steps in Le Havre’s 
de-Americanization 
 
Like the Netherlands, France was lagging behind its neighbors regarding 
infrastructural development. Because of the lack of capital and the inadequate 
government policies for railroad building, the country still did not have an efficient 
national transport network by 1850 (Smith, 2006, 64-65). The government supported 
attempts to support transatlantic steamship connections, yet it failed to produce satisfying 
results on the North Atlantic. During the early 1840s a government commission, 
‘Commission de Gomer’ was appointed to open a steamship line between Le Havre and 
New York.124 During the early 1840s constant rumors on the imminent opening of such 
line circulated, but never seemed to have materialized. The French-American trade was 
pretty much left entirely in the hands of American business man, eighty six percent of the 
trade occurring on American vessels during the fiscal year of 1841.125 In 1847, the French 
government fearing a fall behind England, US and Germany in transatlantic steam 
shipping subsidized the opening of a line. The French Line operated four steamers; 
Union, New York, Missouri and Philadelphia sailing initially from Cherbourg before 
moving to Le Havre. Only the Union’s first trip was successful, all others suffered 
constant delays. The line became a laughing stock in New York, hurting French national 
pride. The two sailings in November 1847 only numbered five and eleven eastbound 
passengers. In the beginning of January, unable to do something about the delays, the 
service was suspended (Greenhalgh, 1939, 320-324).  
After the 1848 revolution attempts of reformers to revive the economy were 
obstructed by a political stalemate which only came to nd with the coup d’état of Louis-
Napoleon Bonaparte December 1851. In the subsequent decades the banking revolution 
which set in during the previous decades, with the introduction of joint stock companies 
with limited reliability took decisive turn when the Pereire brothers, Emile and Isaac 
founded the Crédit Mobilier in 1852. The institution provided the means to finance the 
industrial development of France, making capital avail ble for the modernization of port 
                                                 
124 AND, Nr 7 Reports on steam shipping of the New York consul to MFA Letters August 18 and 
September 16 1842. 
125 Unfortunately the consular correspondence of New York for the period 1845 to 1854 has not 
been preserved. Ibid., letter September 24 1842.  
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infrastructure, expansion of railroads and steamship lines (Smith, 2006, 67-69). The 
Pereire brothers were the driving force behind the establishment of the transatlantic 
shipping company Compagnie Générale Maritime in 1855. Nonetheless, it would take a 
reorganization of the company and another nine years before the Compagnie Generale 
Transatlantique, with the help of government subsidie , offered a successful service on 
the Le Havre-New York route.  
In the meantime American investors and ship-owners provided first class sailing 
ship and steamship connections between Le Havre and New York. When Mills failed to 
gather enough capital to pay off the third ship Franklin intended for the Le Havre service, 
he lost the American mail contract for that route to Mortimer Livingstone. The American 
businessmen, with experience in the packet service, started the service with Argo and 
Fulton later completed with the Franklin and the Humboldt. These decent ships were, 
however, not of the same class of the Collins and Cunard steamers. The success of the 
line was hampered by a new law lifting restrictions on British ships to carry national 
goods. Cunard immediately opened a feeder service from Le Havre in accordance with 
the British company’s sailings to carry continental goods fighting the newly established 
American lines.126 The Havre Line was making losses, and had troubles in fulfilling the 
requirements for the American mail subsidy, an opportunity used by the Belgian envoy in 
Washington, Bosch to convince the American authorities of sailing to Antwerp instead. 
Bosch was backed by A. Thompson, and American entrepren urs strongly soliciting for 
government subsidies and both gained the favor of the postmaster general to alter the 
subsidies. Congress decided likewise but an intensiv  lobby-campaign of Livingstone and 
the French envoy in Washington deferred the transition.127 Thompson’s bid to buy the 
ships from the Havre Line was stopped partly because the line started to make profits. 
The American businessman traveled to Belgium negotiating favorable conditions for the 
project. But, in the meantime the Belgian government had concluded a contract with the 
                                                 
126 Moxhet suggested to establish a similar service from Antwerp in anticipation of the opening of 
direct line. Am Antwerp newspaper article probably dating from 1851announced the opening of such 
service stating that New York was now only 16 to 18 days away yet it never materialized. ABMFA 2241, 
Steam-shipping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Letter of Moxhet to MFA, January 22 1850. 
127 Bosch even gave a speech for the shareholders of the Union Line to convince them of the 
benefits of a changeover. Ibid., various letters of Bosch and Thompson to MFA betwe n May 23 1852 and 
February 1854.  
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Belgian Royal Transatlantic Steam shipping Company. The American had hoped to 
receive extra subsidies but returned from empty handed and abandoned the project.128  
In the end, the Havre Line retained the contract, but had to tolerate a new 
competitor on the route in 1855 Cornelius Vanderbilt opened his Vanderbilt European 
Line. Both lines, however, stopped their activities during the American Civil War. The 
initial plans of the Compagnie Générale Maritime included a steamship line to New York 
targeting migrant transport as the primary source of r venue.129 Arthur Gautier started the 
operations with the Barcelone, leaving the first class business to Collins and Cunard 
steamers, he concentrated on the third-class westbound and second-class eastbound 
passengers, but the ship only made some crossings in 1856.130 The plans only fully 
materialized some nine year later, but in the meantime French authorities started to adapt 
its laws regarding migrant transport which had remained relatively unchanged from the 
1830s.  
On the contrary to Antwerp, Hamburg and Bremen, where laws were drawn up in 
accordance with the migrant broker and ship owner’s interests, there seemed to have been 
a total lack of dialogue between the French authorities and the Le Havre merchants. The 
three-month closure of the French boarders for all migrants on their way to the New 
World during the cholera scare of 1849 illustrates his. The lack of laws regulating 
migrant transport was used by the Prussian government in 1853 as an excuse to prohibit 
transatlantic migration of nationals through French ports, diverting them to Bremen and 
Hamburg. This event eventually led to a shift in polices of the French government 
facilitating the transit rather than obstructing it, dedicating much attention to protecting 
the migrant form abuses. The imperial decree of 1855 was passed, adapting French 
regulations to the German and Belgian model.131  Five years later, the decrees regarding 
migrant transport were bundled into laws fitting the needs of the new era of migrant 
                                                 
128 Thompson then traveled to Netherlands hoping to obain the support of the Dutch authorities 
but without success. 
129 CAMT 9AQ, 2-7, Dossiers des assemblées générales, 1855-1914. 
130 AND, Letter of the Consul in New York to the MFA, March 26 1856. and letter November 12 
1860. 
131 This included the establishment of government commissions supervising the transport both 
over land as at sea. Emigration agents now had to apply for a concession from the government and 
requirements for crossing the borders were restated. The regulations also included measures regarding 
migrant contracts, provisions, space allocations etc. similar to the ones adopted by other European migrant 
ports. 
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transport by steam. With this transition, the American flag which had dominated the 
North Atlantic migrant trade through Le Havre, disappeared to make room for French 
companies (Fouché, 1992, 69-78 and de Vannoise-Pochulu, 1993, 138-142). 
 
3.3.4) Bremen versus Hamburg: The rivalry among the Hanse cities for the North 
Atlantic trade  
 
With their active efforts to attract the American sub idized steamship line Bremen 
characterized itself as ‘the’ port of the Zollverein, with direct connection worldwide, 
much to the disdain of Hamburg. The contacts between both ports decreased, further 
fueling the rivalry. As seen in the previous chapter, the Hamburg Senate started to change 
its policies toward migrant transport during the 1840s, no longer obstructing the 
developing traffic which was predominantly indirect via England because of the strong 
trade relations with the British Isles. Hamburg closely followed the changes in migrant 
transport legislation of Bremen and adapted its laws ccordingly, yet its poor reputation 
regarding inferior protection and quality of service persisted. The Senate had little control 
on the indirect migration through England, which was cheaper, yet passage occurred 
under strenuous conditions and abuses were frequent (Gelberg, 1973, 10-16; Bretting, 
1991, 28). Hamburg lacked direct connections to rival their neighbors’ dominant position.  
The growing interest of Hamburg merchants for the North Atlantic trade and the 
will to counter Bremen’s ‘arrogance’ by establishing direct connections led to the 
founding of the Hamburg-Amerikanischen Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft (HAPAG).132 
The New York bound sailing ships offered room for 20 first-class, and 200 steerage 
passengers. The company deployed great efforts in expanding the migrant-agent network 
connecting out-migration regions with the port. The 1848 revolution and subsequent 
Danish-German conflict disrupted the service but during the 1850s HAPAG developed 
into a first-class sailing ship company, allowing the port to catch up its lag behind on 
continental rivals migrant transport. The success wa crowned by the inauguration of a 
steamship service in 1855 with the Hamonia combining both cabin as steerage passage 
                                                 
132 After his mission as envoy in Washington, Serruys took up the consular position in Hamburg 
closely following the evolutions in steam shipping on the North Atlantic both in Hamburg as in Bremen. 
ABMFA 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Letters of Serruys to MFA, 1847-1848. 
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with a capacity for 54 first-, 136 second-, and 310 third-class passengers.133 The 
cornerstones were laid for what would grow to become the biggest shipping company 
worldwide, by the century end (Witthöft, 1973, 9-18 and Wrede, 1997, 16-48).  
However, Bremen kept a leading role in migrant transport on the continent and 
this, as pointed by rivals during the lobbying campigns, was not so much because of its 
natural advantages or geographic location as it was because of the specific nature of the 
business organized through the migrant agent-network. The Belgian envoy in Berlin 
praised the dynamic activity and organization of the Bremen migrant brokers who did not 
wait until they arrived at the port, but migrant-agents nationwide in a way took the 
migrant by the hand, at the point of departure and gui ed him all the way to the New 
World.134 Thanks to the active role of the Bremen merchant community, the port also 
won the battle for the American steamship line. Besides the obvious commercial motives, 
the Hanseatic city also wanted the contract as a means of remaining outside of the grip of 
the Zollverein. Yet the 1848 revolution and the Danish-German war increased the desire 
of the Zollverein to control the Free City ports, and their merchant marine.  
As the American Line did not produce the expected rsults, and as Inman had 
proven that migrant transport by steam was profitable, Bremen merchants opened a new 
steamship line. A. Fritze & Company launched a servic  with the Hansa and Germania 
targeting migrants in 1853.135 However, the outdated wooden paddle steamers did not 
produce the same results as the iron screw propelled st amers inaugurated by Inman. 
When the Vanderbilt European Line took over Mills’ contract with such steamers in 
1857, and with the establishment of the North German Lloyd (NDL) that same year, 
Hansa and Germania disappeared from the North Atlantic route. After a difficult start, 
only the NGL maintained its service after the Civil War, monopolizing the migrant trade 
to US and in the process becoming the fourth biggest shipping company worldwide right 
after the HAPAG (Armgort, 1993, 46-47). 
                                                 
133 The Belgian consul general, Mr. Swaine, in Hamburg reported that a steamship line had been 
opened from Hamburg to New York with two ships. Yet the chartered vessel, British Queen left the 
company after the first crossing while the second Helena Sloreian constructed disappeared on its second 
voyage putting a premature end to the company. Ibid , Letter March 31 1851. 
134 Ibid., Letter of Nothomb, envoy of Berlin to  MFA, June 13 1849. 
135 The Hansa was refitted to carry 700 migrants and 50 first class passengers, the price for the 
steerage crossing was set at 40$ http://www.geocitis.com/mppraetorius/com.  Palmer list of merchant 
vessels 
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CONCLUSION PART 1: State policies and their influence on the connections 
between maritime and migration networks 
 
Strikwerda has refuted the state’s secondary influece on migration flows, as 
claimed by most migration historians, stressing the demographic and economic causes 
instead (Strikwerda, 1993 and 1999). He rightly points out that during the last two 
centuries, international regimes of the Western World have strongly affected tides of 
migration, despite the lack of an international migration regime, through trade and 
diplomacy: “the significant degree of international cooperation, free trade and economic 
integration which arose in the 19th century was only possible because of this diplomatic 
transformation which created the first modern interational regime” (Strikwerda, 1999, 
375). What seems to have escaped the attention of both migration and maritime historians 
is the commercial importance that the movement of transatlantic migrants generated. 
Based on the lack of laws restricting or encouraging nationals from moving or foreigners 
from entering, it has been wrongly assumed that nineteenth-century governments had 
little impact on migration. For nineteenth-century authorities with ports involved in the 
North Atlantic trade, the main preoccupation was not so much who moved and is much 
more, how and from where, they moved.  
The legislation regulating how people moved would later be used by the 
American authorities to try to control the quality and quantity of the people who moved. 
As was the case in Hamburg, and especially in Antwerp and Bremen, conscious efforts 
were made by the authorities to facilitate the transit of migrants; reconciling it with initial 
fears of burdening the public welfare system. Migrant brokers were assisted through the 
consular corps in expanding their migrant agent network in out-migration regions. The 
consuls also advertised migrant gateways swelling the information flow about the ‘New 
World’ and ways to reach it. New routes to join the port were opened and the border 
controls were adapted to allow the greatest flow possible to pass through. Rotterdam, the 
pioneering migration port on the European continent, missed the boat during the first half 
of the nineteenth century because of adverse maritie and migrant trade policies. Le 
Havre, on the contrary flourished despite the lack of interest of central authorities to 
stimulate the trade thanks to the dynamic activities of predominantly American 
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merchants to attract the migrant trade to the French port. The formation of the eastbound 
cotton and westbound migrant triangle through New York illustrates the extent to which 
migrant networks were imbedded in trade networks with ports as nodal points. 
National studies on migration policies have focused on the influence authorities 
had on the movement of nationals, yet they have fail d to observe the impact authorities 
with interests in migrant trade had on the movement of foreigners. As seen by contrasting 
the Dutch with the Belgian maritime state policies, governments played an active role in 
maritime and migration progressions in both countries. With Rotterdam, the Dutch had 
the most appropriate continental gateway for the migrant trade which would have 
stimulated the transatlantic movement had the statehown some interest in North Atlantic 
traffic. Belgian authorities, on the contrary, strongly supported Antwerp in competing 
with other ports to attract the trade. This spurred the passage of laws protecting the 
migrant on their way to; and during their stay at the port, while measures were taken to 
assure the wellbeing of the migrant during the crossing. Although abuses could never be 
eradicated, the awareness of the importance of the word of mouth publicity in the trade 
spread rapidly among merchants and authorities. This contributed to the low death rates 
among passengers heading to the US, which together with the increasing organization of 
the migrant transport from place of departure to the final destination reduced the costs, 
risks and fears in making the move. The growing flow had converted the migrant into a 
lucrative product, determining trade movements on the North Atlantic, the busiest long 
distance sea route. Authorities backed the development of the trade to support the 
national economy through which they tried to increase their political influence, and in the 
case of the US, Bremen and Belgium aimed at consolidating political independence. In 
the wake of this, new liberal trade treaties were signed between European authorities and 
the US allowing the Atlantic economic integration to further develop. Migrant 
communities established in the US reinforced the economic ties between the home 
country and the new world. Because of this and the belief that migration served as a 
security valve during economic crisis, Belgian and German authorities encouraged the 
movement of nationals. Yet the practice was stopped when it started to threaten trade 
relations between the countries. 
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The competition for the North Atlantic trade also spurred technological 
innovation, both in sailing packets through which most migrants traveled before the 
American Civil War, as in steam shipping, which started to take over the market from 
1850s onwards. With little capital available, government subsidies were crucial for the 
establishment of the pioneering transatlantic steamship connections. These were the 
object of national prestige causing a fierce competition to have the first-class steamers 
flying under the national flag. This was used by steam shipping companies to increase the 
government’s contribution while secretly concluding a reements to neutralize cut-rate 
competition. These cartels or steam shipping confere ces characterized the subsequent 
organization of the trade during the steamship era.The diplomatic corps, important 
contributors to the formation of the first modern international regime, played a key role in 
the opening of such lines, by lobbying for foreign state support; finding foreign investors; 
promoting the line; renegotiating new trade and postal treaties; or acting as shipping 
agents for the lines. Their role decreased when the Inman line proved that such a line 
could be managed without state help when using migrants as main source of revenue; 
allowing the transition from sail to steam to occur. Yet even during the steamship era 
consuls retained their importance as informers on new developing markets leading to the 
opening of new routes (Manitakis, 2007, 63-74).  
As pointed by Hyde: “the real point to grasp is that it was the steamship which 
changed the whole nature, organization and profitability of the migrant trade” (Hyde, 
1975, 23). Only because of the increased organization and commercialization of this 
trade, based on a system which had been developing since the eighteenth century, was the 
transatlantic migrant movement able to attain the ser volume it had. These high 
numbers allowed the steam shipping companies involved in migrant trade to position 
themselves among the biggest companies worldwide. Maritime and migration networks 
have too often been considered as parallel networks however the commercialization of 
migrant transport firmly connected both. These networks encompassed the whole 
Atlantic world connecting state authorities, busines and labor interests with the 
individual migrants, yet the key role of steam shipping companies in these remains 
unexplored. The works of Engelsing and Wockek in analyzing how the business was 
organized during the sailship era have not been followed by a study analyzing the true 
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impact of steam shipping on the organization of the trade (Engelsing, 1963 and Wokeck, 
1998). The following section, predominantly based on the archives of the Holland 
America Line (HAL) which ran a service between Rotterdam and New York, intends to 
fill that lacuna in the literature. 
 
Part II: Full steam ahead: from cut-throat competition to the formation 
of shipping cartels, 1870-1896 
 
The impact of steam shipping on migration patterns ha not gone unnoticed by 
migration historians. By reducing the duration of the crossing to less than two weeks, and 
by increasing the regularity of sailings, mortality rates dropped to below one percent. By 
limiting transit and traveling time, the period during which the migrant remained without 
income decreased. This changed the nature of migration, where it became less permanent 
and comprised of a growing number of single individuals making the crossing to earn a 
certain amount of capital, before eventually returning to their families in the home 
country instead of moving permanently with the family. This transition from sail to steam 
on the North Atlantic was delayed by the Civil War and an economic recession preceding 
the conflict. After the war, when the movement regained its importance, from 1863 
onwards, steamships had difficulties in catering for the increasing demand. Gathering 
capital for steamship enterprises, and the construction of vessels, was a slow process. By 
1873, sixteen steam shipping companies operated on the North Atlantic, driving sailing 
ships for migrant transport off that route (Cohn, 2005, 469-495).136  
The formation of joint-stock companies allowed ship owners to do migrant 
business on an unprecedented scale. These maritime enterprises developed into icons of 
national prestige, on which a wide variety of popularizing literature has appeared, often 
sponsored by the company itself. These publications usually provide a chronological 
overview of the company history, with a focus on the directors of the companies and the 
evolution of the fleet.137 There are few academic studies, and there are nonehav  
                                                 
136 By 1873 97% of the migrants arriving at New York did so by steam, three years later the last 
migrant transport by sailing ship was recorded. 
137 Just to quote a few (Barbance, 1955; De Boer, 1998; Dschaad, 1973, Finch, 1988; Guns, 2004; 
Miller, 1998; Offrey, 1994; Vervoort, 1999, Wentholt 1973) 
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analyzed the impact steamship liners had on the organization of the migrant business.138 
One notable exception is the work of Robin Bastin, yet the archives of the Cunard Line 
did not facilitate an in depth analysis. In particular the formation of shipping conferences 
and how they worked was not explored by Bastin (Bastin, 1971).139 The work of Erick 
Murken dating back to 1922, remains the only study which tried to encompass the 
working of the various shipping conferences regulating he traffic of freight, cabin and 
steerage passengers, by using the minutes of the meetings (Murken, 1922). The focus 
however was on the negotiations of the agreements without looking at their impact on; 
the price of the crossing, the relationship between shipping companies and migrant 
brokers and agents, the further integration of the Atlantic transport network including 
inland transfer, their influence as a lobby-group on legislation and policies on both sides 
of the Atlantic, the means offered by these companies to circumvent restrictive 
regulations etc.  
In this study, conference minutes will be reassessed by integrating the literature 
on shipping conferences and cartel formation and analyzing the extent to which they were 
successful in reducing competitive behavior in contr lling the migrant market. The 
minutes complement the correspondence between the directors of the Holland America 
Line (HAL) running a service from Rotterdam to New York, and their head-agent at the 
port of arrival. The variety of correspondence with head agents, other companies, 
authorities etc. allow investigation as to how one of the most lucrative shipping 
businesses of the nineteenth century, was organized during the age of steam shipping. 
What follows is a reconstruction divided in two chronological parts, using 1896 as 
turning point. That year an agreement was signed between all important shipping lines 
operating on the North Atlantic route and the so-called new migrants surpassed the old-
stock in numbers arriving in the US. Unfortunately, few documents relating to the first 
decade of the Dutch shipping line have been preservd. The company’s general 
correspondence between New York and Rotterdam is available from 1884 onwards, 
while the collection of the correspondence regarding passage business is complete from 
                                                 
138 (Boyce, 1995; Hyde, 1975 and 1978; Ottmuller-Weztel, 1986;  Bastin, 1971; Flayhart, 2000 de 
Vannoise-Pochulu 1993; Armgort, 1992). 
139 Hyde’s chapter on emigrant traffic through Liverpool is for the greater part based on Bastin’s 
work.  
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1889. The minutes of the New York Continental Conference regulating the American 
market are available for the period 1885-1902. This conference was subordinate to a 
similar agreement managed by the directors of the companies in Europe which by 1892 
formed evolved into a pool-agreement known as the North-Atlantische Dampfer-Linien 
Verband. Minutes of this conference are used to complete the analysis.  
The main object of this study is the American market of ocean passages; hence 
the selling of prepaid and return tickets. This second part begins with a chapter on the 
foundation of the HAL, locating the importance of New York as a nodal point for the 
traffic and the relevance of the American market for the shipping companies. The second 
chapter is dedicated to the network of migrant broke s and agents, their function as go-
betweens for shipping companies and migrants and responsibilities towards both. A third 
chapter analyzes the working of the conference agreements and their impact on the cost 
for the crossing reconstructing ocean price series for the members of the Continental 
Conference between 1885 and 1896. A fourth chapter tak s a closer look at the increasing 
number of immigration laws enacted by the American authorities, the role of shipping 
companies in implementing and circumventing these, and the shipping lobby’s attempts 
to impede migration and maritime policies which could hinder their business from being 
adopted.  
 
Chapter I: The establishment of the Holland America Line: New York as a nodal 
point for the migrant trade. 
 
1) The rise of Dutch passenger liners powered by steam 
 
1.1)The transition from sail to steam and the formation of joint-stock 
companies with limited liability 
 
 As seen in the previous chapter the large sums of capital needed for steamship 
ventures caused many prospects to never make it beyond the planning stage. Even prior 
to the advent of steam, specialized shipowners who made making their living from 
managing and owning ships, had made their appearance. The traditional form of 
spreading the risk, by using a large investor base, nd dividing the shares in 64 parts, was 
replaced by a limited number of financers. But, steamships were more costly both to 
construct as to operate, and so the investor base hd to be broadened again. Shipping 
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companies adopted the joint stock structures to facilitate the accumulation of the required 
capital. After the 1860s limited reliability replaced private partnership allowing capital 
increases needed for the establishment of scheduled large scale steamship services. Yet as 
noted by some historians, the maritime world was slow to adopt the new legal structures, 
mistrusting the structures for encouraging opportunis ic behavior. And, the entitities that 
did adopt them usually consisted of private networks bound together by business or 
personal ties. Steamship entrepreneurs still heavily relied on personal contacts to gather 
capital and to obtain information concerning prospects of a venture (Boyce, 1995, 27-33).  
As seen with the establishment of many companies during the 1840s finding 
capital outside the nucleus of merchant communities attached to one port was not in 
evidence. The Antwerp and Rotterdam prospects often turned to the German hinterland 
or the American foreland to find financers, but these potential investors usually reacted 
with apprehension. The problems Mills had in gathering funds, despite the American mail 
subsidies, underline the importance of the reputation of the entrepreneur in gaining 
support from the merchant community. The ease with hich the Belgian government 
obtained information on the trustworthiness of nationals or foreign entrepreneurs 
applying for subsidies through the consular network, indicate that this was readily 
available. Accumulating enough reputation to attrac capital beyond the personal 
networks was a long process, yet it was a necessary one to expand the services to remain 
competitive in the liner business. The increasing mi rant flow and promising business 
prospects stimulated steamship building and led to a b om of new companies during the 
early 1870s. Suddenly, the Netherlands, whose trade relations with the US had hit rock 
bottom found herself connected by two direct steamship lines to New York. 
  
1.2) The steamship boom in the Low Countries early 1870s 
 
In 1863, Belgium capitalized on the abolishment of he Sont, Belt and Stade tolls 
to obtain the free access of the Westerscheldt, Antwerp’s gateway to the sea.140 The 
                                                 
140 The Dutch envoy in Washington reported on the lobbying efforts of his Belgian colleague in 
the American press and in Congress to obtain the support of the United States. He set up a campaign 
refuting the Belgian claims, by pointing to the differences between the Sont and Scheldt tolls.  NA, 2.05.13, 
Gezantschap VS, Correspondence with MFA, Nr 28, June 23 1858. 
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burden on the Belgian government, in repaying the tolls levied on ships using Antwerp to 
safeguard its competitive position, had become unbearable with the increasing traffic. 
The free navigation of the Scheldt was bought dearly with the help of twenty seven other 
nations trading with Antwerp. The Dutch authorities r ceived a lump sum of 36,278,560 
francs (17,141,670 guilders) which was used to moderniz  the infrastructure to bring it on 
par with its neighbors (Hancke and Himler, 1993, Veraghtert, 1986, 73). The abolishment 
of the toll and the collapse of the colonial trade policies, enhanced rivalry with the 
Belgian port for the North Atlantic trade. The opening up of a steamship line to the US 
became one of the focal points of this competition. American shipping entrepreneurs tried 
exploiting the rivalry by juxtaposing the bids of both countries to obtain the best possible 
conditions.141 With the French-German war the trade activity in the Belgian and Dutch 
ports with the US intensified, stressing the urgent need of a steamship line.142 In the end 
Dutch merchants convinced by the high dividends paid out by German steamship 
companies took matters in their own hands.143  
Three projects were launched at the end of the 1860s, one to establish a line from 
Flushing, another from Amsterdam and finally a third one from Rotterdam. In 1869, 
Marin H. Jansen, an influential Dutch naval officer, published a pamphlet on his project 
to open a line between Flushing and Norfolk soliciting government subsidies.144 
Simultaneously, Amsterdam merchants circulated a pamphlet announcing that the Royal 
Netherlands Steamship Company (RNSC) would expand its Baltic and Mediterranean 
service with a line to New York combining freight, cabin and steerage passenger 
                                                 
141 For example Salem and Co a New York shipping company negotiated with the Belgian 
government to open a line between Antwerp and New York. The Dutch envoy in Washington tried to 
convince the entrepreneurs to use Flushing or Rotterdam instead. Through the American envoy in The 
Hague the company committed itself to use one of the Dutch ports on the following conditions: 1) that the 
Dutch government guaranteed an annual 5% interest on the invested capital 2) that they convinced other 
European governments to use this mail service. NA, 2.05.13, Gezantschap VS, Correspondence with MFA, 
Nr 36-37, August 11 1866 and January 24 1867. 
142 The U.S.-mail service from Bremen and Hamburg with New York got suspended because of 
the hostilities. The American considered an alternative in the Low Countries, especially Antwerp. The 
Dutch envoy in Washington promoted Flushing as a worthy alternative to the American postmaster-
general. The envoy stressed that Flushing offered a better alternative than Antwerp since it wasn’t as tide 
sensitive. Yet the war did not last long enough for the service to move elsewhere. Ibid. Nr 40, August 8 and 
17  1870. 
143 During the so called ‘record years’ 1860-1873 the G rman companies’ returns on invested 
capital reached record heights of 20% in 1865 and 1866 (Heffer, 1986, 316-318). 
144 M.H. Jansens, Een brug over den Oceaan, (1869) 
 102
business.145 That same year, Antoine Plate published an article in De Economist building 
further on his father’s efforts to open a line from Rotterdam to New York (Plate, 1869, 
558-571).146 This literature reflects the increased activity of Dutch merchants to open a 
line, and the competition among each other to attract investors. Despite the support of the 
local merchant community for each project, raising capital remained very difficult. 
Unable to collect the funds needed for a service with four steamers, Plate set up a limited 
partnership with Otto Reuchlin in early 1871, by ordering two small steamers for the 
transport of goods and steerage passengers. Their decision was spurred by Jansen’s bid 
for subsidies backed by five members of the Second Chamber and soon to be voted on in 
Parliament. The efforts of the Rotterdam merchants resulted in the refusal of the Dutch 
authorities to finance a company which could comproise the success of a similar non-
subsidized enterprise. Plate and Reuchlin eliminated th  Flushing competition but could 
not prevent that their Amsterdam rivals starting their New York service simultaneously. 
Yet the first two years trade on the North Atlantic boomed, allowing both companies to 
see good results. The initially successful sailings convinced investors and allowed both 
companies to expand. Plate, Reuchlin and Co restructured in a public limited company 
under the name Netherlands-American Steamship Company, popularly known as the 
Holland-America Line. Financing the project was made easier, as a result of the support 
of Louis Pincoffs and Martin Mees directors of the Rotterdam Trade Union and the 
Rotterdam Bank. It was not only members of the Rotterdam community who bought 
shares. The biggest shareholder was a Groningen entrepreneur, W. A. Scholten who 
invested 600,000 guilders in the project. The capital was increased from nine hundred 
thousand to two million guilders Van der Valk, 1976, 1 1-162; Zevenbergen, 1990, 39-
40; De Boer, 1998, 10-19; Wentholt, 25-33 1973; Reuchlin, 1973, 68-72).  
The company shared many the characteristics observed by Boyce of similar 
British enterprises. Something which was unique to liner companies was that a wealthy 
                                                 
145 Plans of Amsterdam merchants were hindered because the ongoing works on the North Sea 
Canal blocked the access of big steamers to the port. Plans to start the service from Flushing and later move 
it to Amsterdam could not convince investors. 
146 His father F.J Plate was the initiator of the attempt in the early 1850’s to open a line from 
Rotterdam (see part I chapter II). Plate senior also was appointed as member of the ‘Control Commission of 
Emigration’ established with the new migration laws early 1860’s supervising the passage of migrants 
through Rotterdam and trying to revive the port as a migrant gateway through advertising campaigns in 
out-migration regions (Van der valk 159-161, Zevenbergen, 1990, 39). 
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businessman could be identified with the project. Also, just as British enterprises the 
founders had been shipping agents, in particular the Plate family had a long tradition as 
such. Furthermore, except for Scholten, the investors and initiators came from the same 
port community, which was quite homogeneous at the tim . The company started as a 
partnership and later became a limited liability company. Compared with British 
enterprises, interests of ship builders in the company were initially weak. British 
shipyards had accumulated an important lead in steam-shipping construction. The HAL 
therefore relied on British shipyards to construct or refit their ships. With the importance 
of local networks for the formation of shipping liners British companies, had the 
advantage of developing stronger ties with national ship builders. Yet over the years 
relationships between HAL directors and British shipbuilders tightened and eventually 
played an important role in the further developments of the company. (De Nijs, 2001, 34-
58; Boyce, 1995, 56-60). The quality of the management of a line was reflected by a 
strict regularity of service allowing cargo booking, stevedoring and bunkering to proceed 
smoothly, essential for the good reputation of the lin ; the success of which greatly 
depended on the ability to maximize capacity utilization and to minimize average total 
costs by attracting a consistent and balanced flow of cargo and passengers in both 
directions. Both cargo and passenger booking agents played a key role in securing a 
constant flow of passengers and goods (Boyce, 1995, 36).  
The minutes of the company show that the associates debated as to weather to put 
the stress on transport of freight or on steerage passengers. The majority voted for the 
latter, which then triggered long discussions on the selection of a broker who regulated 
the migrant transport for the company. The question was wether to give the responsibility 
to a broker in Germany or in the Netherlands. Yet th  associates feared being unable to 
find a broker in Germany who would commit to the exclusivity of sale for the company, 
something they considered to be crucial to bridge the backlog with their competitors in 
the initial years. They believed that a new firm lacked the means of being very 
competitive, while brokers who also worked for other companies usually booked for 
companies offering the best service and lowest price. Therefore the HAL directors came 
to an agreement with three of the most important Dutch migrant brokers whom formed 
the firm Van Es, Wambersie and Ruys to perform the service. They committed to 
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positioning agents in European out-migration regions to attract more migrants to the port 
in exchange for a fixed commission on each passenger booked. To ensure cargo for the 
westbound leg of the trip, the shipping company appointed Wambersie and Son as ship 
brokers.147 John Wambersie, the former American consul and the most important migrant 
broker in Rotterdam from 1839, largely contributed o the establishment of the line which 
explained his prominent role in the company. Like many brokers at the time, he 
combined the sale of ocean passage with railroad passage, by representing the American 
Erie Railroad Company and receiving 12.5 percent commission on each ticket sold. His 
long state of service had allowed him to establish a wide network of contacts with 
migrant agents inland. Complementing this with the contacts of Van Es and Ruys had to 
enabled him to fill the steerage capacity of the HAL ships (Swierenga, 1994, 107,114-117 
and Van der Valk 1976, 156-158).  
The economic downturn which set in at the end of 1873 quickly tempered the 
optimism in steam shipping industries as the construction boom overreached itself. Many 
other companies had been founded simultaneously, like for example the Red Star Line 
(RSL) in neighboring Antwerp; which increased the pressure from competition in a 
falling market. Transport rates for passengers, and especially for freight, fell accordingly. 
The boom had created an overcapacity on the North Atlantic which would persist up to 
1914 leading to intensifying competition and rate wars. British companies advertised 
crossings for as low as two pounds from Liverpool in 1875.148 The Rotterdam-based 
company was immediately confronted with the fluctuating character of the migrant trade 
which depended on the activity on both sides of the Atlantic, making it very hard to 
predict the flow which was more unstable on the North Atlantic than on any other 
migrant route.  Unlike the longer-established first-class liners carrying mail and cabin 
passengers, which were less sensitive to business cycles, the HAL had little in the way of 
alternative resources to fall back on (Aldcroft, 1974, 287 and Hyde, 1975, 62-68).  The 
                                                 
147 GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 9-2 Plate Reuchlin en co / notullen, vennootschap, 
vergaderingen. Minutes of the meeting of May 1871 and January 1872 and letters of Reuchlin to the 
stockholders March 27 and June 26 1872. 
 
148 Continental Lines followed suit with the HAPAG’s prices dropping from 55 thalers midway 
1873 to 45 and eventually 30 midway 1874 (Heffer, 1986, 319-320). 
 105
Dutch company suffered heavy losses between 1874 and 1876 forcing it to halve the 
capital to one million guilders.  
The HAL decided to reorganize and it took the passenger business in Europe into 
own hands in 1877.149 New migrant brokers and agents were approached to book directly 
through the company. One of of the ventures involved in this was the firm Prins & 
Zwanenberg, in Groningen, which dominated the market in the northern parts of the 
country and attracted business from across the German boarder.150 Prins & Zwanenberg 
also placed partners and representatives, such as Martin Prins son of the senior partner, 
among Dutch settlements in the US selling prepaid an  railroad tickets. Through the 
American representatives, the firm expanded its activities to land speculating in frontier 
areas. With brochures and newspaper advertisements, the company tried to direct the 
migrants to the US and if possible to their lands (Gottheil, 1914, 59; Zevenbergen, 1990; 
De Boer 1998, Swierenga, 1994, 116-117). Prins & Zwanenberg illustrate the 
transatlantic dimensions of the migrant trade and that he activities of migrant brokers 
and agents reached much further than the mere selling of transport tickets- which will be 
discussed in the next chapter. It reflects the growing importance of the foreland for the 
migrant transport market which all came together in New York.  
 
2) Where all passenger liners meet: New York as ‘the’ nodal point for the migrant 
traffic  
  
 2.1) The American foreland and migrant transport 
 
Recent studies on port history have stressed the fact th t ports do not stand alone 
but instead have to be studied as nodal points between the hinterland and the foreland. 
During the first global century, competition between ports intensified making this an 
inevitable feature of port studies (Loyen, 2003, 3-6). As David Williams put it:  
“Competition between ports is very much a matter of d ck facilities and 
hinterland networks. Discussion has focused on these, yet a feature yet to be 
                                                 
149 The three migrant brokers had always worked for various lines. It remains unclear whether they 
were forced to give up the agencies of the other lines yet it seems improbable that they never did.  
150 GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 18, Correspondence Scholten, Letter of Van der Hoeven to 
Scholten January 31 1877. 
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explored is that of how ports promoted themselves through advertising, publicity 
and public relations.”151 
 
In the first section the role of the government in promoting ports as migrant gateways and 
nodal points for the North Atlantic traffic has been touched on; illustrating the 
importance of the diplomatic corps during the first half of the nineteenth century in 
advertising ports abroad. With the transition from sail to steam, and the subsequent 
concentration of the migrant transport business in the hands of one or a limited number of 
steamship companies in European ports, a shift fromp rt to company competition took 
place (Feys, 2007, 27-47). As will be discussed in the following chapters the HAL-
company agents took over the efforts of consuls abroad to attract the migrant flow to 
Rotterdam. In doing so, promoting the good reputation of Rotterdam as a migrant 
gateway became more and more associated with services offered by the HAL. Migrants 
no longer migrated through a port but also with a specific company whose reputation 
often reflected that of the harbor. The brand of Rotterdam as migrant gateway was used 
and eventually taken over by the HAL.  
However, the main focus remains the connections between maritime and 
migration networks expanding from ports. As illustrated by Gordon Boyce, the growth of 
shipping companies during the long nineteenth century greatly depended on networking 
activities through agents, brokers and conferences (Boyce, 1995 and Williams, 2003, 15). 
In this study, dock facilities and port infrastructre receive little attention while 
hinterland networks are only briefly touched on. The influence emanating from the 
foreland on this Atlantic trade, barely explored by maritime historians, constitutes the 
main subject of analysis. The particular nature of migrant transport business shaped by 
chain migration patterns based on a vast agent-network spreading on both sides of the 
Atlantic created market specific features turning the foreland into a very important 
catalyst for passenger liners.  
On one hand, according to estimates thirty to fifty percent of the market of third-
class westbound ocean passage was sold in the US through prepaid tickets.152 On the 
                                                 
151 David M. Williams, “Recent Trends in Maritime and Port History,” in Reginald Loyen, et al. (eds.), 
Struggling for Leadership: Antwerp-Rotterdam Port Competition between 1870-2000 (Leuven, 2003), p. 18. 
152 Muken estimated the share of prepaids in the totalsales to amount to anywhere between 25 and 
35% which is corroborated by the data collected by the Dillingham commission for the period 1908-1910. 
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other hand, steam shipping stimulated return migration amounting to thirty percent of the 
westbound movement by the turn of the century, developing into an important source of 
revenue on the North Atlantic. These figures reflect the direct impact of these markets. 
Yet as estimated by Gustav Schwab, New York head-agent of the NGL, when adding the 
indirect business caused by the sale of prepaid tickets, the market was responsible for at 
least 60 percent of the arrivals: 
“The ticket is sent to John Smith to some village of Germany, and the whole 
village knows that he has a ticket from his brother to come over; that he is 
working on a farm, not subject to military duty, paying very little taxes, and 
generally believing that he is in a pretty good country and would like his brother 
to come. His brother tells all his friends and neighbors, and brings with him, two, 
three, or four men to this country they heard of. So this prepaid business is of 
immense importance.”153 
 
Information flows traveling back to Europe, on how and with what company to move, via 
mail and returnees increased the importance of the company’s reputation in the US.  
Also, with immigrant legislation falling under federal jurisdiction, pressures on the 
American government to restrict the movement increased. Shipping companies paid close 
attention to American migration and maritime policies and tried to prevent these from 
compromising their business. New York, by attracting the large majority of the new 
arrivals during the steamship era, developed into the biggest migrant hub worldwide 
where migrant transport business thrived. 
 
2.2) The Big ‘Migrant’ Apple  
 
Whereas the competition for the trade in Europe result d in the development of 
various important migration ports, on the other side of the Atlantic New York succeeded 
in monopolizing the trade. With its superior connections to the hinterland and its control 
as financial capital over eastbound trades, the port outrivaled Atlantic competitors. 
                                                                                                                                      
There are great variations however depending on origins. Jews for instance had very percentages. The info 
collected by Scandinavian researchers for the period 1882-94. Figures of the Allan Line indicate that 57,6% 
traveled on prepaids in 1882, while the American Lie and National line exceeded that figure. In 1892 the 
figure increaded to 73,9%. The combined average of British lines for that year amounted to 47% prepaid’s 
(Lovoll, 1993, 56). 
153 Testimony of Gustav Schwab during the hearings before the industrial commission in New 
York July 25 1899 quoted in C. Erickson, 1976, 232.  
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During the 1860s, federal banking laws turned New York into the country’s banking 
centre allowing the port to consolidate its commercial dominance. The National Currency 
Act designated the city as ‘Central Reserve City’ further stimulating money from the 
country to flow towards New York (Born, 1977, 92-93). In the other direction migrants 
continued to spread nationwide from the port. As the migrant trade gained importance the 
city invested in infrastructure assuring a smooth transition of new arrivals.  
Just as had occurred in Europe, port and state authorities did not want to impose 
too many regulations on incoming ships to prevent them from diverting to rivals. Yet 
with the competition for the trade, the reputation of the port of arrival became equally 
important as that of the port of embarkation. This st mulated authorities to pass measures 
to protect migrants from abuses, with New York taking a leading role. In 1847, 
immigration matters were placed under the special authority of Commissioners of 
Immigration, including the mayors of Brooklyn and New York, and including members 
of the Irish and German organizations. Their activity resulted in new landing station at 
Staten Island which was made up of hospitals, information centers, complaint bureaus 
and culminated with the opening of Castle Garden in 1855. This predecessor to Ellis 
Island seriously reduced the activity of swindlers making a living off the naivety of new 
arrivals. The landing station served as an information center, coordinated inland travel, 
offered cheap food and lodging until departure, provided currency exchange services, and 
housed a labor exchange office arranging immediate employment, etc. (Erickson, 1976, 
270-272). At times, the reputation of Castle Garden suffered from misuse of authority by 
officials working at the landing station, yet the institution further contributed to attracting 
85% of the total arrivals at Atlantic ports by 1860.  
The next decade in the transition from sail to steam New York’s secured its 
preeminence. Controlling the migrant trade contribued to the general development of the 
port and allowed New York to maintain its edge on Baltimore, Philadelphia and Boston. 
The major passenger liners involved in the migrant trade gave direct first class steam 
connections to Europe, which greatly contributed to New York’s supremacy (Heffer, 
1986, 156-173). 154 Various efforts by Baltimore, Boston and Philadelphia, to divert part 
                                                 
154 New York obtained this hegemony of steam by the 1860 and maintained it up to 1914. In 1890 
twenty nine steam-shipping companies transported migrants and passengers from Europe to New York. 
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of the migrant flow, had very limited success.155 Up to 1914, New York’s share of the 
migrant flow hung around 85% with some peaks of 95%.156 Because of the unfavorable 
shipping legislation the trade, with the exception of the Philadelphia-based American 
Line, was left entirely in the hands of foreign companies (Flayhart, 2000; Safford, 1985). 
Whereas in 1862 still 82% of the migrants leaving from Liverpool boarded American 
ships, five years later British ships transported 80% of the trade. New York was the place 
where all these foreign lines, with head-quarters sp ead around Europe, met through their 
branch offices often located on Broadway. It turned the port not only into the nodal point 
of the American passenger market but also into the center for obtaining information on 
rival shipping companies (Bastin, 1971, 29).  
  
2.3) The opening of the Holland America Line’s head-agency in New York 
 
Antoine Plate crossed the Atlantic in the summer of 1871 to secure dock space in 
New York and appoint an agency coordinating the busines  on the spot.157 He contracted 
the Dutch consul of the city who ran a shipping agency Burlange and Company, to 
represent the Rotterdam line in New York.158 The company had a lot of experience with 
trade from New York to Dutch and Belgian ports. Plate believed that Burlange’s position 
added prestige to the line and would help him to esabli h contacts in the US.159 He also 
concluded an agreement with Funch and Edye to act as ship brokers. Contacts in New 
York also stressed the importance of scrupulous regularity of sailings occurring best on 
fixed days rather than fixed dates, being much easier to remember.Similar to other 
companies, the names of the ships needed a special char cteristic to impress the company 
                                                                                                                                      
Boston only numbered six such services that same year while Philadelphia counted four and Baltimore only 
two. 
155 The Pennsylvania Railroad Company founded both the Red Star Line and the American Line in 
an effort to divert part of the traffic from New York to Philadelphia during the 1870’s but eventually had to 
divert most of its activities to New York. For the same reasons the Baltimore Ohio Railroad Company 
offered many facilities to steamship lines to attract them to Baltimore. Of all rivals Boston managed 
maintain various passenger lines throughout the period yet the port remained a very distant second. 
156 According to Swierenga New York attracted 76% of the otal migration in 1888 and after the 
opening of Ellis Island in 1892 the share would even have surpassed the 95% mark (Swierenga, 1994, 120). 
157 GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt,. 9-2, Letter July 22 1871. 
158 R.C. Burlange was consul of New York from 1855 to 1881 (Krabbendam, 2005, 167-181). 
159 GAR, HAL, 318.14 , Wentholt Archief, 9-2, Letter of Reuchlin to the stockholders November 
14 1871. 
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name in the memory of people, with suggestions of names of Dutch towns, ending with –
zee, -dyk or –dam.160 The popularity of the line often depended on superficial issues, the 
hence the serving of steerage passengers with a decent pint of Claret on Sundays, could 
make a difference, according to the contacts. Furthermore, passenger lists needed to 
arrive prior to the ship, allowing the company agent to answer inquiries about people 
expected to arrive. In case of accidents the agents needed the powers to act quickly 
because newspapers could make or break a line by reporting on the poor treatment of 
customers. Finally, an absolute necessity was the appointment of a Dutch official at 
Castle Garden.161  
Plate listened to advice given, choosing Saturday to sail out from Rotterdam, 
using ship names ending with –dam, giving the agent the required responsibilities and 
making a priority of appointing someone at Castle Garden. The advice reflects the 
importance of the reputation of a line and the impact the popular press had on it. John 
Wambersie advised the appointment of a passage agent in the US referring to the 
important revenues German companies retrieved from the business of prepaid tickets.162 
Yet, during the early years the activities in New York were limited to securing cargo for 
the eastbound trip. The appointment of R. Burlange, as head-agent, was short-lived and 
he was replaced by Cazaux van Staphorst during the transition into a public limited 
company.163 The tasks of van Staphorst, as described in the contract, focused on 
establishing contacts with export and import houses, upervising ships arriving in New 
York and the activities of Funch & Edye. He received a salary of 10,000 guilders and had 
to commit to not getting involved in other commercial activities.164 Eventually the 
                                                 
160 The company named all of its ships with town names ending on –dam except two of the first 
ships one called after the main investor, W.A. Scholten and the other after the engineer in charge of the 
modernization of the port P. Caland. When later passenger ships were complemented with freight ships, 
they were given town names ending on –dyk to differentiate both services. 
161 GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 6 Stoomvaart Amerika 1850, Anonymous letter sin data.  
162 Ibid., 9-2 Letters of Reuchlin to the stockholders March 27 and June 26 1872. 
163 The company clearly recruited its representatives overseas among the Dutch community. 
During the 18th century the brothers Nicolas and Jan van Staphorst established one of the pioneering 
migrant broker firms in Rotterdam. Possibly these wre ancestors of C. van Staphorst which would 
underline the durability of commercial connections on certain trade routes often strengthened through 
family ties (Risch, 1939, 241). 
164 The contract with Cazaux van Staphorst stipulated that he was not allowed to engage in any 
other business activities. It seems likely that R. Burlange was not prepared to give up his other shipping 
activities to Ducth and Belgian ports while the HAL-directors may have feared a conflict of interest, 
explaining the exclusivity contract with van Staphorst. GAR, HAL, 318.14 , Wentholt Archief, 44, 
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company appointed a specialized passenger agency, L.W Morris & Co to sell third-class 
and cabin berths for the company in the US.165 The company operated as it had in 
Europe, on a commission base per passage sold through a wide agency-network which it 
managed. Every little piece of business was welcome during the crisis of the 1870s 
especially for the young companies established during the steam shipping boom. Some 
were short-lived, such as the Hamburg based Adler Line taken over by the Hamburg 
America Line or the Norse American Line which left the North-Atlantic to never return 
(Heffer, 1986, 309 and Ottmüller-Wetzel, 1986, 146-149).166 The Holland America Line 
struggled just as its newly founded competitors did in Amsterdam and Antwerp. 
 
2.4) The internal rivalry between the ‘Dam’ ports 
 
Internationally the eyes of Rotterdam merchants were focused on Antwerp as the 
main rival for the North Atlantic trade. However, the internal rivalry between Rotterdam 
and Amsterdam weighed heavily on the operations of the Holland America Line. The 
early success of the Royal Netherlands Steamship Company convinced the directors to 
invest in big first-class steamers with a price tag of one million guilders each. By the time 
they were launched, the market had completely collapsed. The company used the ships 
for the Far East trade before being laid up, in 1876, for lack of returns. Three years later 
the CGT bought the vessels for a trifle just as the North Atlantic market picked up again. 
The HAL started to make profits after several meager years, while Amsterdam merchants 
soon regretted the selling of both ships. The Dutch Trade Company of Amsterdam 
negotiated with the HAL to split their service betwen Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The 
                                                                                                                                      
Correspondence with head-agent in New York,  H. Cazaux van Staphorst 1874-84, Contract between 
Cazaux and NASM 1874. 
165 Whether this agency in New York had any relation with the homonymous agency in Hamburg 
where Albert Ballin started off his career following in his fathers’ footsteps could not be established 
(Ottmüller-Wetzel, 1986, 14). 
166 The ‘Transatlantischen Dampfschiffahrts Gesellschaft’ better known as the Adler Line was 
founded in 1872. Investors generously financed the project building ships to provide a weekly service. The 
company tried to convince the directors of the Hamburg America Line to collaborate yet the latter was not 
prepared to allow a competitor to penetrate its market in the home port without putting up fight. The 
collapsed market and the competition of the Hamburg America Line cutting its prices by half forced the 
company to back down. HAPAG took over the seven ships and docking space of the company in 1875. The 
Norwegian American Line started a service for Norwegian migrants in 1871 yet with the collapse of the 
market it diverted it ships on European routes (Heffer, 1986, 309 and Otmüller-Wezel, 1986, 146-149). 
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HAL directors did not oppose the idea in the long run but refused to divide the fleet 
before being able to offer a weekly service between Rotterdam and New York (De Boer, 
1998, 10-20). Offended by the refusal, the Amsterdam merchant community decided to 
reopen the RNSC service to New York with chartered ships, increasing the rivalry 
between the two.  
Scholten strongly criticized the decision of the HAL-directors, accusing them of 
sacrificing the interests of the stockholders to benefit of the city of Rotterdam. He blamed 
the pride and jealousy of Rotterdam merchants towards Amsterdam businessmen for 
bringing a fierce competitor in the trade, which once the passenger flow dropped again 
could cause the downfall of the company.167 The directors vigorously defended their 
decision, stating that in the interest of the stability and viability of the firm, ships had to 
leave from one port. All other steamship lines limited themselves to one port, except the 
two biggest ones whose fleet outgrew the business of the homeport. That this port, with 
its unique connection to the German hinterland, should be Rotterdam was obvious to 
anyone who was familiar with steam shipping to the US. Moreover, the board of directors 
pointed out to Scholten that Antwerp was a much bigger and dangerous competitor to 
Amsterdam. Every week, three big steamers left the Belgian port for the US which was a 
lot more important than a small three weekly service from Amsterdam. Furthermore, they 
argued that if there had been good prospects for a line from Amsterdam the KNSM 
would not have sold their ships at a third of the construction price the year before. The 
directors blamed the Amsterdam-based company for a lack of collaboration during the 
1870s. The RNSC had neglected the advice against the construction of first-class 
steamers, at a time when the HAL was constrained to sell their own ships under 
construction as a result of lack of trade. The directors had passed on a lot of valuable 
information and had even drawn up a scheme for collab ration and common 
management, which was totally ignored by the Amsterdam-based company. They 
concluded that if there was an issue of jealousy, it could only come from the capital.168 
The reply reflects that the decision was based on a sound business strategy, yet the 
                                                 
167 GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt,18 Correspondence Scholten, Letter to the board of directors 
May 2 1881. 
168 Ibid. Letter of the board of directors to Scholten, May 4 1881.   
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undertone clearly indicates the tensions between th Amsterdam and Rotterdam merchant 
communities.  
These tensions increased as it became clear that the HAL managers seriously 
underestimated the potential of the RNSC. The three w kly service became weekly as 
three chartered ships joined the line. By the end of 1881, the company transported 10,000 
passengers to New York- as opposed to HAL’s 16,000. An extraordinary meeting was 
called with the stockholders discussing the measures to be taken against the competition 
of the RNSC. The company was also confronted with another problem, namely the silting 
up of the Nieuwe Waterweg hindering the ships’ access to the sea. The stockholders 
approved the opening of a competitive service from A sterdam with the two biggest 
ships, keeping the other four in Rotterdam. The RNSC reacted by chartering two more 
ships. Over the period of one year, Amsterdam went from zero to eight steamships going 
to New York. In 1882 the RNSC carried 15,000 passengers across the Atlantic closing 
the gap on the HAL with 18,000 passengers. The spectacular boom of migrant traffic 
through Amsterdam confirms the importance of the migrant-agent activity in directing 
migrants to certain ports; superior access routes to out-migration regions were of 
secondary importance.  
The battle between the Dutch ports was also fought across the Atlantic. The Dutch 
emissaries of Washington and New York reported on smear campaigns in the American 
press against the Dutch lines. The increased competition between steam shipping 
companies for the migrant trade was put forward as m in reason for this development, 
German lines, in particular, were suspected of trying to divert the migrant flow to their 
ports. Yet, after the sinking of the Edam the envoy investigated one of these campaigns 
and traced it to de Toelaer, the head-agent if the RNSC. The Dutch envoy in Washington 
organized an advertising campaign in the American press, refuting the adverse publicity 
on both ports.169  
                                                 
169 The correspondence dates back to the second half of 1882 after the passage of new American 
laws regarding migrant transport. Controls on ships increased and quite a few ships were fined for not 
applying to the rules. Some companies as the RNSC questioned the American jurisdiction asking the envoy 
to intervene. With the increased controls a growing number of stories on abuses on board of ships, 
trustworthy or not, leaked to the press. This was the case for instance for the Nemsis of the RNSC 
mistakenly labeled as ‘Floating Coffin’ also by the ‘New York Herald’. The articles of Toelaer against the 
HAL appeared in the ‘Scientific Times’. The envoy stre sed that the article did not reflect in any way the 
American public opinion about the line, but that is was considered as an envious deed from one Dutch 
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In the competition with the Amsterdam Line in New York, the HAL had a 
particular source of information on the movements of its rival. At the end of 1880, the 
Amsterdam merchants had contacted Funch & Edye to ac  as ship brokers for the 
Amsterdam Line which at the time was expected to only transport freight. Not wanting to 
damage the relations with the HAL, Funch & Edye asked van Staphorst to inform on 
possible objections from the board of directors to do so. They claimed that by accepting 
to act as ship brokers for the freight business of the Amsterdam Line, it would allow the 
HAL to gain control over its rival. Van Staphorst disagreed, fearing that the RNSC would 
take advantage of the many years of expertise that the agency had acquired on the Dutch-
American trade while doing business for the HAL. Moreover, it gave the Amsterdam 
Line the opportunity to send over an agent who van Staphorst would unable to refuse 
from taking office in their buildings. The Amsterdam Line risked getting access to HAL 
files revealing the true inwardness of the Rotterdam line. The HAL shipping agent 
deplored the fact that they had allowed the Antwerp based White Cross line to do so, but 
stressed that there was still a big difference betwe n Antwerp and Amsterdam.  
Van Staphorst stated that he had always praised Edye for the great impartiality 
with which the ship broker managed to keep the interests of the Antwerp and Rotterdam 
apart, however this would be impossible between Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The board 
of directors did not share the opinion of the New York shipping agent giving their go-
ahead for a trial period on the condition that Funch & Edye divided the commission. Van 
Staphorst insisted on the risks of such enterprise. Th  ship broker would do its utmost to 
make the business to Amsterdam work. He pointed to the contract between HAPAG and 
Funch & Edye, committing not to serve any other steamship line from or to Hamburg. 
Their appointment by the German company in 1875 was m inly to keep them out of the 
hands of possible competitors.170 Van Staphorst advised following this example, but to no 
                                                                                                                                      
Company against the other. The consul added that bec us  of the freedom of press all sorts of things were 
regularly published and the public does not attach he same importance as in Europe to what appears in the 
press. NA, 2.05.13, Gezantschap Washington , Nr 1158 overtreding van Am wetten bij het vervoer van Ne 
lv naar de VS 1882. 
170 The date of the contract between Funch & Edye and the HAPAG may indicate that the ship 
brokers worked for the Adler Line. Probably once HAPAG took over its rival it signed a contract of 
exclusivity with the ship brokers to avoid another competitor to benefit from their expertise.  
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avail.171 A good year into the agreement the shipping agent reported that the situation had 
become unsustainable. He accused Funch & Edye of frequently sacrificing the interests 
of the company to the benefit of the RNSC. To date this had been tolerated, but with the 
opening of the HAL-service from Amsterdam van Staphorst urged to force the ship 
brokers to stop doing business with the Amsterdam Line, even if this open act of hostility 
towards RNSC further fueled the rivalry.172 It remains unclear as to whether the directors 
followed the advice from New York. In 1882, the competition intensified and the silting 
up of Rotterdam’s access to the sea persisted driving the company to come to terms with 
the Amsterdam merchant community. Early in 1883 both companies reached an 
agreement. HAL committed to taking over the RNSC’s service to New York, 
guaranteeing that the same number of sailings would leave from Amsterdam as from 
Rotterdam during the next ten years (De Boer, 1998, 18). 
The strategy chosen by the HAL-directors in competition with the RNSC 
allowing Funch & Edye to trade for the rival, illustrates the importance of the 
relationships between ship broker, shipping agents a d ship owners. One’s position in 
these networks was based on accumulated reputation, which reflected opportunistic 
behavior. According to the principal-agent theory, in a world of uncertainty and 
asymmetric information, the principal partly dependd on an agent for information 
gathering and decision-making. In a business where trust and reputation defined the 
relationship between the actors, the ability of ship owners in judging opportunistic 
behavior of agents and brokers played a key role for the success of the company. 
Expanding networks to increase the information flows on business opportunities and its 
actors allowed owners to make the decisions on which the course of growth of the 
enterprise depended. The company relied on the importance of reputation restricting the 
opportunistic behavior of Funch & Edye. Through theship broker the directors gained 
access to inside information on the rival’s business and even shared in the profits of their 
competitor. This compensated for; possible inside information going the other way; for 
the fact that the rival profited from the trade specific expertise of the broker accumulated 
while doing business with the HAL, and for the risk of losing the ship broker’s favor to a 
                                                 
171 GAR,HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 44, Correspondence with H Cazaux van  Staphorst 1874-84, 
correspondence with board of directors  November 22 and 24 1880. 
172 Ibid., Letters November 22 1880 and March 3 1882. 
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rival company if business opportunities revealed very promising. In the shipping world, 
ship brokers and shipping agents often climbed the ladder, in becoming shipowners, by 
accumulating knowledge and reputation. Sometimes the information acquired 
information on a business route incited them to compete directly with their former 
employers (Boyce, 1995, 45-73).  
In the run up to 1914, the levels of doubt rose, as to the efficiency of Funch & 
Edye as ship brokers, in several instances. Yet, th HAL never seriously considered 
engaging another ship broker. The main reason not to change was the growing 
competition for freight traffic between American Atlantic and Dutch ports. These 
competitors specialized in freight, putting a serious challenge to the HAL in combining 
passenger and freight transport, and hence being less flexible. At the turn of the century, 
the company decided to diversify to meet the keen competition. They launched a freight 
service with the so called –dyk ships. Breaking relations with Funch & Eyde could have 
driven the ship brokers to existing competitors, or c uld have led to the establishment of 
another competing line. With their expertise built p over the years working for HAL, the 
ship brokers represented a serious threat. Passenger liners not only ran this risk with their 
cargo business but also with the passenger business which they entrusted into the hands 
of passenger brokers- this will be discussed in the following chapter. With the 
Amsterdam competition finally neutralized, the efforts could now be centered on 
Antwerp, which had developed as a serious contender. 
 
3) Red Star Line: ‘Belgian Royal and United States Mail Steamships sailing every 
Saturday between New York and Antwerp’173 
  
3.1) Antwerp’s decline and new legislation  
 
After reaching a peak of 25,719 migrants transported directly from Antwerp to the 
New World in 1854, the flow gradually declined. The failure to establish a direct 
steamship line initiated the downfall which accelerat d as the transition from sail to 
steam took place. By 1871, direct migration had come to a complete standstill. Antwerp 
                                                 
173 This is how the company named itself in advertising pamphlets of 1886 and 1890 (Vervoort, 
1999, 6 and 47). 
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became a mere transit port providing migrants to British ports through feeder services 
(Broeze, 1994; Stevens, 1998, Veraghtert, 1977). The Belgian authorities renewed their 
efforts to attract the migrant traffic hoping to red ss the situation. It appointed a special 
commission to investigate means to revive the migrant trade and to adapt the outdated 
legislation regarding migrant transport.174  
As the authorities stressed the laws had no intention of impeding the flow, on the 
contrary they were hoped to contribute to the development of the traffic reconciling 
business interests with public order and humanity. The commission used the laws of the 
neighboring countries as an example of adapting the regulations to the changed 
conditions of migrant transport under steam. In particular, the lack of laws controlling the 
honesty, morality and solvency of migration agencies r ceived a lot of attention 
(Spelkens, 1976, 93). France, Germany and the Netherlands had increased their control 
on these agencies; the first two concessions were given to nationals only (see chapter II). 
Especially in Germany, this was increasingly used to direct nationals to German ports. 
Early 1870s, agents doing business with Henri Strauss, Antwerp’s main migrant broker, 
were forced to give up their business relations if they wanted to retain their migrant 
concession (Spelkens, 1976, 94-98).175 Belgian authorities did not impose citizen 
restrictions, since most of the migrant business wa in the hands of merchants with 
German roots. Yet the law of 1876 stated that shipping agencies and their agents wishing 
to engage in the migrant trade now had to apply for a concession at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affaires, which needed to be renewed on a ye rl  basis. Shipping agencies 
needed to pay a deposit anywhere between 20,000 to 4 ,000 francs.  
Other measures protected the migrant in case the shipping agencies did not carry 
out the obligations as stipulated in the contract. Violations observed by the Maritime 
                                                 
174 Another event influencing the decision to revise th regulation was the scandal regarding the 
Guiseppe Baccarcich arriving in New York with 18 deceased in June 1867. The matter received wide 
coverage in the American and German press blaming the Antwerp migrant broker A. Strauss for providing 
inadequate food provisions and transport conditions f r the crossing.  The Belgian authorities leading a 
special investigation in the matter strongly refuted the accusations. The New York consul vigorously 
defended the name of Antwerp as migrant gateway. The Belgian authorities considered the smear campaign 
as yet another attempt of the German ports to divert th  flow (Feys, 2003, 133-137and Spelkens, 1976, 8 -
89). 
175 Henri was the son of Adolphe Strauss one of the pioneering migrants agents of Antwerp. 
Abuses committed by Strauss were largely exaggerated in the German and American press, yet the claims 
were not totally unfounded. Even in Antwerp the firm built up a dubious reputation (Feys, 2003 and 
Spelkens, 1976, 97).   
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Commissioners in Antwerp or by consuls abroad were punishable by fine. The legislation 
obligated migrant agents to welcome their clients upon arrival at the railroad stations, 
guiding them to the lodging houses and taking care of their luggage. These local agents 
needed to obtain permission from the Communal Administration of Antwerp in granting 
access to the railroad station, and it was decreed that they worked for a recognized 
shipping agency. With these regulations the authorities hoped to put an end to the 
activities of the numerous runners at the port living off the naivety of migrants (Spelkens, 
1976, 94-96).  
But, what Antwerp really needed to revive, in terms of the migrant traffic, were 
direct steamship lines to the US. On September 9th 1870 the Belgian parliament passed a 
law granting a mail subsidy of minimum 300,000 franks to any line providing a direct 
steam connection to the US. During the following summer, due to the lack of response, 
the sum was raised to 500,000 and there was an exemption made of beacon and pilotage 
dues.176 When American representatives proposed a project, ba ked by the Pennsylvania 
Railroad Company the authorities quickly came to an agreement. 
 
3.2) The Pennsylvania Railroad Company and the International Navigation 
Company 
 
The failure of the Société belge des bateaux à vapeur transatlantique and its sister 
company for a service to South America financed by the same Antwerp merchant group, 
made financers reluctant to invest in a steamship line to US. The Belgian government 
abandoned its hopes to launch a national fleet with domestic capital, stopping the practice 
of direct subsidies and interest guarantees. Instead, the government tried to lure foreign 
lines to Antwerp by offering lucrative mail contracts to companies using the port. The 
lack of services to the US constituted the biggest drawback for Antwerp’s commercial 
development and remained an absolute priority for the authorities (Devos, 1988, 81-97; 
Veraghtert, 1986 72-84) The Belgian policies stimulating the trade through Antwerp did 
not go unnoticed abroad, especially in the US where plans were elaborated to revive the 
merchant marine. The rebirth of the American merchant marine after the Civil War 
                                                 
176 BGRA 4054, House of Representatives, Session 252, July 5 1887. 
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centered on the West leaving the North Atlantic maritime route in European hands (Ville, 
1990).  
However, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company (PRR) constituted an exception, 
launching an initiative to regain a prominent positi n on that route. The directors of the 
railroad company shared the view, common among contemporaries, which considered 
maritime lines as being natural extensions of their s rvices. By opening a steamship line 
to the European continent, the Philadelphia based company wanted to divert part of the 
North Atlantic traffic dominated by New York to Pennsylvania. The New York Central 
Railroad one of the PRR’s greatest rivals made big profits from the transport of migrants 
to and from the American hinterland. The Pennsylvanian company wanted to get their 
hands on this lucrative business by founding a passenger liner. The battle for the migrant 
clearly did not only limit itself to ocean but also t  railroad transport. Philadelphia was 
not only lagging on New York, but also behind Boston, which with the Cunard service 
had a first-class steam connection from the beginnings of transatlantic steamshipping 
while the strong trade relation between Bremen and Baltimore stimulated the North 
German Lloyd to open a service in 1867.  
The PRR first tried to take over the Anchor Line, one of the pioneers in migrant 
transport by steam running a service between Glasgow and New York. When the attempt 
failed, the directors decided to provide substantial fin ncial backing for an American-flag 
steamship line. The PRR bought an important part of the shares and gave a guarantee of 
interest on invested capital, which immediately attracted active support of the local 
merchant community to found the American Steamship Company of Philadelphia- also 
known as the American Line. The PRR also supported another venture, the International 
Navigation Company (INC) launched by some entrepreneurs doubting the success of a 
line under the American flag. Vessels built in American shipyards cost approximately 
30% more than those built in Europe which, combined with the high wages of national 
crews, constituted important surcharges for the right to fly the Stars and Stripes.177 The 
shipbrokers Peter Wright and Sons, chief initiators f this project, wanted to operate a 
line under a foreign flag. Peter Wright’s close ties with the well respected firms 
                                                 
177 Finch calculated that the salaries of British crews were half that of their American counterparts. 
This difference added to the higher cost of coals, supplies and insurance in America amounted to 50,000 
dollars extra costs per ship per year (Finch, 1988, 35).  
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Richardson, Spence & Company in Liverpool and vender Becke & Marsily in Antwerp 
influenced his preferences for European terminals. Since the American Line had opened a 
service to Liverpool, Antwerp became the first choie for the INC. Aware of the 
favorable predisposition of the Belgian government to support steamship connections 
Wright sent Clement Griscom to negotiate the best possible conditions. Wright also 
convinced the Belgian envoy in Washington of the grat potential of a steamship line 
connecting the PRR and Belgian railroad network on the migrant traffic.178  
The envoy supported the American bid that had to rival with the North German 
Lloyd. The German company proposed letting some of their ships, which would remain 
under the German flag, call at Antwerp guaranteeing a two weekly service to New York. 
Griscom, however, had far fewer demands and offered a lot more advantages.179 He 
quickly reached an agreement with the Belgian authorities. The government granted; a 
yearly subsidy of $100,000 for postal services; free wharfage at Antwerp; exemption 
from beacon and pilotage dues; Belgian train stations would serve as selling points for 
ocean passage free of charge; and a rebate on Belgian coal used by the company.180 In 
return, Griscom conceded to splitting the service between Philadelphia and New York.181 
In order to facilitate Griscom’s negotiation position to obtain a similar subsidy from the 
American authorities, the Belgian government agreed to adapt the contract to the needs, 
even allowing a stopover at an English port.182 Delfosse, the Belgian envoy in 
Washington supported Griscom and worked on a new favorable postal agreement 
between both countries.183 The consular corps also promoted the line and report d that 
the American owners had organized huge propaganda campaigns to make the line known 
to the public.184 With the Société Anonyme de Navigation Belge Américaine known as 
the Red Star Line (RSL) Antwerp finally had its long awaited regular steamship 
connection to the US (Flayhart, 1998, 129-137 and 2000, 79-85 and Finch, 1988, 33-37). 
                                                 
178 BGRA, 4055, Letter of Wright to Delfosse, envoy at Washington, September 17 1871. 
179 Ibid., 4056, Letter of MFA to Minister of Finance April 4 1873. 
180 Ibid., Agreement between INC and Belgian government s.d. 
181 Apart from the government support Griscom did not seek any capital in Belgium. The INC held 
nearly all the shares except an insignificant number bought by von der Becke and Marsily (Finch, 1988, 
23).  
182 BGRA, T 074, Ministry of Finance, 351, correspondec  between the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of Public Works, January 19 until Februa y 2 1872.  
183 Ibid., 4056, Delfosse to MFA August 14 1873. 
184 Ibid. report 1877.  
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Early in 1873, the RSL started its service with theVaderland, was built just as 
two other sister ships, to carry 800 steerage and 70 cabin passengers each. The company 
engaged Strauss and sons as migrant brokers. Like all other newly established 
steamshipping companies it had difficulties to remain afloat during the subsequent crisis. 
Two smaller companies preceded the RSL in providing mi rants a steamship connection 
to the US increasing the competition during the first decade of operations. Daniel 
Steinman, one of Antwerp’s main shippers and migrant brokers during the sailing ship 
area started organizing migrant transports with chartered steam vessels to New York.185 
With the booming migrant business in the early 1870s, the Engels Line trading with 
South-America and India temporally diverted its steamship to the North Atlantic. Both 
companies joined forces in 1879 to provide a regular service under the name of White 
Cross Line (WCL). With the absence of a steamship connection during the ascendancy of 
steam in the 1860s a well established British feeder service positioned itself in Antwerp. 
Especially the Inman Line attracted continental migrants from the Belgian port. Besides 
the internal competition, the newly established companies in rival ports such as the HAL 
and RNSC did not facilitate the market entry of RSL.  
Yet, despite the depressed business conditions and the keen competition the 
company produced encouraging results. The American Line on the other hand 
accumulated losses. Dissatisfied with the management of the Liverpool Line the PRR 
board reorganized the company entrusting the responsibility for operating the American 
ships to Peter Wright and Sons in 1874. The combinatio  allowed cutting costs and 
running ships on a complementary service186. The anticipated postal subsidies from the 
federal government, after year long lobbying efforts in Congress, fizzled out. Missing out 
on a unique opportunity of selling the ships to the Russian navy was the ultimate defeat 
for the PRR board, refusing to give any additional assistance to the loss-making 
American Line. By 1884, the company was forced to wind up the affairs. On the 
insistence, and with financial support of the PRR, the International Navigation Company 
                                                 
185 Steinmann repeatedly complained about the unfair competition of its subsidized rival. When 
during the economic crisis the RSL could not meet th  requirements of the postal contract Steinmann did 
not hesitate to agitate against the line in the Belgian press to take over the mail contract. Ibid., 4056 and 
4057. 
186 The International Navigation company also operated two ships on the Liverpool route under 
British flag. The four ships of the American Line allowed running a weekly service between Philadelphia 
and Liverpool (Flayhart, 2000, 41).  
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took over the American Line which continued to sail as a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
INC. This laid the foundation for a concern which gradually sought to expand its share of 




The establishment of the Holland America Line confirms the findings of previous 
research on the changes in legal structures of shipping companies with the transition from 
sail to steam. Resulting from the initiative of local shipping agents, the HAL started as a 
partnership evolving into a limited reliability company as a result of the support of the 
Rotterdam merchant community. The founders relied on Scholten as main financer of the 
project. The company appointed local brokers responible for cargo, and others for 
passengers, on both sides of the Atlantic to fill vessels. The brokers were used by the 
company to expand their networks, ensuring a constant flow of freight and passengers but 
also to obtain information on business opportunities and rival companies. With the 
introduction of steam, the American market of ocean p ssage rapidly gained importance 
with the increasing number of prepaid and return passages. New York’s supremacy in 
attracting the migrant traffic transformed the port in o ‘the’ nodal point where the 
Atlantic networks came together. Yet, how passenger lin s integrated the widespread 
pre-existing networks of migrant brokers and agents remains unclear. Bickelmann 
suugests that migrant brokers and agents lost theirinfluence when shipping companies 
gained control of the forwarding business by separating freight and passenger services 
with the completion of the transition from sail to steam (Bickelmann, 1982, 135). Agnes 
Bretting also points to a decreasing influence of the agent-network in the bookings of 
migrants once the steamship companies were well established (Bretting, 1991, 84-90).   
On the other end of the spectrum Wyman quotes a repres ntative of the Italian 
society of Emigration stressing that migration agents only became important after the 
introduction of steam which had cheapened and eased the crossing resulting in a new 
level of intensified business competition (Wyman, 1993, 25-26). Migration historians 
generally take on the former assumption, playing down the role of the transport sector on 
migrant flows. The lack of interest of maritime historians for in nineteenth century North 
 123
Atlantic passenger trade contributed to this hypothesis which has however never been the 
object of an in depth analysis. With the exception of Brattne’s study, a lack of research 
using first hand sources has led to many assumptions and speculations based on 
secondary sources giving no conclusive arguments on the impact of the agent-network. 
Using the HAL archives some new insights as to the organization of this agent-network, 
and its relation with the company, will be discussed in the two chapters to follow.  
 
Chapter II: ‘We got prepaid and return tickets to r ide’: chain migration patterns 
and the American network of migrant agents 
 
Migration historians have very much focused on finding answers as to why people 
migrated and what elements influenced their decision to do so? How people migrated has 
received very little attention, and as Miller observed, Atlantic migration only reached a 
high scale as a result of the business networks conisting of lodging house owners, local 
agents, recruiters, labor agencies, migrant brokers, trading, railroad and shipping 
companies (Miller, 2006, 205). Micro studies on migration exposed the shortcomings of 
initial macro studies, for not taking non-economical v riables into account. They 
highlighted the regional differences, and the importance of family and kin, on the migrant 
decision. Successful pioneers encouraged migration through letters and remittances 
establishing ‘chain migration’ patterns diffusing from kin relations to fellow villagers, 
regions, nations and even whole continents.  
Yet, most of these bottom-up studies treat the vast networks of migrant agents and 
system of prepaid tickets managed by shipping lines as parallel networks existing beside 
chain migration patterns and having little or no impact on migrant flows. That is, if they 
are considered in the first instance. Migrant agents are treated as mere traveling agents, 
facilitating the move without stimulating it. Those studies neglect the fact that 
transatlantic migration patterns developed around pre-existing maritime trade routes and 
networks prospering off the commercialization of migrant transport. In this chapter, the 
debate in migration and maritime literature on the influence of migrant agents will be 
sketched.  The terminology of migrant brokers, expedients, agents, runners etc. will be 
treated to deconstruct the various layers within the vast agent-network. Who were they? 
What did their activities consist off? What was their position towards shipping 
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companies? Did it change with the introduction of steam? How did these go-betweens 
link the individual migrant with one or another shipping company? 
 
1) The Dillingham Commission, Larsson brothers and migrant legislation as 
primary contemporary sources for migrant-agent activity 
 
1.1) The Dillingham Commission 
 
There are three main sources which have been used to evaluate the activity of the 
agent network; first the reports of the Dillingham Commission, second the archives of the 
Larson brothers, Swedish migrant brokers and finally the legislation regulating the 
activities of agents and brokers complemented by police records dealing with the 
implementation of these. Around the turn of the century ardent debates about the need to 
restrict immigration into the US resulted in the formation of a parliamentary commission 
investigating the subject, known as the Dillingham Commission. The commission took 
four years to finish its report consisting of 41 volumes, with one on the emigration 
conditions in Europe and another on the steerage conditi ns, immigrant banks and aid 
societies (Dillingham Commission Reports, 1911 vol. 4 and 37). This unique 
contemporary source has been used by migration historians to stress the importance of 
chain migration patterns on the North Atlantic. The commissioners traveled through 
Europe to establish the causes for emigration and to investigate whether the movement 
was inflated by shipping companies and migrant agents.  
As the Progressive Era unfolded the need for scientific information on the issue 
grew stronger. Various American officials had preceded them during the preceeding two 
decades and most came to the same conclusion as the Dillingham Commission: “To say 
that steamship lines are responsible, directly or indirectly for this unnatural immigration 
is not the statement of a theory, but a fact” (Wyman, 1993, 31). American inspectors 
reported on extensive promotional campaigns for shipping companies through their local 
agents distributing propaganda on opportunities in the New World; agents advancing the 
money and providing means to finance the crossing o installments; assisting with 
auctioning off the migrant’s property; and guiding the migrants through to the final 
destination, etc. The findings of contemporary inspectors have been played down by 
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migration historians. Some have pointed to the biased nature of the source. With the new 
wave of nativism the pressures increased on inspectors to write reports advising Congress 
to adopt restrictive measures. The fact that mainly foreign steamship companies 
prospered off the American laissez-faire policy intensified the anti-immigration 
sentiment among inspectors. They constantly placed th  shipping companies under 
suspicion for helping prohibited classes of migrants from passing through the control 
stations (Schulteis, 1893, 45). Researchers have fittingly pointed out to the bias of the 
inspectors, yet doing this does not prove that theyw re wrong. As will be debated in the 
following chapters the impact of transport sector may have reached even further than 
what these contemporaries observed. 
While underlining the bias regarding the influence of steamship companies, 
chain-migration advocates were less critical on the statistical information provided by the 
commission used as one of the pillars reflecting the impact of chain-migration patterns. 
Between 1908 and 1910 the Commission recorded the number of passengers arriving 
with a prepaid ticket, averaging approximately 30%. The migrants were also asked, upon 
arrival at Ellis Island, whether they planned to join family or friends of which 79% 
replied the first 15% the latter, leaving only 6% without contacts (Dillingham 
Commission Reports, 1911 vol. 3, p 359-363). This information based on the passenger 
manifests does not necessarily represent the actual sit tion. Yet, researchers have too 
often used these figures without much critical thought. American Immigration legislation 
left a significant margin for interpretation, leaving the implementation of the laws to the 
good judgment of the Commissioner of Immigration and i spectors of Ellis Island. The 
fear of paupers had not disappeared over time and pressures to restrict migration 
increased.  
From 1893, onwards the shipping manifests had to state whether the migrant 
possessed $30 or more and if not, how much. Since the law prohibited the entrance of 
paupers, this information was gradually used to refus  migrants who were likely to 
become a public charge. If the migrant could mention a relative or a friend it hardly 
mattered whether they had a penny to their name or not. The contract labor law, 
prohibiting the entrance of migrants with work alredy arranged, meant that future 
earnings could not be used as an argument. When taking charge of Ellis Island in 1902, 
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William Williams imposed the need for a certain amount of money to obtain the right of 
landing. Moreover, passengers who were traveling on prepaids and joining kin or 
relatives needed pocket money, but less than migrants traveling outside these chains.187 
During his second term, starting in 1909, the Secretary of Department of Commerce and 
Labor had to blow the whistle on him because deportati ns of aliens had increased 
beyond reason. The commissioner required that all migrants possessed $25 on arrival. 
Mentioning friends or relatives who could act as guarantor for the limited means helped 
avoiding in depth inquiries from the Board of Investigation. Shipping companies quickly 
spread the word about these changes across the Atlantic, informing the migrants of the 
importance of mentioning contacts in the US and carrying some cash to avoid 
deportations, which occurred at their cost.188  
If the local migrant agent did not make arrangements, shipping companies used 
the time migrants spent at the port and at sea finding solutions for them to get through 
Ellis Island.189 They even hired interpreters to prepare the passengers on board, or they 
advanced the money when needed (Schulteis, 1893, 43 and de Vannoise, 1993, 89). 
Hence, on one hand many migrants may have mentioned the name of family and friends 
without having the intention of joining them. While on the other hand, not being able to 
control in depth the exactness of the statements of he mass of migrants arriving at Ellis 
Island contacts may have been fictive.190 At the time when the commission collected its 
data the controls regarding pocket money intensified, while the importance of mentioning 
                                                 
187 Migrants with no relatives or friends and very limited means had been sent back at times 
depending on the strictness of controls on Ellis Island. Migrants with relatives and friends were releas d 
from this requirement until Williams in 1903 also started to require a minimum sum for passengers with
ties and traveling with prepaid tickets, despite disposing of ticket for inland transport and names of families 
they were about to join. Passengers needed a minimum of ten dollars. Shipping companies moved heaven 
and earth contacting relatives to wire the required sum to Ellis Island allowing the landing of migrants. 
GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, correspondence between 1893 and 1910. Figures 
for the fiscal year 1902 staring July 1901 ending June 1902 quoted in an article of the Washington post
coming from the Commissioner of Immigration points to the impact of a strict implementation: the 545,750 
new arrivals  possessed on average $5,51 and only 22,275 had $30 or more (Washington Post January 3 
1903: “Alarmed about Immigration”). 
188 HAL, GAR, 318.04 Passage Department, 221-226, Various Letters from July 13 1909 until 
May 27 1910. 
189 The HAL archives show that stewards of the HAL briefed migrants on how to pass 
interrogations at Ellis Island. This was also noted by Schulteis stating that the Anchor Line engaged special 
interpreters to prep the migrants for the controls on arrival (Schulteis, 1893, 43).  
190 Even if the second and third year of analysis few migrants passed through because of the 
economic recession, Ellis Island had no means to verify the authenticity of the statements. Only suspicious 
cases were investigated by the board of investigation at Ellis Island.  
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a contact had become common knowledge in the migrant business. The results of the 
statistics used by the Dillingham Commission may have seriously overestimated the 
importance of kin and acquaintances, underestimating the number of migrants arriving 
without such ties.  
Having said this, what follows does not necessarily efute chain-migration 
theories but stresses that shipping companies were in great part responsible on how these 
developed. Focus goes to the prepaid ticket market which, in se does not consider the 
ones falling outside these chains. As Baines rightly noted, the narrow attention of studies 
to chain-migration patterns may overestimate the importance of these family and kin 
relations. Migrants who moved outside these chains re much harder to trace (Baines, 
1991 and 1994). This can not be stressed enough.  
 
1.2) The Scandinavian sources   
 
The study of Berit Brattne still constitutes the main point of reference used by 
historians to measure the impact of the migrant agent n twork. Using the archives of the 
Swedish migrant brokers of the Larsson Brothers, a ource unique of its kind, Brattne 
concluded that the extensive propaganda campaigns and pricing policies of the transport 
sector only had a marginal effect on emigration (Brattne, 1976, 199). The conclusions are 
based on the sparse bookings the Larsson brothers received through the direct actions of 
subagents. Moreover an increase in subagents had little impact on their passenger 
volume. Collaborating with more effective sales promoters, i.e. Swedish Americans, 
bypassing subagents altogether proved more effective. Most propaganda spread by the 
Larssons brothers contained information on the advantages of the particular line, services 
at the port of embarkation, while details on conditions and prospects in the US, prohibited 
by law in 1883, were brief. The ads were monotonously repeated in the press. The 
correspondence with possible clients suggests that t ey had little influence on the 
decision to migrate. Finally, Brattne underlined that price fluctuations due to during rate 
or conference price agreements had little impact on the migrant flows, it only delayed or 
accelerated the move (Brattne, 1976, 176-200).  
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Oddly enough Brattne writes very little about the rlationship between the 
migrant brokers and the shipping company employing them. Shipping conferences are 
mentioned, yet not a word about how they worked andhow they tried to regulate the 
agent-network is written. The pioneering work of Murken on North Atlantic shipping 
conferences was not even used (Murken, 1922). These ar  crucial factors neglected by a 
research claiming to analyze the impact of shipping companies and their agents on 
migrant flows. Does the lack of indication of the direct influence on the migrant decision 
by agents and subagents in this correspondence reflect their meager impact? Why should 
direct indications even be mentioned in these letters? Moreover agents and subagents are 
reduced to mere traveling agents while other studies indicate that their activities went far 
beyond that. Why not in Sweden? Did subagents sell exclusively for the Larsson 
brothers, or also for other brokers and companies as in the many other places? In short, 
had Brattne used the source to explain how people migrated instead of why we would 
know more about the impact of the migrant transport sec or on Swedish migration?  
The dearth of studies on the transport system behind the nineteenth century 
transatlantic exodus contributed to the generalization of Brattne’s findings- this while 
historians such as Gould have stressed the regional differences of migration patterns 
(Gould, 1979, 1980). Brattne’s case study of the Swdish situation during the 1880s has 
clarified market specific features. Emigration alredy had strong roots in Sweden and the 
Guion Line was already well established on the market by the 1880s. A study of the 
Italian market, which started its expansion of a line entering the market, gives a 
completely different picture.191  Also on one hand the Swedish government was inclined 
to oppose the movement prohibiting propaganda on opportunities in the US (Brattne, 
1976, 188). While on the other hand the Swedish mariti e policies imposing twice the 
space requirements for the transport of migrants than British vessels made it impossible 
for the national marine to profit from the trade. Revoking these laws in the 1880s came 
too little too late. The British lines had a tight grip on the Scandinavian market, making 
arrangements to keep out the German rivals (Hyde, 1978, 200-202; Lovoll, 1993, 60). 
                                                 
191 Studies on Italian migration seam to confirm that. Agents not only sold tickets, but also loaned 
funds for passage and passport to even help auction off the emigrant’s property. With the growing 
remigration a new encouragement for emigration was used: you could always come back (Wyman, 1999, 
22-36; Schulteis, 1893, 36-48). 
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Markets where governments favored migration and where national lines were involved, 
usually receiving privileges from the authorities to attract the trade, such as for instance 
the Italian should reflect other dynamics. In short, by bringing the superstructure of 
governments and shipping companies back into the picture some new insights can come 
forward on the role of the migrant agent network; the link to the individual migrant.  
At the other end of the spectrum Kristian Hvidt attributed much more relevance to 
the influence of the shipping companies and migrant agents on the global movement. He 
agreed that price policies of the shipping companies had little short term influence on 
migration flows, yet he blamed his Swedish colleague for underestimating the impact of 
agencies. Hvidt’s problematic, to build on his intution, was the sources he used. The 
second hand source, Copenhagen’s policy records only allowed him to point to things 
instead of doing an in-depth analysis. The so called “Yellow Book” containing 
conference regulations of the British lines organizing agent activities in Denmark was put 
forward as a key to understanding the working of the transport system. Both scholars 
opened a debate which few have picked up (Brattne, 1976, Hvidt, 1975 and 1978).  
During a conference debate Hvidt restated his concern for the neglect of the 
transportation system on mass migration where Erickson and Ǻkerman pointed to the 
lack of sources in Bremen, Hamburg, Hull and Liverpool (Mörner, 1992, 283). Drew 
Keeling gives a good survey on how the debate sporadically continued to unfold, based 
on second hand sources. Agents became increasingly sti matized as mere facilitators, 
organizing the move. Keeling corroborates this view, only conceding just as Maldwyn 
Jones or Dirk Hoerder had that during the beginning of mass migration agents stimulated 
pioneers to move. He attributes more importance to the shipping companies in the 
process yet does not explicitly state in what way, this occurred except by reducing risks 
of the actual move (Hoerder, 1991, 79; Keeling, 2007, 118-122; Jones, 1992, 157).  
 
2) The myriad of names defining the various links in the agent-network: migrant 
agents, brokers, expedients, subagents, runners, peddlers, subagent’s subsidiaries, 
recruiters, Yankee’s, Newlanders, etc. denomination 
 
2.1) The migrant broker  
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The variety of names designating the various actors in the network, connecting 
the shipping companies with the migrant, reflects the need for clear definitions. What 
Brattne and especially Hvidt failed to observe was that shipping companies built further 
on the pre-existing networks established in the sailship era. He claimed that prior to 
steam: “migrants were recruited in a haphazard way often by a captain of a sailing ship 
or a recruiting agent of an American or Canadian company” (Hvidt, 1978, 180). His 
division in agents, sub-agents and Yankee recruiters failes to reflect the complexity of the 
networks or of their maritime backgrounds. In this study, the classification into migrant 
brokers, agents and subagents of Hartmut Bickelmann is used, and adding recruiting 
agents to the list (Bickelmann, 1982, 136).192  
The first link below the shipping company is the migrant broker. These started off 
as shipping brokers adding migrant trade to their activities, and as the movement swelled 
they specialized. During the sailship era they chartered the between decks of the ships, 
outfitted them for transport, secured the passenger through agents and coordinated the 
sailing dates. With the evolution from tramp to packets leaving on set dates and the 
construction of ships built for migrant transport the organizational tasks of the brokers 
decreased. They centered their efforts on managing their agent-network which became a 
full time activity with the increased competition. The rivalry to recruit arriving migrants 
at the port through subagents or runners quickly expanded inland. Yet the practice of 
recruiting at the port never totally disappeared. How the proportion of migrants arriving 
without passages evolved over time will probably always remain uncertain. Studies seem 
to indicate that by the steamship era the majority f first time migrants arrived with their 
passage already booked. As seen previously, early migrant transport legislation requiring 
relocaters to have their ticket booked or posses a certain amount of money to cross 
borders, contributed to this evolution.193   
                                                 
192 This classification is derived from the German research on the national networks subdividing it 
into Makler (broker), Expedienten (agents), and Unteragenten (sub-agents). The German literature on 
agent-networks and legislation regulating it is more advanced than any in other country. Especially for the 
sailingship era the works of Engelsing and Bretting reconstruct how this took shape (Bretting 1991; 
Engelsing 1961. Yet other studies just to name a few are also useful (Bade, 1992; Hoerder, 1993; Gelberg, 
1973; Walker, 1964; von der Straeten, 1997). Yet th implementation of the laws and organization of the 
network during the steamship era remains to be explored. 
193 Agnes Bretting however argues that once the steamships were well established the bookings at 
the port increased again based on the agreement between HAPAG and Hamburg expedients and the 
contemporary observations of Philippovich. Yet at one hand the agreement does not reflect an increase of 
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Migrant brokers relied on migrant agents in cities and main transit points inland to 
forward clients. Often these migrant brokers had first hand experience having spent some 
time in the US themselves. The main migrant agent in Rotterdam, Johan Wambersie, was 
born of Dutch parents in Savannah in 1806 but the family returned to Rotterdam in 1833. 
He established a ship- and migrant broker agency. His appointment as American consul 
boosted his reputation in the business (Van der Valk, 1976, 157 and Swierenga, 1994, 
114). Four out of five of the Larsson Brothers migrated for a time to the US during their 
youth to familiarize with the business and acquire language skills (Brattne, 1976, 182). 
This was a common practice in the shipping world, heavily relying on personal networks 
to obtain reliable information. To consolidate ties with overseas shipping agencies, young 
family members were often sent overseas as apprentices. Hvidt observed the same in 
Copenhagen where migrant brokers shared a common past as migrants. Contacts they had 
established abroad with railroad land offices and employment bureaus created extra 
incomes (Hvidt, 1978, 181). On the European contine, the activities of the migrant 
brokers became a primary concern of the authorities trying to attract the migrants to the 
ports. To safeguard a good reputation of migrant gatew ys protecting migrants form 
abuses migrant brokers and agents had to pay a deposit to obtain permission to act as 
such which had to be renewed on a yearly basis. This caution could be used to 
compensate migrants if abuses had been certified or when the brokers were not able to 
carry out their contract. German legislation dating back to the sailship era, especially in 
Bremen, had a pioneering role in this which gradually spread across the continent. The 
money for the cautions was often advanced by ship owners (Bretting, 1991, 31-40; 
Bickelmann, 1982, 136; Fouché, 1992, 74-81; Gelberg, 1973, 10-17; Hoerder, 1993, 74 
Hvidt, 1978, 180-190; Spelkens, 1976, 83-96; van der Valk, 1976, 158-161 and de 
Vannoise- Pochulu, 1993, 44-47). 
                                                                                                                                      
direct business done at the port. The lion’s share of the business done by Hamburg migrant brokers 
involved in the agreement was done through branch offices and sub-agents inland or in the US. On the 
other hand the numbers given by Philippovich for the 1880’s are not compared with numbers for the 
previous period. The bases used by Bretting to point t  an increase of the so called ‘Platzgeschäft’ do not 
seem to be conclusive enough (Bretting, 1991, 85). It is true however that with the improved transport 
connections to the port of embarkation and the numerous regular departures from the port it became much 
easier for the migrants to bypass the migrant-agents. Yet it remains questionable if they did, because 
migrants agents still provided special railroad fares, organized their lodging at the port and continued to 
give useful information on the organization of the rip, the inspections and legislations to go through and on 
opportunities and dangers in the US. 
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Just as with cargo ship brokers successful migrant brokers, sometimes climbed the 
ladder to become ship-owners and to run a line themselves. This was the case, for 
instance, with the migrant brokers Williams and Guion engaged by the Cunard Line in 
1860 when they were forced to launch themselves on the migrant market. Hyde stressed 
the fact that shipping companies were: “largely dependent on the efficiency and goodwill 
of their agents, especially for steerage passengers b cause they were more responsive to 
skillful sales talk than cabin class travelers” (Hyde, 1975, 77). The experience of Guion 
and Williams, running a line of sailing packets transporting migrants prior to their 
engagement with Cunard allowed the steamship line to profit from the wide network of 
agencies in strategic ports built up by the Guion and Williams over the years. Their 
success in attracting steerage business for the Cunard Line inspired them to stop their 
activities as migrant brokers to enter the steam-shipping business. Four years later the 
Guion Line carried more steerage passengers than their ex-employers, the Cunard Line 
(Bastin, 1971, 28; Boyce, 1995, 36 and Hyde, 1975, 77-78). As Murken stressed these 
migrant brokers or ‘Auswanderungsexpedienten’ managing their independent agent-
network were often more powerful than the shipping companies in the steerage business 
(Murken, 1922, 15).  
 
2.2) Migrant agents, subagents, newlanders and runners 
 
Migrant agents were commissioned by several migrant brokers at different ports 
attracting a sufficient amount of business to open rmanent offices. Because of the 
fluctuations in migrant flows and the various side-ndustries the movement generated, 
agents usually combined selling passages with other trades. Arranging migrant transport 
often attracted clients for other business, bankers for example who could profit from 
money exchanges and money transfers. From their part they relied on sub-agents 
connecting them to the surrounding rural areas. The amount of business of the sub-agent 
remained small, yet because generally he constituted th  first link to the person willing to 
purchase steerage passage the sub-agent played an important role. Migrants preferred 
booking through someone familiar hence local sub-agents were more likely to earn the 
trust of purchasers than random recruiters or unknown agents, the sub-agent gave 
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important advice on where and how travel (Bretting, 1991, 65-66). Preferably these 
subagents consisted of people, who by way of profession or position in the local 
community came into frequent contact with locals or travelers, but all kinds of 
professions had propaganda signs supplied by the shipping companies posted in front of 
their houses ranging from religious leaders to mayors, innkeepers, shopkeepers, 
schoolteachers, hotel-owners, notaries, tradesmen, craftsmen, farmers, retired police 
officers, barbers, shoemakers etc (Wyman, 1993, 26; Bickelmann, 1982, 136; Evans, 
2007, 57; Hvidt, 1978, 186; Martellini, 2002, 301-302) When recruiting agents for the 
Dutch market the Holland America Line described the profile and tasks of candidates as 
follows: 
“Agents had to be recruited from people which were held in high regards by their 
community and needed to possess administrative skills. Knowledge on the 
conditions with the United States was an important plus. They had to thoroughly 
brief the passenger before the departure, make the arrangements for their luggage, 
fill out the required forms and point to the advantages of the Holland America 
Line Hotel in Rotterdam. The agents needed to be familiar with the American 
immigration laws and sanitary requirements to inform third class passengers and 
avoid deportations. They had to warn passengers against fraudulent land and 
colonization companies. Special attention had to be drawn to advertising matters 
such as billboards in train stations and public places or ads in the popular press. 
They were responsible for organizing the publicity campaigns in their regions. 
Finally the agents had to send in reports on the statu  of the business on a regular 
basis.”194 
 
By 1890, the Holland America Line managed a network f more than two thousand 
agents spread across the European continent (van der Valk, 1976, 163).  
These locals were often joined by recruiting agents for railroad trusts, land-grant 
companies, immigrant commissions of various states, or new world employers.195 They 
were generally migrants traveling back to the home country, trying to convince fellow 
countrymen to make the move to the New World. These r cruiting agents also known as 
                                                 
194 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 1, Letter November 5 1897.  
195 Wisconsin and Michigan actively advertised the opportunities the state offered for settlers 
before the Civil War. After 1865 other northwestern states also started encouraging immigration through 
advertising campaigns in Europe and eastern States. Especially Wisconsin, Minnesota and Iowa managed 
to attract a significant of foreign-born population through these campaigns. Southern states followed suit be 
it with limited success.  The land grant railroads started promotional campaigns in Europe during the 
1850’s and boomed during the 1870’s and 1880’s. These offered greater inducements than State 
immigration bureau, through reduction on transport, work upon arrival, land to be cultivated and long term 
financing plans (Jones, 1992, 161-162).  
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newlanders or Yankees made arrangements with migrant brokers or directly with 
shipping companies to obtain special conditions for the crossing of the recruits. With the 
increasing regulations regarding migrant transport, au horities tried to protect migrants 
from abuses but also tried to gain control of the movement. German and Austrian-
Hungarian legislation established as early as 1852, stated that these migrant agents, 
subagents and recruiting agents needed to obtain concessions from local authorities 
certifying their good morals and controlling their activities (Just, 1989, 53 and Bretting 
1991, 50-56). The German and Austrian authorities gave out the concessions to nationals 
only. Other European countries gradually adapted these practices. The laws proved 
difficult to apply and could never prevent a wide ntwork of unauthorized runners, 
peddlers or subagents’ substitutes from operating beneath the network of official 
representatives. Exclusivity in these networks seemed to have been an exception, all 
working for different shipping companies, brokers o agents.    
Because of this network people, considering a move usually did not even have to 
leave their village for making arrangements to cross the Atlantic. On the payment of the 
fare the agents or sub-agents gave a provisionary ‘Shipping-ticket’ which was printed and 
numbered by the migrant broker where the name of the buyer, the number of passengers, 
the port of departure, the shipping company and the money received had to be clearly 
mentioned. Some weeks before the departure, the subagents contacted the brokers about 
when his client wished to leave, proposing a ship based on the list of departure sent 
around by the shipping companies. The expedient then communicated on what ship the 
berths were reserved and on what day the passenger needed to leave his hometown to 
arrive in time at the port. The combined sale of ocean passage and inland travel was 
common (Just, 1989, 49).  
Even during the 1840s and 1850s the competition between the American railroad 
and steamship companies for the inland transportatin had moved to Europe. American 
authorities pressured European governments to out an end to this practice because of the 
widespread frauds in the business, yet this only result d in the temporary prohibition in 
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some European countries.196 Agents earned an extra commission on the sale of these 
tickets. With the often shared interests of inland transport companies attached to a certain 
port in attracting the trade, special migrant fares w re offered.197 Because of the common 
interest, migrants benefited from this increasingly integrated transatlantic transport 
network. Sub-agents helped the migrant on his or her way to the train stations and 
sometimes even accompanied them to the port when big groups traveled together. 
Otherwise, other agents assisted them along the way in key transit points.  
Port authorities quickly understood the importance of protecting relocaters from 
all kinds of scalpers trying to defraud migrants by overcharging for lodging, money 
exchanges, traveling utensils, sale of false inland travel tickets etc. In 1847, to fight off 
the bad reputation of migrant abuses at the port of Antwerp the governor asked the 
migrant brokers to advise him of new arrivals beforhand.198 A police escort was than 
arranged to bring the migrants to a place indicated by the migrant brokers. Later police 
escorts were replaced by representatives of the migrant brokers who had received special 
police permission to get access to the platforms welcoming the migrants and guiding 
them to the lodging houses or the ship. In other European migrant ports similar measures 
were taken (Gelberg, 1973, 10-40; Spelkens, 1976, 71-81 and Zevenbergen, 1990, 38-
40). The same was done on the other side of the Atlantic to assist the passenger to his or 
her final destination.199 Migrants who booked through a ‘newlander’ often enjoyed the 
privilege of being accompanied by him to the final destination.  
                                                 
196 This was the case in Prussia. The Belgian and French government also considered prohibiting 
the sale to stop abuses. Yet this measure seemed to have been rapidly revoked (Fouché, 1992, 68-72 and 
Feys, 2003). 
197 Belgian railroads first offered a 30% discount to migrants joining Antwerp which was later 
increased to 50%. Railroad companies connecting Switzerland to Le Havre not only gave special migrant 
fares but organized special trains for the transport. Same goes for trains connecting Hull with Liverpool. 
Rhine boats connecting Rotterdam with the hinterland d subsequent railroads gave special fares. 
Bickelmann states that German railroads stopped giving reductions after their nationalization during the 
1850’s. This fitted in the new policies that emigration should not be encouraged by German states. Last 
special migrant fares on German railroads would date b ck to 1879, according to Bickelmann (Bickelmann, 
1982, 138). Yet the Holland America Line archives indicate that that NGL and HAPAG successfully 
renegotiated special migrant fares at the end of the 1880’s. Maybe these were limited to foreign transit-
migrants but German shipping companies did quote special migrant fares also after 1879.  
198 BAMFA 2020, Emigration, I, Letter of the Antwerp governor to MFA January 17 1847.  
199As stated previously migrants also found their way to the port on their own and many arrived in 
New York without tickets for inland transport. Yet as the movement persisted and the agent networks had 
time developed, it is safe to say that a big majority than arranged the travel to the port through the ag nt.  
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Apart from arranging the transport for the migrants, the agents also provided other 
services but it is hard to know to what extent the facilities offered by some agents can be 
generalized. Sub-agents and agents also helped in obtaining official travel documents. 
Passports were not a prerequisite to board ships and enter the US but the tendency of the 
European authorities during the second half of the century to increase their grip on the 
movement contributed to their use. Especially the Russian, Hungarian and Italian 
authorities tried to direct and control emigration through passport issues long before the 
WOI. This created new market opportunities for migrant agents assisting relocaters to 
travel clandestinely. Swiss migrant agents, for insta ce, often advertised in Italy that they 
could arrange the transport without passport. The enforcement of the Italian government 
requiring a passport from nationals leaving from Italian ports opened a market 
opportunity which Swiss migrant agents quickly exploited sending those who could not 
obtain one through northern ports. As the circular of the Swiss agency Carecco en Brivio 
to Italian sub-agents illustrates:   
“We will accept your passengers for New York at netrates of 120 franks from 
Chiasso through Antwerp with RSL or English steamers. Make sure your 
passengers arrive in Chiasso on Tuesdays year-round. Migrants coming through 
Milan have to go the trattoria which address has previously been sent. We accept 
passengers, even without passports guaranteeing their embarkation. Instruct your 
passengers not to confide in anyone, never tell that they are going to America and 
hide any addresses or papers linking them to their destination. If someone inquires 
about where they are going they should frankly respond that they are on their way 
to Switzerland looking for work. To make reservations you need to send us 
beforehand their names, address, etc and o bond of 50 Lire for each migrant.”200 
  
In countries such as Russia which opposed emigration, a clandestine network of agents 
was formed helping migrants on their way. They smuggled relocaters over the Russian 
borders. The migrant trade was a dangerous business i  Russia where agents risked a trip 
to Siberia if their bribes to local authorities were not big enough (Just, 1989, 54-55).201 
Agents and subagents also assisted their clients with selling whatever properties they had 
(Wyman, 1993, 27 and Thielemans, 1999, 129). 
The agents played an important role by spreading all sorts of information not only 
on how to migrate, but also whereto and why. There are no means of measuring the 
                                                 
200 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department: Conference negotiations, 226, Letter April 19 1894.  
201 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 114, Letter November 23 1900.  
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impact of this on migrant flows, yet it has generally been played down by historians. For 
example, the studies of Yuzo Murayama or John Rice and Robert Ostergren on the 
impact of the diffusion of information on migration do not even consider the role of the 
transport sector (Murayama, 1994, 125-147 and Rice and Ostergren, 1978, 1-15). John 
Gould stressed the importance of information flows and the impact of “diffusion” and 
“feedback” on patterns of European inter-continental migration. First hand information 
on the conditions in the New World of pioneers to kin and fellow villagers determined 
the volume and how the fever spread from villages to regions (Gould, 1979, 614-616 and 
1980, 41-112) A series of migrant letters contains detailed information on the conditions 
in the New World, and advice on whether and how to join the migrants (Kamphoefner, 
Heiblich and Sommer, 1991).  
Outside of migrant letters, the New World and transatlantic migration received 
wide coverage in the developing popular press. Recruit rs and migrant agents eagerly 
used the press to advertise opportunities and the means to travel to the New World. The 
advertisement techniques used to promote shipping companies and migrant agents 
predated modern practice by 100 years and were extremely forceful in their appeal 
(Bastin, 1971, 11 and Hyde 1975, 65). Migrant agents also distributed brochures and 
circulars paid for by the shipping companies promoting he advantages and sailing dates 
of the Line.  They contained sound advice to migrants, details of the services offered but 
information about the conditions in the US remained brief (Brattne, 1976, 191). 
American authorities of western and southern states, employers, railroad and landowning 
companies also used these networks to spread their propaganda. However, according to 
Brattne the monotonously repeated advertisements and propaganda had little influence on 
the migrant decision, especially after 1883 when the Swedish authorities prohibited the 
circulation of propaganda on opportunities in the New World. Even in 1852 the Austrian-
Hungarian authorities had forbidden such propaganda on its territory and German 
authorities later followed suit (Just, 1989, 37). Despite the prohibition, Schulteis noted 
that Belgian and Dutch printers published German pamphlets and booklets which 
clandestinely circulated through the agent-network (Schulteis, 1893, 23).202 Gould 
                                                 
202 With the transition from sail to steam, shipping companies wanted to avoid any associations 
between the line and landowning or colonization companies. Stories on abuses and failures of the latter 
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attributed much more importance to the role of the ag nts as information diffusers than 
Brattne:  
“At least, the constant representation to the public on the opportunities in other 
countries and the proffer of practical information about ways and means must 
have been a factor in the diffusion of the habit of emigration (…). Any advertising 
expert knows that it is constant repetition rather t an reasoned (or valid) argument 
which sells the product” (Gould, 1980, 275). 
 
Agents also provided information on the American immigration laws which from 1882 
onwards extended the list of excluded classes. The Am rican authorities integrated these 
agents into their policies of remote control imposing that immigration laws be posted in 
the offices of European agents. But, the agents also provided information and means to 
circumvent laws restricting emigration or immigration. For instance agents’ assisting 
young males to migrate in order to avoid military service was a common practice. On the 
other hand agents prepared their clients on the tests and interviews at landing stations 
informing them what answers needed to be given to pass the ‘golden door’. If risks were 
judged to be too high, alternative routes through Canada could be suggested.   
Michael Just concluded that the agent-network stimulated Europeans to migrate, 
and especially pioneers. As the movement from a region intensified and persisted their 
job was made easier since word of mouth publicity from pioneers constituted the best 
means of instigating new departures. It remains difficult to estimate their true impact on 
the migrant’s decision. Agents by themselves could not motivate someone to leave yet 
they could win over people who contemplated turning their back on the home country 
(Just, 1989, 60-61).  
Agents were a vital link in the transatlantic transport network, enabling the mass-
migration movement to unfold. As legislation regulating both emigration and 
immigration increased the agents helped the migrants to fulfill the necessary 
requirements or to circumvent altogether. They swelled the information flow on the New 
World and on how to reach it. Combined with the technological innovations in transport 
                                                                                                                                      
could blacken the reputation of the shipping company. The Holland America Line seemed to have 
discouraged the spread of information on these through their agents towards the end of the century. Some 
were allowed to put their pamphlets at the disposition of the HAL-clients if their good intentions were 
certified by the New York head-agents. Special fares could be obtained for groups yet any public 
associations with these ventures had to be avoided. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 1, Letter 
November 5 1897 and 221-226. 
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and communication this helped lifting the psychological fear of migration to the extent 
that a long and fearful journey to New York evolved into something, which for Italians 
was easier to consider than a trip to Rome and could be repeated on a yearly base- which 
for the Irish was much less of a journey into unknow  territory than looking for work in 
an Irish city (Gould, 1980, 294-295). The availability of agents across Europe organizing 
the voyage of the migrant from their village to the final destination and their constant 
advertising campaigns in local newspapers brought the New World a lot closer in the 
mental map of many Europeans.  
The integration of both worlds was further enhanced by the networks of agents in 
the US selling pre-paid and return tickets. The following section discusses the American 
agent-network, which strangely enough in a field stressing the importance of chain 
migration patterns has, received no consideration whatsoever. An important difference 
between the agent-network in Europe, when compared to the US is the complete lack of 
regulations in the latter. Therefore before crossing the Atlantic, the laws passed in 
Germany, the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Denmark need to be briefly examined.  
 
2.3) European laws regulating the agent-network in continental countries with 
important migrant gateways 
 
The first protective ordinance of the Bremen Senate d s back to 1832. Other 
German states soon followed, with Baden introducing the first surety bond of 20,000 
Gulden for migrant agents. Bavaria built further on these regulations by introducing 
formalities to be included in the contract which demanded the issue of visas by the 
Bremen consul. The other states soon followed suit,passing similar legislation. The most 
important feature of these laws was the agents’ concession enabling the authorities to 
control both their number and their activities. Legislations including concession 
regulations were passes in Baden, Württemberg, Hessen (1847); Mecklenburg (1852); 
Prussia, Sachsen, Frankfurt, Kuhresen, (1853) and other smaller states. The free port 
cities Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck did not introduce concessions yet they established 
institutions to control the brokers’ and agents’ activities. In all states however the 
privileges of acting as an official migrant agent could be withdrawn and sometimes it was 
subject to renewal every year. Surety bonds varied f om 300 Thaler to 30,000 Marks. The 
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laws established contractual obligations. The efforts of Prussia to standardize the 
measures for all states late 1840s only materialized in 1897. Concessions now needed to 
be obtained from the central government. Only natiols could apply; they needed to 
have their residence in the region where they intended to establish their business and an 
authorization of a licensed entrepreneur for whom they were acting. Agents acting 
without concession risked one year imprisonment and a fine up to 6000 Mark (Bretting, 
1991, 31-40; Gelberg, 1973, 10-14, and Hoerder, 1993, 75).  
The Belgian government adopted a law in 1875 strictly regulating the duties of 
shipping agencies and their agents. Migrant brokers n eded to obtain the permission of 
the authorities to act as such and had to pay a deposit of between 20,000 to 40,000 franks. 
As the abuses persisted, the concession became subjct to yearly renewal. The law of 
1890 made the shipping companies responsible for the actions of their brokers, agents 
and sub-agents. They needed to hand in a list of all the authorized migrant agents and 
sub-agents allowing the government emigration commissioner to investigate the moral 
character of these agents through the local authorities where they resided. Yet on several 
occasions the RSL refused to hand over the list, claiming that it could be used by rival 
companies to lure away their agents. The authorities d d not press the RSL in conceding 
which reflects both the power of the company and the still ever prevailing economic 
rather than humanitarian concerns of the government when regulating the trade 
(Spelkens, 1976, 94-96; Feys 2003).  
In the Netherlands, the law of 1862 included a clause establishing supervision 
commissions in Amsterdam and Rotterdam that needed to promote the ports as 
emigration gateways and to protect the migrants from abuses. They investigated 
complaints from migrants against dishonest agents. Deposits from brokers and agents 
were collected and supervised by local authorities (Van der Valk, 1976, 157-161). In 
France, article 4 of decree of January 15 1855 establi hed that shipping companies 
transporting migrants and agencies recruiting those ne ded to receive an authorization 
granted by the Department of Agriculture, Commerce and Public works on payment of a 
deposit, ranging from 15,000 to 40,000 francs. The concession could be withdrawn when 
problems occurred. The agencies were responsible for their agents and sub-agents who 
needed to obtain an authorization from the emigration bureau of the Department of 
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Interior. The law also contained stipulations as to what the contracts used by these 
agencies needed to contain. Conversely to Belgium, these laws were strictly 
implemented. From 1880 onwards, despite strong protests of the migrant brokers the 
price needed to include the board and lodging at Le Havre. No major changes were made 
to the impositions of 1855 which were molded into new imperial laws and decrees in 
1860 and 1861 (Fouché, 1992, 76-81; de Vannoise- Pochulu, 1993, 44-47, 68-72, 139-
144).  
The Danish emigration law of 1868 imposed a security bond of 10,000 riksdaler 
on migrant brokers, leading to a concentration of these brokers in Canal Street, 
Copenhagen. They needed to provide the police authorities with a list of inland agents 
working for them and for whom they were responsible. From 1868 untill 1876 the 
migrant brokers rose from 6 to 12, agents from 126 to 571. By 1886, when Danish 
migration peaked, 15 brokers managed a network of 1053 agents. The number decreased 
to eight and 300 during the slump of the 1890s. Themoderate revival at the turn of the 
century brokers and agents increased to 10 and 700 respectively. Despite the regulations, 
migrant agents remained largely beyond police control. Sub-agents and recruiting agents 
escaped the vigilance of the Danish authorities under these laws (Hvidt, 1868, 180-190). 
 European countries directly involved in the first wave of mass migration had 
passed laws to control the expansion and activities of the agent-network by the time 
steamship companies took over the migrant transport market from sailing ships. 
However, for lawmakers also the distinction between brokers, agents and sub-agents was 
not always clear. The French and German authorities imposed the same surety bonds for 
both brokers and agents. In Denmark this was limited to brokers, yet it remains unclear as 
to whether the Danish authorities made much distinctio  between agents and sub-agents. 
Therefore, in France and Germany only a small number could afford the surety bond, 
increasing the number of sub-agents whereas in Denmark a lot of what in Germany and 
France would be called sub-agents were classified as agents.  
 With the introduction of specialized liner shipping services, the differences also 
tended to disappear, possibly explaining the divergence between laws passed before 
1860s and the ones after. Initially, brokers chartered the steerage decks and opened 
agencies inland to fill them. Yet, with specialized ships chartering was not necessary any 
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longer and brokers lost part of their role as middlemen between ship-owners and migrant 
agents. Most of the brokers retained a wide network of inland agents and sub-agents but 
they could not prevent some inland-agents from braking away from them dealing directly 
with the companies and attracting the same amount of business. Except for one having its 
offices at the port and the other inland, nothings else differentiated them any longer. A 
hierarchy persisted nonetheless, based on the amount of business a middleman controlled. 
Brokers, inland or at ports became middlemen on whom shipping companies relied to 
obtain the gross of their share from one of their submarkets. The geographical 
delimitation varied from provinces to whole countries. The rest came from other brokers 
or smaller agents with whom they increasingly started to deal directly. Agents limited 
their business to local regions, relying on sub-agents in small towns. To make the 
network manageable for shipping companies it needed to be limited, therefore they never 
dealt with sub-agents directly.  
 Hence, during the steamship era the differentiation s more based on the 
geographic area and amount of business middlemen controlled, rather than on specific 
services they performed. As the migration fever spread to Eastern and Southern European 
countries new laws regulating the migrant trade in  Italy (1888 and 1901), Spain (1907) 
Hungry (1900), Austria (1904) reflect this evolution. The various layers connecting the 
migrant with the shipping companies made it very difficult to implement the laws. 
Therefore in 1901 it revoked concessions given to migrant brokers to recruit migrants, 
only giving the ministerial permission to do so to shipping companies leaving from 
Italian ports. These were allowed to appoint agents, representatives of the shipping 
companies for whom they were directly responsible. By reducing the layers of 
middlemen the authorities wanted to make the market more transparent enabling the 
prosecution for abuses of the emigration laws to be more effective and to put an end to 
the possibilities for sub-agents, agents, brokers and shipping companies to blame each 
other in cases of violations. The law even made adapt tions of steerage rates pending of 
the emigration commissioner’s approval (Martellini, 2002, 294-302; Murken, 1922, 362-
364). Yet the overall-goal proved ill-effective. Formally, the law limited the actors to 
shipping companies and their representatives, yet in practice the old structural hierarchy 
persisted, keeping backdoors open. On the other side of the Atlantic, where 
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approximately half of the transatlantic steerage tickets were sold only a couple of states 
started regulating the sale of ocean passage throug immigrant banks after the turn of the 
century.  
 
3) The Holland America Line and its agent-network: the organization of the sale of 
prepaid and return tickets in the US 
 
3.1) The sale, distribution and organization of prepaid and return passages 
 
Despite the concentration of the business that tookplace with the transition from 
numerous small sail-ship lines and tramps to major steam shipping companies, these 
migrant brokers maintained their position as middlemen between migrants and ship-
owners. Their strong ties with migrant agents and sub-agents both in Europe and the US 
enabled them to maintain the control over the supply of steerage passengers. By 1884, 
Morris & Son, the Holland America Line passage agents i  New York, coordinated the 
activities of 1,400 agents and subagents spread nationwide selling prepaid and eastbound 
tickets.203 Morris & Son managed the cabin and migrant busines, which generally were 
treated by parallel networks of agents and subagents. With the boom of transatlantic 
tourism after the generalization of steam shipping, specialized agencies dealing with 
cabin passage opened in bigger cities. Wealthy Americans, most especially, were drawn 
to Europe generating the biggest part of steam shipping companies’ revenues drawn on 
cabin passage. An intermediate class between the first-class cabin passage and third-class 
steerage passage quickly developed, responding to the demand of the increasing volume 
of low budget business travel and an upgraded service for wealthier migrants.  
Second-class passengers paid approximately $10 more than what they would for 
steerage berths and offered the advantage of being absolved from passing through the 
immigrant controls upon arrival. This backdoor was often used by people from the 
excluded classes being able to afford the extra expense to enter the country. Migrants 
used those backdoors individually, yet this was also organized on a larger scale for 
certain categories. For instance, the Mormon Society, who actively recruited in Europe, 
established special agreements with the HAL and the Guion Line through the migrant 
                                                 
203 Ten years later the agent-network controlled by the H.A.L. expanded to 2000. GAR, HAL, 
318.04, 223, November 25 1893. 
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broker Spence, to obtain cheap second-cabin fares. Mo t agents therefore sold the 
intermediate second-class passages. The vast majority of Morris’ contacts were migrant 
and sub-agents which reached far inland into rural communities. Shipping companies 
heavily depended on revenues from passage traffic. Keeling estimated that the Cunard 
Line drew half of their revenues from migrant transport, while freight and non-migrant 
transport accounted for nearly a quarter each. The share of steerage business for smaller 
lines, especially during the initial years must have been larger because cabin passengers 
were more sensitive to the reputation and services on board than migrants (Keeling, 
2007). Hence, the external firms managing the passage business shared a big 
responsibility in the success of a line.  
 The activities of agents and subagents were similar in Europe, yet there they 
focused mainly on making shipping companies known to the public. The one-sided view 
of considering the migrant business as a purely westbound movement led to a neglect of 
the competition for the eastbound traffic, which according to rough estimates amounted 
to 30 percent of the westbound movement between 1815 and 1914 (Gould, 1979, 609). 
The organization of the market contributed to swelling the return movement. The 
permanent overcapacity noted by historians on the westbound route after the steamship 
boom of the 1870s was much more pronounced on the return leg of the trip. This 
overcapacity kept the eastbound prices at lower levels than those westbound (Murken, 
1922, 52-54). Also, rate wars between shipping companies tended to start when the 
westbound market collapsed due to economic recessions, as was the case during the 
1870s and midway the 1890s and in 1907. Conference agr ements rarely survived the 
pressures of the collapsed westbound market. These p riods were used to measure the 
strength of the rival companies before renegotiating he agreements when the market 
picked up again. Rate wars always spread to the eastbound market drastically lowering 
the prices just when business conditions in the US favored remigration. Only during the 
Panic of 1907 did the high demand for return steerage berths managed to temporarily 
neutralize this tendency when shipping lines maintained high rates for some months 
despite a rate war. It underlines the growing market forces of the return migration 
movement which gained intensity but never enough to compensate the loss on the 
westbound traffic for shipping companies.  
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 These specific market conditions must have stimulated the eastbound movement, 
which seemed to be conditioned by in economic downturns, during crisis years. The high 
return rates during America recessions underline Russel King’s observation that 
economical rather than non-economical factors weigh more heavily on the decision to 
return, and that often unfavorable economic condition in the immigration country are 
determinant (King, 2001 18-21). Although an increasing number of migrants arrived with 
the intention of returning anyways, American busines conditions largely influenced 
whether they eventually did return and the timing of their return. 204 By reducing time and 
global costs for the crossing, steamships reinforced s asonal transatlantic migration 
patterns described by contemporaries as ‘birds of passage’. Return and repeat migration, 
developed during the ‘old’ wave from Northwestern Europe, spurred by technological 
innovations was more pronounced throughout the succeeding period when predominantly 
Eastern and Southern Europeans started to cross the Atlantic right after winter to return as 
early as the next autumn (Baines, 1994, 533-536; Piore, 1979, 148-154).  
 Shipping companies started to organize special ‘Christmas sailings’ to respond to 
the increasing demand for eastbound crossings for pe ple wanting to rejoin their family 
around that time of the year which illustrates how the movement became 
institutionalized.  Just as in Europe, shipping companies did not passively wait for clients 
to make up their minds to move. As a letter of 1883 of van Staphorst to the directors 
anticipating a brake up of the conference agreement and a subsequent rate war illustrates: 
“We need to prepare pamphlets targeting Germans for whom the American 
experience has been a bitter disappointment inciting them to return home. The 
leaflets need to promote Rotterdam as ideal gateway for the Rhine region. Dutch 
are hard to agitate since most of them are farmers who are stuck to their lands. 
The Dutch who do return, nearly automatically end up with us.205”    
 
Van Staphorst underlines the important difference between agrarian settlers and industrial 
laborers as to their probabilities of return. The ascendancy of the industrial society 
throughout the nineteenth century significantly increased transatlantic mobility. The New 
                                                 
204 As King and Morawska observed personal, social, ethnic and cultural factors also greatly 
shaped the return movement. It explains why a lot of the migrants who had the intention to return never did 
and vice versa.  It is not the intention here to reduce the return migration movement to one spurred by 
economic conditions yet only to underline the great importance of economic fluctuation in the transatlantic 
case.  (King, 2001; Morawska, 1985, 1991, 1996). 
205 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112, Letter November 21 1883. 
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York head-agents of the HAL frequently reported on the difficulties in estimating the 
number of eastbound bookings which usually only started to come in shortly before their 
departure. With the overcapacity and daily departures f om New York to Europe many 
return migrants bought their ticket only after their arrival in New York. The port with the 
largest concentration of migrant brokers, agents, subagents and runners worldwide was 
probably the best place to negotiate a cheap homeward journey. Many of the more 
experienced travelers seemed to have been well aware of that.   
The United States was also submerged by wide advertising campaigns organized 
by shipping companies to acquire their share of the prepaid market. As in Europe, agents 
and subagents were responsible for advertising the lines in their area and local press. 
They were provided with rate and time table sheets, advertising materials and ticket 
books of steamship companies. When people came knocking on the door to pay for the 
crossing for someone in Europe, the agent contacted the migrant broker. He passed on the 
information to the general agent of the shipping company who sent weekly lists, to 
Rotterdam, of who needed to be contacted with traveling instructions. The purchaser was 
handed a receipt and a numbered shipping ticket where the name of the shipping 
company or migrant broker, the port of embarkation, names of the passengers and 
amount paid for the ticket had to be mentioned. The ag nt sent the ticket to the passenger 
to start preparing for the trip and to await instruc ions from the shipping company. The 
recipient was then contacted by the nearest local European sub-agent or by the shipping 
company directly to arrange his forwarding to the port of embarkation. Through this 
network, companies could arrange for this to be done according to the sailing dates, 
minimizing the time spent at the port and cutting down the extra costs for the passenger. 
Generally, prepaid ocean passage was sold together with railroad tickets to the port of 
embarkation and from the port of arrival to the final destination on which migrant agents 
earned an extra commission. When a prepaid ticket was purchased the passenger was 
given up to one year to prepare for his trip.  
Like in Europe agents usually did this as a side earning and could vary from being 
innkeepers, hotel-owners, notaries, insurers, bankers, mine-owners, railroad employees, 
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newspaper-editors206, storekeepers etc. Some specialized and made a living off it, but for 
most it was a means to earn an easy commission and to get in touch with potential 
laborers or clients for other business. Land speculators were avoided because companies 
did not want to run the risk of failed colonization attempts being associated with the line, 
which might damage its reputation. The origins of the agent depended on the dominant 
migrant community in the area, yet by mastering other foreign languages he could extend 
his business to other ethnicities. Although, nearly l  agencies were appointed to men, 
many women helped their spouses, especially in rural are s where the business was often 
transacted at home.207 Steamship companies provided them with rate and time table 
sheets, advertising materials and ticket books but generally failed to generate enough 
business for one agent to impose the exclusivity of sales. Migrant entrepreneurs from 
their part tried to obtain the agency of as many shipping companies as possible to boost 
their prestige and increase their business. To retain the agency of the shipping companies 
the agents needed to spread their sales among the companies it represented yet the 
shipping company offering the best facilities and the highest commission was likely to 
get the gross of the business. The amount of pre-paid tickets sold over the winter served 
as an indicator for the westbound migrant traffic, which peaked between April and 
September. 
 
3.2) Taking matters into own hands: The appointment of W.H van den Toorn as 
HAL New York head-agent 
 
 Despite the important revenue drawn from passenger transport, the directors of 
the company considered discontinuing the business, limiting the activities to freight 
transport. By the end of 1884, the company had suffered four shipwrecks in two years; 
the Edam, Rotterdam, Maasdam and Amsterdam severely affecting the reputation of the 
line. It forced the company to draw up a reorganization plan to cut costs and to regain the 
confidence of the traveling public. One of the measure  was sending someone from 
                                                 
206 Editors of foreign language press used their privileged position to advertise the sale of prepaids 
and return tickets reaching a public of very potential clients. The foreign press rose spectacularly between 
1883 and 1920, when 3,500 new foreign language papers appeared on the American media scene. Few 
lasted yet there the variety of language represented i  these considerably increased (Jones, 1992, 195).  
207 This is based on sporadic reports of traveling agents of the H.A.L. visiting the sub-agents to 
control their activities and maintain good relations with them. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 
72-76 and 221 – 226. 
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Rotterdam familiar with the inside operations of the home port to manage the business in 
New York.208 W.H. van den Toorn quickly replaced van Staphorst as head-agent.209 From 
outside New York, van den Toorn had a great deal of difficulty in establishing himself in 
the local business community, especially because van St phorst held a grudge for losing 
his position and did everything in his power to blacken the reputation of both his 
substitute and the Holland America Line. The Head Agent’s gateway to credibility in the 
New York business community seems to have been his membership in the Holland 
Society of New York, an elitist group composed of Americans who could trace their 
Dutch roots back to the state’s founding fathers. Through John R. Planten, the consul in 
New York, van der Toorn was introduced to the Society and began to make a name for 
himself. The head agents used the company’s ships in organizing diners and little 
excursions to create goodwill among the Dutch community of New York.  
Van der Toorn urged the Board to take more aspects of the business into its own 
hands. He proposed taking charge of the loading and unloading of the ships in New York, 
following the example set by the Red Star Line. Furthermore, he suggested taking control 
of the freight business in Rotterdam, which was then entrusted to Wambersie and Son. By 
doing this, he argued, the company’s interests would be much better served than by 
leaving it to shipbrokers. More importantly, the head agent also convinced the directors 
to take over the control of the American passage business from Morris & Son. Van den 
Toorn urged the training of Krummeich and sent him over to run the passage business 
under his control. This fitted in with the new policy of the HAL, sending over employees 
from the Netherlands where they had time to familiarize themselves with the company’s 
philosophy. The directors believed that nationals were more trustworthy than foreigners. 
An increasing share of the American personnel was replaced by young men trained in 
Holland.  
The reasons for the takeover were twofold. It first allowed the HAL to cut down 
on the commission paid to Morris, which fluctuated depending on the intensity of the 
competition for the market. In August 1885 when the lin s had just signed the continental 
conference agreement and hence when commissions were lower Morris received $6.5 per 
                                                 
208  GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 53, November 2 1884. 
209 Van Staphorst left with slamming doors taking all the archives of the early period and with 
him.   
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cabin and $6.25 per steerage passenger he booked directly. On tickets sold arranged 
through his agents the broker earned $2 for cabin and $2.25 for steerage bookings. Based 
on the books of Morris, van den Toorn calculated that Morris sold 25 percent of the cabin 
passages directly but 93 percent of the steerage tick ts were sold through agents. In total 
Morris & Company earned, with these commissions, on average $10,675 per year.210 
Secondly, Morris’ son, Frank showed little interest in following in his father’s footsteps 
and did not manage the business with the same zeal, loosing control over the sub-agents. 
Hence the company’s interests would be better looked after under Krummeich who had 
to increase their market share. To guarantee a smooth transition the HAL came to an 
agreement with Morris who allowed Krummeich to do an internship at Morris & Sons 
before taking control of the business in 1886. In exchange, Morris still participated in the 
company’s profits for the following two years. Van den Toorn defended the expense, 
stressing that parting in disagreement would have cost the company a lot more.  
HAPAG proved the head-agent right as the same transi io  which most passenger 
liners went through did not occur as easily for all companies.211 In 1892, the German 
Line took over the passage business from C.B. Richard & Company who had represented 
HAPAG practically since its founding in 1847. The migrant broker used all his influence 
to tarnish his former employer. Richard contracted passengers for rival British lines and 
took the head agencies of new smaller lines competing on the same routes as HAPAG. 
The migrant broker also proceeded against his former employer for being member of 
various shipping conferences allegedly in violation of Sherman Anti-trust Act.212  
                                                 
210 To do the math van den Toorn took the following aver ges; 250 cabin passengers booked 
directly, 750 others through agents, 200 steerage pssengers booked directly, 2800 indirectly.  He estimated 
the salaries paid to personnel needed to run the office, the rent and other expenses at 7975 dollars 
representing a saving of 2700 dollar. GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112, Letter August 16 
1885. 
211 Ibid., Letter June 23 1886. 
212 The agency C.B. Richard & Co first booked as many passengers as possible for rival lines and 
than took on the head agency of Atlantic Line later known as the Prince Line (1897), Lloyd-Italiano (1905) 
with a service to the Mediterranean, the Christianson Line (1898) with a service from Copenhagen, 
Antwerp to New York and Baltimore, the Russian Volunteer Line (1906) with a service between Libau-
Rotterdam-New York., the Austro-Americana (1904) with a line to Trieste and Fiume. Richards’ first 
complaint came in 1898 against the Mediterranean Coference Lines and ended with the acceptance of the 
Prince Line in the conference. When taking on the ag ncy of the Russian Volunteer Fleet, members of the 
Continental Conference constantly feared a new complaint by Richard. See G.A.R., H.A.L., 318.04, 72-76 
and 221 – 226. 
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Taking over the control of the agent-network would prove much harder than 
anticipated. As the HAL grew, new offices were opened in key transit points on both 
sides of the Atlantic to coordinate the business.213 Van den Toorn wanted to appoint 
someone above Krummeich, for all passage business on both sides of the Atlantic, in 
order to increase cohesion.214 The New York head-agent replaced young passage 
personnel with more experienced men to better the relations with migrant agents. 
Contacts with western agents had deteriorated under Mor is and were strengthened by 
personal visits.215 Two ‘travelers’ were hired who visited the agents to discuss and 
control the business.216 General Passage agents were appointed to control the sub-agents 
in specified districts.217 The general agents were not allowed to book for other lines. On 
each passage booked by a sub-agent in their district they received a $1 commission.218 
When discussing the takeover of the passage business, Van den Toorn reassured the 
directors that they might lose some agents, but not many because as they formed part of 
the continental shipping cartel, they were assured of having the best and most respectable 
agents. In the event that they stepped out of the shipping cartel, a wide network of maybe 
less solid but very active non-conference agents exi ted on which they could fall back 
on.219  
The figures for 1895 indicate that the number of agencies remained relatively 
stable with 577 agencies in the east, 595 in the west, 36 on the Pacific, and 56 in New 
York.220 Yet they do not include a wide network of unofficial runners and peddlers. As 
will be seen in the next chapter getting control over the passage business proved much 
harder than anticipated. The agents were able to exploit the rivalry among shipping lines 
                                                 
213 Such as Amsterdam, Leipzig, Paris, Vienna in Europe and Chicago, Boston, St. Louis, 
Minneapolis, San Francisco, and New Orleans in the US. 
214 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence 112, Letter February 8 1887. 
215 Ibid, Letter April 8 1886. 
216 They spent half the year traveling and the other half at the passage office in New York or 
Chicago because the company wanted to prevent personal fr m alienating with business policies. GAR, 
HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters F bruary 1 1886 and August 30 1895. 
217 Two for Western states, one for Pacific, one for New England territories and another one for 
Southern states.  
218 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 563, Letter April 30 1885. 
219 GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 18/3, Letter November 21 1884. 
220 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 154, Report New York Office, 1895. By 1890, 3200 
agents represented the HAPAG in the US; 1800 the RSL and 1500 the Anchor Line (Jones, 1992, 160). 
John M. Kirk of the Inman Line stated that they had 3400 agents in the US outside of New York. See New 
York Times: “Beginning their labors: The question of American Immigration” June 26 1888. 
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to increase their grip on the market. Van den Toorn quickly realized that measures to 
control the agents within the firm were insufficient. Shipping companies needed inter-
firm collaboration through shipping conferences if they wanted to prevent their profits 
from ending up in other people’s pockets.  
Other than in Europe, these migrant brokers and agents did not need a concession 
from the authorities. In most European countries concessions were introduced to fight 
abuses against migrants. Yet, an increasing number of European countries started using 
the legislation regarding migrant transport to favor national companies. For instance, the 
German authorities moved to prohibit agents from booking for foreign lines but fearing 
diplomatic repercussions a concession was given to all major lines except the HAL.221 
Some German federal states had already banned the Dutch company from its turf during 
the 1880s, because a number of its brokers advertised he Line as the best route for 
people looking to evade their military obligations. At Dutch ports no military papers or 
passports were required (Bretting, 1991, 40-62). In the early 1890s the company 
successfully convinced some federal states, such as Württemberg and Sachsen to 
reappoint HAL agents. To retain the concession it was essential for the line to make sure 
that no agent had contracted illegal Germans. At times when concessions were 
withdrawn, the company still booked passengers from these regions through prepaid 
tickets. German authorities could do little in preventing the Dutch company from selling 
these tickets in US where a big part of the German bookings occurred. American agents 
sent instructions on how to evade German border controls and to migrate illegally 
through Rotterdam. Putting an end to this practice proved very difficult.  
To control the American migrant agents or purchasers of prepaid tickets for these 
regions, the HAL insisted on sending the tickets or instructions directly. Everything had 
to be organized from the home office in Rotterdam, from where they contacted the 
passenger. Despite the company’s efforts, agents persisted in their old habits. Rival lines 
made sure affidavits of this made their way to the German police that closely monitored 
the activities of the Line. The HAL never got rid off its reputation of assisting Germans 
                                                 
221 Already in some German states as early as 1882 HAL agents started to lose their concessions. 
This law of 1897 favoring HAPAG and NGL which was probably their brainchild backfired against them 
when other European countries such as Italy, later us d it as an example to promote their national lines to 
the disadvantage of the German lines (Murken, 1922). 
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to circumvent the national laws and therefore failed to obtain the concession under the 
German Emigration Act of 1897. That the exclusion of the HAL also favored the national 
lines involved in the migrant traffic probably also influenced the Reichtag’s decision. The 
HAL relentlessly lobbied to redress the decision through the Dutch diplomatic 
representatives, their German trade partners and even ordered two new passengers ships 
from German shipbuilders – the first foreign company to do this - to regain the favor of 
the German government. The company even named the first ship Potsdam, yet the 
German authorities could not be convinced to adapt the laws. However, the American 
market provided possibilities of getting around European legislation by obstructing the 
traffic through certain routes.222 
Prepaid tickets also provided steamship lines with effective means to circumvent 
laws restricting emigration from Europe. This proved useful for instance in Russia where 
agents had to work clandestinely yet the authorities could do little to impede the sale of 
prepaid tickets in America.223 Prepaid passengers made their way to Libau where 
Hoffmann & Bielby, provided them with the necessary government passports allowing 
their forwarding to the New World via the Holland America Line.224 The Austrian-
Hungarian government even intercepted letters from America screening them for prepaid 
tickets. As a counter measure the HAL asked the Austrian-Hungarian agents in America 
to no longer contact the passenger themselves but to leave it up to the Rotterdam agency 
of the company. They then sent an order to the passenger along with the traveling 
instructions directly or through their Vienna-office.225  
Prepaid tickets gave companies a means to circumvent both laws favoring the 
transport of migrants through national lines over fo eign lines and laws restricting 
emigration from Europe. This further contributed to the growing importance of the 
American market in selling migrant transport. Some companies relied more heavily on 
prepaid passages than others depending on the legislation and the migration patterns of 
                                                 
222 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters March 14, October 18, 1894;  
GAR, HAL, 318.04, A1, Correspondence with Berlin office, Letter January 14 1898. 
223 Especially after 1888 the Russian government made it hard for Jewish migrants to obtain 
passports. Officials abused their power to surcharge for the issue of a passport, the average price being 
twenty rubles or about ten dollars while it took three months to deliver. Migrant agents assisted in obtaining 
a passport or offering alternatives to evade the pass ort requirements (Diner, 1992, 43). 
224 GAR, HAL, 318.04, NY Passage Department, 222, Letter October 24 1893. 
225 Ibid., Letter March 24 1891. 
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their hinterland. The Holland America Line attracting business from the eastern 
hinterland was already showing patterns with above a rage percentages of prepaid 
passages and with increasingly restrictive measures strongly relied on its foreland to 
obtain its market share. The table dividing the migrants going through Rotterdam per 
nationality reflects the orientation of the HAL market. According to Murken the Holland 
America Line sold 50% of its tickets in the US (Murken, 1922, 47).226 The agents and 
migrant brokers supporting this system in the US, had no red tape to deal with to enter the 
migrant trade, leaving them under the exclusive control of the steamship lines. This 
control was particularly difficult to obtain in New York. 
 
TABEL I: Emigration via Rotterdam according to thei r nationality 1887-1914227 
 
Year  Dutch German Austrian Hungarian Russian American Other Total  
1887 2659 3754 1135 0 314 822 2451 11135 
1888 2162 3316 685 0 515 315 2616 9609 
1889 5862 4378 397 421 743 700 2751 15252 
1890 2057 2640 1589 946 1111 117 1439 9899 
1891 3169 4985 2727 4314 7312 428 1737 24672 
1892 5182 4860 1207 5729 2582 147 1284 20991 
1893 4598 6737 11275 679 10826 301 1492 35908 
1894 983 1748 3166 277 6072 128 659 13033 
1895 1156 1737 2588 3012 5048 115 487 14143 
1896 1251 1196 2587 2105 3633 31 260 11063 
1897 611 804 1934 762 2599 75 220 7005 
1898 746 959 4725 1751 3862 49 467 12559 
1899 1227 951 6569 2301 6820 42 1052 18962 
1900 1854 1938 7450 3072 13261 98 5708 33381 
1901 1791 1874 5803 4506 14352 107 4472 32905 
1902 2201 2251 8408 8026 19148 173 5328 45535 
1903 2835 2571 8592 8439 24976 184 5233 52830 
                                                 
226 Murken does not specify on what documents he founded this statement nor to what period it 
applies. Yet the growing importance of the prepaid market is confirmed by the testimony of Emil Boas 
before the Ford congressional committee investigatin  the immigration question 1888 stating that about 40 
percent of the company’s business was in prepaid tickets. NGL also sold the same amount whereas 
prepaids constituted 33% of the Guion and National Line’s business (see New York Times June 26 1888). 
227 The numbers are based on the Emigration commission of Rotterdam which are published in the 
yearly communal reports of Rotterdam. Taken from Valk L. “Landverhuizers via Rotterdam in de 
negentiende eeuw” in: Economisch en Sociaal-Historisch jaarboek  (Amsterdam, 1976 p. 165). 1) The 
figures up to 1892 do not reflect the total carryings by the HAL because up to that date the company also 
ran a service from Amsterdam. 2) Smaller companies also started to tap from Rotterdam during the 
following years: a) North Altantic Transport Line b) Russian Volunteer Fleet  c) Uranium Line Especially 
the last line was a serious competitor 3) HAL share of these based on the figures of westbound third class 
transport from the NDLV records shows the % of the total transported by the company (still to be added) 4) 
Van der Valk does not state what the source considered as migrants, only third class, seems most likely or 
second class as well? 
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1904 2224 1446 5403 4391 31835 228 3489 49016 
1905 1965 1511 6105 8809 34878 235 2071 55574 
1906 2069 1354 4794 6587 31944 171 2002 48921 
1907 3435 1729 8084 13794 27521 255 4484 59302 
1908 1695 821 2681 1874 8269 373 1366 17079 
1909 1600 1101 6131 6569 24506 409 3245 43561 
1910 2605 1175 10206 5873 35290 439 5309 60897 
1911 2165 865 9146 4182 20837 405 2773 40373 
1912 1555 1315 11415 6949 39115 456 6585 67390 
1913 1817 1958 17252 9312 44299 380 7452 82470 
1914 1779 882 8276 3663 12567 3842 2336 33345 
 
 
3.3) New York, capital of transatlantic passage sales: immigrant banks and their 
interests in the ocean passage market 
 
Among the wide variety of professions represented in the American agent-
network, bankers were by far, predominant. With a growing number of the migrants 
coming to the New World with as main objective acquiring savings, immigrant saving 
banks quickly multiplied. Selling ocean passages wa a good way of attracting new 
clients managing their account, money transfers and currency exchanges (Wyman, 1993, 
59-60). New York had a very high concentration of such ‘migrant bankers’ specializing 
in this business. Schulteis, in investigating the causes of migration in Italy for an official 
mission for Congress, claimed that a significant number of Italian bankers in New York 
advanced the money for the prepaid ticket- which migrants paid off with the first monies 
made in the US. These prepaid ticket blanks circulated ‘en masse’ in the US and were 
sold in installments as low as $2 a month. Italian b kers had grown prosperous on the 
interest collected from the money advanced for prepaid tickets. Schulteis claimed that the 
prepaid system was used, on a large scale, by American employers to violate the contract 
labor laws, which prohibited the entrance of immigrants who had made previous 
arrangements for work. The inspector urged the authorities to prohibit the sale of prepaids 
(Schulteis, 1893, 32-34).  
The padrone-system, a popular form of often indentured apprentic ships in the 
Mediterranean culture was exported to the US where labor agents, so-called padroni 
relied on chain migration patterns, traveled to Europe or used immigrant banks to recruit 
unskilled labor on contract at a fixed wage to then supply them to American employers. 
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They often advanced the money for the crossing and by the turn of the century the system 
was established in the US. Many of the initial Italians who migrated to the US, did so on 
credit tickets in a form of debt peonage which was also well established in the Italian 
culture (Erickson, 1976, 216-17; Gabaccia, 2002, 62-65; Jones, 1992, 164).228 Few of 
these recruitments happened under formal contracts of indenture, conversely to what 
restrictionist led the public to believe. Yet, despite the tendency of contemporary 
accounts to overstress the influence of new world employers and the transport sector on 
migrant flows pressing for immigration restrictions, Schulteis’ report sheds some light on 
a much neglected side-industry profiting from migration – the banking world.  
Maybe the scale on which employers and banks advanced the money for the 
crossing is exaggerated, yet the institutionalization of the practice shows that it was well 
established. These Italian bankers / migrant agents, concentrated in Mulberry Street in 
New York, controlled an important part of the Meditrranean market. This system of 
advancing money for prepaids was also common on the Continental market. Especially 
Jewish bankers/ migrant agents got their hands on this market concentrating in Grand and 
Canal Street.229 Due to the fierce competition for the trade they rlied on a wide network 
of runners and peddlers bringing in new clients. Peddlers and runners received part of the 
commission and to increase their sales migrant agents often returned the other part as a 
discount to the purchaser. As Van den Toorn noted th y sold tickets with a profit margin 
as low as 25 cent in order to do the money exchange for the passengers. Yet due to keen 
competition the profit margin on these had been drastic lly reduced as well. The primary 
goal was to get their hands on savings or on the remittances sent to Europe to practice 
usury.230  
Van den Toorn divided the Canal Street bankers involved in migrant business into 
two groups. On one hand, there were bankers who only issued tickets when the full 
amount was paid. On the other there were bankers who orked with scalpers and 
peddlers selling passages on credit allowing the relativ s, friends or another third party to 
pay for the crossing in installments. Five to six dollars was enough to buy a ticket on 
                                                 
228 According to Jones the active recruitment of padrones in Italy declined after the 1890’s. The 
padrones became mere employment agents. The padrone-system was also adopted by Greeks and Syrians 
(Jones, 1992, 164-165).  
229 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 222, Passage Department, Letter November 11 1892. 
230 Ibid., Letters April 3 1888 and May 15 1891.  
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credit. Such agents became dependent of peddlers recovering the money to bring in the 
necessary cash.231 Frequently such agents went bankrupt and disappeared leaving 
important outstanding debts with the steamship lines.232 Just as Schulteis had done, Van 
den Toorn reported to the board that in some places of the American interior orders were 
bought on directions of private persons or firms but part of the ticket was paid for by the 
migrant in Europe. Industrialists advanced the money for the crossing of future 
employees.233  
 The system of prepaid tickets also favored speculation by these agents.234 The 
prepaid tickets were valid for a year, thus when prices were low, especially during rate 
wars, the agents ordered prepaid blanks in bulk writing these out to fictive people. When 
prices increased these were sold with extra profit margin. If prices dropped or tickets 
could not be sold in time the agents’ loss was limited to the 5% cancellation fee. As the 
migrant brokers extended their networks on both sides of the Atlantic and the competition 
among agents increased, cheaper European cash rate orders started to circulate in the US. 
Ocean passage rates in Europe were lower than prepaid rates and the commissions were 
higher, resulting in an important difference of net rates on both sides of the continent. 
Jewish migrant brokers in Hamburg opened branch offices in New York or collaborated 
with well-established American brokers and started issuing their own passage orders 
drawn on the European houses at cash rates. Such orders were then exchanged for 
European cash rate tickets by migrant brokers in Hamburg.235  The difference between 
prepaid and cash rate balanced between $3 and $5 during the 1880s allowing the brokers 
to seriously undercut the prepaid price.236 Slowly but surely the practice spread across the 
                                                 
231 Ibid., Letter May 15 1891. 
232 To protect themselves companies substituted prepaid bl nks with receipt books to prevent 
agents from disappearing with unaccounted for prepaid blanks. Ibid., Letters February 19 1889 and April 
24 1891. 
233 Ibid., Letter July 51893. 
234Ibid., Letter May 15 1891. 
235 This practice was also used by the Italian bankers of Mulberry Street, see NYT “Beginning 
their labors: The question of American Immigration” June 26 1888. 
236 This estimate is based on the repeated calls to increase the cash rate and decrease the prepaid 
rate by a combined amount of two to five dollars. In January 1890 the difference on net ocean rates was 
4,7$ with prepaids at 19$ while Hamburg cash rates w re at 60 Mark. This difference was only gradually 
reduced. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-2 6, Letters January 20 1890 and July 15 1892. 
Ottmüller-Wetzel misinterpreted Murken as would he have stated that prepaid prices tended to be 20 to 4
Marks lower than cash rates in Europe. This price diff rence applied to return rates being lower than the 
westbound rates. 
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US. Orders drawn on European houses, at cash rates, drove out the prepaid tickets.237 The 
keen rivalry among shipping companies allowed the migrant brokers to play out the lines 
against each other. Instead of uniting their strengths to increase their grip on the migrant 
brokers, shipping lines paid out extra commissions a d all kinds of other facilities 
spurring the development of the order-system to gain the favor the brokers. Conference 
rules supposedly stimulating the collaboration betwe n the lines to control the agent-
network were flagrantly violated. 
The HAL could not avoid this evolution spoiling Van den Toorn’s plans of taking 
control over the passage business in the US. Van den Toorn was forced to start a close 
collaboration with the Hamburg migrant broker Louis Scharlach “Banking Exchange, 
Passage Forwarding, Insurance and Foreign Express Company”. He belonged to the class 
of migrant bankers who only issued tickets when the full amount was paid. The firm 
opened offices in Hamburg and New York and started forwarding passengers from the 
German port to Rotterdam. The transport between the ports cost $2.25 while the price 
differential with regular HAPAG and NGL steamers was $3 and $5 for express service. 
The differential of the cheapest direct service of HAPAG was only $1. Thus, if adding 
the railroad fare, the passage through Rotterdam imposed extra travel and cost $1.25 
more than the lowest class of HAPAG steamers. This undermines the assumption that 
passengers traveled through the cheapest and most convenient route. It also underlines 
the importance of the migrant agents and brokers in persuading purchasers of ocean 
passage to travel through certain routes.  
This explains why the lines went to great lengths to win over these migrant 
brokers and agents for the company through free passage , special diners on board of 
ships etc. Yet the relations built up over the years with American agents deteriorated as 
Scharlach gained control of the companies’ third-class passage business. American 
agents had to establish contacts with migrant brokers such as Scharlach to get their hands 
on cash orders and alienated from the steam shipping companies. This happened with the 
company’s consent giving Scharlach ‘carte blanche’ to use all possible means to attract as 
many passengers as possible. The board of directors deplored this evolution but claimed 
                                                 
237 Sources indicate that at least as early as 1885 orders circulated in the US and that by 1888 they 
did on a large scale. 
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that the practices of rival lines forced them to follow suit if they wanted to remain 
competitive. The Red Star Line gave the same facilities to S. Jarmulowsky while the 
North German Lloyd entrusted most of their business to Friedrich Missler. Besides the 
disadvantage of alienating agents from the company it also had a negative effect on the 
reputation of Rotterdam. The indirect migration through Hamburg contributed to the 
development of a rival port, while obstructing the promotion of Rotterdam as a migrant 
gateway.238  
The directors of the HAL were aware that the Hamburg migrant brokers with their 
local interest in boarding houses, banks, etc. had no intention of forwarding the migrants 
directly to Rotterdam on the long run. Therefore th collaboration with Hamburg brokers 
threatened to create migration patterns directing the bigger part of the relocaters to the 
German port. Hence the company also started to collaborate with another Jewish migrant 
broker, Bruno Weinberger, who belonged to the class of bankers selling passages on 
installments. The HAL took the financial risk of working with this category of bankers on 
the condition that he would forward his passengers directly to Rotterdam. Van den Toorn 
added another condition revealing how the Hamburg mi rant brokers extended their 
networks to direct passengers where they wanted. The New York head-agent of the Dutch 
Line had to specify that the company consented to bribe but not to swindle or extort 
border agents.239  The Jewish migrant brokers corrupted the business on both sides of the 
Atlantic increasing their grip on the market to thedetriment of the shipping companies.240 
Of all shipping companies the HAPAG suffered most from the activities of the 
Jewish brokers, who increased the indirect passage through the company’s home port. 
Because of the lack of the lack of coordination among shipping lines in regaining control 
of the business, Ballin decided to attack the Jewish migrant brokers at the heart of their 
business. The HAPAG passage business in New York was still in the hands of the 
                                                 
238 Ideally ports tried to attract passengers directly over land. However, it always took the 
companies some time before getting known in new out-migration regions and to organize the routes 
appointing agents at transit points to guide passengers. Especially, when they had to direct passengers from 
regions where rival ports had geographical advantages. Rotterdam had the extra difficulty for Eastern 
European passengers of only having a concession to app int agents for the transit in Leipzig. The 
concession in Berlin had been withdrawn in 1883. Moreover, HAPAG and Hamburg migrant brokers 
excelled in bribing eastern European border guards. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-224, 
1887-1897. 
239 Ibid. 221, September 16 1889. 
240 Ibid. 222, August 5 1892. 
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banking and passage office C.B. Richard & Company. They opened a bank and passage 
office in Canal Street to directly compete with the J wish brokers.241 The HAL 
contemplated to doing the same but their connections with the Jewish community were 
not strong enough to find a person of trust to run the business.242  
Van den Toorn then suggested launching themselves on the money transfer 
market. People buying prepaid tickets often transferred money for the extra costs for the 
crossing. Moreover, the transfer market was the best way of advertising to potential 
clients. By including advertisements of the company with the money transfer, in countries 
where this was not prohibited, they would reach people who were most likely to migrate. 
Van den Toorn suggested that migrants were likely to travel with the company they first 
heard of. Schumacher & Company head-agent of the Baltimore NGL, White Star Line, 
Guion Line and Red Star Line had done so with success. Richard & Company was even 
doing big business with these.243 Moreover, if the increasing anti-immigration movement 
in America as confirmed by the Stump Bill trying to hinder the prepaid system should 
prevent the sale of prepaids, they risked loosing ground on competitors who were 
involved in the money transfer market. Some also prefer ed to transfer money instead of 
buying prepaid tickets, especially when prices were high. The directors agreed to do a test 
in Germany, Switzerland, Austrian-Hungarian Empire, France and the Netherlands.244 
Ballin also concluded special agreements with migrant agents at the Prussian-Russian 
frontier and with the Jewish Aid Society of Berlin where most Russian passengers called 
for help while in transit, to counter the migrant brokers. However, Ballin realized that the 
most efficient way to purge the ticket sale was by increasing unity among shipping lines. 
 
4) Conclusion  
 
In short reducing the activities of migrant brokers and agents to mere travel 
agencies arranging a trip to the New World greatly underestimates their role in the 
European exodus. Part III will go more into detail s to the profile of the American 
                                                 
241 Ibid. 221, Letter August 12 1890. 
242 Ibid. 222, Letter May 15 1891. 
243 According to Van den Toorn, Richard was wiring back 8,500,000$ to Europe every year. Ibid., 
222, Letter July 25 1891. 
244 Ibid., 222, Letters July 25 and September 23 1892. 
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migrant agent, the various services offered and the close connections with the banking 
world.  The difficulties of major shipping lines in controlling the market of migrant 
transport refute the assumption that those agents and brokers have lost their influence on 
the market with the transition from sail to steam. Conversely, increased rivalry among 
shipping lines allowed Jewish brokers to prosper as they never had before. The next 
chapter analyzes how shipping companies tried to neutralize the competition among each 
other through conference agreements and how by doing so they tried to control the agent-
network. The horizontal collaboration in the form of cartels was typical for the steam 
shipping industry. Business historians have emphasized that in this sector the logical 
vertical integration did not follow (Chandler, 1977, 189-192; Boyce, 1995, 6 and 2001, 
15). Yet the analysis of the HAL seems to weaken this argument somewhat as it shows 
clear signs of vertical integration which were more p onounced in the passenger than in 
freight business. By taking the passenger trade into its own hands and by opening an 
increasing number of company offices at key transit po nts on both sides of the Atlantic 
the Dutch Line tried to move forward into the market. Yet to do so and to acquire the 
control over the agent-network the collaboration of other steamship lines was required, 
especially in the US where in the absence of legislation they had much scope to operate. 
As will be argued in the following chapter and part III, the success of passenger 
conferences significantly influenced the structures of the companies and their tendencies 
towards vertical integration. 
 
 
Chapter III: Competition and collusion: the growing pains of shipping conferences. 
 
1) Introduction: Price fixing and price fluctuation s on the North Atlantic 
 
The introduction of steamships on the transatlantic route had a major impact on 
the traffic of goods and people in the Atlantic world. Organizational and technological 
improvements in shipping sharply decreased freight rates (North, 1958, 538-555; Harley, 
1988, 851-876). This decline was the main factor for the convergence of the commodity 
market before 1914 (Williamson and Hatton, 1998). On the contrary to freight rates, we 
have little information on ninteenth century transatlantic passenger fares yet based on 
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circumstantial evidence it has been assumed by historians that the real price for passenger 
transport remained stable in the long run (Williamson and Hatton, 1998; Hyde, 1975; 
Keeling, 1999). This stability is generally ascribed to the organization of steamship lines 
in conferences fixing prices and regulating competition. Only during periodic rate wars 
among steam shipping companies was the price brought down to two pounds. Keeling 
reconstructed yearly averages for the Cunard Line from Liverpool to New York showing 
that prices on the North Atlantic route fluctuated from three to six pounds between 1885 
and 1914 (Keeling, 1999b, 65-66).245 The other incomplete series reconstructed by Hvidt 
for the same period reflects the same tendency (Hvidt, 1971). The extent to which prices 
can be called stable with this information is debata le. Based on the fact that rate wars 
triggered by depressed business conditions did not result in a direct increase of migrant 
volume the influence of the transport price on migration flows has been minimized 
(Brattne, 1976; Williamson and Hatton, 1998; Keeling, 1999; Thomas, 1956). Yet, none 
of these studies have considered how the market was organized or what elements 
influenced the price fixing of North Atlantic passage. These studies only mention when 
conference agreements were at work, but not how they worked or how effective they 
were.  
This chapter will try to shed more light on how this Atlantic market, divided into 
prepaid tickets sold in the US and ‘European cash rtes’ placed in sale in Europe was 
organized through shipping conferences. As the migrant fever spread across Europe, the 
market was sub-divided into three regions; the British-Scandinavian, the Continental and 
Mediterranean market (Murken, 1922).The activities of the New York Continental 
Conference regulating the prepaid business is analyzed here using the Conference 
Minutes and the correspondence between the head-agent in New York and the board of 
directors of the Holland America Line, one of the four members of the conference. The 
minutes allow the reconstruction of a price series of westbound prepaid tickets and 
eastbound return tickets of four continental steam shipping companies running lines to 
New York between 1885 and 1895; the Red Star Line (RSL) from Antwerp, the Hamburg 
                                                 
245 C. Harley actually preceded Keeling in reconstructing hese averages for Cunard Line showing 
the same fluctuations (Harley, 1990). The rate of exchange used by bankers in 1909 was $4,866 to the 
pound. Hvidt used an exchange rate of $6 to pound, hence roughly the prices varied from $14,5 to $36 
(Dillingham Commission Reports, vol. 37, 1911, 242 and Hvidt, 1971). 
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America Line (HAPAG), North German Lloyd (NGL) from Bremen and the Holland 
America Line (HAL) from Rotterdam. The minutes provide further details on ways 
through which the conference tried to neutralize int r al and external competition. Yet, 
much more revealing is the correspondence between th  head-agent and the board of 
directors which gives an inside look on the organiztion of passenger business. Greenhill 
pointed to the difficulties of the dispersed location of the different ports in analyzing the 
conference dynamics. The meetings left very little written sources with which to analyze 
the strategies behind the agreements, explaining why literature on shipping conferences is 
rather sparse (Greenhill, 1998, 55).  
Conversely to Europe where board of directors involved in migrant trade were 
spread over the continent, the head offices in the US concentrated around Broadway. Not 
having the problem of disperse location conference m etings could easily be held 
whenever needed. Since most of the decisions of the New York Continental Conference 
were pending of the approval from the directors anddepended on regulations of the 
European cash business, it generated a dense correspondence. Like the work of Genesove 
and Mullin on the Sugar cartel, the correspondence provides insights into the reasoning 
behind firm’s actions and what mattered during the negotiations to reach an agreement 
(Genesove and Mullin, 2001, 379-398). The success of the New York Continental 
Conference in regulating competition will be analyzed. Attention will be divided between 
external and internal pressures on the conference. What factors influenced the price 
fixing on the North Atlantic Route? What did the competition center upon? How 
successful was the conference in fixing prices?   
 
2) Shipping conferences on long distance routes: their real origins? 
 
 
Shipping conferences or rings are collusive agreements to mitigate competition 
and iron out the effects of trade fluctuations, primarily to regulate prices and market 
shares. They are among the earliest cartels in international trade (Ville, 1990, 95; Marx, 
1953, 3). The origins are generally ascribed to the ne d of shipping companies to ease the 
pressures of destructive competition cutting in prices and profits caused by overcapacity 
on a certain route (Greenhill, 1998, 58-59). The first shipping conference has generally 
 163
been agreed to be the UK-Calcutta Conference regulating the tea trade established in 
1875 (Deakin and Seward, 1973 1-3; Marx, 1953, 46; Ville,1990, 95). The practice 
quickly spread and is still in use today, more than 150 conferences were operative in 
2001 (Sjostrom, 2004, 82).  
Research on conference-systems has concentrated on freight transport, neglecting 
the impact it had on passenger transport.246 In fact, the only substantial research on 
shipping rings regulating passenger traffic from Erik Murken dates back to 1922. Murken 
analyzed the in 1892 established Nord Atlantiche Dampfer Linien Verband between RSL, 
HAL, NGL and HAPAG. The NDLV subsequently made arrangements with other 
conferences which by 1914 grew out to twelve separate agreements between 30 lines 
carrying passengers on the North Atlantic (Murken, 1922). The sparse research led to the 
misconception that conferences on the North Atlantic only appeared around that time, yet 
as seen in previously already during the 1850s the competition between steamshipping 
companies pushed them into collusion. When discussing Sloan’s analysis of the cartel 
between Collins and Cunard Williams stated: “perhaps its significance lies in the field of 
national rivalry, for it does not have much significance in the history of cartels: the 
agreement did not last long, ensure successful operations, or set a precedent” (Williams, 
1999, 206). But didn’t the Cunard and Collins agreem nt set a precedent?  
Up to 1914 the North Atlantic was the busiest long distance route where steam 
shipping competition was the keenest and technological innovation was first introduced. 
Cunard’s hope to control the steam shipping traffic be ame idle in the 1850s when the 
opening of new lines from continental ports boomed. But worse was the growing 
competition in the nearby port of Glasgow with the Allan Line (1854) and Anchor Line 
(1856), and in the home port of Liverpool where besid  the  Inman Line, the Guion Line 
(1862), National Line (1863) and White Star Line (1869) started services to New York. 
Falkus argued that the very dominance of the British merchant marine on long distance 
routes brought these conferences into life (Falkus, 1990). This concentration in Liverpool 
                                                 
246 One notable exception is the attempt made by Deltas, Sicotte and Tomczak in a working paper 
“Passenger Shipping cartels and their effect on trasatlantic migration” (Deltas, Sicotte and Tomczak, 
2001). They concluded that for the period 1899-1914 shipping conferences reduced the migrant flow by at 
least a fifth which clearly contradicts the above mntioned conception as would shipping companies and 
the price for the crossing only have a minor impact on the migrant flows. Their findings will be tested in 
the following part.  
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unarguably facilitated negotiations. Early on, a Liverpool Steamship owners Association 
was established to defend common interests (Hyde, 1975, 94). Non-economical variables 
such as group cohesion based on same social background and locality, being clustered in 
the same port Liverpool or Glasgow ensured stability and facilitated the formation and 
working of conferences (Greenhill, 1998, 66-67). Boyce illustrated the importance of 
personal networks and inter-firm communication for the expansion of British maritime 
enterprises (Boyce, 1995).  
The agreement between the Cunard Line and Collins Li e had been beneficial for 
the English Company. Once the transition to include migrant berths on ships was 
completed, than why would Cunard not seek to build on the previous experience? Hyde 
found indirect evidence that by 1868 a conference agr ement, fixing freight rates and 
minimum passenger fares was concluded between the Glasgow and Liverpool 
steamshipping companies. By 1870 those companies practically monopolized the 
passenger traffic by steam on the North Atlantic route and organized themselves in the 
North Atlantic Passenger Steam Traffic Conference (Aldcroft, 1974, 289; Hvidt, 1978, 
193; Hyde, 1975, 94). The boom in steamship building early 1870’s completed the 
transition from sail to steam (Cohn, 2005, 469-495).   
However, Cohn agued that up to the 1870s the demand for new steamships lagged 
behond the passenger demand and also that the price fo  steerage berth on steamers 
balanced between 5 and 7 pounds for the period 1855- 7  (Cohn, 2005, 483). This 
seems to remove the main reasons for the establishment of conferences, namely increased 
competition which creates excess capacity and lower prices. So then what other than 
locality and personal networks explains the establishment of the conference? The reason 
for it can be found in the specific characteristics of the migrant market itself. Boyce 
underlined the co-operative dimension of conferences, its importance to shape relations 
between shippers and shipowners and amongst shipowners, criticizing economists for 
focusing on market power and cost/service driven necessity of conference regulation 
(Boyce 1995, 161). The major difference between the shipment of cargo and migrants is 
that the former is supplied by shippers in the portwhile the latter was provided by a wide 
network of migrant brokers, agents and subagents which spread on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Models explaining the viability of conferences are based upon a common 
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interest between shippers and ship owners (Pirrong, 1992, 89-131; Sjostrom, 2004, 88-
95).  
This was not the case between the migrant agent-network and shipowners. These 
go-betweens worked on a commission basis and were employed by various shipping 
companies. Lines were not able to obtain exclusivity of sales from agents.247 If the 
demand for crossing the Atlantic was not very price sensitive, as some claimed and that 
increased competition yielded higher commissions migrant agents had no reason to favor 
a stable market- and instead profited from higher commissions during rate wars.  
Therefore, a plausible explanation as to the main incentive for passenger liners to 
organize themselves in conferences was to control the broad agent-network. Hvidt 
pointed to the in 1871 published ‘Yellow Book’ of the North Atlantic Steam Traffic 
Conference containing regulations for Danish migrant gents. He also found evidence 
that they appointed migrant brokers in Copenhagen who organized themselves in a sub-
conference regulating the local business and reporting to the main body in Liverpool 
(Hvidt, 1978, 193).  
Research in the HAL-archives disclosed that the first conference of British lines 
regulating the American market of prepaid and return ickets goes back to 1872 with the 
establishment of the New York North Atlantic Steam Traffic Conference. The various 
agreements between British lines controlling the traffic from the British Isles, 
Scandinavia and gaining grounds on the continent cocerned the organization of the 
agent network and transport prices. From the 1860s onwards, the German companies 
Hamburg America Line and North German Lloyd pierced through the British dominance 
of transatlantic steam-shipping. All other lines of various nationalities, which were 
subsequently established, never made up the backlog on the biggest German and British 
firms. The competition for the trade organized itself around this rivalry. To strengthen its 
competitive position the German companies tried to unite lines transporting migrants 
directly from the European mainland to the US in similar conference agreements as their 
                                                 
247 The archive research did not produce clear answers on why companies could not impose 
exclusivity of sales of subagents. A probable explanation could be that the sales for one company could not 
generate enough business to convince agents and subagents to enter the business. Possibly only the 
combined sales of different companies made it worthwhile, keeping people motivated to sell ocean passage.  
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British rivals. This resulted, among other agreements i  the establishment of the New 
York Continental Conference regulating the migrant transport market in the US.  
 
3) The establishment of the New York Continental Conference and the organization 
of the American third class passage market 
 
The increased competition for the migrant transport and the experience of the 
slump (1873-1879) creating overcapacity on the North Atlantic favored collusion. 
Keeling pointed out that the incentives for cartelization in migrant transport proved to be 
stronger than freight transport because the underlying demand was both more sensitive to 
economic swings and less dependent on transport prices. Economic downturns had bigger 
impacts on the migrant flows than on freight movements (Keeling, 1999a, 199). This first 
lasting continental conference was established in 1885 and tried to unite the lines 
transporting migrants directly from the European mainland to the US. The conference in 
New York was the result of a parallel agreement signed by the directors of the companies 
to regulate the business on the old continent. The HAPAG, NGL, RSL and HAL had 
already tried to join forces in 1883, but direct outside competition of the Carr Line in 
Hamburg and the White Cross Line in Antwerp saw it fall apart after a few months.248 
Under the pressure of dropping migration rates in 1884 and 1885 the North Atlantic 
Steam Traffic Conference dissolved as well (Hyde, 1975, 103).249 A general rate war 
broke out making prepaid prices fall from approximately $20 to anywhere between $6 
and $12.250  
                                                 
248 Unfortunately the minutes of the first conference have not been preserved. A letter of Van den 
Toorn to the board of directors on November 23 1883 referred that the agreement was not beneficial for the 
members and on the verge of being dissolved. Carr Line and White Cross Line were quoting lower rates 
and paying higher commissions luring away the passengers from the members. Van den Toorn mentioned 
that H.A.P.A.G. respected the agreements but that Red Star Line cheated to protect its share. The Le Havre 
based Compagnie Generale Transantlantique did not join he first agreement. GAR, HAL, 318.02, 112-121, 
General Correspondence, Letter November 21 1883. Ottmüller-Wetzel mentions another attempt in 1884 
including the Carr line without the CGT and HAPAG but because of the inland tariffs of the H.A.L. the 
agreement could not be carried out (Ottmüller-Wetzel, 1986, 153). 
249 The Conference was dissolved in March 1884 and reorganized under the North Atlantic 
Passenger Conference in Januari1886 with a provisional agreement. A previous agreement on outward rates
was reached in July 1885.    
250 Van den Toorn mentions gross prices of twelve dollars for the HAL and ten dollars for the 
German Lines GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter January 16 1886. 
Huldermann even quotes rates as low as six dollars, however he does not specify whether these were net or 
gross rates (Huldermann, 1922).   
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In the meantime HAPAG started negotiations to takeover the Carr Line. As the 
market recovered at the end of the 1870s new steam shipping companies were founded. 
After taking over the Adler Line two new lines opened a service from Hamburg to New 
York the Union Line and Carr Line. Especially in the latter, HAPAG found a serious 
contender for the migrant traffic. In 1885, the three lines reached an agreement which 
saw Albert Ballin who had managed the passage busines  for the Carr Line, make his 
entry into the HAPAG. With the agreement some of the external pressures on the 
conference were relieved allowing the Continental Conference to be renewed. Under the 
impulse of Ballin the conference system later expanded to include the entire North 
Atlantic traffic (Ottmüller-Wetzel, 1986, 150-157).251  
After long negotiations the Continental Conference reorganized in May 1885.252 
Minimum differential rates were fixed based on the quality of the service that the lines 
offered (see appendix 3). The HAL, having the oldest and slowest steamers on the New 
York route, obtained differentials to their advantage. The RSL service to Philadelphia and 
the NGL service to Baltimore were taken up in the agreement.253 Rates were lower on 
these less popular routes. The fares could only be changed if the differentials were 
maintained. Prices quoted were gross ocean fares, including the agent’s commission. 
Charges for inland travel could not be included andrate sheets of continental inland fares 
had to be sent to the secretary. Meetings were held monthly, except if a special one was 
called in between. Decisions had to be made unanimously. The agent commission was set 
at $3 covering all expenses except advertising in newspapers. Each company appointed 
general Agents for the Pacific coast, Western States nd Southern states defending the 
company’s interests with the agents of the area in exchange for one dollar commission on 
every ticket sold in their districts. Discounts, commissions, or allowances of any 
descriptions to influence passengers were not allowed. The cancellation fee for a ticket 
                                                 
251 In 1885 the HAPAG negotiated the takeover of the Carr Line. In the end the Carr Line merged 
with the Union Line which came to a pooling agreement with the HAPAG in 1886 (Ottmüller-Wetzel, 
1986, 150-158).    
252 Already in December 1884 a draft was drawn up for the reorganization of the conference. 
GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 563, Continenal Conference minutes, Meeting March 29 1886, 
Minute 200.  
253 All lines were allowed to book passengers at agreed oc an rates to and from Boston, Baltimore, 
Philadelphia and New York. This means that the HAL was allowed to give free railroad transport from and 
to New York to Boston, Baltimore and Philadelphia which cut the edge of the competition between those 
ports. This obviously cut in the profits of the shipping company to the advantage of the migrants. 
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was set a five percent. Circulars to agents could not contain comparisons with other 
members nor could a newspaper that attacked a line be supported by a member.  
Every breach was reported to the Secretary who if necessary passed the complaint 
on to the Arbitrator William Booker, British consul in New York.  He enjoyed the same 
powers which were entrusted to him as such by the North Atlantic Steam Traffic 
Conference. Booker was empowered to look into the books of the companies. The costs 
for investigating complaints were covered by a special fund raised by the members. His 
decision was final and $1000 had to be deposited as a bond. The agreement was valid for 
six months, and withdrawal was possible with one month notice.254 Finally the secretary 
had to notify the former members of the North Atlantic Steam Traffic Conference of the 
reorganization of the Continental Conference. If they advanced steerage rates on the basis 
of $25 rate and fix the commission on $2 for their British, Scandinavian and Continental 
business alike, increase the childrens rate by charging adult fares from years ans upward 
instead of twelve and charge infants $2 instead $1, they would do the same.255  
A circular followed to the agents notifying them ofnew regulations which 
predominantly tried to make agents adhere to the Conference rules. No returns or 
divisions of the commission could be given nor could improper inducements be held out 
to purchasers of tickets. Agents were prohibited from engaging sub- agents dividing the 
commission with them. The actual amount received for passage money had to be entered 
on the ticket and no credit could be given to the purchaser. Shipping companies only paid 
commission on the actual issue of the ticket and the direct receipt by the agents of the 
passage money. Agents were not allowed to issue certificates, orders or tickets for 
prepaid passage drawn on or advised to any person or company other than the lines 
actually employing such agent. The selling of tickets was restricted to a certain area 
preventing agents from invading each others territory and preventing them from sending 
their tickets to New York or any other place for sale. Violations of other agents had to be 
reported with proofs to the secretary. The punishment d pending on the infraction could 
                                                 
254 This was brought to two months meeting 14-4-1887 and changed on 25-5-1890 to sliding 
periods of fifteen days if only one, ten days when two and a week if three companies or more gave notice 
of withdrawal. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 563, meetings April 14 1887and May 25 1890. 
255 Ibid., Meeting May 15 1885 “Articles of an agreement entered into by and between the 
managers of the Continental Lines for the purpose of r gulating rates of passage and the business conne ted 
therewith.” and minutes 1-27 of the Continental Conference.    
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vary from a minimum fine equal to the amount of theicket to the disqualification of the 
agents. Agents at default would be disqualified and li es agreed not to engage any 
dismissed or disqualified agents. 
 
4) The working of the Continental Conference up to the formation of the NDLV 
 
 The evolution of the ocean fare serves as a good indicator for the success of the 
conference. To what extent were they able to augment prices? To do so, applying 
Osborne’s model to this case the cartel had to overc me both external as internal 
pressures. The external problem boils down to the ext nt to which were they able to 
predict and limit the market share of outsiders to keep the agreements viable? Internal 
problems were first to find a workable and profitable contract surface; second make sure 
that the agreement approximates expected shares for each member, third the ability to 
detect cheating and fourth means to deter cheating. For both Osborne and Stigler the 
detection of cheating played a crucial role in collusion. Secret violations of the 
agreement, especially in the form of price cuts gave shipping lines the possibility of 
increasing their market share. According to Stigler, if means of detection are weak then 
prices will not be able go much above the competitiv  level reducing inducements of 
price cutting to minimum. The basic method of detection is to note when price cutters are 
obtaining business which a line otherwise did not obtain (Osborne, 1976, 835-844 and 
Stigler, 1964, 44-61). Information on the market share of each line was readily available 
as American ports registered all third class passengers coming in. The fluctuation in sales 
of migrant agents in certain regions also served as a serious indicator. Yet the biggest 
problem was to obtain proof that the increased share w s obtained by cheating. What will 
follow is an analysis of the external and internal pressures during the first seven years of 
the cartel which aimed at fixing prices and controlling the agent-network up to the 
formation of the NDLV when the continental traffic was divided in quotas.  
 
4.1) Harmonizing the external pressures 
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4.1.1) The connections between British-Scandinavian, Continental and  
Mediterranean markets 
The external pressures on the conference were considerable. The European 
migrant market was divided in three sub-markets; the British-Scandinavian, the 
Continental and the Mediterranean (see appendix 4). The British-Scandinavian market 
was predominantly in the hands of the British lines. They managed to prevent foreign 
lines from taking significant numbers of British and Irish migrants from their home ports 
(Murken, 1922, 58).256 This internal market covered the major part of the revenues of the 
British lines. They had a strong foothold in the Scandinavian market through long 
established feeder services, such as the Hull based Wilson Line (Brattne, 1976, 176-202; 
Evans, 2007, 52-55; Hyde, 1975, 60-62).257 Despite the geographical advantages and 
efforts of the German lines and the Copenhagen based Thingvalia Line to increase their 
market share, the majority of Scandinavians preferrd t aveling with British ships. The 
big advantage of the British lines on the Continental lines the protection of their own 
market while having a foothold on the Continental mrket.  
The strong trade relations between Hamburg and England during the early years 
of mass migration transformed Hamburg into the most important hub for indirect 
transatlantic migration through English ports from the continent (Engelsing, 1961; 
Gelberg, 1973, 10-13).258 The ties between migrant brokers and agents in Liverpool and 
                                                 
256 Murken states that the British Board of trade imposed foreign ships transporting migrants from 
the British Isles to be built according to the stand rds of the Passenger Act. They had to posses a Board 
Trade Certificate and go through extensive time consuming controls before every sailing. These inspections 
blocked out the foreign lines. Murken however fails to explain why the American Line was exempted from 
that rule (Murken, 1922, 58). Also the NGL used Southampton as port of call and even obtained British 
mail subsidies in 1874. Furthermore Aldcroft suggests that a special agreement was concluded in 1886 
allowing the HAPAG to take passengers from British ports (Aldcroft, 1968, 348-49). The archives of the
Holland America Line do however point out that it resulted very difficult for Continental Lines to attr ct 
British passengers. The archive research indicates that during rate wars efforts to attack the British Lines on 
their home market centered on the Eastbound return route. Only during the 1894-1895 rate war did the 
HAPAG mention controls impeding the Continental Lines from boarding British steerage passengers on the 
Westbound Route. The Scandinavian market was a much easier target for the German Lines to attack the 
British Lines. Further research is needed however to shed light on the reasons why on the Westbound route 
the British internal market seemed impenetrable for C ntinental Lines.  
257 The Wilson Line would later also provide a feeder s vice from Libau from where many 
continental passengers, mainly Russian Jews, migrated indirectly through England to the U.S. 
258 Unlike Bremen the Hamburg authorities initially opposed the migrant trade. Only during 
the1840’s did the Hamburg merchants realize the importance of the trade (see part I). The lag of interest for 
the direct transatlantic transport from Hamburg andthe long established trade relations between British 
ports and the Hanse town favored indirect migration. The indirect migration through Rotterdam quickly 
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Hamburg were well established and institutionalized by British and Hamburg Senate 
laws.259 These ties constituted the achilles heel of the Continental Conference. During the 
1880s, indirect migration from the German port via England often totaled 50 percent or 
more of the number traveling directly (Moltmann, 1989, 314). Although the continental 
traffic only represented a small percentage of the total business of British lines, it allowed 
them to constantly pressure the Continental lines which were to a large extent dependent 
of the goodwill of the British lines to raise their p ices or lower commissions for the 
continental traffic.260  
At that time the Mediterranean market coincided with the Italian market which 
was starting to pick up. Some lines, such as Fabre Line and Italian Line, opened a direct 
service to New York. Other British and Continental lines also tried to lure those Italians 
to their ports. Especially the CGT which drew migrants mainly from South-West 
Germany and Switzerland with special railroad services saw the Italian market as the 
most natural territory to expand (de Vannoise-Pochulu, 1993, 10-17). The company 
increasingly centered its efforts on the Mediterranean and Oriental market which boomed 
from the 1890s to 1914 attracting English and German lines to open direct services from 
there.261 At one of the first meetings of the continental conference it was decided that 
direct and indirect lines should try to unite in a Mediterranean conference to fix through 
rates to these points.262 The Mediterranean conference was formed in November 1885.263  
                                                                                                                                      
decreased once the Holland America Line was establihed (Van der Valk, 1976, 162). The Inman had to 
stop its feeder service from Antwerp immediately after the opening of the Red Star Line (Flyhart, 2000, 
113). However, the HAPAG which grew out to be the biggest shipping company worldwide was never able 
to make an end to the indirect migration through its homeport (Broeze, 1992, 1-3).     
259 Passage brokers and emigration agents in Liverpool needed to get a certificate from the 
authorities agreeing to abide the English laws. For th se who worked with brokers in Hamburg, a copy had
to be deposited with the Hamburg consul agreeing to abide both Hamburg Senate and English laws 
from1855 onwards. Contracts were made between Michols & Co from Liverpool with Morris & Co in 
Hamburg, Sable & Searle with L. Scharlach & Co, S. Stern with Falck & Co, W. Inman with J. Kirsten, 
Hartmamm with O. Moeller, D. Mac Iver with G.Hirschmann, Magnus Ballin with Morris & Co, Hamburg  
Staatsarchiv, Consulaat Liverpool: Auswanderungsangelegenheiten 1851-68 nr 8. 
260 In 1894 the British Market-share of steerage passengers consisted of 70% English and Irish, 
22% Scandinavian and 8% Continental passengers. 1894 was a year with low migration and a rate war was 
going on between the Continental lines and the British lines hence the efforts to attract continental 
passengers were considerable during that year. GAR, H L  318.04, Passage Department, 223, Letter May 9 
1894. 
261 Most Italians initially came from the North and reached huge numbers once the movement 
spread to the South. Greeks and Syrians soon followed.    
262 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter January 16 1886 and GAR, 
HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 563, Meeting May 25 1885, minute 41. 
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The reason for the Continental lines to organize the Mediterranean market was its 
dependence of the stability of other markets to be a l to raise continental fares. If rates 
for Italian destinations differed too much from the continent than Swiss and Austrians 
may choose that route instead of going through contine al ports. If Scandinavian rates 
were lower than continental rates than Germans and Poles would be booked at the lowest 
price. If the rate difference between the continent a d British Isles was too big, 
continentals traveled to Liverpool which had frequent services to many continental 
destinations. In short, the different conferences wre dependent on each other to increase 
rates. 
 
4.1.2) Outside rivals on the Continent: Thingvalia nd French Line 
The Continental market ranged from Spain to Russia and was in full expansion to 
the east at the time. The Continental Conference had been drawn up to include both 
Thingvalia Line and CGT. The Danish Line focused on the Scandinavian market but the 
geographic position of Copenhagen allowed them to easily target the continental market. 
However, the Danes could not be convinced to join the conference.  
The exclusion of the French Line had greater repercussions on the working of the 
conference. Having to a great extent the same hinterla d as the members of the 
conference, they could not permit to fix rates and commission that differed much of the 
CGT without risk of loosing a share of the traffic.264 After months of futile negotiations 
the Continental lines increased the ocean rates by $2,5 while taking measures to force the 
CGT in the conference. The lines did not use fighting ships which consisted of appointing 
steamers of conference members at drastically reduced rates that coincided as much as 
possible with the CGT’s sailings.265 Neither did they cut on the ocean rate affecting all 
continental business. Instead they cut on the railroad rates to popular destinations of the 
French Line’s traveling public. These railroad tickets were sold below cost while they 
followed the CGT’s raise of commission, paying $4 on eastbound tickets. Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                                      
263 It consisted of the Italian Line, Fabre Line, Red Star Line and the Holland America Line.  
264 The French would only join if $25 for the express service was used as a base to fix the rates. 
However, the prepaid rate for NGL express was set at $22, but it was prospected to reach $30. When it did 
it was agreed that the HAL would be allowed to increase its differential. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage 
Department, Meeting July 15 1885, minute 63, 67. 
265 By sharing the costs conferences often use the technique to drive out an outside line of a certain route or 
force them to enter the agreement 
 173
agents were notified that unless they relinquished the agency of the French Line, ticket 
books of the conference lines would be withdrawn from them.266 The French Line then 
had to rely on a parallel network of non-conference ag nts for selling their tickets.267  
Six months later the British lines finally reorganized. They quoted continental 
rates at a basis of $22 for express service, $5 lower than the Continental lines. Only if the 
CGT joined the Conference, would the British lines would raise their rates. The British 
lines helped pressuring the French to enter the confere ce by using the agent network.268 
Negotiations with CGT resumed. The French Line tried to obtain the right to quote equal 
railroad rates as the RSL and HAL to what it called its special territory, Switzerland, 
France and Northern Italy. The latter refused to give up their geographical advantage to 
these points. They agreed to cancel special rates using the actual inland tariff instead. 
Commissions were lowered and the rates set at on a basis of $27 for express service. This 
cleared the path to enter further negotiations withthe British lines.   
 
4.1.3) The network of migrant brokers and agents: the concentration in New York 
One of the priorities of the Continental Conference was to impose ‘city rules’ in 
New York. At the port where the sale of passage ticke s for the American market 
concentrated, chaos reigned because of the proliferation of agents and runners.269 Besides 
through migrant agents, tickets were sold over the counter by innkeepers, 
boardinghouses, peddlers etc. With ‘city rules’ thelin s wanted to do away with the 
middleman and restrict the sale of ocean tickets in New York to the company’s office. 
This would greatly increase the control over the business and do away with commission 
costs. To do so without important losses of market share all the lines had to adhere. Once 
the British reached their provisional agreement them mbers of the Continental 
                                                 
266 Ibid. meeting May 3 1885, minutes 39; meeting July 15 1885, minute 63 and meeting August 
20 1885 minutes 74 and 85. 
267 In a letter of Van den Toorn to the Board of directors on joining the Continental Conference he 
reassured the directors that they may lose some agents, but not many because as a conference line they 
were assured to have the best and most respectable agents. In case they stepped out of the conference ther
existed a wide network of maybe less solid but very active non-conference agents to fall back on. GAR, 
HAL, Wentholt Archief, 318.14, 18/3, Letter November 11 1884. 
268 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter January 16 1886. 
269 Emil Boas when testifying before the Ford congressional committee stated that 75% of the 
tickets sold in the US were sold in New York, NYT “Beginning their labors: The question of American 
Immigration” June 26 1888. 
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Conference limited the number of sub-agents in the city to twelve, two in Williamsburg 
and one each in Hoboken, New Jersey and Brooklyn. The commission over the counter 
would still be paid as long as the British lines did and the French line did not join the 
conference.270  
Besides stopping the proliferation of agents and runners the lines wanted to 
counter the developing order-system with the ‘city rules’. Some American agents started 
offering orders for steerage passage from Hamburg to New York $4 below the British 
Continental prepaid rate. Such orders were then exchanged for European cash rate tickets 
by the brokers of the British lines in Hamburg.271 The German line informed the 
conference members that unless the British lines raised the European cash rates, they 
would see themselves forced to lower the prepaid rate to meet said competition.272 The 
HAPAG opened a New York-Baltic service, to and from Copenhagen, Göteborg and 
Stettin at $19 to pressure the British lines.273 This resulted in an agreement between the 
HAPAG and the British lines. The Hamburg America Line withdrew its direct 
Scandinavian service while the British lines agreed to limit their share of the traffic going 
through Hamburg to 35 percent. Price difference betwe n indirect and direct routes could 
not exceed five marks, to the advantage of the British lines. This was controlled by a 
Clearing House in Hamburg (Murken, 1922, 19; Otmüller-Wezel, 1986, 195). Yet all the 
efforts to get the lines on the same wavelength fell to pieces when in August 1886 the 
Red Star Line dropped out of the New York Continental Conference triggering a rate war 
which would last eight months. 
 
4.1.4) The dependence of stability of other conferences 
The Continental Conference was renewed in accordance with the Mediterranean 
and the North Atlantic Steam Traffic Conference, for whose members the agents were 
                                                 
270 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 563, meeting May 25 1885, minute 38 and meeting 
January 25 1886, minutes 164-166. 
271 HAPAG quoted 25$ for prepaid tickets at the time which gave the English Lines a differential 
of 7$ using this system. Ibid., meeting March 29 1886, minute 197. 
272 The HAPAG reached an agreement with the migrant houses in Hamburg operating for British 
Lines in December 1886. The HAPAG agreed to stop its d rect Scandinavian service while the British 
Lines committed to limit their outtake of the traffic going through Hamburg to 35 percent. A clearing house 
was established to supervise the divide the traffic ccordingly (Ottmüller-Wezel, 1986, 195-196). 
273 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 563, meeting Ju e 26 1886, minute 250. 
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allowed to book. Yet the Harmony between British and Continental lines was still far 
from being reached. City rules stayed out and the commission over the counter 
persisted274. The British kept paying extra commissions, quoting low rates to the 
continent and waited for the NGL to raise their Scandinavian rates. The NGL for their 
part waited for the British lines to raise the continental rates before changing theirs. The 
HAL and HAPAG urged to lower the rates to meet the British competition. The deadlock 
could only be broken after several notices of withdrawal and a two week period where 
regulations were lifted. In the end it took another six months before the British lines 
finally raised their continental rates275. All preparations were made to enforce city rules in 
New York. Only the consent of the Mediterranean Conference was needed to apply them, 
yet the conference fell apart due to internal tensions276. The improved collaboration with 
the British lines allowed lowering the commission to $2 for continental business and 
price changes were mutually discussed. Yet the increasing tension among the British 
lines, especially between the White Star and Cunard Line led to a rate war on the 
Scandinavian market. Net Ocean Rates to and from Scandinavian points fell as low as 
$12 and commissions of $6 were paid out. The German lines gave guarantees that these 
would not be misused for continentals to prevent the war from spreading277. The situation 
on the Mediterranean market also remained fairly unstable and treats were made to let it 
spread to the continental business to pressure some members sitting in both to 
concessions. However, this did not happen and when t  Italian government imposed a 
refulation on its citizens to migrate directly from national ports the situation changed 
completely278.  
                                                 
274 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, circular April 14 1887.  
275 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563; meeting May 31, minute 31; meeting June 26, minute 50; meeting 
August 15 , minute 61, meeting  September 6 and 20 1887 minutes 64, 69, 70.   
276 Fabre Line and Florio Rubathino Line refused to rerganize after the Red Star Line’s condemnation by 
the Arbitrator for faltering with the agreements. It put an end to the idea of pooling the Mediterranean 
market. This was to the great regret of Van den Toorn who saw a unique opportunity to get rid off the 
Italian agents who, to his opinion were even less tru tworthy than other agents. Van den Toorn had hoped 
to open Joint Offices where all lines were represented by an independent agent and whose books had to be 
accessible to all lines at all times.  GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563; meeting October 25 1887, minute 77; meeting 
January 31 1888, minute 165. Ibid. 221, Letters of Van den Toorn January 3 and 20 1888. 
277Ibid. 563, meeting July 16 1889, minute 165; meeting October 2, minute 370; meeting December 2 and 
23 minutes 375-379, 382. Ibid. 221 and 222, Letters October, 11, 15 1889; January 21 1890 and December 
10 1891. 
278 Both the RSL and CGT threatened to step out of the continental conference if they did not get 
their way on the Mediterranean market but were eventually not executed. Once the law prevented them 
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The external problems seriously hampered the working of the Continental 
Conference. Price agreements and measures to control the agent network could only be 
implemented by forcing the outside continental lines to join, as was the case with the 
French Line. Moreover, the foothold of the British lines in Hamburg on the continent 
made the conference dependent on the goodwill of these to raise prices and implement 
measures to control the agents. Also continental market was sensitive to unrests in other 
sub-markets of the North Atlantic traffic. Rate wars easily spread or at least forced the 
lines to lower their rates avoiding continental passengers from taking alternative routes. 
Finally, the lack of control over migrant brokers and agents on both sides of the Atlantic 
posed another threat, especially when Hamburg migrant brokers started opening branch 
offices in New York selling orders at cheaper European cash rates corrupting the 
American prepaid market. The impotence of shipping companies in imposing themselves 
on the agents also undermined internal cohesion. 
 
4.2.) The internal pressures 
 
 4.2.1) Internal mistrust, duration of agreements and constant renegotiations 
The mistrust between the members who, for a long time, considered each other as 
their number one rivals constantly weighed on the Continental Conference. The 
underlying suspicions are reflected by the period fr which the agreements were 
concluded. During the first five years the agreements were never renewed for longer than 
seven months279. Sometimes the negotiations to renew, during which the old agreements 
usually still stood took longer than the agreement itself. The differentials between the 
lines were always open to renegotiations. Especially since fixed prices moved the 
competition to improve the quality of service. During the first five years the Dutch Line 
                                                                                                                                      
from booking passengers the companies used their agnt-network to circumvent the laws and continued 
transporting Italians via Marseille GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563; meeting October 2 1891, minute 370; GAR, 
HAL, 318.04, 221, Letters September 10, October 3, 17 and November 19 1890. 
279 Only at the end of 1889 the agreements were renewed for a year to December 311890. GAR, 
HAL, 318.04, 221 Letter December 11 1889. 
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in particular greatly improved their fleet.280 The RSL continuously pushed for initial 
differentials, which were set on speed and quality of service, to be adapted 
accordingly.281 These tensions quickly led the conference into its first crisis. Hardly a 
year after its founding the conference fell apart. The RSL accused the members of 
perusing an aggressive policy against them in Europe, alienating the agents from them.282 
Failing to obtain its expected share the RSL refused to renew the agreement triggering a 
rate war, plummeting prepaid fares by $10. The HAL followed notifying its agents that it 
would meet any new reduction as far as possible to maintain the differential. Conference 
agents were at liberty to dispose of their commission as deemed proper yet had to 
discontinue selling tickets of the RSL or send back the ticket books of the conference 
lines. The limit on the number of agents in New York was lifted.283 This rate war to force 
RSL back in, lasted eight months during which agents were allowed to disregard many 
regulations. If they did violate the ones still standing fines were less severe. Agents 
caught selling tickets for the RSL first received a w rning before being disqualified, to 
prevent as many agents as possible from giving up the conference agency. With the new 
agreement a circular was sent to remind the agents of the regulations adding some new 
ones. Among these was the increased cancellations fee to ten percent and fixed 
commission were replaced by ten percent on the tickt. Among these were the increase of 
cancellation fees to ten percent and the replacement of fixed commissions with 
commissions of ten percent of the price of the ticket. The latter could have moved the 
agents and ship-owners towards a common interest in raising prices. But the smaller lines 
feared that the percentage basis would stimulate the sale of the more expensive services 
of the bigger lines. Their protests eventually led to the reintroduction of fixed 
commissions. This was only one disadvantage of the lack of homogeneity of product. 
 
                                                 
280 Between 1886 and 1889 the HAL bought no less than seven second hand ships, totaling 27.000 
tons, among them the Arabic, Baltic and the Republic of the White Star Line which enjoyed a good 
reputation with the traveling public.  
281 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563; meeting December 11 1888, minute 214; meeting June 13 1889, 
minute 273. Eventually the HAL gave in to increase th ir rates and to decrease their differential by 50 
cents. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221 October 11 1889.  
282 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, meeting July 26 1886, minute 258.  
283 Ibid. 563, July 26, minute 258, August 2 1886, minutes 265-269 and Ibid. 767, Circular to agents 
August 3 1886. 
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4.2.2) The lack of homogeneity of product: various services, destinations at 
differential rates 
The working of the cartel was further complicated because some lines offered 
slow and fast services and also to different ports of arrival such as, Baltimore, 
Philadelphia and New York at different rates. Negotiations whether to include new 
services of members in the conference added to the in ernal tensions. For example, the 
HAL opened a Baltimore service; to fight the increasing competition for freight between 
Rotterdam and the US; for cheaper passenger and freight railroad rates to and from the 
West from that port; and for the more lenient application of laws regarding the landing of 
migrants284. However, the Dutch Line was also the only company with just one 
destination and no variety in standard of service. It was a well known practice that 
companies sometimes booked passengers at regular service to be transported on express 
steamers, or passengers were booked at lower Philadelphia and Baltimore rates but 
landed in New York. Although this was against the conference rules it was very difficult 
to prove this abuse. Companies gave these facilities to their most reliable and important 
agents, who, to avoid fines and disqualification, used the greatest secrecy. As passengers 
could hardly ever be convinced to give affidavits about fraud, the lines hired private 
detectives when they suspected a member of evading the regulations on a large scale. 
They represented themselves as clients yet all kinds of tricks were used to prevent them 
from getting their hands on evidence.285 To prove cheating with upgraded services, the 
detectives had to actually travel on these tickets. It seemed to have been the Dutch Line’s 
policy where the violations of the agreement were too difficult to prove, to make sure to 
be able to tamper with them as well, explaining the op ning of the Baltimore service. The 
NGL, which managed a service to Baltimore from 1867, had recently seen the HAPAG 
opening a line to the port and was determined to block out new competition. In theory the 
exclusion of HAL’s Baltimore service out of the conference meant that conference agents 
were not allowed to book for that service.286 The NGL visited many agencies stressing 
that if they booked for the Dutch Baltimore service th y would be disqualified. Yet, in 
                                                 
284 In 1890 for instance rates from Baltimore to the Wst differed on average $1.94 and from 
Philadelphia $1.24. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221 Letter December 20 1890. 
285 At some stage the HAL had to hire an extra bookkeeper to cover up the violations of the agreements. 
Ibid., 222, Letter August 21 1891. 
286Ibid. Letters March 17, June 12, July 22 and September 25 1891. 
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practice by paying extra commission the HAL found many agents willing to take the risk 
of being fined or disqualified, since they had means to prevent other lines to obtain proofs 
of the violation. The non-inclusion permitted the HAL to quote low rates and pay higher 
commissions attracting a fair share of passengers.287 
 
4.2.3) Moving the competition from ocean rates to railroad rates 
Fixed ocean rates further moved the competition to railroad rates as rail and ocean 
passage were often sold together. The hardly negotiated differentials on ocean rates could 
easily be cancelled out by railroad fares. Trying to fix through rates the conference 
secretary required the lines to hand in lists of actu l inland fares obtained from inland 
transport companies at both sides of the Atlantic. Any cut on these was considered a 
conference violation, yet again proving this appeared very hard. The lines constantly 
negotiated with railroads to obtain special rates in exchange for their business. Initially, 
on the American soil a fierce competition between the railroad lines was prevalent. All 
kinds of reductions could be obtained. The rate wars lso pushed the railroads to 
cooperate establishing the Immigrant Clearing House, coordinating the migrant business 
in the territory between New York and Chicago in 1887.288 It allowed them to increase 
the rates and cut on the commissions granted to steam hip companies and migration 
agents for the sale of railroad tickets in connection with ocean passage. Plans of 
steamship lines for the opening of Joint Railroad Offices to regain control over the 
railroad business never materialized. Secret reductions and special commissions still 
existed, but these were far less significant than during rate wars (Feys, 2007).289  
The European inland tariff caused greater instability. Particularly the low inland 
tariff of the Dutch Line had a demoralizing effect. The Dutch railway and the Rhine 
                                                 
287 Many new services were opened were eventually included in the conference such as the 
HAPAG, Union service specializing in migrant and freight transport, HAPAG express service, the Stettin 
Line and Baltimore Line which were all accepted. Their Hansa Line to Montreal however was blocked out.
The introduction Lloyd ships built as the Union steamers, for migrant and freight transport only also led to 
intense discussions on what rates it would include. In the end this service both to Baltimore and New York 
would be taken up in the conference under the Roland Li e.  
288 The Immigrant clearing House regulated the traffic between New York and Chicago. Railroads 
in the West organized later on. 
289 But that the problems still persisted is illustrated through the establishment of a committee 
appointed to put an end to rate cuts on railroad ticke s sold in connection with eastbound ocean passage 
GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563,  Meeting, December 22, 30 1890, minute 384, 390.  
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steamboat companies recalculated the fares in 1887 giving the HAL an important 
differential on inland transport. The other members questioned the validity of the rates 
and brought the case to the arbitrator. The RSL claimed to be loosing important amounts 
of business and started quoting the same inland tariff as the Dutch Line adding 80 cents- 
representing the cost from Rotterdam to Antwerp.290 It ignored the rule imposing lines to 
quote the actual tariff obtained. The HAPAG soon followed.291 The RSL threatened to 
leave the conference and brought the case to the arbitrator. Tensions increased when the 
arbitrator ruled in favor of the HAL.292 The RSL kept on using the same tariff as the HAL 
who denounced the abuse.293 The Dutch Line attributed the low rates due to the
geographical advantage of Rotterdam which it was not prepared to give up. It believed 
the matter to be important enough to risk war.294 The RSL demanded the permission to 
quote equal inland fare as the HAL or a decrease of the differential of the ocean rate to 
extend the agreements. In the end, the Antwerp-based company obtained the right to 
lower its ocean rates by fifty cents.295 However, the French Line claimed that the 
situation was no longer sustainable and demanded adapt tions of differentials. It had 
calculated that the average differential, railroad and ocean rate included to thirty five 
common points in Europe amounted to $9.25 in favor of RSL and $11.35 in favor of 
HAL.296 A special sub-committee was formed to tackle the problems on European inland 
fares by establishing a list of maximum 300 points where passengers could be booked 
through at well established rates. Yet, the formation of the list was delayed by Austrian 
and German Railroads which were about to issue new reductions.297 The French Line lost 
its patience and dropped out of the conference. The HAL convinced the French to rejoin 
by reducing differentials to French, Swiss and Northern Italian points for through rates to 
$2 and allowed RSL to use their rates to these points.298    
 
                                                 
290 Ibid. meeting May 31, minute 32, meeting November 17, minute 87 and meeting December 27 
1887, minute 104. 
291 Ibid., meeting April 24 1888, minute 143. 
292 Ibid, meeting January 31 1888, minute 109. 
293 Ibid, meeting July 7 1888, minute 174-176. 
294 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221, Letters June 16 and 22 1888. 
295 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 563, meeting Ja uary 22 1889, minute 224. 
296 Ibid., meeting June 27 1889, minute 272-276.  
297 Ibid., meeting February 27 1890, minute 329 and meeting December 30 1890, minute 390. 
298 Ibid., meeting May 21, minute 432 and meeting July 1 1891, minute 449.  
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4.2.4) The take-over of the pre-paid market by migrant brokers 
The most important internal pressure was the competition between the lines to tie 
migrant brokers by giving them special facilities. It allowed the predominantly Jewish 
entrepreneurs to completely demoralize the prepaid market out of Hamburg through their 
own orders with the line’s consent. The pool agreement for the Hamburg traffic between 
HAPAG and the British lines did not make an end to the practice. Repeatedly, the New 
York head-agents of the shipping companies urged thir directors to raise the cash rate or 
allow them to lower the prepaid rate to fight these abuses.299 As long as migrant agents 
could offer cheaper prices for the crossing than the lines themselves it would be 
impossible to introduce ‘city rules’.300 Migrant broker, Richard, acting as passage-agent 
for the HAPAG said that only an advance in cash rates could prevent their withdrawal.301 
Although being against the conference rules it was a public secret that the HAPAG 
concluded special arrangements with some brokers using their own orders to counter the 
competition of the British lines in its homeport. Because of this rivalry the practice 
quickly propagated and other Continental lines made rrangements through the branch 
offices in New York to get their hands on the order business. Instead of imposing ‘city 
rules’ closing the gap between shipping companies and clients, the discord between the 
lines allowed these brokers to take over the control of ocean passage sales. Despite 
raising European cash rates by 10 marks the French Li e insisted on a decrease in the 
prepaid rate by an additional $3,5. Their sale of prepaid tickets had practically come to a 
standstill and they threatened to leave the conferec . Their orientation towards the 
Swiss, Austrian and Italian market led to a neglect of he migrant flow from the east. 
While the British and the other Continental lines developed relations with the Hamburg 
migrant brokers enabling them to get their hands on the order business, the French Line 
did not.302 
                                                 
299 Unfortunately no price series of European cash rates re at hand but additional commission and 
the price difference must have balanced around four t  five dollars, based on the repeated calls of the 
agents to raise the cash rate by ten to fifteen Marks o  cut on the Prepaid by two to three dollars.  GAR, 
HAL, 318.04, 221-223, Letters of Van den Toorn.  
300 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, meeting October 25 1887, minute 72; meeting June 16 1888, minute 
165.  
301 Ibid., meeting February 28 1888, minute 127.    
302 Decision on lowering the prepaid rates was continuously deferred during the next four months 
after which the French Line withdrew its claim. It is unclear if the French obtained concessions on the 
Swiss and Italian territory or elsewhere from the other Continental Lines that were against lowering the 
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Through the order-system Jewish migrant brokers undercut American prepaid 
price by $4 to $5. They drove migrant agents selling regular prepaid tickets out of 
business. Therefore many agents started selling the brokers’ orders instead of regular 
tickets. Occasionaly the agents were caught cheating. Offenders paid the fine protesting 
the pending disqualification for a subsequent offence claiming that the conference gave 
no protection to do regular business. Occasionally, the brokers were caught violating the 
conference rules. First time offenders were fined an threatened with disqualification. 
However, they defended themselves claiming that as long as tickets could be sold over 
the counter by outsiders without liability and responsibility to the Conference for 
violation of the rules, they had no choice but to follow suit with abuses to stay in 
business303. The eight month negotiations to prolong the agreements in 1889 allowed the 
Hamburg brokers to increase their grip on the market. The practice of drawing orders 
spread to the bigger American cities including Baltimore, Philadelphia, Chicago, Saint 
Louis and Milwaukee. As observed by Van den Toorn the competition between the lines 
contributed to the demoralization. Instead of standing up for themselves the lines let the 
control over the business slip away into the hands of Jewish brokers.304 The Hamburg 
brokers started opening offices in Bremen and would later do the same in Rotterdam and 
Antwerp. The spreading out of the system indirectly resulted from the Hamburg pool 
dividing the traffic between HAPAG and British lines. To increase their business the 
Hamburg brokers started to forward migrants through Bremen, Rotterdam and Antwerp 
which did not fall under the agreement. Also, the control of the cash-order system in the 
US allowed them to establish contacts with new shipping companies.  
Albert Ballin’s plan to control the indirect traffic through Hamburg backfired and 
lead to new routes of indirect migration via Hamburg. The HAPAG-manager threatened 
letting parts of his fleet call at Rotterdam.305 The HAPAG demanded that the HAL and 
RSL closed their Hamburg agency under L. Scharlach and S. Jarmulowski 
                                                                                                                                      
rates. However, they did not get their hands on order business GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221, Letter November 
19 1889. 
303 The bigger agents claimed that small agents tried o increase their sales through low rates by 
cutting the commission to 25 cents. Ibid., meeting 29 August 1889, minutes 284-285. 
304 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221, Letter of November 19 1889. 
305 Ibid, Letter January 31 1890 
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respectively.306 Both companies were prepared to withdraw the authority f the brokers to 
draw orders for them out of Hamburg, on the condition that HAPAG stopped giving the 
same facilities to brokers not belonging to the Hamburg Pool and that NGL prevented F. 
Missler from doing the same via Bremen.307 With these facilities, that companies gave to 
increase their market share, all sorts of facilities in violation of the conference agreements 
ranging from faltering with upgraded service, to not charging cancellation fees, paying 
extra commission, allowing changing names on the ticke , hiring subagents, dividing the 
commission or offering part of it as a reduction to the buyer.  
To avoid being caught, Scharlach avoided that the purchaser never received actual 
documents that may be used against him in conferenc meetings. Instead of receiving the 
receipt attached to the ticket, an outsider issued a proof of payment. The originals were 
sent to the houses in Bremen or Hamburg to prevent co ference members from getting 
their hands on legal proofs. The practice was so embedded that New York head agents of 
the shipping lines cabled the home offices asking the prepaid prices to be lowered at the 
same level as cash rates.308 The NGL opposed the decrease whereupon all other members 
gave notice of withdrawal. A reduction of $2 followed to bring prepaid rates closer to 
cash rates.309 The difference remained $2.5 which was still enough margin for the abuses 
to continue.310 The HAPAG defended their abuses with the excuse that they had to follow 
the prices quoted by the British lines in Hamburg. As a result Scharlach and Jarmulowski 
were reinstated by the RSL and HAL.311 Much to his dislike, Ballin was forced to allow 
both lines in the Hamburg pool.312 The tensions between the lines greatly increased while 
                                                 
306 Ibid, Letter October 2 1889 and meeting September 17 1889, minute 291.   
307 The outside pool agents mentioned were C. Seligman, M. Flateau, C. Stockel, K. Weinbereger 
and Landav, GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, meeting October 10 1889, minute 298.  
308 Ibid., meeting January 23, minute 317 and meeting February 27 1890, minute 328. 
309 Ibid, meetings March 10 1890, April 10, May and 10 1890.  
310 The European cash rate stayed at 60 Mark, which at t e contemporary exchange rate used by 
the companies of 4,2 Mark to $1 brings it at $14,1 while the prepaid net rate was $17 or 72,1 Mark. 
According to Murken lines started making profit on migrants when selling above 40 to 45 Marks (Murken, 
1922).   
311 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221, Letter July 30, August 19 and September 10 1890. 
312 HAPAG tried to intimidate the Dutch Line by threatning again to use Rotterdam as a port of call. As a 
countermeasure the HAL made preparations to include Hamburg in its sailings. RSL and HAL the former 
eternal rivals joined forces to strengthen their negotiating position against the German Line. By the 
admission in the pool lines had to stop giving extra commission to their Hamburg agency but were assured 
a fixed number of passengers or compensation if the number was not attainted. The number of passengers 
would decrease but they would be booked at a better price. Because of the renegotiations the HAPAG saw 
its share of the traffic through Hamburg decrease from 65 to 57,8 percent. As observed by van den Toorn: 
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the prices for the transport remained low. It was sensed that a rate war was unavoidable 
unless the members came to an agreement to pool the continental traffic.   
   
4.3) An evaluation of the first seven years of the Continental Conference 
 
  If the success of a conference has to be judged on the ability to detect and to 
discourage cheating, then the Continental Conferenc failed. Instead of becoming more 
transparent the transactions became even more corrupt. As the policy of the Dutch 
company illustrates, where the violations of the agreement were too difficult to prove, 
they made sure to be able to tamper with rules as well. This logic is also to be find behind 
the ‘game theory’, underlining the conditional cooperation between firms wherein as 
soon as one acts opportunistically the others will fol ow reducing their mutual support 
(Boyce 2001, 8). Even the hiring of private detectives was not enough to efficiently 
verify cheating. Relying on agents denouncing colleagues also proved to be ineffective. 
Most of the proofs of cheating was collected by companies’ personnel and detectives, and 
only sporadically by migrant agents. Cheating seems to have been so widespread that 
most agents were not irreproachable taking away the incentive to denounce the practice. 
Shipping companies were unable to implement the ruls which had to eliminate 
differential treatment of customers by the migrant gents.  
Neither could they prevent themselves from giving some brokers facilities and 
others not. When violations were recorded the confere ce failed to use retaliation, 
deterring reoccurrence. Fines were not high enough while the threat of disqualification 
was hollowed by the fear that agents could do more damage by working for non-
members. This was the situation with Scharlach who suffered two disqualifications, yet 
both times he fought his way back in. As observed by van den Toorn, when lines were 
caught cheating, apart from slightly affecting the negotiation position when agreements 
had to be renewed and having to pay a moderate fine, companies easily got of the hook. 
Under these circumstances, it is no surprise that te companies failed to raise gross 
prices, which included the commission- as shown in the graph 1. As argued above, the 
                                                                                                                                      
“ the Hamburg pool is an excellent means of putting Ballin under pressure.”  GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221, 
Letters of Van den Toorn June 8, July 14 and September 12 1891.  
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prices only reflect part of the reality which was worse for the profits of the companies 
than the graph suggests. Secret commissions and reductions on railroad rates cut deep 
into the companies’ profits while investments in the fleet increased. This occurred to the 
advantage of the agents and especially the migrants who benefited of improved services 
at low prices. Yet, the conference also produced positive results. After the rate war during 
the second half of 1886 the conference managed to prevent open rate wars from 
reoccurring on the continental market. It also brought the four core members HAL, RSL, 
HAPAG and NGL closer together, and proved that the Fr nch could be forced in and 
strengthened their negotiation position with the British lines. These elements were 
essential for the successful formation of the subsequent pool-agreements.  
 































5) Pooling the traffic, the tonnage clause and the impact on the Conference  
Agreements 
 
Fixing market shares is the most efficient of all methods of combating secret price 
cutting (Stigler 1961, 44-61). The initial years of the continental conference convinced 
the members of the necessity thereof to cut the edgoff the competition - to control both 
agent-networks as well as transport fares. Albert Ballin, manager of the HAPAG who 
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suffered the most of the instability became the driving force behind the expansion of 
agreements. Internally core members divided the market into shares and used schemes of 
compensation to balance shortages or excesses. To reduce external price cuttings 
agreements were made with other lines to geographiclly divide the North-Atlantic 
market. Although simultaneously the American anti-trus  movement gained momentum, 
shipping lines felt protected by the knowledge that American jurisdiction did no extend 
over international waters. This belief vanished midway the 1890s yet did not affect 
conference negotiations during the period analyzed here. 
 
5.1) The formation of the Nord-Atlantischer Dampfer-Linien Verband 
 
The negotiations for a westbound pool started at a secret meeting between the 
RSL, HAL, NGL and HAPAG early in 1890. The French made it clear not to be 
interested in joining. This idea was met by considering France, Switzerland and Italy as 
special territory organized on the basis of a money-pool.313 The situation in Hamburg 
made the inclusion of the British lines highly desirable if not indispensable. Market 
shares were based on the continental steerage passenger  carried in the previous decade 
from ports north of Cadiz to the US and Canada givin  the HAL 8%, RSL 13,5%, NGL 
39,7% and HAPAG 24,8%. The British lines with whom a separate contract was 
negotiated, received 14%. The percentage participaton could be altered depending on the 
changes in tonnage of vessels employed for transport of steerage passengers of each 
company by either more frequent use or introduction of new vessels. Companies that 
exceeded their percentage needed to compensate the lines which were short at a rate of 60 
marks per passenger. To limit these compensations members with a plus during the year 
would raise their rates to allow companies that were short on their share to book 
passengers at more profitable prices instead of having to lower theirs.  
Gross rates and agent commission were fixed; anywhere between 6 and 20 Marks 
in Europe, $2 to $5 in the US. Members agreed that prepaid gross rates had to, as much 
                                                 
313 RSL, HAL and HAPAG organized the territory through a money-pool where all lines chipped 
in a fixed amount per passenger transported from these territories which was then divided in shares at the 
end of the year. The NGL decided to stay out of this agreement. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221, Letter January 
29 1892. 
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as practicable be equal to European cash rates. All agents receiving more than two had to 
be reported to the secretary. No commission was allowed on the inland European 
transport and tariffs to a maximum of 300 points were fixed. All members deposited high 
bonds as detriment for lines to drop out of the agreement. Disputes would be brought 
forward to an arbitrator. The contract was valid for f ur years, yet alterations could be 
proposed. If alterations proposed by two members or m re were objected to, then these 
companies had the right to withdraw from the agreement.314  
 Negotiations among the four Continental lines went smooth yet there was a great 
anticipation about the outcome of it. As observed by Van den Toorn: “No one knows 
what the pool will bring and why HAPAG was so compliant with the NGL. Possibly it is a 
conspiracy to destroy us and the RSL, however I’d rather believe that both urgently need 
money and want to clear out the steerage business from innumerable abuses, being 
weighed down by the restless actions of agents, or sh uld we say parasites”.315 The 
agreement showed that the Continental lines learned f om the weaknesses of the previous 
agreements. The quotas warranted that rates would no longer be cut to obtain a larger 
market share. Linking prepaid with cash rates had to put an end to the order-system. 
Work was put into fixing rates for inland travel. Furthermore, the Baltimore line of the 
HAL was admitted. While passengers who RSL and HAL drew from Hamburg were no 
longer a loss to HAPAG, since they were calculated in the pool. The duration of four 
years without notice had to out an end to continuous renegotiations and constant threats 
of withdrawal.316 Outside competition from French and British lines was neutralized.317 
Despite keeping out of the pool, the French Line remained in the New York Conference 
abiding to the rules and adapting the rates in accordance with the members’ interest.318  
 
                                                 
314 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 580, ‘Nord-Atlantische Dampfer-Linien Verband’ Copy of the contract 
made in Hamburg January 19 1892. 
315 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 222, Letter December 20 1891. 
316 The initial plan was to conclude an agreement of 10 years with three years notice. It was than 
suggested for five years without notice.  
317 Despite the passing of the Anti-Trust Act, 2-7-1890 the lines were not expecting any 
difficulties from the American government. The anti-immigration feelings were rising in the US while the 
many European governments were looking for ways to restrict the exodus. An agreement which would 
increase the price for the passage, so was believed would be welcomed on both sides of the Atlantic. GAR, 
HAL, 318.04, 222, Letter September 12 1891. 
318 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, meeting  April 1 1892, minute 537. 
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 5.2) The British-Jewish Hamburg Connection: the conference’s Achilles Heel  
  
 Nonetheless internal division among the members of the British Conference, 
which by then numbered thirteen members, delayed th signing of the contract. The 
Continental lines had an important ally among the British with the American Line. Both 
RSL and American Line formed part of the International Navigation Company.319 The 
American concern, having interests in both the pool and the British Conference served as 
platform for the negotiations. Although according to van den Toorn the cooperation of 
the British lines was bought dearly, the distrust mainly of the Cunard Line towards the 
German lines delayed the signing of the agreements. The verbal agreement which had to 
be enforced on February the first 1892 remained pending. Two months later a three 
month trail period was adopted without the National and Cunard Line.320 Rates were 
jointly increased to unprecedented levels. Yet, the vulnerability of the HAPAG became 
once again painfully clear when the Cunard and Nation l lines quoted respectfully $19 
and $15 through Hamburg, while the German Line’s lowest rate came in at $25. The 
Hamburg Line secretly paid $3.5 extra commission to the agents in the US to reach their 
pool share.321  
 Whatever scheme Ballin put together to increase the profits for his shipping 
company it ended up in everyone’s pocket but his. He concluded special agreements to 
shut out the Hamburg brokers with agents on the Prussian-Russian border and with the 
Jewish Committee of Berlin through which the majority of the Jewish passengers passed 
on their way to the New World. The Hamburg brokers even feared that he was pressuring 
the German government to pass legislations putting an end to their business.322 A new 
three year pool agreement with Hamburg Agents Associati n was concluded which set 
minimum rates for all lines served by these agents. Fixed commissions on cash 
passengers were pooled by the agent association. A clearing house controlled all prepaid 
                                                 
319 In this text when mentioning the British lines, it referrers to the lines managing a service from 
the British continent and thus includes the American Line from 1885 onwards. With the takeover of the 
Inman Line in 1886 the line greatly improved its reputation on English soil.  
320 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, meeting April 1 1982, minute 541 and Ibid. 222, Letter May 11 1892.  
321 Ibid., 222, Letter May 27 1892. 
322  Ibid., Letter July 1 and 15 1891. After the cholera outbreak the German government built 
control stations at the borders and gave the management of these to the German Lines. This proved a useful 
means of directing migrants to the German ports (Wüstenbecker, 2003, 234). 
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tickets on their authenticity and validity preventing evasion from the pool through order-
tickets. HAPAG could also book passengers through a limited amount of Hamburg 
migrant brokers who remained outside of the associati n but the same prices and 
commissions had to be offered to both at all times.323  Van den Toorn reported that apart 
from secret extra commissions which corrupted the business in the US, especially 
because of the lack of an eastbound-agreement, the pool was working very well.324 When 
everything seemed to be falling into its place, cholera broke out in Hamburg disrupting 
the traffic for six months.  
 As a consequence, the traffic through Hamburg came to a standstill and many 
Hamburg brokers moved to Rotterdam and Antwerp.325 But due to the American 
quarantine measures all lines agreed to suspend the traffic until March 1893. When 
business took up again the pool in both directions wa prolonged until the end of 1893. 
Despite the troubles HAPAG experienced with these brokers the HAL rather saw them 
settle in Rotterdam rather than in Antwerp.326 Also, in case the pool fell apart the brokers 
were an asset in assuring part of the migrant flow to Rotterdam. This illustrates the power 
that migrant brokers had in directing the migrants via certain routes even if it meant extra 
travel or extra costs. As Murken put it, some migrant brokers were more powerful than 
ship owners and the competitions between shipping companies was strongly intensified 
by the agent-network (Murken, 1922, 19).  
                                                 
323 The Hamburg brokers agreed to quote a difference of no more than two marks below the price 
of direct Union steamers. Also the fares to embarkation ports such as Liverpool, Southampton or Glasgow 
through Hull Grimsby, London or West Hartlepool were fixed at 26 marks (17,5M for the ocean transport 
and 8,5M for inland transport).  GAR, HAL, 318.04, 580, Contract between HAPAG and ‘Vereinigung 
Hamburgischer Passagier-Expedienten’ June 1 1892.   
324 An eastbound-pool between the members of the NDLV would eventually be established in 
November 1892 on the same principals as the westbound pool. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 222, Letters June 22, 
July 12 and August 5 1892. 
325 Spiro & Co, L. Scharlach & Co and Karlberg & Co opened offices in Rotterdam.  
326 Initially the directors of the HAL opposed the traffic via Hamburg and Bremen through the 
Hamburg agents. They much rather attract the migrants directly to Rotterdam. The directors feared thate 
indirect expedition would be detrimental to the Dutch port and turn to the advantage of HAPAG which was 
expected to find a way to cut short the Hamburg agents. Moreover, the agents with their boarding houses 
and other interests in Hamburg were not expected to be willing to divert the traffic directly to Rotterdam. 
Yet the connections in Hamburg had proven a very effici nt means of pressuring Ballin. The establishment 
of these agents exposed the HAL to increase of indirect migration to England through the port and the 
abuses which HAPAG fruitlessly had tried to control. Yet they preferred those risks rather than seeing the 
flow directed through Antwerp. 
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 The pool did not put an end to this. Before long, the agents corrupted the traffic in 
Rotterdam. HAL gave Scharlach a special rebate of tn marks on cash rates, which added 
to higher commissions in Europe allowed him to undercut the prepaid tickets by $5. 
Scharlach was also at liberty to alter the name on the ticket, omit the price and was 
exempt from paying cancellation fees. This allowed him to greatly speculate writing out 
many orders when he expected prices to increase. Alo, if he obtained better conditions 
from the British lines HAL passengers could easily be cancelled and transferred to British 
lines. Van den Toorn warned that Scharlach controlled their sales in America. Other 
agents sold order tickets through him and alienated th mselves from the company.327 In 
the meantime, HAPAG decided to take the passage agency in New York into its own 
hands. Richard was cast aside. He joined forces with Scharlach and with their long 
established contacts in the US represented a real threat; especially since Richard was out 
for vengeance and approached the British lines who had not renewed the pool 
agreement.328 Van den Toorn blamed the latter for lack of cooperation to put an end to 
the abuses: Not only do they (brokers) corrupt the inland, prepaid and cash rates or 
alienate the agents from us; they also blacken our reputation by mistreating the 
passengers.329 The Dutch authorities started applying stricter boder controls because of 
the increasing arrivals of poor migrants needing assistance. The American authorities 
were also complaining about the poor quality of migrants arriving with HAL ships. Under 
these growing pressures the company decided to withdraw all facilities from Scharlach 
and retake complete control of the business.330 Richard and Scharlach took matters in into 
their own hands for their part by chartering a ship, the Red Sea, taking care of the 
expedition themselves.331 This called for drastic measures. The lines initiated long talks 
to regain control of the passage business in the US. 
  
5.3) Remaining internal and external pressures and the outbreak of a general rate 
war 
                                                 
327 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 222, Letters of Van den Toorn March 17, 27 and May 29 1893.  
328 Ibid., Letters March 27 and April 7 1893.  
329 Ibid., Letter May 29 1893.   
330 Ibid., Letter July 14 1893. 
331 The ship arrived with many sick and was quarantined creating important costs. An estimated 
forty passengers were deported on the shipowner’s expenses, as the American law prescribed. This 
experience appeared to have deterred the agents to renew another attempt.  Ibid., Letter July 19 1893. 
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 Despite failing to neutralize the external pressure , the NDLV did improve 
cohesion among the members as joint action to regulate aspects of the passenger business 
became more common. Yet two aspects of the agreement still caused a lot of friction. 
First because of the tonnage clause the lines expanded their fleet, decreasing the capacity 
utilization (Murken, 1922, 80-86; Sicotte, 1997, 152-153). ).332 It augmented the number 
of services such the NGL Roland Line carrying freight and steerage passengers only at 
lower rates inciting abuses. HAPAG converted sections f cattle steamers to carry the 
minimum amount of migrants. To make the tonnage count for the recalculation of the 
market share, companies needed to book fifty passengers westbound and fifteen 
eastbound. When it was feared that the quota was not going to be met, passengers could 
obtain ‘last minute deals’. HAL secretly booked passengers as low as 5$ net, while 
HAPAG even transported some for free. Instead of reducing overcapacity, the conference 
stimulated it with this clause and incited lines to cut rates.333  
 A second pressure point was that the lines only signed a one-year instead of four-
year contract due to the exclusion of all the British lines. This caused long annual 
discussions about the shares. During the initial yers of the pool the members did not 
fully trust in the fixed shares and it was felt that when a member fell short too often, it 
could result in a reduction of the quota. Therefore lin s paid extra commissions to make 
sure that the quotas were filled if not surpassed. This practice was reinforced because the 
rate agreements with British lines did not decrease the keen rivalry and violations 
persisted. HAL paid $3,848 extra commission the first nine months of 1892; another 
$9,179 from March till July 1893 and the amount reached $12,739 during the following 
six months.334 The price for the passage augmented but so did the commissions. These 
commissions were often returned to the passengers to enable the agents to increase their 
sales. This practice together with the order-system makes one wonder about the extent to 
                                                 
332  Westbound  Joint NDLV tonnage Passengers # Passengers per 1000 tons 
1892  1 505 209  214 753   143  
1893  2 123 899  211 656    99 
1894  2 051 720  84 610    41  
1895  2 114 212  127 111    60  
333 The members of the pool were quick to realize thisas well. The increase of number of 
passengers attributed to an increase in tonnage would first be lowered in 1895 to finally being cancelled in 
1899.  
334 Ibid., Letters March 20 and July 14 1893. 
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which the quoted gross rates for prepaid tickets reflect the increase in costs for the 
passenger.     
 The financial crisis of 1893 made the migrant rates westbound drop. Tensions 
between the British and Continental lines became more obvious with the collapsed 
market. As van den Toorn reported back from the contine tal conference; should the 
competition of the English lines become too strong, it was decided to send some express 
steamers to English ports to keep them on their Island.335 Yet an agreement was 
anticipated and the Continental lines felt strong eough to introduce ‘city rules’ for the 
eastbound traffic, limiting the sale of tickets in New York to joint offices before the 
signing of contracts.336 On the initiative of the Continental Conference this was expanded 
to prepaid tickets as well. To stay in the business the city agents made great efforts to 
book for British lines. While van den Toorn was confident that the short term loss would 
largely be compensated by the long term gain of putting an end to the abuses and 
allowing the inland agencies to increase their sales.  
 At a meeting in Cologne, another attempt was made to convince the British lines 
to join the pool, since rate agreements had proven to be unsustainable.337 The pool lines 
gave the British lines two weeks to reflect on the proposal. In the meantime, they decided 
to attack them in Libau, Russia to force an agreement. The British lines did a 
counterproposal but again disagreement among themselves obstructed it. In particular the 
duration was put forward as being the main objection by Boumphrey, director of the 
Cunard Line.338 All the agents in New York had to be reinstated anextra commissions 
were paid out.339 The Continental lines opened a regular service to Queenstown, 
                                                 
335 Ibid., Letter December 22 1893. 
336 G.A.R., H.A.L., 318.04, 563, meeting January 4 1894, minutes 669-672.  
337 The offer consisted of 12 % of the continental traffic, prices not to be lower than the lowest 
price quoted by a pool member, no extra commissions, the compensation rate to be 60 Mark. In return they 
proposed an agreement for the Scandinavian market and the withdrawal for steerage passengers from Great 
Brittan and Ireland.  A month later the counter proposal was made to withdraw both from British and 
Scandinavian market in exchange for 6% of continental market. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 223, Letters March 10 
1893 and January 18 1894. 
338 Boumphrey said: “not be prepared to put the Cunard Line at the mercy of Ballin for three 
years”. He claimed to be willing to agree for a year while the continental wanted at least three years. Ibid., 
226, Letter April 20 1894. 
339 That the market plummeted is best illustrated by the fact that the British lines transported only 
200 direct passengers from the British Isles during the first quarter of 1894. Thanks to the introduction of 
city rules they were able to secure a good share of indirect continentals. Ibid., 223, Letters, April 2, 11 1894 
and Ibid., 563, meetings March 30 and April 4-1894, minutes 717-739. 
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alternating sailings on the eastbound route while sailings to and from Southampton would 
be increased.  The pool members considered the situation as a good barometer to see the 
extent to which the International Navigation Company would defend the interests of the 
Red Star Line against the ones of the American Line.340  A rate of $10 was agreed to for 
the service to the Irish port while the British lines used the migrant brokers in Rotterdam 
to undercut the continental fares by orders at $15 from Rotterdam to New York.341 The 
war also spread to the Mediterranean and Scandinavia  market.342  
 Meanwhile, the Continental lines were aware that tey could not hit the British 
lines as hard as the other way around. Englishmen were believed by the Continental lines 
to be too tied to their own national lines to board foreign ships. Moreover, the Board of 
Trade hindered the Continetal lines from boarding steerage passengers from English ports 
on the westbound route.343 An agreement with the American Line, joining the fight 
against the British lines, allowed the pool members to attack the British at the heart of 
their business.344 German express steamers, with a rate of $14 to London were pretty full, 
yet the chaos among the agents made it impossible to prevent continentals from boarding 
the ship to then buy a $3 ticket from London to the continent.345 The Continental lines 
initially responded with extra commissions instead of lowering the rates. This had the 
advantage of binding agents to the lines and prevent d agents and brokers from 
speculating, writing out prepaid blanks in bulk to use them when the prices increased.346 
However, the measure did not prove effective because prepaid sales of the Continental 
lines halved since the introduction of low rates by the British lines. A drastic cut of $8 on 
prepaid and a similar one on eastbound rates followed.347 The pool was about to 
                                                 
340 Ibid., 223, Letter April 10 1894. 
341 Ibid., Letter April 24 1894. 
342 In the meantime major continental and British lines had opened direct services from Italy to 
catch a share of the booming market. After the reluctance of the British lines to join the pool, the HAPAG 
reopened the direct Scandinavian service under the Scandia Line. 
343 The British Board of trade helped their national lines by strictly enforcing the rules regarding 
the space per steerage passenger on foreign lines. Th  British way of measuring differed from German lws 
and its strict enforcement significantly lowered the number of passengers that could be carried by German 
Express steamers. Ibid., 223, Letters December 22 1893; August 2 and 24 1894. 
344 Agreement reached at a conference in Cologne. Ibid., Letter April 27 1894.  
345 Ibid., Letter May 11 1894. 
346 The Red Star Line stuck the longest to the policy of extra commissions going up to 7 dollar 
commission on a 21dollar ticket, or one third of the icket price. Ibid., Letter September 5 1894. 
347 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, meeting July 26 1894, minutes 775-777. 
 194
diamantle since its purpose of increasing incomes wa  totally impossible and hence 
useless with current prices.348  
 Negotiations with the British lines resumed in 1895. It was agreed to jointly 
raise the rates while negotiations continued. The strategies set out by the pool where 
members with a plus raised their rates to allow companies that were short to book 
passengers at good prices instead of having to lower theirs started to be implemented. 
Reports of agents still tampering with orders persisted, but the negotiations and the 
previous introduction of joint offices made them realize that they risked going out of the 
business. The most important agents established the New York City Agents Association 
presided by A. Falck, which tried to come to terms with the shipping companies.349 This 
was also stimulated because of an agreement between th  HAPAG and the English lines 
which allegedly allowed the controlling of the number of passengers going through 
Hamburg.350 Agents agreed to abide to all conference rules and to stop drawing orders on 
European houses in exchange for a guarantee of a minimum amount of business.351 The 
CGT joined the agreement with the New York agents.352 In the meantime, the long 
awaited pool-agreement with the British lines materi lized. The Continental lines 
withdrew from the British and Scandinavian market while the British lines’ share of the 
continental traffic was limited to six percent and their minimum rates had to at least equal 
the lowest fare of continental regular or express services.353  
                                                 
348 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 223, Letter December 10 1894. 
349 Ibid., 223, Letter June 15 1895. 
350 Ibid., 223, Letter April 24 1895. 
351 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, Meeting June 19, minute 843, meeting August 13 , minutes 861-871 
and meeting September 4 1895, minute 875.  
352 However, outside migrant agents would pose a constant threat of demoralizing the business 
again if a new line on the North Atlantic route was to be established.  
353 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 223, Letter September 15 1895.  
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 At last an agreement involving British and Continental lines allowed concluding 
loyalty agreements with the agents and brokers; which ad important repercussions on 
transatlantic ocean fares. As the graph below illustrates the pool agreement allowed 
Continental lines to significantly increase the prepaid prices in 1892. However, discord 
among the British lines delayed further increases and forced the companies to pay out 
high commissions, thus cutting into their profits. When the market collapsed tensions 
increased resulting in a rate war. Negotiations resumed in March 1895 during which 
prices were increased. When all lines signed the agr ement prices were raised again 
reaching unprecedented levels. Compared to 1885, prepaid prices of the Holland America 
Line doubled going from $17 to $34. The agreement would set new standards for fixing 
ocean fares for the following two decades.  
 
6) Steerage price formation and shipping conferences on the North Atlantic: a 
complex story 
  
 The widespread migrant agent-network on both sides of the Atlantic clearly 
undermined the shipowners’ ability to fix prices for transatlantic transport. Agents 
favored an unstable market because the keener the competition between the lines, the 
higher their commissions and the more facilities they obtained to increase their sales. The 
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lack of common interest between migrant agents and shipowners forced the latter to rely 
on conference rules to police the former. Shipping conferences regulating passenger 
transport were just as much horizontal combinations regulating the competition between 
shipping companies as they were a means of vertical integration to gain control over the 
agent-network. The analysis of the New York Continental lines illustrates that it took the 
members a decade to find a workable equilibrium.  
 A lasting agreement could only be concluded once the members neutralized the 
competition of outside Continental lines in their homeports. Yet the distrust between the 
members prevented them from making longstanding arrangements. The constant 
renegotiations on ocean rate differentials and the fact that fixed rates moved the 
competition even more towards improved and new servic s, railroad rates and tying 
migrant brokers and agents to a line, impeded the conference from relieving the internal 
pressures between the lines. Price agreements for the prepaid market in the US were 
further demoralized by the lower European cash rates. Hamburg migration brokers 
opened branch offices across the Atlantic to undercut prepaid rates by drawing orders on 
their European offices. The competition of British lines impeded the Continental lines of 
getting control on the agent-network. This competition culminated in Hamburg where 
most of the indirect continental migrants via Englad traveled through. All kinds of 
facilities violating the agreements were given by the shipping companies to the brokers in 
order to remain competitive.  
 The rivalry between the lines drove the market of prepaid tickets into the hands of 
some Hamburg migrant brokers. The chaos which spread from Hamburg explains why 
Ballin was the driving power behind the conference agreements. Instead of making the 
market more transparent all kinds of abuses covering up price cuts expanded during the 
first seven years of the Continental Conference. Cheating on conference agreements was 
too difficult to detect and no effective means were put into place to deter lines and agents 
from doing so. The only solution was to divide the market into shares. The establishment 
of the NDLV, pooling the continental traffic decidedly improved the harmony among the 
Continental lines. The increased collaboration helped to augment the pressures on the 
British lines to reach a compromise. Eventually, the agreement involved arrangements for 
the three sub-markets of European migration; the British-Scandinavian, the 
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Mediterranean-Oriental and the Continental market. Experience had shown that a rate 
war on one of the sub-market easily spread, disrupting he whole market. By 
geographically dividing the North-Atlantic market the Continental lines tried to protect 
themselves from external price cuts. With no lines left to play off against each other the 
New York migrant agents feared being cut off the business and organized themselves to 
come to terms with the shipping companies. The harmony between the lines gave the 
long awaited possibility of obtaining loyalty from the migrant brokers and agents. 
 The agreement had an immediate impact on the cost of prepaid tickets. Over the 
previous ten years the purchaser often received a discount on the gross rate of the ticket 
from the migrant agents. They cut their commission in order to sell as many tickets as 
possible, which were used to attract clients for other business. The increased gross prices 
during the first two years after the formation of the NDLV was followed by an increase in 
commission which when given as a discount to the purchaser of a prepaid ticket cancelled 
out the increase of the costs of migration. Moreover, the prepaid market was often 
flooded by orders sold at lower European cash rates. The improvements of the fleet and 
the services offered by the Holland America Line could not be charged to the purchaser. 
Also, the competition between the shipping companies to a great extent determined both 
prices for the ocean passage as for the inland transport. For the period analyzed here, 
shipping companies went to great lengths to reduce the inland transport and even sold it 
below costs at times to ensure a market share. Onlywhen the harmony between all lines 
was established, did the cost for the migrant to cross the Atlantic substantially increase. 
Before the agreement, net prices of migration with the HAL roughly balanced between 
$15 and $20, when excluding the low points of $10 during rate wars. In 1896 it peaked at 
$32. In short, the net price of migrant passage sold in the U.S. remained low because of 
an unstable market corrupted by the agent-network du ing the decade from 1885 to 1895. 
The subsequent evolution up to 1914 will be discussed in part III.  
 
Chapter IV: The nationalization of American migrati on policies: the influence of 
shipping companies in immigration legislation and enforcement thereof 1870-1895 
 
 During and after the Civil War the tendency of thefederal government to regulate 
immigration matters increased. Federal laws encouraging immigration during the conflict 
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quickly made way for the growing pressures to reduc the influx. Two barriers preventing 
the state from taking control disappeared during this period. First, the notion that anti-
immigration measures undermined the international relations based on reciprocity 
between countries were slowly replaced by the conviction that it was the state’s own right 
to control immigration and emigration matters. Without denying the natural right of 
migration, the state’s primary obligation was to prtect her own citizens and institutions. 
Secondly, decisions of the Supreme Court moved the immigration matters from state to 
federal authority. State Immigration laws which were often undermined due to port 
competition for the migrant trade could now be made uniform.  
 Two main pressure groups were established advocating increased controls. One 
hand Labor Unions, which with the raise of the Knights of Labor and subsequently the 
American Federation of Labor lobbied to make an endto unrestricted labor import. 
Unions claimed employers misused immigrants to brake up strikes and keep down the 
wages.354 On the other hand, two breeding places of renewed nativism in California and 
Massachusetts pushed for far reaching restrictions claiming that the ethnic composition of 
the migrant stream consisting of Chinese, Southern and the Eastern Europeans posed a 
threat for the American institutions and citizenship. These were not only based on 
eugenic beliefs, and were also linked to the increasing return rates and hence lack of 
intention of becoming Americans. On the other side, of the spectrum foreign 
communities established in the US lobbied against re rictions. The influence of the 
Jewish lobby, especially has been uncovered by historians who along together with 
business interests were considered the principal defen rs of a liberal policy. Politicians, 
both democrats as republicans were to a great extent influenced by the importance of the 
immigrant vote balanced against the native labor vote. Western and aouthern States 
neededing workers for industries and agriculture, and some seaboard states, especially 
New York having important interests in the migrant trade, generally opposed restrictions 
while California, eastern and northern states advocated these.  
                                                 
354 Researchers demonstrated that the image of migrants as strike-breakers and job-robbers was 
largely exaggerated by unions because the migrants te d to concentrate in low-level segments of the labor 
markets shunned by the residents. Segments of where both competed caused conflicts only when migrants 
undercut the wages or introduced new technology yet th se were rather exceptions to the rule (Hoeder 
1991, 90-96; 2002, 9). 
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 A much neglected actor in the whole debate is the s ipping lobby. Although 
Zolberg and Jones stressed the importance of the shipping lobby in American laws 
regulating the migrant transport, they neglect to acknowledging their role in opposing 
immigration restrictions (Jones, 1976, 1989, 1992 and Zolberg 1992, 2003, 2006).  
Moreover, most studies analyzing immigration policies have focused on the laws passed 
in Congress, but have paid little to their enforcement by immigrant control stations and 
consuls abroad. This chapter tries to shed more light on how the laws were implemented 
and especially how shipping companies tried to protect heir main source of revenue by 
circumventing restrictive measures and prevent far reaching limitations from being 
enacted or enforced. What did the companies do to ensur  the right of entry for their 
passengers? Also, the reaction of European governments towards American immigrant 
regulations will be touched on. What did they do to defend the interests of nationals being 
held at the gates or of national shipping companies whose success depended on the 
migrant trade?  
 
1) The Civil War and proactive measures to attract migrants 
 
 
 Ten years after the diplomatic conflict between the US and Belgium for sending 
over paupers, beggars and convicts, the American Secretary of State William Seward 
himself financed the crossing of Belgian detainees of beggar workhouses. The Civil War 
created an important shortage of laborers and farmers pushing employers and land-
speculators to intensify their recruiting activities in Europe. Yet, these were insufficient 
in filling the gap and forced the American authorities to intervene. A first measure 
consisted of the re-enactment of the Homestead Act in 1862 offering 160 acres of land to 
citizens and aliens who committed to work it for at least five years. Seward coordinated a 
vast propaganda campaign to promote the Act in Europe, through the diplomatic corps. In 
a circular addressed to the US consuls, he also stressed the unique opportunity the 
country offered for unemployed European workers. To make the opportunities known to 
the public some consuls even hired full time agents to attract prospective settlers (Balace, 
1969, 2 and Tichenor, 2002, 66).  
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Due to the heavy inflation caused by the war, strikes broke out among labourers 
escaping military duties. As was the case with Belgian mine workers, recruiting agents 
lured them to the US under the pretence of high wages. Upon arrival they quickly found 
out that the inflation had reduced the salaries by 40 to 60 percent. Letters of defrauded 
migrants and disappointed returnees eventually had an adverse impact on migration 
(Feys, 2003, 100-104). Nevertheless, the combined efforts of the government and 
recruiters managed to put an end to the downward spi al of migration in 1863. On the 
West coast, especially for the completion of the transcontinental railroad connection, 
Chinese merchant associations and the Pacific Steamship Company formed a partnership 
to import Chinese workers on a large scale. Seward convinced the Chinese authorities not 
to obstruct this coolie trade, where labourers paid off the transport costs with the first 
money earned in the new world.  
The lobbying efforts in Washington of the Secretary of State also resulted in an 
‘Act to encourage Immigration’ in 1864. Seward had set up a scheme where the 
authorities provided employers who advanced the money for the crossing, the legal 
means to enforce the contracts binding both parties. The failure of land-speculators and 
employers to enforce the contracts in the past had prevented the adoption of this system 
on a large scale. The period of indentured labour was limited to one year.  The American 
Emigration Company coordinated the initiative and received support from the consular 
corps to tap into from the European labour market. But it could not raise the necessary 
funds to organize the move on the scale it intended. The company for instance also 
planned to own and operate steamships to organize the transport of recruits. The initiative 
closely resembled the Redemptioner-system and received internal opposition for differing 
little from the slave trade, the cause for the ongoi  war. The American workforce also 
started to unionize opposing the scheme. The activities of the American Emigrant 
Company remained limited to arranging the transport and differed little of other 
middlemen such as railroad and shipping companies (Tichenor, 2002, 65-67 and Zolberg, 
2006, 166-173).  
In Europe a growing number of governments started to look with apprehension on 
the movement of nationals across the Atlantic and did not necessarily welcome the 
initiatives of the American government (Dovering, 1963, 463-470). Especially with the 
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parallel recruitments taking place in Europe for the federal army rumours spread that 
workers were forced to join the federal troops upon arrival.355 For instance the agent L. 
Dochez, who recruited the above aforementioned mine-workers, also advertised the 
following:  
“In America they look for 800, single, voluntary emigrants between 21 and 40 
years of age to emigrate to the United States of America. It is of no use to present 
one’s self without the certificate of militia. Address yourselves to L. Dochez, 
bureau of emigration, number 2, Brabant Street, Brussels.”356 
 
In collaboration with the notorious Antwerp migrant broker Adolphe Strauss, Dochez 
contacted the governors of different provinces and mayors of important cities to reinstate 
an old practice, namely the release of detainees from beggar workhouses to ship them to 
the US. This time, the crossing was not paid for by the Belgian, but by the American 
authorities. Again, the practice caused a diplomatic conflict between both nations, and 
now it was the Belgian authorities who protested against the practice. An investigation 
revealed that recruits had been deceived, believing they would be engaged in work, but 
when they landed in the US they filled the ranks of the federal troops.357 The scandal put 
an end to the recruitments of the federal government in Belgium and compromised the 
attempts to lure Belgian workers to the country (Balace, 1969, 1-24 and Feys, 2007, 100-
108). With the end of the Civil War, migration picked up again while the internal 
opposition against the active immigration policy grew strong. In 1868, Congress repealed 
the law putting an end to the policy of encouraging immigration which would be replaced 
by laws restricting the movement. 
 
                                                 
355 The 1862 circular of Seward also suggested that poor and unemployed Europeans could join 
the federal army. This kind of recruitment mainly took place in Ireland and Germany. Officially the 
American federal government only engaged volunteers. However questions were raised as to the voluntary 
nature of the recruitment. Some stories claimed that men who went to America to work, were forced to join 
the federal army. The recruitment in Belgium happened with the consent of the American legation in 
Brussels. Activities increased in 1864 as numerous soldiers who had entered the army in 1861 were 
discharged after their three year service. A blockade of the German ports forced him to ship his recruits 
through Antwerp. This took place on the ‘Bellona’ and the ‘Guerland’ on the 6th and 15th of June. About 
sixty Belgians also embarked on the B llona. The notorious migrant broker Adolphe Strauss organized the 
shipping (Balace, 1969, 15).  
356 Letter from Rogier to Tesch July 7 1864: Advertisement published in L'Etoile April 7 1864, 
BGRA, I 160: Archives du Ministère de la Justice: Administration de la sûreté publique du Régime français 
à 1914, nr.154, Enrôlements et recrutements de Belges pour l'étranger. 
357 Balace estimated that 300 Belgians joined the ranks of the federal army that way (Balace, 1969, 
19).  
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2) Reaching an international consensus on migrant transport legislation: From the 
Emigrant ship Convention to the Passenger Act of 1882 
 
2.1) The Emigrant Ship Convention 
 
Judicial decisions following law suits concerning infringements of the capacity 
requirements of the 1855 Passenger Act exposed its shortcomings. The first case was won 
by shipowners based on the fact that the law only applied to passengers from the US, and 
not to migrants who landed on American territory. Subsequent cases were won on the 
basis of the same argument. The arrival of various ships with high death rates in 1867 and 
1868 renewed the interest of the American authorities in the problem.358 New lawsuits 
followed, yet this time shipowners won the case based on the argument that laws applied 
to sailing ships only, and not to steamships, which started to monopolize the migrant 
trade.  
In the meantime, the British Minister at Washington, Edward Thornton intervened 
to protect the interest of the national merchant marine. Together with his colleague in the 
North German Confederation, Baron Gerolt, the British envoy proposed that the 
American authorities to assimilate the existing passenger laws of the three countries. The 
American secretary of State, Hamilton Fish welcomed the initiative and addressed all 
maritime powers involved in the migrant trade along with those already mentioned; 
France, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands. Fish tried to organize an 
emigrant ship convention producing uniform regulations for emigrant vessels and to 
establish international courts in the American ports f arrival to prosecute for abuses that 
occurred on the high seas. This had to solve the dual problem of American courts on one 
hand lacking the jurisdiction over foreign flagged ships, while on the other foreign courts 
lacked the witnesses to effectively exercise their jur sdiction over national ships.  
The composition and functions of the ‘Emigrant Courts’ constituted the main 
obstacle during the negotiations. Mixed tribunals with foreign representation through the 
                                                 
358 The case of  ‘Guiseppe Baccarcich’ discussed in chapter one was followed by the Lord 
Brougham arriving in New York with 75 deceased out of 383 passengers and shortly after by the Leibnitz 
losing 105 out of the 544 passengers. Both ships had sailed from Hamburg. Just as in Belgium, German 
authorities appointed a special committee to investigate regulations regarding migrant transport in both 
Bremen and Hamburg. Bismarck took advantage of the negative report to place emigration under federal 
supervision (Jones, 1976, 180-183). 
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consuls were unconstitutional in the US while foreign authorities refused the concession 
of jurisdiction of their ships to a court where they were not represented. The Bremen 
Chamber of Commerce vigorously fought the idea and received support from Baron 
Gerolt, as shareholder of the North German Lloyd. Gray Hill, secretary of the Liverpool-
based North Atlantic Steam Traffic Conference opposed the establishment of 
international courts in American hands. Hill feared an abuse of power because of the 
American jealously about the ascendancy of the British merchant marine. The conference 
criticized other measures proposed by Fish for unnecessarily increasing the migrant fares 
(Jones, 1989, 326-330 and 1976, 178-204).  
Belgian authorities followed suit protecting the interests of Antwerp merchants 
involved in the transatlantic migrant traffic. However, the Minister of Foreign Affaires, 
Vander Stichelen asked the Department of Justice to sh w their good will and to 
cooperate as much as possible. After the ‘Guiseppe Baccarcich’ case he wanted to avoid 
a new wave of criticism against Antwerp. Any risks which might have repercussions on 
the emigration movement through Antwerp had to be avoided.359 The project of 
establishing such courts dragged on for six years. By dragging out the negotiations the 
shipping lobby successfully prevented new American P ssenger Acts from being passed. 
Yet, the shipping lobby only postponed new legislaton. Building further on the efforts to 
reach international regulations the American Congress finally revised the Passenger act in 
1882 in accordance to German and British laws.   
 
2.2) The 1882 Passenger Act  
 
In 1875 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the case Henderson versus Mayor of 
New York that the practice of levying commutation fees as a ubstitute for head tax 
usurped the power of Congress regulating foreign commerce and hence to be 
unconstitutional (Ueda, 1992, 42-43). The State of New York therefore lost an important 
source of revenue on which it relied to finance the maintenance of landing facilities for 
                                                 
359 ABMFA, Emigration, 2020, IX, Emigration 1870-1895, Letter of Vander Stichelen to Tesch, 
January 5 1870. 
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migrants.360 Seaboard states’ efforts to receive federal compensation during the years that 
followed remained unsuccessful. With the new signifcant influx of migrants arriving in 
the US in the early 1880s New York threatened to close down Castle Garden bringing 
migrant legislation back on the American agenda.  
In 1882, Congress first passed a Chinese Exclusion Act in response to the 
constant petitions of the Californian anti-immigration lobby, which barred the 
importation of Chinese laborers for the next decade. Subsequently, the federal 
government passed laws excluding convicts, lunatics, idiots and persons likely to become 
a public charge which up to then had been under the authority of states. These acts 
launched a new era in American immigrant legislation where the federal government 
started taking control over immigration matters and the first distinctions based on race 
and nationality made their entry way into migrant policies (Bennet, 1963, 15-17. Torpey, 
2004, 97, Jones, 1992, 214-215, Zolberg, 2006, 185-189).  
The intense activity in Congress regarding migration issues also resulted in a new 
Passenger Bill that same year. The law was modeled chiefly on German and British 
passenger acts. Yet, once again the shipping lobby, represented by former celebrated 
senator Roscoe Conkling induced President Arthur to veto the measure until it was 
adapted to their likings. For instance, the provision providing that deportation of people 
likely to become a public charge to occur at the expense of the shipping companies was 
omitted (Jones, 1989, 329; Zolberg, 2006, 193). The passenger act of 17th of August 1882 
imposed new requirements for migrant ships regarding bunk space, separation of men 
and women, light and ventilation, hygiene, food supplies, physicians and hospitals on 
board, et al. A head tax of 50 cent was levied on all third-class passengers. Most 
importantly, the controls on the compliance with the laws of ships arriving in New York 
intensified. Jones claimed that again the laws failed to be applied, yet the consular 
correspondence of the Dutch envoy at Washington proves that the authorities did enforce 
the acts triggering a debate on sovereignty between European States and the US. 
Moreover it shows that the idea of an international convention to regulate migrant 
transport was not fully abandoned (Jones, 1989, 329). 
                                                 
360 The competition between the seaboard states to attract he traffic had reduced the commutation 
fees in the 1870’s. The state of Massachusetts even cancelled it to be more competitive with New York. 
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The Royal Netherlands Steamship Company, also known as the Amsterdam-Line, 
complained about the negative influence these laws had on their business. Moreover, they 
questioned the American jurisdiction over foreign ship . The envoy in Washington, 
Weckherlin underlined that little could be done against these laws. They were conceived 
of to protect the well being of the needy, so fighting these ideals was difficult. The 
argument could be made that Dutch ships on the ocean were not obliged to follow 
American laws, however it was equally true that nothing defended the American 
authorities from refusing ships to their ports that did not respect their laws.361 The HAL, 
be it more diplomatically than the Amsterdam Line, also pointed to the conflictive 
character of some of the new requirements in comparison with the Dutch laws. They 
called for an international agreement regarding the matter with all countries concerned.  
The Emigration Supervision Committee of Rotterdam and Amsterdam analyzed 
the new proposals and compared them with the existing Dutch laws. They wrote out a 
report on the discordance with the Dutch laws and negative influence that this might have 
on the protection of the migrant. But, they concluded that the US legislation would 
always have an important influence on the traffic coming from Europe, which was not 
undesirable. This protected the migrant from the self-interest of businessmen and had a 
unifying effect on the legislation of the countries dealing with migrant transport. They 
urged unification by preserving the freedom of sailing under the national colors through 
an international convention. The Minister of Foreign Affairs had ordered the envoy in 
Washington to make sure that these remarks would be spr ad to all the members of 
Congress before the law was voted on for a second time.  
However, the communication arrived too late.362 Under influence of the German 
and English passenger liners, the governments of both c untries presented a joint 
resolution to adapt these laws to theirs without consulting the smaller countries 
concerned.363 A congressional commission had been appointed for the unification of 
                                                 
361 NA, 2.o5.13, Gezantschap te Washington. Nr 210 Ingekomen brieven en uitgaande minuten 
over het vervoer van Landverhuizers, Letter from the HAL directors to MFA April 12 1884, Letter from 
envoy Weckherlin to MFA May 4 1882.  
362 Ibid. Lettrer from MFA to Weckherlin 14-8-1882 with reports of Supervision Committee of 
Rotterdam June 29 1882 and Amsterdam July 3 1882. 
363 Ibid. Letter from Weckherlin to M.F.A. February 16 1883. 
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British, German and American laws.364 The envoy proposed that the Dutch government 
organized an international convention to get these laws adapted to the legislation of all 
countries involved.365 However, the Minister of Foreign Affairs refused claiming that it 
might lead to the impression that the Netherlands tried to organize a convention with the 
European countries against the United States. According to him, it was up to the US to 
invite all the countries concerned.366 The envoy insisted on making contact with Great-
Britain, Germany, Italy, France, Belgium and Denmark. Although Sweden had numbered 
high emigration rates, they had no national shipping li e.367 The envoy advised against 
inviting Sweden since the government was trying to reduce emigration and would use all 
means available to make emigration as expensive as possible. Weckherlin wanted to take 
the initiative, by motivating his colleagues to obtain the collaboration of their Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs.368  
Building on the initiative of the late 1860s the head-agent of the CGT had already 
raised the matter of an international convention with the authorities in Paris, and word 
came from Rome that the Italian government was not really pleased with the new laws 
either.369 The Belgian envoy favored the intervention of his Dutch colleague, yet he could 
not actively help because his superiors failed to give clear instructions on how to 
proceed.370 The Dutch and French envoys sent letters to the American Department of 
State with the request to invite all countries involved.371 Weckherlin met with the 
Secretary of State Frelinghuysen regarding the agreement between the US, Germany and 
Great-Britain. Frelinghuysen suggested that he could not take any initiative to involve the 
other countries because the Republicans had gained th  majority in the House of 
Representatives. If the invitation came from a European country, than he would be more 
than willing to collaborate. Frelinghuysen wrote to the minister of Foreign Affairs in 
                                                 
364 ABMFA, Emigration, 2959 I, US migration laws 1882-1898, Letter February 16 1893. 
365 NA, 2.o5.13, Lettrer from Weckherlin to MFA Februay 16 1883. 
366 Ibid. Letter from MFA to Weckherlin March 16 1883. 
367 Sweden was one of the few European countries that up to 1883 passed migrant passage acts 
obstructing the development of the merchant marine under the national flag rather than stimulating it. The 
authorities repealed the laws attributing space requi ments which were double that of British ships only in 
1893, too late to recover the backlog on foreign competitors (Lovoll, 1999, 1-48). 
368 Ibid. Letter from Weckherlin to MFA March 30 1883 and April 18 1883. 
369 Ibid. Letter from Weckherlin to MFA May 19 1883. 
370 ABMFA, 2959 I, Correspondence from February 16 1883 until July 28 1883.  
371 NA, 2.o5.13, Letter from Weckherlin to M.F.A Februa y 28 1883 and March 14 1883. 
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Italy, France, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden to find out what they would think of a 
convention jointly organized by the Dutch and American authorities.372 Italy and Belgium 
reacted positively, Denmark agreed to cooperate if others did, Great Britain wanted to 
wait and see what impact the new regulations would have while the others had not yet 
replied.373 Due to a lack of interest the Dutch authorities abandoned the idea.  
As was seen in previous chapters, consuls played a crucial role in establishing 
contacts with local authorities and merchant communities to promote trade relations with 
shipping enterprises based in their homelands. Especially in new markets, where 
uncertainties and hence transaction costs were considerable, consuls played a vital role. 
During the early years of transatlantic shipping emissaries actively promoted the opening 
of new lines to national ports. Once the line was inaugurated shipping agents took over 
the responsibilities of producing reliable information on business opportunities, market 
fluctuations and competition, as well as defending the interests of the home port and 
company. The transition was often gradual, consuls ometimes being appointed as initial 
head-agents of the line which was true for Antwerp and Rotterdam lines.  
Although the direct ties between steam shipping companies and diplomats 
diminished, their role in defending the commercial interest of the merchant marine with 
foreign authorities remained intact. In the case of the HAL, the Dutch emissaries assisted 
in introducing the newly arrived HAL personnel in the American merchant community. 
They defended the reputation of companies sailing under the Dutch flag and lobbied with 
the authorities against laws and treaties obstructing trade between the countries such as 
the Immigrant Passenger Act. Issues on granting more space to migrants on board of 
ships translated in a loss of revenues for shipping companies. The main problem for 
shipping companies with the American law was that te penalties for having too many 
passengers on board did not only consist of a fine per passenger, but also of a possible 
prison sentence for the captain. Effective sentences were never served by the captains but 
the trials cost the companies a serious amount of money. Moreover, these procedures 
could cause delays of departure.  
                                                 
372 Ibid. Letter from Weckherlin to MFA May 20 1883 and June 18 1883. 
373 Ibid. Letter from Weckherlin to MFA May 5 and 19 1883. 
 208
Especially the RNSC had a lot of problems with these laws as the ‘Survey case’ 
illustrates. The company kept on embarking a number of passengers based on the Dutch 
legislation. It questioned the jurisdiction of the American authorities because the 
embarkation in Amsterdam occurred according to the laws enforced in that port. The 
Survey had been chartered, sailed under the British flag and was under the command of a 
British captain.  Weckherlin advised against an intervention of the consul general, and let 
a lawyer handle the case. The envoy believed that if Toelaar, head agent in New York for 
the RNSC proved he acted in accordance with the Dutch legislation, the court would 
offer a settlement. The British consul general shared in his opinion. Weckherlin however 
tried to avoid a trial, safeguarding Toelaar from a slur, but in the meantime he hoped it 
would serve as a warning for the company. The Dutch envoy could not intervene directly 
because the Survey sailed under the British flag, but he tried to pull some strings 
indirectly. Toelaer received support from the Supervision Committee of Amsterdam and 
also from the American consul at the home port. Thehead-agent and the captain Bacon 
were released on bail of $5000. Shortly after another RNSC ship, the Nemsis arrived with 
twenty deceased individuals, while the HAL’s ship, Edam, sank.  
The German and American newspapers published articles bringing the Dutch 
lines into disrepute. The emissaries launched a propaganda campaign in the American 
press to defend the reputation of the Dutch companies. The media attention worked to the 
disadvantage of the companies in the ‘Survey-case’ which initially was not going to be 
pursued, and then suddenly the authorities set a dae for trial. The envoy took charge of 
the case pleading with the district attorney and hence becoming officially involved. He 
decided not to plead the case based on the argument that he company respected the 
Dutch laws those being just as lawful as the American laws. Weckherlin feared that this 
line of argumentation would lead to a very long trail h rming the reputation of the line. 
The consul pleaded the case that the company had assumed that the laws where only 
applicable on sailing ships, and not on steamships, to play down the criminal intent.374  
The source did not reveal the verdict yet the Survey case reflects how the 
jurisdiction of migrant ships remained a delicate topic. Not being able to reach an 
international convention the American authorities went ahead to impose it’s will on 
                                                 
374 Ibid. Correspondence between  Weckherlin and MFA from April 24 and August 20 1883. 
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foreign ships through federal legislation. To avoid international repercussions the 
government consulted the biggest maritime nations concerned, Germany and Great 
Britain. The US knew that with their approval the other smaller maritime nations would 
follow suit. The Secretary of State welcomed the initiative of the Dutch authorities to re-
launch the negotiations of an international convention yet the Americans no longer took a 
leading role. The federal government now being empowered to pass legislation regarding 
immigration matters in general, gradually expanded its control on the incoming flow and 
how they were transported. Americans no longer feared protests based on the argument 
that they had no jurisdiction on foreign ships. The established notions of reciprocity 
between nations regarding shipping and migration matters slowly made way for the 
conviction that these issues belonged to the nationl authority and had to be imposed to 
preserve and enhance sovereignty. With all migration matters falling under federal 
authority the shipping lobby also lost the opportunity of fighting laws in the Supreme 
Court for being unconstitutional. Washington now became the place of predilection for 
passenger liners to defend their interests. 
 
3) The labour Unions as a lobby group and the ‘Alien contract labour law’  
  
 3.1) Labour organizations and the new wave of migrant sojourners 
 
Labour Unions formed another interest group trying to influence the migration 
policies of Congress. The openness of the ‘Knights of Labour’ uniting workers of 
different trades without discriminating on racial, religious or gender bases allowed the 
union to quickly expand its membership. Midway through the 1880s the union numbered 
more than 100,000 members allowing the organization to become an important actor in 
American political and economic spheres fighting the growing influence of the corporate 
lobby in Washington.375 The rise of big corporations with their monopolistic tendencies 
widened the gap between employers and employees. Calls for legislation limiting the 
                                                 
375 F. NOTEBOHM, "Rapport sur la situation des ouvriers aux Etats-Unis", Stockholm, 1905, p. 
36-37, ABMFA, , Question ouvrières, 3284, Etats-Unis 1885-1912. 
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power and formation of trusts intensified as illustrated by Terence Powderly, master 
workman of the Knights of Labour:  
“our railroads enjoy privileges which gives their owners a power which the 
Emperor of Russia does not possess and that power is b ing directed towards the 
complete overthrow of our Republican form of governme t. Our factories, great 
and small, our water privileges are being cornered under the sway of the “Trust”.  
…As a nation we must within the next ten years completely divest the railroads 
and other corporations of their autocratic power (Powderly, 1888, 170).”  
 
Labour organizations spread the notion that American employers artificially swelled the 
migration movement, increasing the competition among workers to lower wages. They 
also suspected employers of importing work forces as strike breakers undermining the 
union’s position towards employers.  
Especially skilled labourers, such as glassworkers, organized themselves to obtain 
the best work conditions possible. Some Belgian glass workers had migrated to the US 
during the 1870s and created a link with the Belgian glass industry located around 
Charleroi. Employers tried to attract Belgian workers while the Knights of Labour 
established contacts with the Belgian Union Verrière, expanding the solidarity among 
workers across national borders. The unions mutually supported each other financially in 
times of strike. By giving support to foreign unions and even by establishing new ones 
overseas, the Knights of Labour hoped to increase the wages in Europe. This network 
expanded to glass workers in Germany, France and England creating a Universal 
Federation to control the transatlantic labour market. Ideally, the union believed that this 
would neutralize the migration movement between both c ntinents; seeing the wage gap 
as main incentive for many European labourers to make the move. Yet during the 1890s 
established craft solidarity became splintered and Belgian unions even made secret 
arrangements with American employers to send over strike breakers. Ellis Island 
inspectors kept an eye open for Belgian glassworkers b cause by then a law had been 
passed barring the entry to migrants who had made arrangements for work before their 
arrival (Feys, 2003, 134-140; Goyens, 1982, 28-34 and Fones-Wolf, 2002, 63-68 and 
2004, 300-308).  
These kinds of translational networks for skilled migrants were exceptional and 
did by no means apply to the bulk of unskilled labourers landing at New York. The 
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constant flow of unskilled workers allowed the employers to contract strike breakers at 
the port of arrival. Yet, demands for legislation t restrict importation of contract labour 
from Europe were first voiced by glassworkers and cigar makers and than taken over by 
the Knights of Labour. These materialized in 1885, prohibiting the importation of aliens 
to perform labour in the US exempting skilled workers for new industries, professional 
actors, lecturers, singers, domestic workers, relativ s and personal friends (Jones, 1992, 
215 and Zolberg, 2006, 194). The last two categories point to the influence of the 
shipping companies protecting their prepaid market. Employers caught contracting 
emigrants before their arrival risked a fine of up to $500.  
The Congressional debates leading to the law reveal th  rising sentiment against 
new arrivals from Southern and Eastern Europe, labelled as ‘pauper labor’. Martin Foran 
who introduced the law and Powderly voiced the criticism which would dominate the 
immigration policy debates for the next three decads. The new wave of Hungarians and 
Italians consisted mainly of single men coming to save as much as possible, therefore 
accepting living and working in degrading conditions, in order to return home after some 
years- having no intention whatsoever of becoming American citizens. Many of the 
American trade unions had been pioneered by migrants d except for the Contract 
Labour Law they initially showed little intention to demand far reaching restrictive 
measures. However, the new wave of migrant sojourners from Eastern and Southern 
Europe did not show the same tendency to join unions. The difficulty in mobilizing the 
new workforce pushed the existing unions to retract and to increase the barriers for new 
entrants further alienating both parties. As the Contract labour law proved very hard to 
enforce the labour movement started to press to restrict the immigration movement 
altogether (Feys, 2003, 139, 207; Higham, 1955, 112-113; Jones, 1992, 188-190 and 
Zolberg, 2006, 194-196). The American Federation of Labour only followed suit midway 
through the 1890s, while Powderly as spokesmen of the Knights of Labour, openly did 
this during the 1880s376:  
                                                 
376 Scholars such Higham and Tichenor have generally dted the support of labor unions for 
immigrant restrictions midway the 1890’s. The statements of Powderly refute the conception as formulated 
by Tichenor that the Knights of Labor hardly made any difference between new and old immigration; Due 
to its international orientation the union sought to enhance the solidarity among workers regardless of 
nationality and thus expressed no desire for sweeping restrictions (Tichenor, 2002, 72). For Powderly 
international solidarity seemed to have reached its limits in the 1880’s. The idea of Americans for 
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“It is still dangerous to say anything concerning the restriction of immigration for 
fear of being charged with Know-Nothingism. Whatever Know Nothingism 
meant in former years, the man who advocates restriction of immigration today is 
a patriot who loves his country better than the opini n of demagogues, or of those 
who will not speak the truth, because it may temporarily affect their interest 
(Powderly 1888, 166). 
 
To limit the entrance of the new stock which he labe led as ‘semi-barbarous’ Powderly 
advocated consular controls on the character and intent ons of the migrants before issuing 
consular certificates needed for landing on US shores. These only had to be granted to 
migrants intending to become American citizens.  
 
3.2) The European reaction to the Alien Contract Labour Law 
 
The Contract Labour Law remained a dead letter until the amendments of 1887, 
putting the Secretary of State in charge of its enforcement and providing that violators be 
sent back on arrival (Hutchinson, 1980, 91). The delayed reaction of the Belgian 
authorities to the Bill and the fact that this instance saw the first passengers return to 
Antwerp accused of violating a law dating back to 1887, corroborate this. When being 
informed of the law the Belgian minister of Foreign Affaires Joseph de Chimay wrote a 
letter to all the provincial governors ordering them to make this measure known to the 
public.377 Charles Mali asked the minister what procedure he s ould follow when a 
compatriot filed a complaint against his extradition. The consul noted that the law 
conflicted with the ‘treaty of commerce and navigation’ signed on the 8th of March 1875. 
However he pointed out that it wasn’t the first time that American authorities passed 
immigration laws which went against treaties and agreements. The consul informed 
                                                                                                                                      
Americans started to sink in. The immigration began to affect the American quality of life, hence the influx 
needed to be reduced to prevent that the same living and working conditions prevailing in Europe 
infiltrated into the US, according to Powderly. To what extent have the ideas of the spokesman of the 
Knight of Labor contributed to the decline of the union? Did it have any affect on the growth of the AFL 
refraining to take a restrictionists stand until 1897? 
 
377ABMFA, 2961, part I, Ouvriers Belges aux Etats-Unis (1883-1908) Letter from MFA Joseph de 
Chimay to the governors January 1 1888. 
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Chimay that the law had triggered an international protest but that so far no country had 
undertaken diplomatic actions.378  
Shortly after receiving the letter the maritime police informed the minister of the 
arrest of a group of Ottomans for vagrancy in the str ets of Antwerp. They were the first 
to be sent back to Antwerp on the basis of the ‘Alien Contract labour law’. The city of 
Antwerp and the national authorities risked getting stuck with many foreigners, who 
being without means became dependent on the authorities. Chimay considered lodging an 
official protest against the American law. First the minister wrote his colleague in the 
Department of Justice, Van Begerem, to see what measur s could be taken to prevent 
emigrants of getting stranded in Antwerp.379 Chimay was determined to take action. He 
wrote to the ministers of foreign affairs of ten other countries to find out what their 
intentions were regarding the law.380 The replies show that most countries had no 
intention of opposing it. The German minister made it clear that he did not plan to protest 
against the measure. He considered the emigration of compatriots to be detrimental to the 
country and thus he favoured the measure. His Russian colleague shared this point of 
view. Moreover, he stressed that Russia had no intent on of interfering with other 
countries’ legislation. Other nations like Portugal and Great-Britain informed Chimay 
that they had no objections to the law. These countries preferred to direct the emigration 
movement to their own colonies. The ministers of Norway and Sweden stated that they 
preferred to keep their compatriots within their borders considering the vast lands that 
needed to be cultivated. Finally, the Swiss minister aid that his government intended to 
remain neutral regarding the issue. Swiss authorities wanted to refrain from stimulating 
emigration, but at the same time wanted to protect the emigrants from people who tried to 
make profits of them.  
Due to the lack of support from his foreign colleagues, Chimay decided to 
abandon the idea of filing an official protest against the law. In the meantime Mali 
informed the minister that the case had already been taken to the Supreme Court under 
claims that the law was unconstitutional, yet the court rejected the complaint. Mali 
advised Chimay to fully inform the population about this new law: 
                                                 
378 Ibid. Letter from H. Mali to Chimay February 6 1888. 
379 Ibid. Letter from Chimay to Van Begerem February 8 1888, 
380 Ibid. Letter from Chimay to the ministers of Internal Affairs J. Thonissen February 20 1888. 
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“we would not dare to advise our labourers to come here without a bond or a 
support assuring them work, but it is important to inform the emigrants to keep 
this silent if they do not want to experience difficulties upon their arrival in New 
York.”381 
 
The Contract Labour Law created a ‘catch 22’ in theAmerican migrant legislation 
requiring new arrivals on one hand to prove that they were not to be likely of become a 
public charge, while on the other hand they could not make arrangements for work before 
entering the US. Yet, both shipping companies and Belgian government authorities, 
through the emigration commissioner in Antwerp informed the migrants of the right 
answers in order to get through the interrogations granting access to the US. 
The answers received by Chimay from his foreign colleagues reflect the position 
of some European countries which, with exception of P rtugal and Russia had a long 
tradition of migration to the US. Although most countries more or less followed a non-
intervention policy, they tended to discourage rather t an encourage migration. Belgian 
authorities still leaned more towards encouraging a movement which had failed to 
materialize earlier and was only starting to develop. It shared this characteristic with 
other nations such as Italy where the US bound moveent was in its initial phase. With 
the second industrial revolution, outbreaks of the social unrest had become more 
frequent. Belgian authorities considered emigration as a possible security valve to temper 
protests in large industrial centres during crisis times. American laws obstructing this 
security valve did not seem to have pleased Belgian officials. Another reason for 
Chimay’s protests was that the laws affected the commercial interests of the port of 
Antwerp and the cities’ welfare funds. Migrants sent back to Antwerp threatened to 
become a significant burden on the Belgian authorities. Deported subjects roaming 
around the port could also affect the reputation of Antwerp as migrant gateway to the US. 
Therefore, the reputation of the Red Star Line in co trolling the large share of the migrant 
trade trough the port was also at stake.  
 
3.3) The conflict of interest between Labour Unions and shipping companies  
 
                                                 
381 Ibid. Letters from H. Mali to Chimay March 11888 and August 29 1889. 
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The increasing influence gained by trade unions in the US affected the shipping 
companies on two fronts, first as employers and second as a lobby group defending 
opposed interests regarding migrant legislation. Midway through the 1880s under 
pressure from the Knights of Labor, New York longshoremen went on strike demanding 
better working condition and higher wages. The Union spread the action to coal handlers 
to increase the pressure on the shipping firms. Van den Toorn, found it hard to estimate 
how long they could hold it out, yet according to the head-agent, funds supporting the 
longshoremen flowed in from everywhere; from the various branches of the Knights of 
Labor, from politicians out for votes, from small commercial ententeties which were 
forced to contribute and landlords stopped charging rent during the strike, knowing they 
would not receive their rents in any case. The biggest problem was the support they 
received from the popular press stigmatizing non-union men as scabs. Aware of the 
importance of the press in gaining support of the public opinion against the strikers, 
shipping companies joined forces starting a lobby campaign in the popular press.382  
The passenger liners had the big advantages of landing immigrants seeking jobs 
en masse on a daily basis. The high concentration of newly arrived in the port made it 
easy for shipping lines to contract an alternative workforce to break up the strikes. 
Occasionally, the Holland America Line even embarked extra personnel in Rotterdam to 
unload and load the ships. Close collaboration betwe n the shipping firms was a key to 
hold their dominant position. If one company gave in to the demands it weakened the 
stand of all shipping firms. There existed an important internal rivalry among the lines 
yet the collaboration through shipping conferences d fending matters of common interest 
stimulated cohesion. Shipping companies remained unaffected by the pressure of unions. 
It was only in 1910 that HAL gave in under the increasing public pressure, and gave the 
longshoremen a pay increase. The company considered the claims to be justified since 
longshoremen had not received a pay raise for thirty years!383 
The divergent interests regarding migrant legislation divided both pressure groups 
once more. In this battle, the shipping companies again took the upper hand. The 
                                                 
382 The INC did not take part in these joined efforts since the strike drove the trade to neighboring 
ports such as Philadelphia. As will be seen below the owners of the Red Star Line and American Line 
defended converse interests than foreign shipping lines in US forming a separate lobby group.  
383 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence 112-121, correspondence between January 19 
1887 until November 11 1887. 
 216
Contract Labor Law proved a pyrrhic victory for the unions and illustrates the gap 
between passing a law and enforcing it. Castle Garden and Ellis Island authorities were 
by far the most important filter for incoming migrants. The control stations remained 
under the New York State authority until 1891, when it moved under federal supervision. 
This transition did little to alter the bad reputation of the control stations. Van den Toorn 
often complained about the corrupt, despotic and arbitr y management. Frequent 
scandals reported by the popular press corroborate this view. Positions at the control 
stations were often used as rewards for political favors and not so much based on the 
capacities of the appointees.384 The superintendent of the control station was select d by 
the President after 1891 and tended to change more frequently than the time spent by the 
latter in office. As immigration laws passed in Congress left a great margin of 
interpretation on their enforcement, migration policies depended largely of the zeal of 
immigration inspectors. These were easily influenced by external pressures; especially 
when elections were looming, the controls became stricter, as was reported by Van den 
Toorn: 
“The government here is completely corrupted, to an extent which is hard to 
imagine for a European. Just as the examination procedure of passengers. 
Immigrants are often sent back with no valid reason but for the sole purpose of 
pleasing the labor party for upcoming elections.”385 
 
Van den Toorn felt powerless, but tried to be on good terms with immigration officials by 
giving them all sorts of incentives hoping that passengers of other shipping companies 
would be sent back instead.  
Yet, the shipping companies also used the venality of immigration inspectors to 
their advantage. One of the top priorities of the Holland America Line when opening 
their office in New York was to appoint a person of trust at Castle Garden. This person 
had to create goodwill for the company among the inspectors and assisted the passengers 
during the landing. The enforcement of the Contract Labour Law proved the importance 
of good contacts at the control station. Van den Toorn reported that initially protests 
against the deportation of people suspected of violating the law had little effect. Yet early 
in 1888 the head-agent prevented the deportation of eighteen Syrians arriving on the 
                                                 
384 Ibid. Letter December 26 1886 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage 221-226, Letter July 7 1891. 
385 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage 222, Letter March 8 1892. 
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Schiedam. An old acquaintance, Captain Heinzmann had been nominated as inspector of 
Ellis Island which gave him some power in these matters. Van den Toorn gave him some 
non-specified presents on top of free passage third-class for his cousin, which was 
enough to obtain the right of landing for the Syrians. Van den Toorn tried to remain in 
good favor with Heinzmann but asked Rotterdam to use the greatest care when 
embarking Arabs, Turks, Syrians and Polish Jews.386 Once the ship arrived in New York 
little could be done because an inspector specialized in detecting contract labor 
immediately mingled with the passengers when reaching quarantine.  
The head-agent underlined the importance of the purser of the ship in preparing 
migrants for the interrogations. They also contributed by controlling the passenger 
manifests which with the law of 1891 contained some sp cific questions to track down 
contract labor. For instance, Van den Toorn praised the purser of the Amsterdam for 
preventing difficulties with the landing of a group of twenty five who had given up the 
same address of someone in Hazelton as final destination. Based on this kind of 
information, inspectors investigated possible violat ns of the Contract Labor law. By 
changing the addresses the purser avoided this.387 Yet the head agent reminded the 
pursers to use the greatest secrecy. The New York Herald, New York World and New 
Yorker Staats-Zeitung reported that the purser of the Amsterdam boasted about the fact 
that no passenger of this ship had ever been sent back for violating the Contract Labor 
Law. The newspapers accused the purser of forcing passengers to claim that they had 
paid for their passage themselves, possessed $30 or more and not to have made any prior 
arrangements for work. This kind negative publicity had to be avoided at all costs and the 
purser needed to limit his efforts to people running a risk, not to all passengers on 
board.388  
Yet the preparations for the interrogations started with the subagents in Europe 
informing the migrants about the American laws. The dir ctors of the Holland America 
Line praised the efforts of the company’s office in Vienna for preparing their passengers 
to evade the Contract Labor Laws. It proved very hard for the HAL personal in 
                                                 
386 The HAL also maintained good contacts with Heinzmann’s successor responsible for Syrian, 
Arab and Egyptian immigrants, Mr Arkedy. In exchange for three second class tickets for his children, the 
inspector facilitated the landing of 70 Syrians. Ibid. Letters February 8 1888 September 8 1896. 
387 Ibid. Letter March 2 1894. 
388 Ibid. Letters June 15 and July 13 1894.  
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Rotterdam, screening the passengers of high risks, to establish the truth about contract 
labor violators sent through the Vienna Office.389  
These efforts, combined with the sale of prepaid tickets to third parties other than 
relatives or friends which were worked off by the migrants after their arrival, underlines 
the importance of shipping companies in circumventing Contract Labor Laws. These 
violations proved to be very difficult for American authorities. With the law, employers 
avoided written work agreements; hence authorities v ry much relied on obtaining 
confessions during the interrogations at the control stations. Shipping companies made 
sure that passengers knew the right answers to avoid deportations. Yet the interrogations 
of suspects by the immigration inspectors proved to be more than just answering a few 
straight forward questions.  
In the case against Belgian glassworkers, one of the accused Jean-Baptiste Saint 
testified that the translator at the interrogation Mr. Palmeri confessed that they were told 
to state that they had work. Palmeri had told them that they would be sent back otherwise 
and did not deny this in court. The glassworkers were then forced to sign a declaration 
which had been drawn up before their arrival in English and hence they could not read it. 
The chief inspector of the Immigration Commission admitted to have been on the look 
out for Belgian glassworkers. Through their contacts in Charleroi, the Knights of Labor 
had passed on a list with names of glassworkers.390 The case illustrates that when the 
Immigration Commission lacked the proofs they could fabricate evidence by intimidating 
passengers. The accused owed their right of passage to the intervention of the Belgian 
consul Charles Mali. The Belgian diplomat went great lengths to obtain the right of 
landing of compatriots, be it glassworkers, diamond cutters, cigar makers, etc. (Feys, 
2003, 134-148).  
The British consul also fought unjust deportation while van den Toorn mentioned 
the lack of interest of Austrian-Hungarian diplomats, reflecting this nation’s tendency to 
restrict migration.391 Hence besides shipping companies, diplomats from se European 
                                                 
389 Ibid. Letter March 14 1894. 
390 ABMFA, 2961, part I, Report about the trial against the Belgian glassworkers (126 pages), 
attached to a letter from Mali to Chimay August 19 1890.  
391 As was the case of seven English passengers which had been sent back with the Obdam. The 
HAL had refused to pay the 1000 dollar bond to keep them in the US while the British consul was taking 
steps to fight the injustice. If the consul obtained the right of landing of the seven passengers van den Toorn 
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authorities also fought deportations by immigrants. The efforts or lack thereof, of 
governments through their consular corps to protect the interests of citizens and to retain 
ties with the home country, as Donna Gabbaccia denoted f r the Italian case, is an area 
which has not yet been fully explored by international migration historians (Gabaccia, 
1999, 1125).  
 
4) The resurgence of the nativist movement and its opponents: the Immigration 
Restriction League versus the Pro-Immigration League 
 
4.1) Intellectualizing the restrictive movement up to the foundation of the 
Immigration Restrictive League 
 
 The debates on the Foran Act reflect a new tide of nativism which was growing at  
the time. The Haymarket bombing in Chicago in May 1886 fueled the movement because 
of the association in the US of radical movements ad the foreign born population. The 
foreign-born anarchists convicted for the affair symbolized the imported radicalism, 
through immigration, undermining the foundations of the American society. The political 
reaction soon followed with the foundation of the nativist American Party in California 
demanding immigration restrictions. In the years that followed more than fifty proposals 
limiting the influx were proposed in Congress. The topic also became a concern among 
the intellectual community as the essay contest “The Evil Effects of the Unrestricted 
Immigration” sponsored by the American Economic Association illustrates. The winner, 
Edward Bemis, launched the idea of a literacy test as the best solution for the immigrant 
problem. The measure would drastically reduce the influx from Eastern and Southern 
Europe while leaving the flow coming from traditional out-migration regions practically 
unaffected (Hutchinson, 1980, 89-95 Just, 1989, 191-196; Jones, 1992, 214-218; Zolberg, 
2006, 199-211).  
Concurrently three articles by Richard Mayo Smith appeared Control of 
Immigration I, II and III  which attempted to give scientific arguments for rest ictions. 
Smith argued that; (1) the movement started to have undesirable consequences, (2) 
immigrants were not of the same character as they us d to, no longer representing a 
                                                                                                                                      
suggested resending the lot on the next sailing for free. This would create goodwill with the English 
diplomat and result in positive publicity for the British market. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage 221, Letter 
May 24 1889.  Whereas the apathy of the Austrian-Hugarian is mentioned in: Ibid. 222, March 9 1892. 
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desirable element for the community to acquire, (3) the country no longer needed it for its 
development. The social scientist also motivated th restrictions by discussing the right of 
migration and its possible effect on international relations. Finally, he suggested means to 
administer restrictions with focus on means of control and enforcement (Smith, 1888, 
part I 48-49). Using statistical evidence Smith claimed that the exponential growth of 
immigration increased the percentage of foreign-born population whose assimilation as 
an American citizen could no longer be guaranteed. The high percentage of criminals and 
illiterates among the foreign born lowered the political capacity of communities to govern 
themselves putting stress on the American institutions. The problem was as much one of 
quantity as of quality. The evolution in the transport sector had decreased the cost and 
risks of the move taking away the natural barrier guaranteeing that only the thriftiest 
made the crossing, keeping the lowest class at home. Remittances and government 
assistance further reduced the barriers. Also, the new wave of migrants; such as 
Hungarian Slovaks, showed strikingly inferior features while Italians easily conformed 
with living in overly crowded conditions on a diet of stale bread, stale fruit and stale beer 
until they save enough money to go home again (Smith, 1888, part I, 52-75).392   
In his second article, Smith questioned the economical benefits of immigration 
pointing to the fact that through remittances and return migrants the capital exported from 
the US increasingly exceeded the import. Also, because immigration reduced wages and 
the living standards they had a negative influence on the birth rates of Americans which 
would increase if the influx stopped. Furthermore, the author claimed that the country 
had passed the pioneering phase, hence the need for unskilled labor decreased. Machinery 
offered alternatives and the call for the West was no longer valid since most of the new 
arrivals concentrated in urban centers (Smith, 1988, part II, 197-224). Smith stressed that 
the state needed to give priority to its own citizens before its duty of helping the humanity 
at large. He did not foresee any diplomatic repercussion in questioning the natural right 
of migration from Europe where most nations would even welcome such measures. The 
lack of official protests against the previous federal restrictions were considered as 
implicit approvals of nations who themselves considere  it to be the state’s right to 
                                                 
392 According to Smith the quality of migrants deteriorated also from traditional out-migration 
regions. Other than Bemis he did not focus all thatmuch on the distinction between the so called ‘old’ and 
‘new’ migration.  
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control migration and would gladly see the precedent established to restrict immigration. 
The reaction from various European ministers of foreign affaires to Chimay’s intent of 
protesting against the Contract Labor law, seemed to confirm Smith’s assessment.  
In contrast to Bemis Smith did not propose any measures directed specifically 
against the new tide of migrants, nor did he propose any other innovative measures. He 
did not advocate wholesale restrictions considering it impossible to prevent people from 
sending for their relatives or friends. Also, destroying without due notice the vast 
interests bound up with the business of transportati n would have negative repercussions 
on the American trade. He pleaded for a gradual decrease through a very rigid 
enforcement of the current laws, barring; criminals, narchists, those unable to support 
for themselves, those receiving assistance by states from charity institutions, or those 
violating the Contract Labor law. Another measure was stimulating European 
governments to strictly regulate the migrant transport business, lowering the high profits 
generated by the traffic which would decrease the activity of parties involved unnaturally 
swelling the flow. Means of discouraging European governments and shipping 
companies from shipping those from the excluded classes had to be imposed.  
Smith proposed using consuls as the initial control agents, forcing migrants to 
obtain a certificate of good character, with means to upport themselves and enough skills 
to rely on to make a fresh start in the US. This information had to be gathered in 
collaboration with foreign authorities and shipping companies. Bemis also favored this 
kind of remote control which was already in use to check the Chinese immigration, 
suggesting that consuls at the port of embarkation carried out the literacy test. To increase 
the responsibility of shipping lines in this process of sorting the good from the bad, 
authorities needed to require security bonds from these companies. Finally, as the new 
tide of migrants did not show the same will, as earli r migrants had to become American 
citizens or to take friendly dispositions towards the authorities, requirements for 
naturalization had to be raised (Smith, 1888, part III, 409-425 and Zolberg, 2006, 211).  
The American Protection Association, founded in 1887 and boasting a 
membership of two million members by the mid-1890s underline the growing concerns to 
defend ‘American values’ (King, 2000, 52). Bemis and Mayo’s ideas constituted a 
platform on which the calls for restriction during the next three decades were based.  
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They quickly found their way to Congress where Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge, who earned Harvard’s first PhD in political science, advocated general 
restrictions and the literacy test in particular (Zolberg, 2006, 200). Immigration issues 
were a hot topic when political science started to develop. In Massachusetts, together 
with California, which was ‘the’ breeding place for the nativist lobby a group, of young 
Harvard intellectuals; Charles Warren, Robert D. Ward and Prescott F. Hall 
institutionalized the movement by founding the Immigration Restriction League in 1894. 
Efforts by the league focused on advocating measures to restrict the influx of Southern 
and Eastern Europeans based on increasingly open eugenic motives portraying them as 
physically and mentally inferior. The movement took ver the literacy test as most 
adequate means for reaching that goal. The influence of the restrictionist movement has 
however too often been boiled down to their failure in imposing the literacy test prior to 
1917. Yet as Smith’s articles reflect, there was a growing awareness of the urgent need 
for means to enforce the laws already enacted, rather than passing new ones. With the 
movement, the pressures on Castle Garden and Ellis Island authorities increased and 
infiltrated the control policies. The next federal l ws to be passed focused on the 
enforcement of existing laws which gave immigration inspectors enough leeway to center 
their efforts on migrants coming from certain regions.  
 
4.2) The passage of Immigration Inspection under federal supervision. 
  
 4.2.1) The Immigrant Bills of 1891, 1893 and their implementation 
  
 To process the increasing proposals of immigrant legislation and study the 
working of the existing laws the Senate had established a standing Committee on 
Immigration and the House appointed a select Committee on Immigration and 
Naturalization (Hutchinson, 1981, 98). In February 1891, Congress passed a new 
Immigration Act placing the regulation of immigration under the authority of the 
Secretary of Treasury, which appointed a new Superintendent of Immigration within the 
department.393 He was responsible for the enforcement of the previous laws, and passed 
                                                 
393 In 1895 the appointment of Superintendent of immigrat on was changed to Commissioner 
General of Immigration. The appointment of Commissioners of Immigration at various ports moved under 
the President’s authority. 
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new provisions which increased the supervision; this included the opening of twenty-four 
new border controls stations, including Mexico and Canada (Torpey, 2004, 96). A 
Congressional investigation, known as the Ford committee, had shown how easily 
migrants from the excluded classes used Canada as a loophole to get in (Dillingham 
Commission, 1911, vol 39, 37).  
The immigrant control thus moved from state board control to federal inspection 
assisted by the Marine Hospital Service. The Inspection Board decisions on admissibility 
were final, only subject to administrative appeal to the Secretary of Treasury. 
Polygamists and persons suffering from a loathsome r a dangerous contagious disease 
were added to the list of excluded categories. It obligated that the shipping companies 
medically inspect, disinfect and vaccinate the migrants from where they left (Kraut, 112, 
2006). The law prohibited advertisements containing promises of employment, except 
from state immigration agencies. Steamship companies had to refrain from soliciting 
immigrants, limiting the advertisements to rates, facilities and dates of sailing. They also 
needed to provide passenger manifests with names, nationality, the last residence and the 
destination of the passenger, upon arrival. Deportati n would from then on be charged to 
the ship-owners and this could happen up to a year afte arrival. For instance, migrants 
becoming a public charge within their first year in the US could be sent back. Lodge 
suggested the literacy test for the first time in Congress during these debates yet it was 
not considered (Bennet, 1963, 21-23 and Dillingham Commission, 1911, vol. 39, 35-48).  
As the Dillingham Commission rightly concluded the purpose of the bill was to 
improve the selection of immigrants, not so much to pass new restrictions. The law of 
1893 added some provisions, including putting an end to the common practice of paying 
a bond to obtain the right of landing of people suspected of becoming a public charge.394 
This could now only be obtained through the explicit approval by the Secretary of 
Treasury. Shipping companies had to make sure that their agents in Europe posted the 
American laws in their offices and informed prospective migrants about them. Also, the 
procedure of investigation was adapted, where all suspects became subject of a special 
                                                 
394 The New York State laws of 1849 set these bonds at 300 dollars raised it to 500 dollars two 
years later. Hence it seems unlikely that the many passengers were landed this way unless the price was 
lowered over time or some kind of credit system could be obtained to do so (Dillingham Commission, 
1911, vol. 39, 775). 
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inquiry conducted by four inspectors. A favorable decision of three of them was needed 
to obtain the right of landing. It included a provision forcing captains to hand over a 
complete passenger list signed and sworn in by the US consul at the port of embarkation, 
certifying that after a personal examination of all passengers he did not detect any of the 
banned classes. The law also added many questions to the manifests.395 Finally shortly 
after, the head tax increased to $1 to cover the extra expenses for the inspections 
(Dillingham Commission, 1911, vol. 39, 39).396   
 But laws, for instance, did not specify the criteria to which migrants had to 
comply so as to avoid falling under the category ‘likely to become a public charge’. A 
meeting in 1891 of the New York head agents of the shipping lines with the 
Superintendent of Immigration, John Weber, illustrates that these criteria depended on 
the nationality of the migrants. Van den Toorn reported the following statements of the 
former Congressman to the board of directors: 
“The best way to fight the increasing agitation against immigration in the US is by 
tightening controls at the port of embarkation on the ‘desirability’ of the migrants. 
‘Desirability’ is a question of mentality and nationality which do not fit in the US; 
French, Belgians, Dutch, Germans, English Scandinavia s etc are desirable; 
Italians, Russian Jews, Arabs, Slovaks, etc are undsirable. The major discussion 
topic is to find out what criteria could be used to define ‘pauper’ which varies in 
each country. In America strong and healthy individuals willing to work yet 
arriving without means are not considered as likely to become a public charge. 
However, people with means but with a reputation to thr w it away -- a shabby 
fellow, is. If a migrant becomes ill and becomes a public charge he will not be 
sent back if he had no predisposition of catching the disease prior to arrival, 
otherwise he will. Also the nationality is an important factor; English speakers 
stand a better chance. Idiots should be turned away yet when traveling with 
relatives this is not applied. Same goes for disabled although we rather not have 
them. Servants following a farmer would have to be considered in violation with 
the contract labor law. In short Weber has warned us that laws would be strictly 
applied and that we’d better sharpen our controls at the port of embarkation.”397  
                                                 
395 It contained the full name, age, sex, whether married or not, occupation, able to read or write, 
nationality, last residence, seaport of landing, final destination, whether in possession of a ticket to that 
destination, who paid his passage, whether in possession of money, and if so whether if it was over 30$, 
whether if going to join a relative, and if so his name and address, whether ever before in the US, whether 
ever before in prison or an almshouse, whether under contract to perform labor and what was the 
immigrant’s health, mentally and physically, if so whether deformed or crippled. 
396 On top of that the shipping lines had to pay for the maintenance of detained passengers waiting 
for Special Inquiry or to be sent back. These cost remained very limited, depending on the number detain d 
and hence as Senner put it “on the quality of the migrant”. The cost per capita amounted for the White Star 
Line to 0,02 cent,  Cunard 0,05c NGL 0,06c and HAL 0,09c. Ibid. Letter July 26 1894. 
397 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage 221, Letter of October 8 1891. 
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The advice of Weber illustrates the ambiguity of the definition of likely to become a 
public charge and how this was used to apply stricter ontrols to the ‘undesirable classes’ 
of migrants.  
 
4.2.2) Assisted migration and Paupers: the efforts of the shipping companies to 
make them look not so likely to become a public charge 
 
Shipping companies used all possible means to obtain the right of passage for 
clients being detained by immigration inspectors. If passengers had acquaintances in the 
US these were contacted to see if they could to pose a bond for them. This was the case 
for ten Galicians who had friends in Shanondock. Van den Toorn obtained a delay of 
deportation to track down these friends. He proposed paying for the railroad transport to 
Shanondock if the friends posed bond, yet they refused. The head-agent stressed the 
importance of sending full information of passengers running a risk, so that 
acquaintances could be contacted prior to their landing. Booking them through to their 
final destination also helped their cause. Van den Toorn refuted the claims that 
passengers would have had more chances of obtaining the permission to land if they were 
traveling with another line. All lines suffered an ugmentation in deportations due to the 
overzealous actions of Castle Garden inspectors applying a law which has not yet been 
enacted.398  
Besides family or friends, charity and immigration association also paid bonds for 
the landing of passengers. The Hebrew Charity Society of London for instance, took care 
of banned Jews from Russia. They collected money to pay for the passage to the US and 
also posed bond, when needed, to guarantee their land ng.399 In every European migration 
port and major transit points, Jewish Charitable Associations assisting Jews on their way 
to the US were founded. As a result of their contacts with Hamburg migrant brokers, the 
HAL received many Russian Jews. Some were assisted by the Jewish Committee of 
Charlottenburg, Berlin. In order to avoid problems with the passage of the laws in 1891, 
prohibiting the entry of passengers who were assisted in coming, they were sent over on 
                                                                                                                                      
 
398 Ibid. Letter February 1 1889. 
399 Ibid. Letter September 29 1890. 
 226
the service via Baltimore. The inspections in Baltimore were known to be less strict than 
in New York. Baltimore port authorities encouraged the inspectors to be lenient hoping to 
attract more traffic. The practice of bonds was drastic lly reduced by 1892, when 
immigration authorities practically put an end to is use. Although the brothers of J. 
Pasmovska were found willing to pose bond for their sister, the authorities no longer 
accepted the practice. The directors advised Van den Toorn that they would try to rebook 
this lady for Baltimore and asked him to contact the brothers to pick her up on arrival.400  
The Russian Jews were often labeled by New York migrant inspectors as ‘the 
worse kind’, meaning without means and in poor healt . The cholera outbreak in 
Hamburg attributed by contemporaries to the Russian migrant traffic did little to improve 
that reputation. Steerage traffic came to a full standstill for some months and when it 
picked up again Russians remained excluded because reports on cholera in the region 
persisted. Yet shipping companies were eager to maximize the capacity after months of 
inactivity. Van den Toorn reported that HAPAG and NGL evaded the restrictions, but 
feared being caught by the American authorities.401 HAL soon followed suit sending a 
circular to the American agents stating that the company could not assist passengers, 
given the circumstances, with their travels to Rotterdam. Russian migrants had to make 
their way to Rotterdam on their own where the prepaid ticket awaited them. Yet the 
lawyer of “our dear friends of the Red Star Line” Mr. Neill leaked the circular to the 
authorities. Van den Toorn cancelled all tickets and had to deploy great efforts in 
convincing the authorities not to make a case of it.402  
A year later when the Russian traffic had picked up again the company came into 
disrepute once more. Articles about the sending of Russian Jews on HAL ships assisted 
by the Jewish Charitity Association of Rotterdam, Montefiore, appeared in the New York 
press. Van den Toorn feared the reaction of Joseph H. Senner, Ellis Island Commissioner 
of Immigration, since he had the reputation of blowing up such sensational news in the 
press to bring steamship lines, charity institutions and European governments into 
                                                 
400 The reason for the refusal was that she arrived alone with her child. An investigation had 
pointed out that the man she had given up as her husband was living with another woman. Ibid. Letter 
March 8 1892. 
401 Ibid. Letter March 27 1893. 
402 Ibid. Letter April 7 1893. 
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disrepute.403 The head-agent refuted the accusations in the press and claimed that such 
passengers migrated indirectly through England.404 Internal correspondence proved that 
eighty passengers embarked on the Spaarndam at the expense of the Montifiore, some 
had received a reduction, other free lodging at the Holland America Line Hotel.405 An 
investigation pointed out that the American health inspector Woodward sneaked into the 
hotel and on board of the Spaarndam to obtain the information, which he leaked to the 
New York newspapers.406 Except for stricter controls, the incident had no further 
consequences for the HAL.  
On that side of the Atlantic, with New York being the most rapidly growing 
‘Jewish City’ at the time, numerous Hebrew associations assisting new arrivals were 
founded. The Jewish community formed an important lobby group whose influence can 
be noted both in migrant legislation and the application thereof. For instance, Van den 
Toorn stated that of the twenty five detained passengers of the Edam only two were 
eventually sent back as a result of help from Jewish Charity institutions. The major 
problem was that the passengers did not have a penny to their name, nor a railroad ticket 
inland. Van den Toorn stressed the importance of agents making sure that Russian 
passengers had at least a minimum of money on arrival, be it only to reach their final 
destination. Furthermore, Jewish passengers often mistrusted manifests and interrogators 
lying on the amount they own fearing that it may be taken from them. The passengers 
needed to be better informed about this.407 The landing of migrants was also greatly 
facilitated if the captains and doctors made sure passengers washed themselves 
thoroughly before arrival something which should always be done.408  
                                                 
403 The quote taken from a New York newspaper sounded as follows: “Word has been received by 
Dr. Senner, Commissioner of Immigration at Ellis Island that as a preparation for winter, the municipal 
authorities of European cities, particularly those of Belgium, are gathering together their paupers and
sending them over here, prepaying their fares. In this they are largely assisted by the charity institutions” 
GAR HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 113, November 24 1893. 
404 GAR HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 222, Letter December 4 1893. 
405 The practice of shipping companies to quote special ch rity rates 30 to 50% below the regular 
fare was common at the time. These were granted to consuls and charity institutions under special 
conditions for passengers they assisted. Every separate case had to be reported to the secretary of the 
Continental Conference to avoid abuses. Hebrew Charity Associations were excluded by 1895 because of 
the many abuses. 
406 Ibid. Letter December 8 1893. 
407 Ibid. Letters December 7 and 11 1894. 
408 Ibid. Letters December 24 1894 and January 3 1895. 
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 With the financial crisis midway the 1890s the agittion against immigration 
persisted after the cholera scare. One of the agitators was Superintendent of Immigration 
Stump, who published articles to influence the public opinion and through excessive 
controls at Ellis Island. Van den Toorn illustrated his when he stated that with the arrival 
of the Amsterdam, 138 out of the 230 passengers were detained. Mostof them were not 
paupers but instead waited to be picked up by family or friends or were being sent 
railroad tickets and money transfers to continue their journey. But, it did increase the 
maintenance bill for detainees charged to shipping companies. In the end only two to six 
were deported.409  
However, the cost of deportation also started to way heavily on the company’s 
expenses because of the stricter controls. The directors decided to provisionally stop 
taking Russian prepaid passengers, for whom the railroad transport from the German 
border control stations such as Oldenzaal to Rotterdam was not paid for. Many relied on 
charity institutions to defray the cost. The company needed to cover their hotel expenses 
at Rotterdam; they created extra dietary problems and Dutch authorities disapproved of 
their passage in the country and they were the kindof passengers most likely to be 
deported. The biggest problem for the companies wasthe lack of fixed criteria 
established by law. The most frequent reason for deportation was ‘no money’, yet no 
American law specified this to be a valid reason. Hence, shipping companies had no right 
to refuse passengers for that reason and risked numero s lawsuits if they did.410 
Therefore, the HAL tried to recoup the costs for deportations from the agents or 
purchasers of the ticket. An extra clause was added on prepaid tickets putting the 
responsibility for these expenses and eventual extra hospitalization costs on the 
purchasers of the ticket.411 
 The federal legislation of 1891 provided means to American authorities of 
selecting immigrants, although not explicitly, based on race and nationality. The focus 
here went to Jews because of the popularity of the Dutch company among this class of 
passengers. Yet Poles, Slovaks, Hungarians, Italians, Arabs, Syrians etc. were all subject 
to stricter controls. By augmenting deportations and, hence increasing the transport cost 
                                                 
409 Ibid. Letter of January 3 1895.   
410 Ibid. Letter of January 17 1896. 
411 Ibid. Letters February 4 and May 19 1896.  
 229
of such passengers, the authorities hoped to discourage shipping companies from 
bringing over the ‘undesirable classes’. The American authorities were also aware of the 
deterrent effect of deported passengers on members of their home community 
considering migration. But, the many loopholes, such as sending them to other ports or in 
second-class and the assistance of consuls, charity institutions of all sorts to obtain the 
right of passage, helped in keeping forced returns at a minimum.   
 
4.2.3) “John Smith’s followers travel second class”: Guion and Holland America 
Line’s special service to Utah  
 
The laws did not deter shipping companies from bringing in passengers from the 
excluded classes. The organized transport of Mormons in second-class on board of HAL 
and the British Guion  Line ships clearly illustrate this. The clause barring polygamists 
from entry tried to put an end to the recruitment of J hn Smith’s followers in Europe. 
Yet, the religious movement had no objections paying the extra $10 to allow members to 
travel in second class, which allowed them to avoid immigrant inspection at Ellis Island. 
Shortly after the passage of the law Van den Toorn c ncluded a special agreement with 
the migrant agent Spence of Salt Lake City. The head agent gave Spence a reduction on 
second-class rates in order to appropriate part of the Mormon business, which till then 
was exclusively entrusted to the Guion Line. Preachrs accompanying the groups 
received precise instructions. In cases where the authorities detected the passengers, Van 
den Toorn doubted that they could claim legal motives to refuse their landing since they 
had traveled in second class. Moreover, other than e Guion Line transporting groups of 
300 to 400, the HAL agreed to take small parties of 25 to 40 which would not stand out 
as much.412  
Spence also obtained special railroad rates to Utahand monopolized the Mormon 
transport. Railroad companies violated the interstate commerce laws with these 
reductions, but like the shipping companies the keen competition for the business forced 
them to do this. Instead of fearing that the American authorities would find out, the HAL 
directors were much more preoccupied by the possibility that the RSL might uncover the 
practice. This violation of the Conference Agreement by cutting rates could affect other 
                                                 
412 Ibid. Letter July 1 1891.  
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business, increase mistrust and stimulate cheating among the lines. Van den Toorn 
assured the board of using the greatest secrecy in the correspondence, bookkeeping and 
bookings preventing the RSL or the American authoriies from finding out. If the 
directors stopped the business which had been very hard to obtain, the opportunity to 
book for the Mormon association would be gone for god and with that the market for 
Colorado, Idaho and Utah, according to Van den Toorn.413 Despite the arguments the 
board decided against continuing the special agreements with Spence. When the Guion 
Line was forced out of business in 1893 van den Toorn regained the confidence of 
Spence. The directors gave the go-ahead after finding out that the Red Star Line was 
cheating with its second-class rates.414 A year later, Spence wanted to increase the 
business with the HAL. He was convinced that the well-established migration pattern of 
the Mormons through England could be diverted to Rotterdam.415 Yet, the Conference 
agreements among the Continental lines for second-class business setting the 
compensation price at 140 marks no longer made it profitable for the Dutch company to 
give reductions. Spence was more than welcome to continue using their services, but only 
at full prices. Spence transferred his business to the Anchor Line from which he obtained 
special second cabin rates.416  
The Mormon traffic illustrates that the exemption of inspection of second-class 
passengers created an important loophole for illegal migrants. Shipping companies feared 
little from the American authorities taking advantage of extra business opportunities 
American laws created. Conference agreements, instead of American legislation, deterred 
the company from taking on the business. When Joseph Senner took charge of Ellis 
Island, he made closing these loopholes a main priority. Yet the traveling public, 
consisting mainly of Americans, heavily protested against passing immigrant controls for 
second-class and with success.417 Commissioner Williams later managed to introduce a 
screening process of second-class passengers on board, sending suspicious individuals to 
Ellis Island for further control. Inspectors only referred a small percentage of second-
cabin passengers to the control station. The commodity and higher probabilities of 
                                                 
413 Ibid. Letter March 3 1892. 
414 Ibid. January 16 and March 4 1893. 
415 Ibid. Letter April 11 1894. 
416 The route through Canada also served as a back door. Ibid. Letters May 14, 18 and 25 1897.  
417 Ibid. Letter December 24 1895. 
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landing was especially appreciated by the growing class of repeat migrants for whom 
shipping companies introduced mixed tickets consisting of third-class eastbound passage 
to Europe and second-class westbound return to the US.  
Keeling rightly pointed to the business logic behind the expansion of second cabin 
passage being one of improving capacity utilization of passenger ships. However, he 
underestimated the importance of the tightening immigrant inspections at American 
control stations spurring its development. (Keeling, 1999a, 202-204). The use of second 
cabin as a means to evade controls was not limited to individual cases; as the Mormon 
migration illustrates, it could happen on an organized scale. Also, the commodity of not 
having to go through Ellis Island encouraged perfectly legal passengers, without any 
intent of evading the law, to travel second class, further spurring development of this 
class of business. Mixed tickets seem to indicate that repeat migrants, in particular, who a 
priori would run little risk of being debarred, preferred to pay a little extra to avoid 
repeating the hurtful and often degrading inspection experience. The security it offered, 
of avoiding debarment, for people buying prepaid tickets for family members to join 
them, certainly also played a role. How big remains impossible to measure.  
 
4.2.4) The impositions of Remote Control: from temporary consular and medical 
inspections to putting the responsibility on steamship companies 
 
The idea of empowering consuls to regulate migration at the point of departure 
through a visa system or controls at the port of embarkation can be traced backto  as early 
as 1838 (Neuman, 2003, 108 and Zolberg, 2003, 205). That the proposition came from a 
diplomat, Friederich List consul at Leipzig, is unsrprising. This would have increased 
their influence and given them new means to enrich themselves. With the introduction of 
the spoil-system in 1828 by President Andrew Jackson, c nsular post became rewards for 
political supporters of the party that had won the pr sidential election. Merchant-consuls, 
who often served for long periods, were replaced by salaried and often incompetent 
consuls, that were rotated. Only with Roosevelt wasthe spoils-system abandoned and it 
was replaced by a professionalized corps (Krabbendam, 2005, 167-181 and Kennedy, 
1992).  
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In the meantime, many consuls tried to use their position to enrich themselves as 
much as possible. The List’s suggestion was first picked up to regulate the re-entry of 
Chinese laborers once the exclusion act was passed, by introducing documents requiring 
a visa of the consul. An increasing number of contemporaries also wanted to expand this 
early form of remote border control to Europe (Torpey, 2004, 91; Zeidel, 2005, 15; 
Zolberg, 2006, 211).  Beginning of the 1890s, bills providing for inspection by US 
consuls abroad were introduced in Congress, but shipping companies tried to avoid this at 
all costs (Hutchinson, 1981, 98-112).418 In 1891, the Treasury Secretary appointed a 
commission chaired by the Commissioner of Immigration, Weber, to investigate the 
causes for immigration in Europe and to analyze the cost and feasibility of a consular 
certification system (Zeidel, 2005, 16-17). Weber rjected the idea, claiming it to be an 
impracticable, useless and costly venture for the American tax payer; of at least $500,000 
annually. Instead he proposed perfecting the existing statutes, to rigidly apply them at the 
points of entry and;  
“place the expense of all returned migrants upon steamship companies whom self-
interest will force to look for reimbursement to their sub-agents who have a 
personal knowledge of the qualification of the intending immigrants, better than 
anyone else, and who would have a direct pecuniary concern in the return of a 
defective; make sub-agents in this country responsible for the sale of prepaid 
tickets, estimated to be nearly 60 percent of the wole; than up to the time of 
acquiring citizenship hold all aliens liable to compulsory return” (Weber, 1892, 
429).  
 
Weber, was in contrast to another member of the commission and immigration official, 
Herman Schulteis, who accused the shipping companies of deliberately facilitating the 
entry of the excluded classes. He pointed to the report of another commission member, 
Joseph Powderly, whose interpreter on board of the Anchor Line vessel from Genoa to 
New York confided that he had traveled to the US four times already that year, in the 
capacity of assistant interpreter, an that he was paid as steward on the books, whose duty 
was to instruct the passengers as what to say to go through the American inspectios.  
In response to a circular sent to consuls, inquiringas to their opinion about the 
involvement of the shipping companies as instigators of the movement and the feasibility 
of controls in Europe, most replied negatively. Schulteis blamed these adverse results on 
                                                 
418 Ibid. Letter October 6 1891. 
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the fact that most of the consuls were involved in the business or had been corrupted by 
the lines. He did not believe in the system suggested by Weber and urged for a system of 
inspections in Europe (Schulteis, 1893, 41-43 and Just, 1986, 244). John Noble supported 
Schulteis point of view and was convinced that if the legal qualification be made simple 
and precise, a plan of consular certificates was perfectly feasible (Noble, 1892, 238-239). 
The arrival of passengers affected by cholera in New York on board of HAPAG ships 
increased the pressure for some kind of inspection on European soil.  
Although the cause of the outbreak of cholera in Hamburg is still a subject of 
debate, contemporaries quickly blamed Russian Jewish migrants.419 The stir in the US 
press against this class of passengers -for being in poor health- had started a year earlier. 
Van den Toorn reported that due to a typhus scare, Russians were transferred to Hoffman 
Island where they underwent stricter controls. He suspected that the authorities were 
doing this in order to discourage new arrivals of Russian Jews, apparently with success 
because the NGL and RSL temporarily refused the transport such passengers to avoid 
difficulties on arrival. Just as the HAPAG, Van den Toorn advised his directors by 
telegraph to: “have Russians inspected by Dutch doctor, luggage fumigated, doctor 
certificate legalized by the American consul must accompany the passenger”.420 Hence, 
some kind of consular inspection at the port of embarkation existed for certain class of 
passengers coming from regions infected by contagious diseases.  
Companies tolerated and even collaborated with this but wanted to avoid the 
general adoption of this practice at all cost.421 Yet the American authorities used the 
commotion caused by the cholera scare in 1892 to impose controls on European soil. 
First, a three week quarantine period on ships coming from Hamburg was imposed while 
other companies depended on the goodwill of health inspectors. The HAL enjoyed 
preferential treatment due to the certificate of inspection and disinfection issued by the 
American consul prior to each departure. The company also worked with American 
doctors on ships which facilitated communication with the health inspectors. This, 
                                                 
419 There are various theories about the origins of the c olera outbreak in Hamburg. Some claim 
that it was imported through ships from Le Havre where the disease had been noted months before. Yet 
most contemporaries blamed the Russian Jews (Würstenbecker, 2003, 227). 
420 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 222, Letter February 16 1892. 
421 Ibid. Letter October 6th 1891. 
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combined with the efforts of Glavis the lobbyist at Washington, limited the quarantine for 
HAL ships to from three to five days.422  
However, the disease fueled the agitation for restrictions. Van den Toorn feared 
that far reaching measures would be passed, as a reult of the upcoming presidential 
elections. Long quarantine periods, of up to twenty days, were imposed forcing the 
shipping companies to suspend migrant transport while awaiting new immigration laws. 
Van den Toorn did not expect the laws to prohibit immigration completely, since it 
infringed upon all the treaties with European countries, who would protest against this. 
The head agent feared less defined barriers impeding European countries to exercise 
political pressure against restrictions.423 He also warned about the increasing 
susceptibility of American authorities towards diplomatic protests regarding migration 
matters.424  
The President considered a one year suspension of immigration as proposed by 
Senator W. Chandler, chairman of the Committee on Immigration not to run contrary to 
treaty stipulations. Chandler stated that the time for restrictions had come and that a one 
year suspension would give Congress time to pass adequ te legislation.425 But, he 
confided in the New York Times, that the greatest difficulty in passing such measure  was 
the opposition of steamship companies. Several senators noted increased activity of the 
companies at Washington to be powerfully represented in the lobbies during the next 
sessions of Congress.426 The bill of February 1893 was not so radical, yet it mpowered 
the newly elected President Cleveland to prohibit imm gration from regions infected by 
contagious diseases, for as long as he deemed necessary.  Later on, in his Presidential 
message of 1893, he stated that regarding a new treaty signed with Turkey that “the right 
to exclude any or all classes of aliens is an attribute of sovereignty” (Hutchinson, 1981, 
                                                 
422 The Dutch seemed to have been the only line to hire exclusively American doctors for their 
ships. Van den Toorn spoke very highly of Glavis during the cholera scare preventing the crisis to GAR 
HAL 318.02 General Correspondence, 112-121,  between August 29 1892 and March 5 1893.  
423 Ibid. Letter December 6 1892. 
424 Ibid. Letter June 2 1893 
425 The suspension was also considered necessary to safeguard the success of the World Fair 
organized later that year in Chicago. It was feared that the transport of steerages with the ongoing cholera 
threats would scare off European cabin passengers to sail over (Chandler, 1893, 3). 
426 NYT, “Total Restriction Talk” December 1 1892. 
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109-110). This reflects how the US authorities increasingly considered immigrant 
legislation to be a national rather than an internatio l matter.  
Despite the new law, new immigration bills including, consular inspection and the 
feasibility of property and educational tests were discussed in Congress.427 This 
culminated in the Stone Bill of 1894 which passed the House but not the Senate where 
the Democrat majority opposed it (Higham, 1955, 101). Both the State and Treasury 
Secretary believed that the consular corps was understaffed to carry out the inspections. 
They did not oppose the idea, but they did not consider it feasible, preferring to put the 
responsibility for refusing excludables on the transportation companies- with the acts of 
1891 and 1893. By doing so, they also avoided international complications for granting 
consuls authority over foreign citizens on non-American soil (Hutchinson, 1981, 112).  
Increasing the pressure on steamship companies by charging all maintenance, detainee, 
and deportation costs of undesirables, which were later reinforced through a fine system, 
became ‘the’ regulatory policy. As suggested by J. Weber it was believed that companies 
would recuperate the costs from sub-agents who would be more inclined to make sure 
their clients did not belong to the excludable class.   
The pressures of extending control on European soil did result in the sending of 
American health inspectors to the port of embarkation. New York state quarantine laws 
passed in the wake of the cholera scare stipulated that all passengers coming from 
infected regions had to be detained for five days at the port of embarkation under 
supervision of the consul and a physician designated by him, preferably a member of the 
US marine hospital staff. All their baggage items needed to be disinfected by steam. 
These measures were completed by federal quarantine regulations requiring a ‘Bill of 
Health’ and ‘Certificate of Disinfection’ for such passengers. The US consul also 
certified the passenger manifests in which captains took an oath that after a personal 
examination of all passengers they did not detect any of the banned classes.428 When the 
                                                 
427 The Oates bill presented in Congress February 14 1891 pleaded for far reaching consular 
inspections. During the next sessions in Congress similar proposals imposing consular certificates were 
considered. In 1894 the Stone bill, imposing consular certificates proving that the migrant did not belong to 
the excluded classes passed the House, yet not the Senate. In 1895 Stone reentered his bill but to no avail 
because the Lodge bill based on the literacy test rceived all the attention in the House Immigration 
Committee.  
428 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 222, Letters Ap il 20 and 24 1893. 
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steerage traffic picked up again in March 1893 from which Russians remained excluded 
for another couple of months, these measures were impl mented.  
The HAL complained to the American authorities about the arbitrariness of their 
enforcement. The American consul at Rotterdam, Gardner, overcharged the company for 
issuing the certificates while the appointed Doctor Woodward displayed an exaggerated 
zeal in controlling the passengers on diseases according to the Dutch company.429  The 
shipping lines had offered to build special quarantine and disinfection facilities at New 
York so that all companies would be screened on the same bases, but the local authorities 
opposed the idea. The HAL claimed that charges were higher and that controls were 
stricter in Rotterdam compared to Antwerp.430 Based on the news regarding some 
isolated cholera cases in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, Doctor Woodward considered 
the region to be infected and hence imposed five day quarantine on Austrian and 
Hungarian steerage passengers. Doctors in Antwerp and Bremen did not, generating extra 
costs and an important temporary competitive handicap on that market for the HAL.431  
American consuls, on their part, did not want the health situation in Europe to 
change since the new measures produced important extra r venue. Yet reports on abuses 
in other ports quickly reached Washington leading to an investigation on the matter. 
Some consuls were found guilty of overcharging the companies, and with weak 
connections to the White House, some like Gardner i Rotterdam, were discharged.432 
Despite the excessive charges, Gardner maintained good relations with the Dutch 
company. The consul planned to take up his old job as journalist in the US again and 
promised to use his influence in the Senate and State Department to put an end to the 
controls at the port of embarkation. Gardner voiced the main objections that besides the 
arbitrariness of the medical decisions, the measure ran contrary to the agreements of 
international courtesy; rejected passengers in Europe had no possibility to appeal; and 
                                                 
429 Initially the American authorities did not fix a rte for the certificates which was later set at 
2,5$ for the Health Bill and the same amount for the Certificate of disinfection. This included all costs for 
the inspection and disinfection service. Furthermore the consul received 2,5$ for certifying the official oath 
of the captain and ship doctors for not deliberately embarking people of the excluded class. Finally the 
consul received 25 cents per passenger manifests certified by him. These contained 30 passengers per 
manifest. When the number of manifests exceeded ten, only 10 cents was charged per additional one. Ibid
Letter April 24 1893. 
430 Ibid. Letter April 21 1893. 
431 Ibid. Letter August 22 1893. 
432 Ibid. Letter May 19 1893. 
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that doctors were inclined to refuse more than they should to justify their function433. 
Meanwhile, as other steam shipping lines refused to engage in the lobbying costs of 
Gardner, his activities were short-lived.434  
By the end of the year, Russian still needed to remain five days at the port of 
embarkation for observation. The American doctors tried to find a uniform way to act yet 
iy was to no avail. Due to the massive complaints and buses both the consular and 
inspections of health officers were abolished by the end of 1893.435 The experience 
obstructed the attempts of Congressman Stone to pass federal laws imposing controls on 
European rather than American soil through consuls or special inspectors. Glavis 
reminded Congressman of the insurmountable practical d fficulties such as the multitude 
of languages in which inspectors should be able to make the interrogations. Empowering 
such inspectors on foreign soil went against all inter ational laws and treaties. However, 
to him what was infinitely worse; “it will make the US morally responsible for the many 
sets of cruelty and injustice, for migrants unrightfully rejected access to the land of the 
free, not by laws of the US but by the decision of an US inspector.”436  
Other than the case in New York with the Board of Special Inquiry, the previous 
experience with health inspectors had shown that no appeals were possible. Besides 
spreading this information, Glavis also provided some Congressmen with texts proposing 
amendments to laws which safeguarded the interests of teamship companies. In this case 
as in others, Van den Toorn attributed last minute amendments to the efforts of the 
lobbyist. The obstacles blocked the adoption of this remote border control system by 
Congress where the literacy test gained grounds, as a more adequate means.  
The American authorities were not alone in taking new measures in the wake of 
the cholera scare. Hamburg authorities pleaded withthe German government to tighten 
controls at the borders because of the increasing influx of poor Jews with the new 
pogroms in early 1891. Their idea of imposing medical ontrols along the Prussian-
Russian border would only materialize on an organized scale after the outbreak. Attempts 
to keep out the Russian Jews out of German territory du ing the epidemic failed, causing 
                                                 
433 Ibid. Letter August 12 1893. 
434 Ibid. Letter October 16 and 17 1893 and 318.02, General Correspondence, September 11 1893. 
435 Ibid. Letter November 11and December 22 1893. 
436 Ibid. Letter August 8 1894. 
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a sharp rise in illegal crossings. Furthermore, blocking the traffic harmed the national 
economic interests of shipping and railroad companies. To protect their interests the NGL 
and HAPAG proposed financing and managing border control stations, where health 
inspections and baggage disinfection would take place. Also, passengers could be 
screened as to whether they complied with the American requirements of entry and if 
they had enough financial means. By the end of 1894 stations in Bajohren, Eydtkuhnen, 
Prostken, Illowo and Ottlotschin were opened (Würstenbecker, 2003, 224-234).  
With these stations the German authorities gave their national shipping lines a 
very effective tool in diverting the migrant traffic to Hamburg and Bremen, to the 
detriment of foreign competitors such as the HAL. Matters got even worse for the Dutch 
company when law in 1897 prohibited migrant agents from representing the Dutch 
company on German soil. This illustrates that towards the turn of the century the US did 
not stand alone in considering migrant control and transport as being more a national than 
an international issue. This tendency grew in Europe as well, and would be reinforced 
over the decades to follow. 
 
4.3) The Shipping Lobby 
 
The agitation for laws restricting migration and the measures to enforce the 
existing ones increased the need for a person specializ d in defending the shipping 
interest in court and in Washington. Van den Toorn deplored the fact that European 
governments had forfeited the pressure on the US by reaching an international agreement 
regarding migrant transport. The help of Dutch diplomats was no longer called upon 
when the controls regarding space requirements intensifi d in 1887. Fighting the charges 
for excess passengers by questioning the jurisdiction of American authorities on Dutch 
vessels complying with their own national laws, ceased to be used as defense strategy. 
Lawyers needed to be hired to defend the company in court and before the Treasury 
department, incurring a lot of extra expenses. For instance, the authorities fined the HAL 
$2900 because the Edam carried fifty-eight excess passengers.437 Van den Toorn also 
                                                 
437 The fine for every excess passenger was set at 50 dollars by the New York State Laws in 1847. 
The federal authorities took over that sum in the Passenger Act of 1882.  
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needed to pay $2500 in bail for the release of captain Taat who had been arrested for the 
infraction.438 The head-agent reassured the directors that by making rrangements with 
the District Attorney, as other companies did, the fin would be dropped.  
But, the lawyer’s fees started to weigh heavily on the company’s budget. Despite 
the efforts in Rotterdam to refit the ships to the American laws, some vessels still arrived 
with excess passengers during peak periods, like the Edam, Schiedam and Zaandam in 
the spring of 1888. Van den Toorn complained about the scandalous treatment of foreign 
shipping lines by corrupted immigrant inspectors who even forged reports. Besides the 
legal costs the captains also needed to appear in court ausing extra logistical problems 
for the company. Instead of entrusting the cases to their lawyer Joachimsen and Governor 
Abbet, Van den Toorn hired George O. Glavis. He described the attorney having offices 
in the Washington Post building as: “the lobbyist of the Conference Lines knowing all the 
inside tracks”. Glavis charged less and could pull more strings439. He became the 
spokesman in Washington for three of the core-members of the New York Continental 
Conference; HAL, NGL and HAPAG. The other core membr, the RSL kept out because 
the divergent interests of the American owners in US migration and maritime policies 
were incompatible.440 As Van den Toorn stressed; “the lobbying efforts had to be kept 
secret from the INC that was working on a scheme to obtain support of the American 
government to the detriment of foreign lines.”441 Glavis also lobbied for other shipping 
lines, some of which only carried cargo as long as it did not conflict with the core-
members’ interests.442 
The founders of the International Navigation Company ssumed that the US 
Congress would support their undertaking to reposition he American flag on the North 
                                                 
438 The law also established that captains risked up to six months imprisonment for breaking the 
law. This was never enforced yet Van den Toorn stres ed that paying bail, appearing in court, hire lawyers 
and further proceedings were time consuming.  
439 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence 112-121, Letters May 24 1887, April 10, June 26 
and September 7 1888.  
440 A second lobbyist mentioned in the source is Mr. Sandford representing the British Lines. 
GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage, 222, Letter October 24 1892. 
441 Ibid. Letter October 16 1893. 
442 In 1893 Glavis renegotiated his salary with the shipping lines. He proposed a fixed salary of 
9000 dollars including expenses, excluding his lawyer fees when representing lines in court. Of the amount 
25% would be paid by the cargo lines, 75% by the passenger liners. The latter divided the share in 
proportion to the number of passengers carried. For the HAL the cost balanced between 750 and 800 
dollars which seemed reasonable to van den Toorn. Ibid. Letter October 16 1893. 
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Atlantic in 1872. More than a decade after the government had stopped giving direct 
subsidies to transatlantic steamship companies, the entrepreneurs sent a delegation to 
Washington lobbying for a lucrative mail subsidy. They received the support of the 
Secretary of Treasury, the postmaster general and the secretary of the Navy, yet the Ship-
subsidy Bill drawn up by the owners was not considere  by Congress (Flayhart, 2000, 
31-36). The US maritime policy protected its shipbuilders, by preventing foreign ships 
from registering under the American flag. Yet by doing this, it abandoned American 
shipowners by forcing them to buy national ships and letting them operate by nationals at 
higher costs. Moreover, the US authorities did not associate their military needs to the 
developments of the merchant marine as much as European governments did. This policy 
contributed to the further decline of the merchant marine, which right before the Civil 
War transported two-thirds of the import and export, decreasing to one-third in 1866 and 
to sixteen percent in 1881 (Safford, 1985, 58-59).443  
The lack of support for the American Line and the Rd Star Line in the 1870s 
illustrated the indifference of Congress towards American shipowners. They did not 
receive any subsidies or any preferential treatment against foreign competitors. The 
Postmaster gave the American mail to the fastest line regardless whether the ship was 
operated by nationals or not.444 However, Griscom, the manager of the INC, never really 
gave up on the idea and his efforts intensified in 1887 when the British government 
cancelled the mail subsidies given to the Inman Line shortly after it had been taken over 
by the International Navigation Company (Flayhart, 2000, 126-27). That same year the 
Belgian authorities reduced their annual subsidy by $50,000 bringing it back to 
$77,000.445 Van den Toorn reported that the INC tried to take dvantage of the growing 
American sentiment, agitating in the press to gain support for a ships-subsidy bill in order 
to pass the company’s Belgian and British ships under the American flag.446 Senator 
                                                 
443 After the Civil War the American authorities blocked out the re-entry of all vessels who had 
registered under foreign flags during the war (Safford, 1985, 61). 
444 BGRA, 4056, Letter of the Belgian envoy in Washington to MFA early 1877. 
445 BGRA, 4054 and 4059, Convention for a service to New York March 10 1887. Griscom spent 
several months in Belgium to renegotiate the contract. Especially the fact that the Belgian authorities no 
longer considered Vaderland, Zeeland and Nederland to be suitable and fast enough to carry mails caused 
difficulties. The RSL feared that questions would then be raised about the seaworthiness of the ships in the 
press which would harm the reputation of the company. In the end the ships were allowed to act only as 
substitutes for other ships. 
446 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, Letter April 10 1888.  
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William Frye became the leading proponent of governme t aid to the merchant marine, 
placing two law proposals before Congress resulting in the Postal Aid Act of 1891.  The 
bill, the first piece of legislation aiding the merchant marine in 32 years, allowed the 
Postmaster General to conclude contracts with American citizens running a line with 
American built, owned and officered ships.447 The Navy supervised the construction of 
these vessels to guarantee usefulness for military purposes (Flayhart, 2000, 133-134).  
Yet, no applications followed since the subsidy did not compensate the extra costs 
which American built and officered ships produced while the foreign flagged ships of the 
INC did not qualify. According to van den Toorn, an imminent war with Chili was staged 
by the Navy and the Republicans to influence both the upcoming presidential election so 
as to get a special law passed, allowing the newest British steamers of the American Line 
to register under the Stars and Stripes.448 In return Griscom committed to constructing 
two equivalents- of the City of Paris and City of New York in the US. After lobbying for 
20 years the INC finally obtained a subsidy of $25,000 to $40,000 per crossing for their 
first class steamers. Simultaneously, Griscom renegotiated the RSL contract with the 
Belgian authorities. The government withdrew the dir ct subsidy, yet it continued to give 
full ‘moral’ support, facilitating the company’s business as much as possible.449 Only half 
of the fleet had to remain under the Belgian flag while the contract of indefinite term 
could be ended by either party with three months notice. On one hand this gave Griscom 
the freedom to increase the lobbying efforts in Congress to also obtain subsidies for RSL 
ships. While on the other hand the INC manager could now threaten to move the line to a 
rival port, as a means of acquiring favors from the Belgian authorities.450  
                                                 
447 The sum of the subsidy depended on the size and speed of ships. The bill passed the house only 
after introducing an amendment reducing the amount f the subsidy by one third.  
448 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, Letters January 29 and May 6 1892.  
449 The Belgian authorities still had a say in sailing dates and port of call used by the RSL. The 
steamship company retained the exclusive right to carry mails unless another firm offered a faster servic  
from Antwerp. Two Belgian officials per sailing traveling on State mission could travel 1st class freeof 
charge except for the catering expenses. Extradited nationals, Belgian sailors in distress, and paupers not 
exceeding ten per ship would be transported for free, except catering expenses. The government took up the 
patronage of the company, keeping its title of Belgian Royal Mail Steamers. Reductions on railroad fares, 
the use of train stations as selling points and special connections to Paris, Basel and Cologne were 
guaranteed. BGRA, 4068, Contract between RSL and Belgian government 1892. 
450 Ibid., Letters August 12 and November 21 1892 and Report 1893.  This was done to pressure 
the Belgian authorities to improve the infrastructure in Antwerp, building a dry dock for the line’s bigger 
ships, enlarging and deepening the Westerschelde to allow their access to the port, buying new icebreakers, 
etc. The authorities quickly gave in to these demands.  
 242
The foreign lines which controlled the majority of the North Atlantic traffic feared 
that the renewed interest of the American Congress for the merchant marine could result 
in measures hindering their business interests. Through their lobbyist at Washington they 
influenced Congressmen to oppose laws favoring American over foreign ships for 
passenger and cargo trade. Van den Toorn mentioned various proposals circulating in 
Congress going from; (1) attributing special transfer facilities to American ships enabling 
the INC to monopolize the express goods coming from Europe, (2) differential tariffs to 
be levied on all goods arriving with foreign ships (3) increase the head-tax for passengers 
landed by foreign ships to $10.451 The tendency of passing measures regulating the 
migrant transport, which favored the national merchant marine over foreign competitors, 
was gaining grounds in Europe as the German border control stations in the hands of 
HAPAG and NGL illustrated. Yet no European governmet was in the position to favor 
its merchant marine by such measures as much as the American government.452 Avoiding 
this was a condition sine qua non for foreign lines, which explains the division of the 
shipping lobby in the US. 
Both fought immigration restrictions, but by using different lobbyists. The impact 
of the lobby is hard to measure, yet the shipping companies used various strategies to 
have their voice heard. For instance, when during the 1890s the agitation for immigration 
restrictions led to various congressional missions t  investigate the matter in Europe, they 
made sure that someone defending their interests traveled along too. This was the case 
too during the mission led by Weber, investigating among other things, the role of 
shipping companies as instigators of the migrant flow. Mr. Semsey of the Hungarian 
Association of New York accompanied Weber and needed to cancel his previously 
planned trip as a delegate of an association aimed at stimulating migration. Van den 
Toorn reassured the directors that their Hungarian employee by knowing Semsey quite 
well, made sure that their interests would be protected.453 General Spaulding, assistant of 
                                                 
451 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter May 23 1896. 
452 In case the American authorities would have passed laws favoring the American merchant 
marine could have driven many foreign steamship lines with other routes and possibly with them part of the 
transatlantic migrant traffic.   
453 The HAL employee also gave Mr. Mucs of the Hungarian Association a free passage round trip 
to ensure that HAL prepaid passengers would not encounter any troubles at the border control stations. 
Mucs also wanted get more uniformity into the travel route of migrants making the crossing through the 
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the Secretary of Treasury was next to travel on official mission to Europe. It was none 
other other than the lobbyist from the Continental lines, Glavis, that accompanied 
Spauldin; who had to report on new laws that might be promulgated regarding passenger 
traffic.454 By making sure someone defending the shipping interes s traveled along on 
those missions serving to promulgate new laws, it was one way of influencing the 
information flows on migration which found their way to Congress and the popular press.  
Another way used by the Conference lines was by appointing a commission 
screening the American press by separating newspapers gitating against foreign shipping 
lines and migration from those defending their interests. The commission hired a 
journalist to respond to the hostile articles in the press, and to write and collect 
propaganda to distribute to the agents via the travelers of the company.455 The travellers 
needed to investigate the opponents inland that could possibly be won over.456 About the 
effectiveness of the campaigns Van den Toorn reportd the following when, during the 
cholera scare, the Chandler bill prohibiting immigration was discussed in Congress: 
“…the bill stands a chance to pass the Senate (majority Republicans) yet not the 
House. The Eastern gutter press predicts that the law will pass while more serious 
papers don’t mention it. The secret agitation of the shipping lines out of 
Washington targeting the western voters through local western papers triggered an 
important wave of protest against restrictions. Western Senators and 
Representatives will not dare to vote in favor of the Chandler Bill unless a new 
wave of cholera brakes out again.”457  
 
With the foundation of the Immigration Restrictive L ague, the shipping lobby 
redoubled its efforts. From 1895 onwards the Dutch and German lines of the Continental 
Conference paid two Washington journalists, who worked as correspondents for various 
prominent American newspapers, $80 per week to agitate n favor of migration. Two 
years later the conference established the Immigration Protective League, which 
                                                                                                                                      
organization and promised to direct as many as possible via Rotterdam GAR, HAL, 318.02, General 
Correspondence, 112-121 Letter of van den Toorn July 7 1891. 
454 On their return from Bremen Glavis introduced Van den Toorn to Spaulding to reinforce the 
contacts between the Treasury Department and the shipping line. GAR, HAL, 318.02, General 
Correspondence, Letter July 6 1892 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-26, Letter July 28 
1892. 
455 Travelers are employees of the shipping companies who traveled across the US visiting agents 
controlling their sales, promoting the lines and reporting on the movements of the local markets.  
456 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 222, Letter October 26 1892. 
457 Ibid. 222, Letter January 5 1893. 
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coordinated the lobbying campaigns in the American press. The involvement of the 
shipping lines had to remain secret and therefore they hired Joseph H. Senner, former 
editor of the New York Staatszeitung and former Commissioner of Immigration at New 
York to head the league. During his term as commissioner he was known for bringing the 
shipping lines into disrepute (see 4.2.2.) and hence was the ideal person to counter 
suspicions of the shipping lines’ participation. Hetraveled around the country to recruit 
members and established offices all over the US. His salary was $500 a month, plus 
costs.458  
Finally, another way to create goodwill for the shipping interests among 
politicians was by financial contributions to party campaigns of Republicans and 
Democrats during elections. In 1894, for instance wh n it seemed likely that Republicans 
would take control of the House, Senate and the White House, the HAL decided to fund 
their election campaign. Van den Toorn reported that other lines, such as the NGL, did 
the same and by contributing $250 during the campaign much more could be obtained 
than with $5000 once they were in office.459 During the presidential elections two years 
later NGL, HAPAG and HAL channeled $5000 through Glavis to both the Republican 
and Democrat campaign funds. This was needed to prevent the passage of a differential 
tariff discriminating foreign lines, and other laws, hindering their business interests.460 
 
5) Corporate liberalism and the progressive era: The rise of the ‘Third House’ or 
the ‘Assistant Government’ regarding immigration issues 
 
 Steam shipping companies were important actors in shaping, enforcing and 
circumventing migrant legislation in the Atlantic World. When the American federal 
authorities took control of immigrant legislation during the 1880s the tendency to 
consider migration primary as a national, rather than international matter had set in on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Shipping companies used all schemes possible to protect their 
main source of revenue, the third-class migrant transport from restrictions. This ranged 
from; pro-immigration propaganda campaigns in the US press to influence public 
opinion; engaging lobbyists at Washington to influenc  Congressmen and migrant 
                                                 
458 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, Letter November 16 1897. 
459 Ibid. Letter October 3 1894.  
460 Ibid. Letter April 3 1896.  
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legislation; preparing passengers for the interrogati ns at control stations; directing 
passengers with high risks via alternative routes such as Baltimore or Canada where 
controls were more lenient than New York or to second-class to avoid inspections etc. 
Shipping companies were a key actor in the implementation of the immigration laws, 
especially with the growing tendency of American immigration control stations to put the 
responsibility of keeping the ‘undesired’ classes out, n the shipping lines.  
Previous studies on American immigrant policies have too often focused on 
Congressional debates and the laws it enacted, yet studies analyzing how the laws and 
policies are almost completely absent. Based on the failure of passing the literacy test 
many studies claim that the anti-immigration movement, as represented by the 
Immigration Restriction League, was unsuccessful in influencing migration policies 
based on eugenic theories. Yet, as argued here, eugnic prejudices towards the ‘new’ 
migrant wave found their way into immigration policies and control stations at the end of 
the 1880s. The main problem was not defining who was desirable or not, but more it was 
finding adequate means to adopt and implement policies to block the entry of 
‘undesirables’- meaning according to the Superintendent of Ellis Island, Weber, Italians, 
Russian Jews, Arabs, Slovaks, etc. Finding applicable means to reduce the ‘new’ 
migration flow, especially through the literacy dominated congressional immigration 
debates from 1890 to 1924. It became one of the topics of social reform during the 
progressive era during which the close ties between business interests and government 
authorities were consolidated, despite being contested.  
Besides, internal discord among different American States regarding immigration 
policies, the lobby of employers, migrant communities and steam-shipping companies 
help in explaining why it took so long for the literacy test to be passed. The various 
interests groups involved extended their influence as a result of the the institutional 
changes, increased bureaucracy and the decreasing influence of party politics during this 
period. Congress acquired a growing amount of responsibilities and gradually started to 
rely on lobbyists to collect information. By the turn of the century, lobbyists had invaded 
Washington, becoming the main source of information for Congressmen and Committees 
to decide on what and how to vote. For exceptional issues special investigation 
commissions received appropriations to collect scientif c information and recommend 
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legislation. The newly set up Senate and House Immigration Committees processed the 
bills and destroy them by keeping them in the committee; but when they reported those 
cases it usually formed the basis for action on the floor. Because of their influence these 
committees became the battlefield of restrictionist and pro-immigration lobbyists. Both 
sides stirred up constituents to put pressure on legislators, through mail or press 
campaigns, and supported the latter in election campaigns. How this battle between 
lobbyists free from legal restrictions and centering on the literacy test intensified during 
the following decades will be discussed in the following chapters (Clemens, 1997; Filne, 
1970, 20-34 Kolko, 1963; Logan and Patten, 1929, 56-60; McCormick 1981, 247-274, 
Tichenor, 2002).  
However, in the meantime at controls stations the vague legislation at hand 
allowed the immigrant inspectors to start selecting mi rants based on their origins. Under 
the excuse of health reasons, immigrant inspectors tried to send contract laborers or those 
‘likely to become a public charge’ back as much as po sible when economic or political 
pressure called for it. The impact on the immigrant flow of this policy remained, at first 
glance relatively small, yet the remote border control measures improved in the 
subsequent period debarring a growing number of newcomers. As a result of the efforts 
of shipping companies the impact remained fairly limited. 
 
Part III: The consolidation of transatlantic shipping companies and 
their efforts to protect the steerage market during the Progressive Era 
 
 Conference agreements boomed in the shipping industry at the end of the 
nineteenth century. At the brink of WOI, over a hundred agreements and consolidations 
regulated the foreign and domestic waterborne commerce in the US (Huebner, 1914, 75). 
As contemporaries noted, despite the booming market only a few new passenger lines got 
were established on the North Atlantic passenger traffic after 1890 and the ones that kept 
afloat played no important part in the general expansion of the trade (Gottheil, 1914, 49). 
This chapter analyzes the apparent success of the North-Atlantic passenger conferences 
in raising prices, stabilizing the market and closing down the points of entry for new 
companies. Most of the studies on shipping cartels have dealt with freight traffic; very 
few have looked at passenger traffic. Yet, as Keeling noted, it was not freight, but 
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passenger transport, especially that of migrants con tituted the main source of revenue of 
the large shipping companies that dominated the North-Atlantic, the biggest international 
shipping market (Keeling, 1999b, 40). It was not shippers, but migrant agents, who 
continued to supply these companies with steerage pssengers, a market feature which so 
far has remained untouched by maritime historians.  
How shipping companies rationalized the migrant agent-n twork through 
conference agreements and its impact on migration patterns will be analyzed in Chapter 
II. Of interest in this first chapter are the internal and external pressures on the continental 
market, as experienced by the Holland America Line. To what extent did the evolving 
internal agreements manage to neutralize the competition between the members? How 
did other sub-markets, new passenger lines and increased government interference 
influence the organization of the continental traffic? Focus remains on the US market of 
passage sales. For a long time, shipping cartels managed to remain outside the attention 
of the anti-trust movement, which was initiated by the Sherman Anti-trust act and raged 
throughout the Progressive Era. It allowed the passenger liners to quickly expand 
conference agreements to other segments of the business, as those regulating the 
westbound steerage market proved successful. This chapter analyzes the role of the 
Continental lines as a driving force behind the rapid development of the conference 
system through which they tried to reduce the external pressures. They also adapted some 
clauses within the continental pool-agreement to even out the internal pressures.  
The continuous trend towards consolidation and the legal uncertainty engendered 
by American legislation favored the formation of mergers which also affected the 
shipping world. The attempt of J.P. Morgan to expand his business philosophy of vertical 
integration to the shipping industry with the establishment of the IMM, and its impact on 
the North Atlantic steerage market, will be discussed. In the meantime the steerage traffic 
increased but it was very uneven in the various sub-markets through which the traffic was 
organized. It will be shown how the Continental lines neutralized, the pressures on one 
hand of the British lines the pressure to enlarge their continental share, and on the other 
hand the drive of various governments trying to exploit the increasing continental 
migration flow to stimulate their merchant marine. How successful was the continental 
conference in preventing established and new companies from enlarging or acquiring a 
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market share? What were the barriers of entry into the conference? To what extent did the 
American anti-trust threat influence the strategies used to fight new lines and to force 
entry?  How did it affect the internal relations among the NDLV pool members? What 
was the impact of all this on the steerage rates?  
In the end because of the foreign control over most of the traffic, the secrecy of 
the agreements, and accumulating tensions on the migration issue during the Progressive 
Era the anti-trust campaign, caught up with the shipping industry. The strategies used by 
the shipping lines to defend the existence of the conference system during the federal 
investigation sheds some light on the growing fusion between public opinion, business 
interests, legislators and academics during this period. This trend will come forward 
much more when discussing the impact of shipping companies on the enactment of 
immigration laws and the implementation thereof in Chapter III and IV.  
 
Chapter I: Consolidation, success and failures of passenger conferences during the 
Anti-Trust Era: 1896-1914 
 
1)  Expansion and consolidation of the North-Atlantic continental conference 
agreements between 1896 and 1904. 
 
1.1) Releasing the competitive pressures in other trade departments 
 
 The agreement between the British, Mediterranean and Continental Conferences 
for third-class westbound passage constituted a landm rk for tightening the cartel 
organizations competing for the North Atlantic traffic. Yet, the lack of agreements on 
eastbound third-class, first- and second-cabin passage till left a lot issues unresolved. 
The competition for these passengers could quickly build up tensions between the lines 
undermining the third-class westbound agreements. To ease these pressures the various 
conferences negotiated agreements regulating the entir  North Atlantic passenger traffic. 
Freight traffic posed less problems between the confere ces since it wasn’t profitable for 
British lines to make the detour of calling at continental ports for goods, while German 
lines calling at English ports only took or delivered mail and cabin passengers.  
Internally the members of the NDLV, spurred by the success of the pool 
agreement for third-class passenger traffic, fixed minimum rates for freights and pooled 
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the revenues.461 It allowed the passenger lines to face the stronger outside competition for 
freight than for passenger transport. Most of the refined goods found their way to 
passenger liners because of their superior speed and service, yet for other cargo, 
specialized freight lines and more flexible tramp ship  competed for a share of the traffic.  
No agreement could be reached for the eastbound leg of the trip.462 Consisting mainly of 
raw materials and cereals, the eastbound market fluctuated much more and impeded the 
implementation of fixed minimum rates (Gottheil, 1914, 49; Huebner, 1914, 77; Murken, 
1922, 119-141; Smith, 1906, 249-253). The rise of cruise business during the 1890s and 
the growing attendance of transatlantic visitors at World Fairs organized in Europe, 
reflects the fast growing transatlantic tourism which consisted mainly of Americans 
(Cornelis, 1993, 57-64; appendix).  
Migrants quickly took over a large part of the second cabin compartment. The 
price difference with third-class averaged about $10, a margin which became fixed with 
the NDLV agreements. As seen before, the exemption of i spection at the port of arrival 
represented a strong argument for migrants to travel in second-class. Statistics of the first 
decade of HAL’s second-cabin traffic illustrate how the rates followed the increasing 
demand for the service. The parallel evolution of tightening controls at the American 
Gate also contributed to this evolution.463  









to dollars  
1886 1374 63,3 25,3 
1887 1606 63,9 25,5 
1888 1919 65,1 26 
1889 2106 62,2 24,9 
1890 2553 63,4 25,4 
1891 2877 67,5 27 
                                                 
461 The percentages as divided between the Lines in 1894, based on the figures of the three 
preceding years: HAPAG, 37,75; HAL, 18; NGL, 23,75 and RSL 20,50. Murken estimated that the Lines 
attracted approximately 85 to 90 % of the total traffic from their home ports (Murken, 1922, 127). 
462 The only exception being the traffic between the US and the Baltic for which the HAPAG 
created the Baltic Pool (Murken, 1922, 140). 
463 The correspondence of the New York head agent corrob ates this, yet the suspension of 
steerage traffic following the cholera scare in 1892 artificially swelled the figures for 1892 and 1893. The 
numbers plummeted with the subsequent recession. 
464 The source did not specify whether these were net or gross prices. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage 
Department, 221-226, Letter September 15 1896. 
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1892 3448 81,3 32,6 
1893 4202 92,6 37 
1894 1561 93,7 37,5 
1895 1241 94,3 37,7 
 
The competition for tourist passengers between the Continental and British lines was 
keener than for steerage. Tourists had less financial restrictions, proved much more 
sensitive to technological innovations and their routes were less defined. Attempts by of 
the Continental lines to pool the traffic without parallel agreements with the British lines 
therefore quickly failed. In the wake of the third class westbound agreement, the British 
and Continental lines concluded minimum rate agreements midway through 1896. It 
included the fixed differential of $10 between second- and third-class for all steamship 
lines to reduce the interference with each other.465 The large number of subdivisions 
within first- and second-class accommodations and constant changes therein, prevented 
lasting rate agreements. Yet through constant renegotiations the main actors of the North 
Atlantic cabin passenger traffic managed to neutralize the competition (Murken, 1922, 
90-118). In the meantime, due to the large overcapacity nd the lack of agreements for 
eastbound steerage traffic with the British lines, r turn migrants paid approximately $10 
less to go back home than to reach the US on the sam hip.  
 
1.2) Rising the Eastbound steerage rates to Westbound levels 
 
 Van den Toorn repeatedly expressed his frustrations, stating that there shouldn’t 
be any reason for eastbound rates to be lower than t ose westbound. He urged the 
directors to negotiate an agreement setting equal rates in both directions. The lack of 
agreements with the British lines obstructed the effici ncy of the eastbound pool 
concluded between the NDLV members.466 Out of fear of losing continental passengers 
to the British lines, the rates could not be raised as the Continental lines had hoped for. It 
                                                 
465 According to the initial NDLV pool agreements (art 21) the lowest cabin rate had to be at least 
50% higher than the steerage rate of the same Line and at least 30 Marks higher than the highest steerag  
rate of any of the other lines. Yet the Lines never managed to implement these large differentials. When t e 
British Lines joined the agreement the differential was set at 50 Marks westbound and 10 dollars 
eastbound. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 580, NDLV agreement January 1892 and meeting 
December 12 1895, minute 182.  
466 The eastbound pool started on November 1 1892. Ibid , NDLV meeting December 12 1892, 
minute 53. 
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also impeded the working of the pool whereby lines exceeding their quota raised their 
prices, allowing the ones with a minus to fill up their quotas at higher rates.467 The 
negotiations did not lead to the formation of a pool but only to rate agreements. The 
bigger lines; Cunard, American and White Star Line agreed not to quote lower, through 
rates to the continent, than the express services of the HAPAG and NGL, while the 
British slow lines committed not to go below the lowest fare quoted by Continental lines 
(Murken, 1922, 63).  
Despite the contract, the lines remained relatively r stricted in setting the prices 
according to the pool ideology. The gap with the westbound rates hardly decreased as the 
agreement did little to reduce the competitive pressures. At the end of 1896 the 
Continental lines estimated that the British lines acquired nearly 10% of the eastbound 
continental market. It forced the German lines to reduce their rates for the regular service 
(see appendix).468 With the lower railroad rates from Hamburg and Bremen to the East, 
the Rotterdam route became more expensive creating  minus for the HAL in the 
continental eastbound pool. Yet, if the HAL reduced their prices to catch up with the 
German lines’ plus, the slow British lines would follow allowing them to attract 
passengers who would be lost for the continental pool. In the interest of the pool, the 
Dutch company maintained its rates accepting the compensation for their minus paid by 
the German lines at the end of the year. Financially this option resulted in being more 
profitable for the HAL, yet in the long run it threat ned to drive the company out of the 
eastbound market.469 It wanted to temporarily cut in the interior railroad rates from 
Rotterdam to reduce their minus without lowering the ocean passage fare, but the other 
lines opposed the idea.  
The Dutch company needed to await a more specific rate agreement between 
British and Continental lines, containing differentiations per continental port instead of 
covering the whole continental range. This specification prevented slow British lines 
                                                 
467 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters September 11, 15, 16 18 and 
October 27 1896. 
468 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter July 30 1897. 
469 In 1896 the compensation came to twenty dollars while t e HAL quoted 25 dollars eastbound. 
The cost per steerage passenger being estimated at n dollars left an approximate financial gain of five 
dollars. The compensation had gradually increased form 10 dollars in 1892, to 15 the following year. The 
subsequent rate war temporarily obstructed the upward trend. Ibid. Letters September 18 1896 and July 30 
1897 and NDLV meetings February 16 1893, minute 59 and December 18 1893, minute 95. 
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from quoting HAL rates to Hamburg, still the continental port of predilection of the 
British lines.470 The British lines seemed unable to direct part of he eastbound stream 
through Rotterdam. With this adaptation, the Continental lines could reintroduce the 
differentials on ocean passage between each other enabling the HAL to fill its quota. Yet, 
the interdependency between steerage and second cabin rates prevented the shipping 
companies from raising the eastbound prices at westbound levels. The New York head-
agent of the HAL reported constant disputes between th  German lines on second cabin 
rates. Only midway through 1901 did all the lines rach a consensus agreeing to jointly 
raise eastbound rates with $2.471 Gradually the eastbound rates closed the gap with 
westbound fares. It fully materialized after the rate war with the Cunrad Line when the 
French line could finally be convinced of joining the NDLV-pool.  
Graph 1: HAL Price evolutions west and eastbound steerage passage 1885-1905 










































































































































1.3) The NDLV-headaches caused by the solitary course of the CGT 
 
                                                 
470 Ibid., 580,  Agreement between the British Lines and NDLV June 7 1898. 




 As seen in the previous section the Northern Italy, France, Switzerland, and the 
Orient (Asia, Africa, Turkey and Greece) had been dclared as exempted territories 
because of the French line’s refusal to join the pool agreements. The RSL, HAPAG and 
HAL formed a money pool for these regions quoting special rates to meet the CGT’s 
competition.472 The collaboration between both parties improved over the years. The 
CGT joined the New York continental conference to gain control over the agents and 
raise rates, however despite the agreements it continued its individual course violating the 
rules whenever the company judged that opportunistic behavior might grant greater 
returns. It centered its efforts on afore mentioned exempted territories, rather than the 
eastern European market. Through Marseille and the feeder service from the Messageries 
Maritime, the CGT gained a strong foothold on the new oriental market. To do this it 
often quoted special rates, like for instance when tensions between the Ottoman Empire 
and Greece were strong in 1897, making special arrangements with the Greek consul in 
the US to transport nationals wanting to defend their ome country. The line also cut into 
the railroad rates and continued to give special faci ities to some migrant brokers, such as 
Fugazi, Zotti & Company and Zwilchenbart & Company paying out extra commissions 
and allowing them to use cash-orders instead of prepaids (see chapter II).473  
The competition for exempted territories made traveling to or from some places in 
Alsace, Lorraine and Switzerland cheaper than Rotterdam. When the CGT started 
seeking expansion to the east, the need for an agreement became more pressing. Rates to 
South Austria also needed to be lowered making it more and more difficult for the 
NDLV-lines to prevent these prices from affecting other destinations of continental 
market. Passengers living in the neighborhood of Vienna could take advantage of the low 
South Austrian rate, as they were forwarded via that city.474 Further east however the 
CGT encountered much more difficulties to penetrate the market which an agent of the 
French line had labeled as ‘holy northern pool territory’.  Taking Russians through ports 
                                                 
472 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 580, NDLV, meeting February 19, 1892, minute 9. 
473 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters May 14, 25, June 25, July 6 1897; 
February 25 1898; March 31 and April 4 1899.   
474 Midway 1901 prepaid tickets from Rotterdam cost 34 dollars while from Basel, Bern and 
Innsbruck, including the inland fare the passage amounted to 32,65, 33,15 and 30,95 dollars respectively.  
Ibid. Letters June 22, September 13 1901; March 25 1902. 
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other than Antwerp, Hamburg, Bremen or Rotterdam seemed impossible to him.475 
Therefore, the French line finally decided to join the westbound pool in 1903. The 
company’s share was set at 11.7%.  It was based on the passengers carried from 1900 
until 1902 and was divided into on one hand continetal passengers and on the other hand 
Italian and Oriental passengers. Satisfied with theoutcome, the CGT joined the 
eastbound pool the following year based on same princi als acquiring 15.21% of the total 
traffic. Finally, all the principal Continental lines within the Hamburg-Le Havre range 
were united in the NDLV pool agreement.476 
 
1.4) The vendetta of C. B. Richard& Co: Anti-Trust laws and interference from the 
Mediterranean 
 
 The growing Mediterranean traffic attracted new companies to the Italian shores. 
The HAL considered opening a direct service to Italy with their oldest steamers, Didam 
and Dubbledam. Yet, the inability of getting their hands on goods for the Mediterranean 
route making the trip profitable proved too difficult. Also, accidents with both ships 
especially the Dubbledam earning the knick name ‘Troubledam’, continuously harmed 
the company’s reputation. The HAL therefore gave up on the idea, but many others did 
not.477 With their larger fleets, the German lines could more easily react to new market 
opportunities and opened direct services to Italy. Through the pool agreement of 1896 
they managed to exclude the British lines, except for he Anchor Line from the booming 
market. Nonetheless, the NGL and HAPAG could not prevent new lines from penetrating 
the market.  
 One of these new ventures, the Atlantic Line, was announced by Oscar Richard, 
manager of C. B. Richard. The former passage agent of the HAPAG took on the head-
agency in New York.478 The HAPAG had every intention of making Richard’s attempt 
fail, but a new interpretation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act by the Supreme Court in the 
1897 Trans-Missouri Case, made the German line reconsider its strategies. The court 
                                                 
475 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence 115, November 21 1900. 
476 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 580, Agreement G and L between NDLV and CGT 
of 1903 and 1904 respectively. 
477 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters September 26 and October 16 
1891.  
478 Ibid., Letter July 8 1896. 
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ruling declared all combinations regulating commerce, keeping prices high and stable to 
be unlawful. The verdict created a shock effect among the American business 
community. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 expressed the growing fears of the public 
towards the ascendancy of big business which threaten d to undermine the country’s 
liberal ideals. Aiming at preventing the formation f business combinations that could 
acquire a monopoly the Act declared ‘restraints of trade’ in the form of trusts to be 
illegal. Congress acknowledged the need for reasonable restraints, in some cases, yet it 
failed to specify when and how to implement the act, leaving the interpretation of the law 
to court rulings. The interpretation of the Supreme Court in 1897 declared all restraints of 
trade, regardless of whether they were reasonable or not, to be illegal (Bittlingmayer, 
1996, 375-378; Blackford and Kerr, 1986, 222-224; Chandler, 1977, 172; Weinstein, 
1968, 66-68).  
 All traffic associations, including the shipping conference system, seemed to be 
called into question. As van den Toorn noted they now seemed liable for prosecution by 
Richard’s Atlantic Line or by any agent falling under the conference authority. During 
the next two decades, the conference lines regularly conferred with their lawyers to 
determine the legality of their actions and how to circumvent anti-trust laws. Out of fear 
that the conference system be declared unlawful, the shipping companies often adapted 
their policies, especially towards new entrants trying to penetrate the market. New 
companies, such as the Prince Line used the legislation to force their way into the 
conference. The Prince Line substituted the unsuccesful Atlantic Line in 1897 providing 
a direct service between Naples and New York.479 Richard also represented this line in 
the US and used the press to fight the competition of the Mediterranean Conference. This 
competition was fueled by the personal vendetta betwe n Richard and his former 
associate and head-agent of HAPAG, Emil Boas. Richard accused the conference of 
blocking out the Prince Line in the Journal of Commerce. He challenged the right of 
conference lines to prohibit its agents from selling tickets of non-conference members. 
Following the attack, the conference lines met to discuss the issue. Van den Toorn 
                                                 
479 The Atlantic Line operating from Genoa did not manage to establish a regular service. Ships 
often waited in ports for cargo while the prohibition of conference agents to work for the line hindere  the 
bookings and expedition of passengers. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter May 15 
1897. 
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suggested that the best way to solve the problem was to accept the Prince Line in the 
conference. Despite Boas’ strong opposition Richard obtained an initial victory, as 
shortly after the Mediterranean Lines took up the Prince Line into the conference, 
allocating a percentage of the traffic to the company nd allowing it to be represented by 
its agents.480  
 The British Dominion Line used the same strategy two years later to get the 
clause abolished which blocked the British lines from the westbound Mediterranean 
market.481 The British lines quickly realized their misjudgments on future market growth 
of the subdivisions of North Atlantic passenger traffic after signing the 1896 agreement. 
Having settled predominantly for the receding British-Scandinavian market, they were 
left with little to no marge de maneuvre on the rapidly growing Continental and 
Mediterranean markets. Therefore other British lines quickly followed into the opening 
Dominion Line created to get a share of the Mediterranean market. They joined various 
new Italian lines which gained access to the confere ce due to protective measures 
imposed by the Italian government guaranteeing the national companies a nice slice of 
the profitable cake (Molinari, 2002, 240).482  
 The constant expansion of the conference kept down the rates, which had already 
started off below continental fares, partly due to the inferior ships used on that route. As 
the rate difference increased, a growing number of continental passengers were booked 
through Italian ports. To prevent the Mediterranean from affecting the continental 
market, prices to the Mediterranean needed to be increased. Conference agreements 
remained the best way of doing this and gradually the prices to and from the 
Mediterranean increased, but the differential with t e continental fares never 
                                                 
480 Ibid., Letters March 27, April 6 1897; October 25 1898 and Journal of Commerce “Rival 
Mediterranean Lines: Prince Line charges Competitors with Conspiracy” October 22 1898. 
481 The Dominion Line opened a service to Boston in 1901. It used the same arguments as the 
Prince Line to denounce the conference practices of neutralizing competition in the Boston Herald. To get
local support for its case it also portrayed the conference system as a scheme of the port of New York 
interests against to counter the competition of other Atlantic ports. 
482 The Mediterranean Conference which when Prince Line tered included Navigazione Italiana, 
HAPAG, NGL, Bordeaux Line, Fabre Line, CGT, Anchor Line, HAL and RSL expanded as follows:  
(1901) La Veloce; (1902) Dominion Line; (1904) Austro-Americana, Compagnia Transatlantica, Cunard 
Line, White Star Line; (1905) Lloyd Italiano, American Line; (1907) Hellenic Line, Sicula Americana, 
Italo-New York Line, Lloyd Sabaudo and  (1909) National Greek Line.  
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disappeared.483 The Italian law of 1901 gave the authority to the commissioner of 
migration to have a say in the setting of the steerag  prices (Murken, 1922, 73). Despite 
the differential, and because of the improving collaboration between the conferences, 
special measures could be introduced to prevent continentals from traveling at lower 
Italian rates (see chapter II, 2.4). 
  
 1.5) Remaining Internal pressures among NDLV members 
 
 Besides the afore-mentioned external pressures, th NDLV-members still faced 
internal tensions centering on the tonnage clause, the German boarder control stations 
and the quality of the passengers. The NDLV agreements contained a clause stipulating 
that the quotas could be adapted according to alterations in tonnage. The agreements 
stated that the aim of the conference was to reduce competition and that the companies 
would respect the percentages, however one could not take away the right of a company 
to expand their fleet or increase their frequency of navigation. Seventy percent of each 
increase of 1000 tons towards the reference year 1890 was counted for the line that in 
return was allotted a certain number of steerage passengers. To make the tonnage count a 
minimum number of passengers needed to be aboard. As seen before, the clause pushed 
the lines to at times cut their rates when the minium could not be reached through 
regular bookings. Moreover, it obstructed the pool idea of having members with a plus 
increase their prices allowing members with a minus to book at more profitable rates. 
Companies with a plus were reluctant to raise their prices to avoid their tonnage not being 
counted for because of lack of passengers.  
It also generated a keen competition to increase the tonnage on the route.484 The 
math done by Murken showed that tonnage increased by 51 percent, in comparison with 
1890, during the first six years of the pool. Together with the decreasing migration during 
these years the number of passengers transported per 1000 tons dropped from 119 to a 
mere 38. The tonnage clause allowed the HAPAG to increase its share (WB + 1,84; EB + 
5,18) to the detriment of the NGL (WB, -1,59; EB, -3 21) and RSL (WB, -0,79; EB -
                                                 
483 Murken quotes an average difference of 25 francs (Murken, 1922, 63). After the rate war 
triggered by the Cunard Line the augmentation of Mediterranean prices closed the gap a little with 
continental fares, yet the fares never reached the ame level.  
484 Letters October 2 1896, June 6, September 9, 1897 
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1,11) while the HAL (WB +0,54; EB, -0,86) managed to contain its position. Especially, 
the relations between the German lines suffered as HAPAG closed the gap on the NGL. 
During the renegotiations of the pool agreements in 1898 the NGL only wanted to extend 
its participation on the condition that the tonnage clause was excluded. After long 
discussions as to what bases the new fixed percentages should be based upon, the lines 
reached the following compromise; again as compared to the reference year of 1890 
(Murken, 1922, 80-86).485  
 WB 1899 WB1890 +/- EB 1899 EB 1890 +/- 
HAPAG 30,71 0,95+ 26,47 8+ 
HAL 9,78 0,45+ 13,32 -3 
NGL 44,14 -1,4 41,53 -2 
RSL 15,37 0 18,68 -2 
 
The percentages remained unchanged, with the exception of a slight concession (WB 
0.5%; EB, 1%) of the NGL towards the HAPAG in 1908. The fixed quotas relieved the 
tensions only to become a reason for internal discord again during the renegotiations of 
1913. With the end of the tonnage clause, the German lines abandoned their specialized 
freight and third-class services known as the Roland and Union Line.  
Another point of tension that remained unsolved wasthe competition for cheap 
railroad fares. In the US the Interstate Commerce Commission supervised the rates while 
a railroad clearing house at Ellis Island divided the raffic under the railroads and assisted 
passengers to their inland destinations. The commission reduced the competition between 
railroads, allowing them to strengthen their positin towards the steamship lines. Because 
of the improved collaboration between American railro ds, shipping companies no longer 
managed to obtain competitive advantages on inland passenger rates. Some railroads 
reduced, or even withdrew the payment of commission on inland tickets sold by migrant 
                                                 
485 
Westbound joint NDLV tonnage Passengers # passengers per 1000 tons 
1890 1775 839 210 598 119 
1892 1505 209 214 753 143 
1893 2123 899 211 656 99 
1894 2051 720 84 610 41 
1895 2114 212 127 111 60 
1896 2383 881 129 554 54 
1897 2480 718 83 699 34 
1898 2686 050 102 886 38 
 
 259
agents in connection with steamship tickets. The railroads withdrew facilities given to 
traveling representatives of the steamship lines for some time. Moreover, the railroad 
migrant tariffs increased and were also called intoquestion at some stage. The concord 
between the railroads suffered various crisis before 1914, yet the Interstate Commerce 
Commission prevented steamship companies from exploiting this in their favor as they 
did in the past.  
In Europe, railroad fares and transit facilities resulted were much harder to 
regulate. The long-awaited list reducing the common p ints to and from where the lines 
provided through booking facilities from 12,000 to 300 destinations did not alleviate the 
tensions between the lines generated by the inland f re. By taking care of forwarding 
passengers from these points the NDLV-lines wanted to curtail the influence of the 
expedients on the migrant traffic. Yet, to most of he points the HAL lacked the means to 
arrange the through booking properly. Often, the company could only send money to the 
passenger who had to buy the train ticket to one of the main transit points himself. 
Because of the bad service prepaid through-bookings dropped spectacularly from an 
average of 65 percent (1888-1892) to 25 percent (1893-1896). Other pool members 
showed similar figures. Van den Toorn suggested limiting the through-booking facilities 
to major transit points instead of taking responsibility for transportation to places on 
which the company neither had control nor supervision. The biggest problem was making 
sure the luggage followed to these points. If all lines followed suit they could maybe put 
an end to the continuous rate cutting and instead establish prices on a fair kilometer 
bases. The original plan of the NDLV-members of quoting uniform fares to the common 
points had never materialized. Because of the geographical advantages of Hamburg and 
Bremen for passengers from Northern Germany, Russia and Galicia; RSL and HAL sold 
railroad tickets to and from the home port below cost. This competition kept the prices 
inland down until HAL, after several refusals by the RSL to significantly increase theirs, 
introduced a new reduction at the turn of the century. Afterwards, the rates finally seemed 
to have stabilized and complaints about the expedition of passengers diminished (see 
table I and annex 5).486 The NDLV members finally seemed to have settled for the 
                                                 
486 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226; Letters August 1; September 1 1897; 
February 4; March 23 1898; September 28; July 16 1899; June 6 1902; January 1 1903. 
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differentials from their respective ports to the main transit points, as given in tables 3 and 
4.  
Table III: HAL rate evolution in dollars to and fro m some important transit 
points487 
 
Destination  1893 1895 1900 1907/09 
Agram  14,15 11,5 8,4 8,4 
Budapest 11,95 8,78 7,55 7,55 
Chur   6,03  6,7 
Debreczin 13,6 10,18  9 
Kaschau 13,6 7,9 7,9 7,55 
Oderberg 5,87  5,6 5,6 
Oswieczim 6,07  5,7 5,7 
Prag  8,95 7,55  4,6 
Szegedin 13,6 11,2  8,75 
Temesvar  13,6 11,6  9,15 
Triest  12,2 11,25 9,55 9,35 
Wien  7,18 7,18 6 6 
 
Table IV: Continental lines’ inland fare to and from main eastern European transit 
points in 1902488 
 
 CGT RSL HAPAG NGL HAL 
Agram 13,55 9,6 7,4 8 8,4 
Budapest 12,6 8,05 5,8 6,85 7,55 
Fiume  12 9,9 7,3 9,05 8,4 
Innsbruck 8,8 6,9 6,2 6,35 5,95 
Karlstadt 14,95 9,85 7 8 8,4 
Laibach 11,7 8,6 6,8 7,4 8,5 
Oderberg 12,25 6.05 3,9 4,1 5,6 
Oswiecim 12,45 6,3 4 4,25 5,7 
Triest 12 9,7 7,9 8,45 9,35 
Vienna  9 6,5 4,65 5,3 6 
 
 With both prices and quotas fixed, the competition moved even more towards to 
quality of service and the quality of passengers transported. The quality of service did not 
                                                 
487 Ibid., Letters August 24 1894; December 6 1895; February 6 1900; Circular Zotti  October 
1905; HAL rate sheet April 12 1907; Uranium Line that rate sheet November 29 1909, the company quoted 
the same rates as HAL. 
488 Ibid., Letter July 15 1902. 
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limit itself to the ocean leg of the trip but extend d from the place of departure to the final 
destination, as companies assisted the passengers whenever possible. Arrangements 
ensuring a fluid transit to and from and to the ports constituted an important part of that 
service. Special assistance and facilities at key transit points helped the passengers on 
their way. The HAL not only opened offices at key transit points but also built a hotel in 
Leipzig for that purpose. This was the company’s second hotel, after opening one also in 
Rotterdam. By providing cheap lodging at the port the company, not only tried to reduce 
the costs of migrating via Rotterdam but above all wanted to protect its clients from 
scalpers making a living off defrauding migrants. The HAL took up the responsibility of 
defending the reputation of the migrant route which, to some extent, had been looked 
after by the Dutch authorities.  
On board more and more companies adapted their steerage accommodation to 
second-class standards. HAL converted its steerage dormitories into closed staterooms 
fitting a maximum of six passengers, by the turn of the century. It gave the passengers 
more space and privacy while the sanitary conditions a d ventilations also improved to 
ensure a pleasant crossing. The company put a lot of stress on the good treatment of the 
passengers by the personnel. About thirty people att nded the third-class passengers 
during their crossing. They cleaned the steerage compartments on a regular basis and 
served the food in ever more spacious dining rooms. In these, the HAL also started to 
provide some entertainment for steerage passengers. They made sure that food was 
abundant and of good quality.489 Occasional stories of starving, weakened migrants 
arriving in New York because of malnutrition at sea during the sailing ship era totally 
disappeared from the sensational press, with the introduction of steam. For many steerage 
passengers, the quality and quantity of the menu on board exceeded the rations they had 
at home.490  
                                                 
489 The cost of the food over the years fluctuated. The document did not specify the currency yet 
by comparing the price evolution for catering at Ellis Island it seems likely that the figures reflect the daily 
cost per passenger in dollars. During the 1880’s prices decreased from 0,5 to 0,4 and reaching 0,35 at the 
beginning of 1890’s. Midway the 1890’s it increased again to 0,4 to reach a low point of 0,3 at the turn of 
the century. From 1907 onwards it stabilized at 0,4. GAR, HAL, 318.16 Museum, 53, Staten van 
voedingskosten van passagiers 1883-1919. 
490 What follows is an example of a menu on board of a slow steamer of a well established 
steamship line: Breakfast consisted daily of; cereal, coffee, white bread and either butter or prune jam. In 
the afternoon coffee and dried bread. On Sundays this was changed to chocolate and coffee cake. The day 
by day menu of dinners and suppers consisted of: Day 1: Dinner: macaroni soup, boiled beef, potatoes, 
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Even in the first half of the nineteenth century, interests involved in the migrant 
business were well aware of the importance of a good reputation of a migrant route. In a 
migratory system dominated by chain migration patterns where word of mouth played a 
crucial role at the hour in deciding if when, and how to travel. Steam shipping reinforced 
these patterns by allowing seasonal repeat migration to develop. A good service allowed 
the company to attract regular customers. Both, the increased competition between 
steam-shipping companies and transatlantic migration patterns favored an improved 
service which as the HAL promoted itself centered on ‘good treatment, good food, 
comfort and convenience’.491 
 The quality of the passengers depended both on the means of the migrants and the 
likelihood of being deported- in which ethnic background played an important role. The 
US authorities’ preferences towards the migrants from certain ethnic groups were 
reflected by shipping companies. Jews, especially those from Russia, enjoyed the worst 
reputation among the continental passengers. Many Jews, often forced to flee because of 
political repression, lacked the means to migrate and relied on the assistance of all sorts 
of aid societies.492 These passengers spent less in the port and on the ship and frequently 
could not even afford board and lodging before embarking. As the American authorities 
refined the clause ‘likely to become a public charge’ using $10 and later $25 as 
                                                                                                                                      
white bread. Supper: stew of meat, potatoes, black bread, butter and tea. Day 2: Dinner; Lentil soup, boiled 
fish, potatoes, gravy, white bread. Supper: hash potatoes, dill pancake, tea, black bread, and butter. Day 3: 
Dinner: stewed liver, gravy, potatoes, stewed rice with dried apples and raisins, white bread. Supper: 
Boiled fish, potatoes, gravy, tea, black bread, and butter. Day 4: Dinner: salt pork, potatoes, string beans, 
white bread. Supper: Sausage, potatoes, tea, black read, butter. Day 5: Dinner: soup meat, stewed leftovers 
of roasts, potatoes, white bread. Supper: Sauerkraut with leftovers, potatoes, tea, black bread, and butter. 
Day 6: Dinner: sausage, potatoes, a vegetable mixture, white bread. Supper: pickled herring, potatoes, tea, 
black bread. Day 7: Dinner: soup, corned beef, potatoes, white bread. Supper: Mutton stew, cabbage, 
potatoes, tea, black bread, butter. Day 8: Dinner: macaroni soup, meat with gravy, potatoes, l ntils, raisin 
bread. Supper: Potatoes, with meat gravy, tea, black bread, butter. Day 9: Dinner: Pea soup, either herring 
or meat with gravy, potatoes, cabbage, bread. Supper: Canned fish, potatoes, tea, black bread, butter. 
Day 10: Dinner: Vegetable soup, leftovers of roast, potatoes, white bread. Supper: Hash potatoes, pickle, 
tea, black bread. Day 11: Dinner: Soup, salt pork, potatoes, cabbage, bread, Supper: sausages, potatoes, tea, 
black bread, butter. Day 12 Dinner: Soup, beef, potatoes, string beans, white bread. Supper: boiled eggs, 
fried potatoes, bread (Dillingham Commission Reports, 1911, vol 37, 24). 
491 GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Department, 49-58, 97, 160 and 190, Letter February 1 1914. 
492 The average amount of money shown by European immigrants admitted to the United States 
per ethnicity during the six fiscal years ending June 30, 1909 was as follows; the French showing the 
highest with $60,27; the Lithuanians the lowest with $11,01 per capita. Among the races showing the 
largest number of immigrants and the smallest amount f money per capita were the Polish with an averag  
of $11,70; the Hebrew $13,93 and South Italian, $14,38 (Dillingham Commission Reports, 1911, vol. 4, 
39). 
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prerequisite for entry, the financial means of the passenger gained importance. Therefore, 
especially the NGL and RSL were known to center their efforts on the Austrian-
Hungarian rather than the Russian market.  
For economic rather than anti-Semitic reasons RSL introduced discriminatory 
prices for Jews midway the 1890s while setting up a big propaganda campaign in Austria. 
The express steamers Saint Paul and Saint Louis of RSL’s sister company, the American 
Line were put on the Antwerp-New York route for that purpose. The measures coincided 
with the end of the ‘Wiener cartel’- which had operat d between RSL and HAL (1892-
1895). The ‘small’ lines had joined efforts for the business transiting through Vienna as a 
precaution against the ‘big’ lines underlining their mistrust towards the true intentions of 
the German companies with the NDLV-pool. The cartel divided the cash business 
contracted through Vienna into 44% for the HAL and 56% for the RSL. Yet nine months 
after terminating the agreement the RSL managed to acquire 69.5% of the total business, 
including prepaid ticket holders going through the Austrian capital. The Dutch company 
disapproved of the policy of discriminating against certain markets to specialize in 
another. It pointed to the recently established Oesterreichs Colonial Gesellschaft aiming 
at improving foreign trade relations and assisting emigrants from the Austrian-Hungarian 
Empire. Depending on the state support given to the organization, it could have a very 
disrupting effect on the Austrian-Hungarian market, increasing the importance of having 
a strong foothold in Russia.493 Debates followed between the pool members, establihing 
that discriminatory prices were against the spirit of he pool. Instead the HAL introduced 
special prices for Russian passengers, charging an extra $2 per ticket which however also 
included board and lodging at transit points and at the port of embarkation. The line often 
went to great lengths to get the board and lodging charges paid for by the passengers. If 
unable to get the money in Leipzig or Rotterdam, it withheld the passenger’s luggage in 
Rotterdam only to forward it when the New York office managed to cash the unpaid bills. 
The other lines soon copied the strategy of the HAL. Gradually, the custom spread to 
other ethnic groups, such as Rumanians, Austrians and Hungarians.494 
                                                 
493 RSL and HAL also concluded a similar arrangement for the Benelux. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 
Passage Department, 221-226, Letters September 15 1896 and July 13 1899 and Ibid, 235, Wiener Cartel, 
correspondence 1892-1896. 
494 Ibid., Letters August 6 1897; July 28 1898; February 15 1899; January 16 1907.  
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 Another point of conflict between the lines remained the German boarder control 
stations under the management of the HAPAG and NGL. It proved an important tool in 
filtering migrants and it shows that the RSL did not stand alone in selecting the 
passengers based on their quality. Some agents reported problems with the expedition of 
HAL passengers at the border, because German lines tried to rebook them through 
Hamburg or Bremen.495 The HAL repeatedly complained that agents on the frontier 
discriminated very much in favor of the HAPAG and NGL. All the so called ‘Anschluss’ 
migrants, without tickets accompanying friends or relatives who had their passage 
already booked, were always directed to Bremen or Hamburg. People who did not yet 
have a ticket had to buy one to cross the border.  
As it shared in the cost of exploitation of the stations the HAL believed to be 
entitled to a part of the ‘Anschluss’. To the HAL’s great frustration it frequently occurred 
that passengers booked for the HAPAG who were refused by the company at the control 
station, because of the probability of being debarred at Ellis Island, were rebooked for the 
HAL. In this way the passenger was not lost for the pool, while the German line did not 
take the risk of defraying possible extra costs in case of deportation.496 Except voicing a 
complaint from time to time, there was not much the HAL could do about it. Its biggest 
fear was that the stations would be used as the original decree had foreseen, allowing 
only the passengers traveling with German companies to cross the borders. The company 
prepared alternative routes through Libau and Austria, but just before WOI broke out, 
German authorities blocked the transit of HAL passengers. Up to then the Dutch line 
received support from the German railroads that profited from the companies’ transit 
business and helped in safeguarding their common interest.497  
 
1.6) Price evolutions  
                                                 
495 Ibid., Letter July 18 1896  
496 For instance returned New-Amsterdam passengers Helena Malakowski, H. Liszkauskas and 
Agahtha Lauschanot on account of Trachoma, initially held HAPAG tickets but they were refused at the 
frontier and provided with HAL tickets. Same goes for the family Krukonis, consisting of four members of 
whom a child of nine had Trachoma. It was sent back with his mother while the father and the other 
member of the family were discharged and remained i the US. Ibid., Letter January 6 1901. 
497 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 1, correspondence with Berlin agent Katz 1898-1903 
and  Ibid, 318.02, General Correspondence, 121-121, Letter June 23 1914. 
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The long fought for westbound steerage agreement between the British and 
Continental lines served as a platform to consolidate the North Atlantic transport business 
on various levels. Rate agreements between the conferences for cabin passage soon 
followed, preventing the competition from these markets to affect the westbound steerage 
rates. Especially because of the interdependence between second- and third-class passage 
competition, as for the former could easily destabilize the latter. Finding a workable 
equilibrium for the eastbound steerage market was a lot more difficult due to the large 
overcapacity, the concentration of the lines in the same port and the divergent return 
migration patterns of the various ethnicities stimulating interference between the sub-
markets.  
This keen competition for the eastbound market prevented the rates from 
following the same upward evolution as westbound rates. Despite extending the pool 
agreements to the eastbound market, the Continental li es did not manage to protect the 
return rates as well as the westbound rates. Rate wrs underline this greater susceptibility 
to competitive pressures of return fares falling lower and more rapidly than prepaids. 
Nevertheless, despite the lack of a pool, but through simple rate agreements with the 
British lines and by convincing the CGT to join the NDLV-pool, returning to Europe 
gradually became as expensive as going to the New World. By consolidating the pool 
with the French line the NDLV finally included the principal Continental lines. The 
agreements with the CGT that targeted both the Contine tal and Mediterranean 
passengers also improved the stability of the latter market which was needed to prevent 
low rates of one sub-market from affecting the other.  
The expansion of conference agreements reduced the external pressures on the 
NDLV pool which in the meantime were consolidated. By striking out the tonnage clause 
the members put an end to the excessive competition of introducing new material. Also, 
the intensified pressure that fixed ocean rates had generated on inland railroad fares 
stabilized, both in the US due to increased governmnt control and in Europe through 
mutual agreement to cut the losses on railroad fares. As the graphs on eastbound and 
prepaid passage for these years illustrate, the consolidation allowed the lines to stabilize 
the gross rates for the North-Atlantic ocean passage and to adapt the prices according to 
the common pool interests. Whereas previously, rates of all companies followed the same 
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evolution, they now started to diverge more frequently reflecting the adaptations 
according to their plus or minus in the pool quotas.  
As migration picked up again following the recession of the mid-1890s, all the 
conference lines greatly benefited from the stability booking passengers at much more 
profitable rates. The increased cost of the passenger was compensated by the improved 
service to which the competition moved to ever more. Y t, as to how far the agreements 
constituted a monopoly artificially inflating the prices threatened to become a matter of 
public concern. The American trust-busting climate gained momentum putting the 
legality of the conference system in jeopardy. This t reat influenced both the attitude of 
conference members towards new entrants and the strat gies used by the shipping lines to 
expand the consolidation. 






































































































































































 2) Taking horizontal combinations a step further: The IMM Merger  
 
 The Trans-Missouri verdict had a boomerang effect, as it pushed many cartel type 
agreements to evolve into great corporate consolidation by way of merger. Looser 
agreements, by way of pools or cartels, became much more vulnerable before federal 
courts (Weinstein, 1968, 67-68). The shipping industry did not escape this tendency, but 
as noted by Chandler economic rather than legal reasons led to the administrative 
centralizations (Chandler, 1977, 334). J.P. Morgan’s attempt to introduce the 
rationalization, which had proved successful for railro ds into the shipping industry, led 
to the foundation of the International Mercantile Marine Company, the world’s largest 
shipping venture in 1902 (Navin, 1955, 291). The HAL which had been feeling 






 2.1) The HAL at crossroads 
 
 Van den Toorn reported as early as 1898 on a syndicate which had been formed in 
New York to take over the HAL.498 Johan Wierdsma immediately adapted the statutes of 
the company stipulating that the consent of 90% of the share holders would be required to 
alter the Dutch character of the line (Wentholt, 1973, 118). The Vanderbilts, owners of 
the New York Central and Hudson Railroad Company were behind the takeover. The 
Pacific Mail Co and Grace & Company managing a lineto Chili also formed part of the 
syndicate. The reason for the increased interest in teamship lines was the speculation on 
important subsidies of the American government, which following the Spanish-American 
War had been exposed to the shortcomings of the national fleet (see Chapter III). Another 
event which may have spurred the plans of New York interests for the takeover was the 
establishment in 1896 of the Joint Traffic Association, a joint effort of eastern ports and 
railroads to pierce through the New York dominance by offering high differentials for the 
inland traffic. It successfully pushed the exports through New York further down the 
downward spiral.499 Moreover, nothing guaranteed that Griscom’s INC would not 
redirect its course to Philadelphia, as the initiators intended to route the company, once 
the subsidies had been acquired.  
The negotiator of the New York syndicate, O. Hatfield presented the scheme as 
part of a vertical integration project similar to the one launched by PRR with the 
establishment of the RSL and the American Line, in order to further rationalize freight 
and passenger transport on the North Atlantic. The syndicate would take over the 
commands, yet the Dutch character of the company and a large part of the personnel 
would be retained. Buying a way into the market by taking over a small firm, was often 
much cheaper than starting a new line and fighting a way into it. Van den Toorn favored 
a far reaching collaboration with the prestigious concern yet his primary concern, was to 
dissuade the Vanderbilts from starting a direct competition with the HAL.  
                                                 
498 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters September 23 and October 13 
1898. 
499 Another measure taken by New York port interests, al hough contrary to the New York railroad 
interests, to counter the competition of Atlantic ports consisted of renovating the Erie Canal around the turn 
of the century. With funds partly supplied by the shipping companies a big propaganda campaign was 
organized in the State to gain support from the public for the approval of the appropriation bill. Ibid., 
Letters December 17 1897; January 25 1898; September 18, November 6 1903. 
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Besides the Vanderbilts, Ballin’s move to get his hands on the statutes of the HAL 
through an intermediary, rather than requesting it directly, also raised suspicions about 
his intentions of buying out the line. It certainly fitted into his expansion policy which by 
that time had earned the HAPAG the status of biggest shipping company worldwide. As 
Boyce noted, the conference agreements favored expansion by merger. HAPAG had used 
this strategy early on by taking over the smaller competitors in its home port. This way, 
the German line prevented them from cutting rates, giving North Atlantic conference 
agreements greater stability and allowing the company to explore opportunities on other 
markets. Fast growing companies, such as HAPAG often opted to acquire small 
companies on new routes to prevent reprisals on its core services. Yet by pooling its 
North Atlantic core service, the takeover of one of its members became the most logical 
way of increasing its share, without per se putting the thoughly fought and fragile 
equilibrium at risk (Boyce, 1995, 105; Broeze, 1993, 419; Murken, 1922, 165; Vale, 
1984, 68).500 
Yet the HAL, having no interest in consolidating with the Vanderbilts who only 
seemed to be speculating on the passage of a ship subsidy bill and being even less 
prepared to fall into the hands of a direct rival, took further steps to prevent a takeover. 
As Van den Toorn stated:  
“We are at a turning point. If we want to play with the big guys we need a lot of 
capital and a lot of tonnage. It is important not to divide our fleet on various 
routes, increasing our vulnerability to be driven out. The line Rotterdam 
/Amsterdam – New York is a magnificent route, and there isn’t any destination 
other than New York where so much money can be earned.”501 
 
The company increased its capital with 2 million guilders and managed to place most of 
it with an Amsterdam financer. With the move, the directors hoped to create goodwill 
among Amsterdam merchants and strengthen the national character of the company to 
retain its autonomy. The capital was used to invest in the fleet which at the time could not  
prevent a big line using first class material to out-compete them on the New York- 
Rotterdam/Amsterdam Line, according to Van den Toorn. He estimated that five twin-
screw steamers for Rotterdam and three big freight ships for Amsterdam would guarantee 
                                                 
500 Ibid., Letters November 22 and 25 1898 
501 Ibid., Letter December 18 1898. 
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its position.502 Between 1897 and 1901 the HAL doubled its carrying capacity expanding 
the fleet to van den Toorn’s recommendations. With the new tonnage the HAL acquired 
the status of a first-class steamship company, allowing the line to quadruple its Cabin 
business during the following decade (see graph). But, this could not prevent the passage 
of 51 % of HAL’s shares into the hands of its rival pool members (Vale, 1984, 85-87). 






















































2.2) The formation of the IMM 
 
 Simultaneous to with Vanderbilt’s attempt to take over the HAL, Clement 
Griscom, the principal lobbyist for ship subsidies, sought fresh capital to expand the 
American Line as he felt confident that his efforts were finally going to bear fruit. His 
search led him to J.P. Morgan. By the end of the following year Griscom, Morgan and 
                                                 
502 At the time the HAL reopened its service to Buenos Aires while it still chartered freight ships 
for the Amsterdam – New York route. Shortly after, he company discontinued the service to Buenos Aires. 
It placed orders for three new freight ships, the Amsteldyk, Sloterdyk and Soesdyk for the Amsterdam route 
and also for three new twin-screw passenger ships Noordam and Ryndam with Harland and Wolf and 
Potsdam with Blohm & Voss. Ibid., Letters February 15 1901; January 17, 24, 30 and February 28 1899. 
503 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 578, Conferece Statistics 1899-1914. 
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Bernard Baker, owner of the Atlantic Line, the only other American flagged service on 
the North Atlantic agreed to merge the American companies while entering into 
negotiations with European lines to participate (Vale 1984, 55-57). The American 
syndicate contacted Lord William Pirrie, manager of the shipyard Harland & Wolf which 
had built numerous ships for various lines on the North Atlantic.504 With his contacts, 
Pirrie proved a very valuable inside man to explore and negotiate the possibilities of 
expanding the merger in Europe. By 1902, the combinatio  had bought up the freight 
carrying Leyland Line, and had acquired a controlling nterest in the White Star and 
Dominion Line, which formed a community of interest wi h the American, Red Star and 
Atlantic Transport Line.  
In the meantime, the German lines negotiated a profit sharing agreement with 
IMM. With the agreement of the principal continental initiator, Albert Ballin protected 
his shipping company from possible repercussions of the major american railroads having 
terminuses on the Atlantic, which Morgan and his asociates controlled. The architect of 
the expansion of the conference system on the North Atlantic surely also wanted to 
safeguard and strengthen if possible the long fought for equilibrium which started to pay 
out its dividends.505 The merger could, in many ways, be considered as a logical 
consequence and expansion of the conference agreements. That the most important part 
of the agreement between the IMM and the German lines consisted of stipulations 
regarding the continuation, renewal and changes of the pool agreements corroborates this 
(Murken, 1922, 199). Ballin dragged in the NGL and HAL into the combination yet he 
underlined that IMM on their part needed to neutralize the Cunard Line to remove any 
cause of friction.  
The failure of the IMM to do so eventually destabilized the entire North Atlantic 
passenger market rather than consolidating it. The conflict between the Cunard Line and 
the IMM dragged the lines into a rate war. Its effect on the price for the transatlantic 
                                                 
504 The success of the WSL had for a great part relied on the ships provided by Harland & Wolf 
ever since its establishment. The shipbuilders soon attracted other clients involved in the North Atlan ic 
passenger trade such as HAPAG, Dominion and HAL. Pirrie’s close involvement in the merger was 
motivated by the lucrative building contracts he would secure by the IMM combine. The bigger it became, 
the better the prospects.  
505 And this quite literarily too as during the five yars preceding the agreement and succeeding 
the economic recession of the 1890’s the HAPAG averag d a dividend of 7,6 % and the NGL of 6,8% 
(Murken, 1922, 190). 
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crossing and the working of the NDLV pool will be analyzed in point 3. This non-
inclusion of the Cunard; the failure to obtain the taken for granted subsidies from the 
American government; the royal bonuses paid to the ex cutives bringing about the 
merger and the huge overcapitalization of the combine; all led to well documented 
collapse of Morgan’s attempt to expand his business philosophy to the shipping industry. 
Vertical integration, primordial for a merger’s success according to Chandler, did not 
follow the horizontal combination as the IMM remained a federation of autonomous lines 
(Chandler 189-192; Murken, 1922, 145-239; Navin, 1955, 291-328; Vale, 1984). This 
questionable need for vertical integration in the migrant business will be discussed in the 
following chapter. Of particular interest here is its impact on the equilibrium between the 
main Continental lines and the working of the Holland America Line. 
 
 2.3) The HAL and ‘foreign control’  
 
 HAPAG made the control over the HAL, a condition of entering an agreement 
with the IMM. The HAL had gradually become a respected rival with first-class ships, 
while from its homeport of Rotterdam it attracted from the same hinterland as the 
German lines. The Dutch company could easily undercut the German Lines if it wasn’t 
tied to the same agreement and it would have greatly undermined the working of the 
pool-agreement. Pirrie, the Dutch line’s shipbuilder led the negotiations in the name of 
the IMM to acquire a controlling interest of 51% of the Dutch company. As Broeze 
pointed the HAL didn’t have to join the combination, at least not by way of selling out 
more than half of its shares (Broeze, 1996, 107).  
The directors were well aware that Morgan would notdispose of the capital to 
buy out the German companies, even if these allowed him to. The interests between the 
IMM and the Continental lines would have to be consolidated through a traffic agreement 
and as Van den Toorn put it; “making part of such agreement was a matter of life or 
death for the line”. The HAL director who represented the company during the 
negotiations in New York repeatedly underlined the lin ’s eagerness to take part in the 
agreement. The board of directors feared that if itremained outside the combine, its 
participants would try to drive the company out of the North-Atlantic. With Morgan’s 
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connections to the American railroads on one hand and on the other hand the lack of 
concession in Germany and the control of the German lines, on the other; over the 
boarder control stations through which the biggest part of HAL’s passenger business 
transited, the company was in a weak position (Murken, 1922, 206).  
The directors stressed the importance of conveying to the members of the 
combine that the company enjoyed the support of the city of Rotterdam, the Dutch 
Government and Dutch railways, without which a company like theirs could not be 
established in the Netherlands. In short, it wanted to convince the IMM initiators that the 
line could not be bypassed by the combine, in order to obtain a decent proposal.506 
Moreover, the pool agreements entering their second decade had produced very satisfying 
results. The directors were well aware that the weaker, small members profited more 
from the pool than stronger, big members. Forming part of a consolidation guaranteeing 
the continuation of the pool was a logical business strategy. The only question remained 
was at what price?  
The directors finally agreed to transfer 51% of the s ares to the combine through 
Pirrie. To convince the shareholders, the directors did not want the takeover to be linked 
to Morgan -only to Harland & Wolf- hoping that the n ws on the IMM remained secret 
for a little while longer.507 Something else that the directors made sure did not leak to the 
shareholders was the royal bonus and salary increases they received upon signing the 
contract (Broeze, 1996, 112). To enable the takeover, th  capital of the company was 
increased by four million, increasing it to twelve million guilders. Conversely to the 
royally paid shareholders of the Leyland and White S ar Line, the IMM managed to buy 
the HAL shares only a little over the market value. Some months later the IMM 
transferred half of their shares in the HAL to the G rman lines. Wierdsma asked; why the 
IMM gave up their control and denounced the hypocrisy of the German companies, 
which during the negotiations had been used as a blocking issue by the HAL against the 
combine; while in the meantime the German companies had concluded other 
arrangements behind their backs. As he posed: “surely our sympathy for Wiegand and 
Ballin will not grow bigger because of it, yet what we need to do now is to tune the 
                                                 
506 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters January 3 and 10 1902. 
507 Ibid., Letter April 22 1902. 
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German companies to our interests which also have become theirs”.508 The division of 
the shares gave the directors of HAL more freedom than originally thought. The true 
extent of this foreign control has been the object of debate. Broeze refuted the common 
conception in Dutch historiography that the company, remaining under the Dutch flag 
retained full entrepreneurial control. The contract of he takeover stipulated that HAL’s 
policy would be in accordance with the general direct ons of the Board of Committee of 
the IMM consolidation; meaning that the company would respect the geographic 
delimitations and the quota’s for steerage and westbound freight traffic as established by 
the pool agreements. As long as this was respected the powers of the HAL directors 
remained intact. For capital increases, for opening of new services and amalgamating 
with other companies, the HAL would need to acquire th  permission of the Joint 
Committee. Based on this clause; the strict conditions imposed by the HAPAG on the 
opening of the HAL service to Savannah in 1911; and restrictions on expanding to other 
routes where German lines sailed  when the HAL bought back their shares during WOI; 
Broeze too quickly jumped to conclusion that the Dutch line got trapped in Ballin’s 
‘Welpoltik’ (Broeze, 1996, 113-117).  
Conversely, as Murken denoted the clause attributing a say to the Joint 
Committee in HAL’s policies remained a dead letter, while during this period, the 
company rapidly expanded its operations, neutralizing every competition that established 
itself on the Rotterdam–US Atlantic route (Murken, 1922, 207-208). This evolution is 
particularly noticeable for the cargo trade, which at the turn of the century went through 
an important crisis. The HAL first forced the Holland Boston Line (1900-1905) out of 
business. The competition from the Cosmopolitan Line, running a service from 
Philadelphia and managed by Peter Wright and Sons proved to be tenacious. Yet, when 
the HAL opened a direct competing service from thatpor , the Cosmopolitan Line had to 
give in and was taken over by the HAL in 1909. That s me year ships of another long 
standing rival, the Neptune Line operating from Baltimore came under control of the 
HAL. Two years later it took over the Burg Line’s service between Rotterdam and 
Savannah. By completing these with their own servics from Newport News (1899) and 
                                                 
508 Ibid., Letter October 14 1902. 
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Boston (1910) the company gained control over the cargo traffic between Rotterdam and 
the Atlantic coast (Gottheil, 1914, 60-61).  
As for the passenger business, the HAL managed to contain the competition of the 
Russian Volunteer Fleet and Uranium Line (see point 4). The failure of Ballin to contain 
the company’s growth is best illustrated by the new capital injection in 1907. As 
underlined by J. Wierdsma, officially and by contrac  the company only had a binding 
agreement with Pirrie’s Harland & Wolf to whom they sold the shares too. The director 
of the HAL explained his views to Pirrie:  
“Of course there is some difference in the relations between our company and 
your firm as compared to the German lines, our agreement having been closed 
with you – and it is for this reason that, whilst it gave us great pleasure to discuss 
our plans with your lordship, we did not feel at liberty to take the matter up 
ourselves with our German friends as we have no occasion to inform all our other 
shareholders of it.”509 
 
Together with the takeover Pirrie, concluded an exclusivity contract with the HAL for the 
building of new HAL steamers and therefore had every r ason to support the capital 
increase destined to modernize the fleet. Ballin protested pointing to the article that 
important matters of policy needed to be approved by the Board of Committee of the 
consolidation. The HAPAG manager objected to the increase which would only serve to 
“built ships which were calculated to greatly injure the German Companies.” He did not 
understand why Ismay supported this, while it hurt is interests with the RSL as much as 
those of the German companies. However, Wierdsma reassured Pirrie that according to 
the bylaws the HAL did not need the approval of 75% of the shareholders to increase its 
capital, and hence did not need to confer with the German lines. Moreover, with article 1 
of the contract with Harland & Wolf the company had covered its back by stipulating that 
the HAL would seek to bring its capital from 8 to 20 million by 1911. Therefore, instead 
of increasing capital the Dutch line simply issued a certain series of pre-authorized 
capital.510  
                                                 
509 GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt Archive, 8-2 and 8-3, Morgan Trust, Correspondence between J. 
Wierdsma and W. Pirrie, July 20 1907. 
510 The by-laws provided that the issue of new capital could be decided by the board of directors 
and the managing directors with the right on Pirrie’s part to object to such issue the HAL failed to give 
every share holder an opportunity of subscribing on equal terms for every such new issue in proportion to 
his holding. 
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Wierdsma refuted the fact that the HAL sought to harm the interests of its pool 
partners by building new ships which ensured increased comfort to the passengers, 
combined with a large cargo capacity without competing for the fastest crossing. The 
HAL directors stressed that they intended to preserve the good relations they maintained 
with Ballin. The fact that Ballin was made godfather of Henri Reuchlin, son and grandson 
of the respective HAL directors Johan and Otto, underlines that the working relationship 
between the steamship managers reached far beyond business levels. The three monthly 
pool and other conference meetings in various European localities greatly improved the 
esprit de corps among managers of passenger liners, which largely exceeded the local 
boundaries of one port. As noted by Greenhill, the success of shipping conferences 
depended on the personalities leading those and that the sense of group loyalty could be 
as important as industry characteristics (Greenhill, 1998, 66-67). The leading capacities 
of Albert Ballin ensured the success of the continetal conference which earned him a lot 
of respect. The HAL directors acknowledged this, but always remained suspicious of the 
true intentions of the man whose motto was “Mein Feld ist die Welt”. They gladly 
cooperated with the consolidation efforts from which the company prospered but had no 
intention of becoming absorbed by HAPAG.  
The American panic of 1907 eventually prevented the capital increase because 
many Amsterdam bankers had their money invested in the falling American stocks. 
However the HAL continued to refuse to acknowledge th  Board of Committee in its 
decisions on expanding the line. It repeated that it had no intention of passing on inside 
information about the company and went ahead placing the order for a new ship 
Rotterdam IV which joined the fleet in 1909. With its 24,000 tons it was the seventh 
largest ‘floating palace’ on the North Atlantic. The positive results inspired the HAL to 
place another order with Harland & Wolf for another vessel with a gross tonnage of 
32,000 in 1912. Unable to steer the company as Ballin had hoped the German lines resold 
their shares to the HAL in 1915.511 In the meantime, the Dutch company had used its 
entrepreneurial freedom to largely expand its activities and it made more profits than any 
other line involved in the IMM merger. Between 1903 and 1913 the HAL averaged 
                                                 
511 GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt Archive, 8-2 and 8-3, Morgan Trust, Correspondence between J. 
Wierdsma and W. Pirrie, July 18, 20, 24, 26; August 1 1907; July 20, 25 1908; October 13 1910; February 
14 and 22 1914. 
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annual dividends of 11% leaving the other members (HAPAG, 7.6%; NGL, 4.7%; and 
IMM, 0%) far behind (Murken, 1922, 206). 
 
3) The non-inclusion of the Cunard Line in the IMM and the revival of the British 
pioneer 
 
3.1) The reaction of the British authorities towards the IMM combine  
 
Another company which greatly profited from the establishment of the IMM was 
the Cunard Line. During the IMM formation the British pioneer was renegotiating the 
subsidy contract with the British admiralty. These negotiations were greatly influenced 
once the press reported on the passage under American control of the Leyland, Dominion 
and White Star Line. Although the British maritime supremacy remained unquestionable 
around the turn of the century, with two thirds of the world’s ships being built in Britain 
and half of the global steamship tonnage sailing under the Union Jack, the rapid 
ascendancy of the German fleet and the IMM formation alarmed the British public and 
authorities. Proportionally, the British tonnage acquired by Morgan amounting to 
300,000 out of a total of 12,000,000 should not at first sight have been a matter of 
concern. Yet, the quality of the tonnage on the North Atlantic which retained its status of 
most prestigious and competitive route on the globe superseded by far that of ships used 
elsewhere. Technological innovation and speed records, both of crucial importance for 
naval purposes were still established on the North Atlantic. British companies had 
dominated this competition since the introduction of steam.  
But, in 1897 the German companies determinedly attacked British supremacy by 
taking the ‘Blue Ribbon’ for the fastest crossing to the European mainland- where it 
would stay for a decade. The IMM made an offer to the Cunard Line’s board of directors 
to buy a controlling part of 55 % of the steamship company’s shares. As the British press 
noted, if the pioneering pride went into the offer, four-fifths of the country’s finest 
steamers would fall under American control, while making it practically impossible for 
any capitalist to compete with such immense combinatio . With the pending American 
ship-subsidy bills the tonnage could soon be sailing under the ‘Stars and Stripes’. 
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Preventing this, when jingoism was prominent in many places around the world became 
an urgent matter of national security. 
The Cunard Line used this situation to regain the driver’s seat on the North 
Atlantic. The British admiralty renewed negotiations both with Lord Inverclyde, manager 
of the company to ensure it retained its independence and with the IMM to prevent the 
merger from transferring the acquired fleet, part of which it had on its reserve list, under 
another flag. Without American ship-subsidies the IMM seemed unable to produce the 
same financial effort as for the WSL, while other investors also showed interest in taking 
over the shipping line. With the authorities also intervening in the matter, Cunard set high 
demands while negotiating favorable terms with the admiralty. The inside information on 
the IMM formation obtained through their New York head-agent, Vernon Brown allowed 
the company to play out the situation to its favor. Some months later, the line obtained a 
cheap loan for the building of two fast steamers which would re-conquer the ‘bleu 
ribbon’. In addition, the admiralty drastically increased its support to the line which rose 
from a yearly subsidy of approximately 20,000 to 150,000 pounds while the Postmaster 
maintained the annual mail-subsidy at 68,000 pounds. In exchange, the shipping 
company pledged not to sell a controlling part of its shares to foreign interests retaining 
its full British character.  
To Cunard’s frustration the authorities took a year to make the contract official, 
announcing it simultaneously with the agreement reach d with the IMM in July 1903. In 
spite of the favors granted to the Cunard Line, Morgan also came to terms with the 
British authorities to avoid the withdrawal of the existing subsidies to the WSL and 
prevent other discrimination against the IMM regarding naval and mail subsidies. The 
fact that the expected support of the American authorities became less and less likely 
made some kind of arrangement with the British authorities of crucial importance for 
Morgan. The investment banker gave guarantees that;e that the majority of the 
directors of the British companies of the IMM would remain, no ship of these companies 
would pass under foreign registry without the approval of the Board of trade, ships be 
manned by British sailors and that half of the future tonnage be registered under the 
Union Jack (Boyce, 1995, 100-102; Hyde, 1975, 142-18; Murken, 1922, 223-230; Vale, 
1984, 103-181).  
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This agreement took away much of the IMM’s incentives to press for concessions 
from the US authorities for American flagged ships while it obstructed a far reaching 
rationalization of the administrations of the various IMM lines. Once made official, both 
parties finally knew where they stood and could prepa  for a face off which the Cunard 
Line implicitly announced by giving notice of withdrawal out of the British and 
Continental agreements in May 1903. With the increased subsidies and two blue ribbon 
steamers under construction the Cunard Line felt confident in starting a fight for a bigger 
slice of the Mediterranean and Continental markets. In 1902 its share only amounted to 0 
and 0.38% respectively while its own market stagnated. To reassess the potential in 
attracting business of the various companies, a rate war seemed inevitable before 
establishing a new equilibrium. 
 
3.2) Cunard Line’s withdrawal and its effect on the Continental Market  
 
 Freed from the conference obligations the Cunard Line immediately sought to 
increase its market share in all sectors of the North Atlantic Passenger market. On the 
continental market, the company lowered its rates from Hamburg and Antwerp. The 
Continental lines took no immediate action against the minor reduction. To improve its 
competitive position on the American market the British line lured away the secretary of 
the New York Conferences, Lawson Sandford with a big salary to lead the passage and 
freight department of their Mediterranean service. Through the appointment Cunard 
acquired considerable and valuable information about his rivals.512 An even bigger blow 
to the Continental lines was the agreement concluded between the British line and the 
Hungarian government for the transportation of Hungarian migrants.  
                                                 
512 With the establishment of the Atlantic Conference Sandford returned to his position as 
Conference Secretary. Another similar appointment took place in 1911 when Hermann Winter joined the 
passage department of the Cunard Line. Working his way up in the New York passage department of the 
NGL he promoted to join the passage department in Bremen. Yet the New York head-agent of Cunard Line 
informed his superiors that he had difficulties to adapt in Bremen urging them to make him an offer. 
Cunard beat HAPAG and especially HAL to the punch. T e HAL was looking for people to reinforce its 
New York staff which wasn’t very well up to work. Winter could be very valuable for the upcoming 
conference negotiations by supply inside information on the NGL strategies. Within the week he signed a 
contract with the British Line. The price of the transaction, an annual salary of 7500 dollars seemed well 
worth its investment. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters 23 June and October 30 
1903 and CLA, Chairman Correspondence, C 1, 63, Letters April 22, 25, 28 1911.  
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Following the European trend, the Hungarian Emigraton Commissioner, Ludwig 
Levay, pursued the idea of using the emigration of nationals to launch a national line 
from Fiume to New York, at the beginning of the twenti th century. Levay suggested 
using passports as a means to obligate nationals to travel through Fiume. Yet, the 
emigration commissioner failed to convince national shipping interest to set up such line 
on the highly competitive North Atlantic. Subsequently, he negotiated with HAPAG and 
NGL. The German lines also refused because the rout proposed was unprofitable being 
1200 sea miles longer than through Bremen or Hamburg and showing little prospects for 
cabin passengers and freight transport. The members of the North Atlantic passenger 
Conference signed a clause not to accept a concession of the Hungarian authorities prior 
to approval of all the members. When the Cunard Line stepped out of the conference the 
Hungarian government finally found an interested party who seized the opportunity to 
increase its share of continental passengers. By the end of 1903, the British line organized 
some sailings from the port, which became a regular service when the government 
authorities guaranteed to compensate the line if it was unable to direct 30,000 citizens via 
Fiume.  
The Austria-Americana, managing a freight service from neighboring Trieste to 
the US seized the opportunity to launch itself on the passenger market. In contrast to the 
booming passenger trade, freight transport entered an important crisis in 1902. It sought 
support from the Austrian government and the Cunard Line to diversify its service. The 
former showed interest in developing its merchant marine, but the latter fearing it may 
upset their agreement with the Hungarian government d clined. The initiators then turned 
to the German lines, while in the meantime, starting its operations and appointing Oscar 
Richard as head-agent in New York. The location on the Adriatic allowed them to attract 
both mediterranean and continental passengers. Attemp s to reach rate agreements with 
the line without accepting it to the pool failed. This created the difficult situation of 
fighting for a line whose representative in New York had participated in the 
Mediterranean conference as head-agent of the Prince Li e.513 Fearing a similar scenario 
as in Hungry, the German companies chose to support the initiative by supplying an 
                                                 
513 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters April 15, May 10, 13 and October 4 
1904. 
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important part of the capital. Yet, even by doing this it could not prevent the Austria-
Americana from working against their own interests, something Richard gladly 
contributed to (Murken, 1922, 247-262). 
The Austrian-Hungarian migrants who traditionally made the crossing through 
northern ports now had two alternatives through the Adriatic. The competition from the 
Cunard Line forced the Continental lines to reduce th ir rates for the Hungarian and 
Croatian market on a basis of $29.5 for express services and $24.5 for regular transit. 
But, Wierdsma reported that it affected the whole market since other nationalities 
anticipated the rate war to spread and therefore waited to buy tickets. Newspaper articles 
fueled this speculation by reporting that the cuts in Hungary, Croatia and Scandinavia 
would soon spread to the Mediterranean where the Cunard wanted to gain foothold while 
the German lines contemplated to reopen a Scandinavian service. The press predicted that 
rates would soon reach $10 again.514 The atmosphere between the lines was still one of 
contention during the spring of 1904. The British lines of the IMM interest group fought 
the Cunard for the British-Scandinavian market while the Continental lines managed to 
prevent the rate cuts from spreading outside the Austrian-Hungarian boarders. In the US 
the Continental lines did not yet prohibit the agents from booking on the Cunard Line, to 
prevent the conflict from escalating to first- and second-class business. The situation 
deteriorated as the Cunard cut in the Mediterranean rates while the Continental lines 
advertised low rates for British passengers to New York via the mainland. More and 
more cases of confiscated continental tickets by the Hungarian police forcing nationals to 
travel via Fiume strongly affected the sales in the region.  
Just before the summer the much announced general rate war by the American 
press broke out on the eastbound market yet for the westbound continental market the 
NDLV lines managed to resist the pressures from lowMediterranean, British and 
Austrian-Hungarian rates.515 Even when in September Wierdsma sent alarming reports 
that the low British cash rates greatly affected the Russian prepaid market, which was 
invaded by $10 cash orders from Libau via English ports, the NDLV lines refrained from 
spreading the reduction to the whole continental market, for the duration of the rate war- 
                                                 
514 Ibid., Letter March 25 1904 Mail and Express, “10$ Ocean rate may soon come”. 
515 Ibid., Letters April 15, May 20, 27 and June 15 1904  
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which ended in November 1904. While little could be done to counter the feeder services 
from Libau, the German lines successfully managed to ivert Russian Cunard passengers 
at border control stations. In the meantime, the diplomatic pressures of the countries 
having interests in the migrant trade forced the Hungarian authorities to lift the barriers 
on emigration of nationals through northern ports. 
Compared to the rate war midway through the 1890s, where the Continental lines 
totally depended on the British lines to set the continental rates, they now managed to 
contain the rate war to certain sub-markets, while ke ping the rates of where they had a 
strong foothold on profitable levels. While the British lines fought each other on the 
British-Scandinavian market and even transported continentals below cost, the Cunard 
Line could not drag the Continental lines into a general price war. The NDLV lines 
continuously adapted the rates in competitive areas to limit the impact of the conflict on 
their total earnings. The following table shows thenumber of HAL prepaid bookings at 
special rates in these areas per month. It does not pecify the area for to which the various 
rates applied during the rate war however the correspondence reveals that the competition 
centered on the Hungarian and Croatian prepaids and to a lesser extent in Romania, 
Bulgaria, Crain, Serbia, Istria, Dalmatia and other pa ts of Austria where special rates 
were quoted.516 
Table V: Prepaid tickets sold at special rates during rate war 1904 
 24,5$ 19$ 12$ 21$ 26,5$ 10$ 
April 257      
May 165      
June 69 84     
July  3 234     
August 1 224     
September 102 332 8    
October 196 145 138 33 93 183 
November    59 186 498 
 
Everywhere else the HAL maintained gross rates of $31.5 for continentals and $33.5 for 
Russians, including board and lodging.  The increased control on the continental market 
allowed the HAL to report satisfying results for pre aid sales which had increased in 
                                                 
516 Ibid., Letters August 29, September 1, 7, 9, 16 and 27 1904.  
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1904 at an average net price of $29.71 only a good f ur dollars less than in 1903. The 
average eastbound rates dropped from $30.23 in 1903to $21 in 1904 and this illustrates 
that the eastbound route remained much more sensitive to outside competition.517 
Table VI: HAL Rates changes east and westbound in 1904 
 Eastbound  Westbound  
1 jan 32 34 
21 Jun 20 34 
28 Jun 17 31,5 
16 Sep 20 31,5 
14 Nov 33 33 
 
However, the effectiveness by which the NDLV lines contained westbound 
predatory pricing to certain regions contrasted with its incapacity of blocking the new 
lines from entry into the continental pool; in 1904 the Austro-American, Cunard and 
Canadian Pacific Line all managed to acquire a share. The Continental lines wanted to 
prolong the war yet the British lines competing on all fronts with the Cunard Line 
recorded much higher losses. Murken estimated that the shipping companies dumped 
approximately 5 million dollars into the ocean during the rate war. The HAL and NGL 
paid out a dividend of 2.5 and 2% respectively while the Cunard and IMM passed 
dividends. The IMM showed a deficit of $2,039,149 and put pressure on the Continental 
lines to get to an agreement (Murken, 1922, 278).  
Since the 1880s, the conference and subsequent pool agreements had gradually 
neutralized the competition among the Continental lines, allowing them to monopolize 
the traffic through their port, to gain control over the migrant-agent network and to secure 
cooperation from the British lines. In doing so, it successfully drove some companies out 
of the market, while it prevented new lines from establishing themselves on the 
continental route. Except for the loyalty contracts with migrant-agents, no specific 
clauses of the agreements referred to blocking out new entrants, yet the members initially 
had no intention of enlarging the select group. North Atlantic Passenger conferences were 
of the ‘closed type’ admitting new members only after mutual consent of the existing 
members (Deakin and Seward, 1973, 1; Stevens, 1914, 26).  
The high cost required to enter the specialized passenger service on the very 
competitive North Atlantic seemed to have worked as a deterrent for new initiatives. On 
                                                 
517 Ibid. Letter February 14 1904.  
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rare occasions, some entrepreneurs took the risk, such as the North Atlantic Transport 
Company to Rotterdam, yet they then faced the competition of NDLV members not 
refraining from using fighting ships (see point 4).By scheduling a fighting ship as close 
as possible to the new entrant’s sailing; the confere ce cut the rates preventing the rival 
from making profitable crossings and forcing the entra t out of the market (Sjöstrom, 
2004, 96). Fiona Scott-Morton analyzed the likelihood of using predatory pricing by 
British cargo shipping, pointing out that a lot depended on the new entrant during this 
era. Especially the age of the firm, its financial resources, experience and the customer 
base influenced whether and how the conference would fight the entrant. Government 
subsidies affected the share of the entrant into a c nference but not whether it would fight 
it or not (Scott-Martin, 1997, 679-683).  
In the migrant transport sector these subsidies and government support played a 
much bigger role, which the events of 1904 clearly illustrate. First, companies enjoying 
financial support from the government were likely to uphold cut-rate competition longer. 
When this financial support was given to a powerful h ndred million dollar company, 
such as the Canadian Pacific Railroad Company, it was obvious that the CPR could not 
be fought off through predatory pricing. Moreover, by extending its activities to ocean 
carrying trade enabled the railroad company to damage the Continental lines in the 
American as in the Canadian markets, through comprehensive rate policies. By 
supporting the takeover of the Beaver Line and some ther steamers, the Canadian 
government reacted to the formation of its neighbor’s IMM combine, allowing the CPR 
to open services to both Antwerp and Liverpool. Ballin entered immediate negotiations 
and without engaging in a rate war both parties came to an agreement through which the 
Canadian Giant acquired 5.429% of the NDLV core memb rs’ westbound traffic in early 
1904 (Boyce, 1995, 117; Murken, 1922, 241-245).  
A second factor of much bigger importance was the growing tendency of national 
governments to use the migrant stream to support its merchant marine making it much 
harder for the companies to block out new entrants. The Continental lines transported 
migrants from or to the countries which supported nw initiatives under the national flag 
in 1904. Hence, when obstructing or fighting these new rivals, the government could take 
measures to exclude the Continental lines from a sub-market, as illustrated by the 
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Hungarian case. Possibly this also influenced the acceptance of the CPR in the pool, it 
definitely did this in case of the Austro-Americana. The main reason for the German 
Lines taking a controlling share of the Austro-Americana which facilitated its subsequent 
entry to the pool was to dissuade the Austrian authorities from following their neighbor’s 
example. The Austria Americana obtained a quota of 4% of the westbound continentals 
transported by their company, the NDLV core members and the CGT.  
Because of their long standing experience, shipping companies remained better 
equipped to direct migration, than the national authori ies still in the experimental stages 
of migration control. Through the migrant-agent network the pool lines still managed to 
attract seventy-five percent of Hungarians illegally to northern ports. The Hungarian 
policy proved a total failure as it led to the opening of a line under the Austrian flag while 
its service from Fiume remained British. Moreover, instead of reducing migration the 
increased competition and rate war accelerated the movement. The diplomatic protests of 
the various countries with migration ports illustrates that migration was still considered a 
trade issue. The NDLV Lines regained permission to work on Hungarian territory yet it 
could not prevent the Cunard Line from increasing its footing in the continental market. 
By the end of the year, the lines reached a provisinal agreement in Berlin whereby the 
NDLV recognized the contract between Cunard Line and Hungarian government granting 
it 32,500 continental passengers for its Fiume servic  for a five year period. This 
amounted to a share of 6 to 8 % of the continental traffic during the agreement (Murken, 
1922, 261, 275). By the end of 1904, the NDLV pool had to tolerate three new 
competitors on the continental market, strongly affecting its supposed superiority status 
and deterring entrants. New challengers for the Russian market soon followed. 
 
4) The attacks of the Russian Volunteer Fleet and the Uranium Line on the ‘holy 
pool territory’ 
  
4.1) The Russian Volunteer Fleet and the first test cases against shipping cartels 
 
 Due to discord among the lines about the British share of the continental traffic, 
the Berlin agreement failed to be ratified. Cunard had drastically increased its market 
share of continentals from 0.38% (1902), to 1.4 % (1903) and 7.48% (1904), excluding 
the Fiume passengers. Re-signing an agreement where it needed to divide a 6% share 
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with the other British lines was not negotiable. The Cunard Line accepted entering the 
continental conference regulating the agents and fixing prices, but it did not enter a 
pooling agreement. The enormous surge of Russian migration following the Russian-
Japanese War in 1905 made the British lines even more reluctant to join an agreement 
limiting its share of the continentals. In 1905 the Cunard Line booked 2.34% of the 
continental traffic via Liverpool and another 39,626 steerage passengers through Fiume. 
The other British Lines increased their share from 4.91% in 1904 to 7.99% the following 
year. The Continental lines looked for means to limit the penetration yet a new rate war 
failed to occur. With the big immigrant influx supers ding the million mark in the US, 
market forces neutralized conference strategies. The prices remained high despite the lack 
of agreement (Muken, 1922, 283-296).  
The negotiations dragged on in 1906 and were further complicated by the 
establishment of the Russian Volunteer Fleet (RVF). The RVF represented the downside 
of the Russian-Japanese War for the Continental lines. The heavily subsidized, company 
operated by military officials, had transported troops to the Far East before redirecting its 
fast steamers to New York from Libau, via Rotterdam. At Libau, the company found a 
well-established network of migrant brokers and agents which had been supplying 
various shipping companies through feeder services ov r the years. The RVF gave them 
the long awaited opportunity to increase the business through the port; obstructing 
Ballin’s attempts to include the company prior to opening its service in the NDLV pool. 
Little collaboration could be expected from their head-agent in New York, the inevitable 
Oscar Richard. He announced the service as the fastst and cheapest from Russia, 
offering the major advantage of being direct, avoiding the often humiliating experience at 
the boarder control stations.518  
According to Richard, passengers traveling with RVF no longer needed to go 
through the time consuming process of applying for passports to their district governors, 
but obtained one through the Russian Minister of Interior at Libau. The rates to and from 
the Russian port amounted to $87 first class, $47 third cabin and $37 for a steerage berth 
whereas rates to and from Rotterdam were set at $70, 37 and $30 respectively. 
                                                 
518 For unpleasant accounts on the experience of Jewish pa sengers at these control stations see  
(Brinkman, 2004 and Just, 1986; DC reports, vol. 4, 1911)  
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Moreover Richard also underlined that inland fares to and from any Russian destinations 
were much cheaper from Libau than any other European ort. He invited more than two 
hundred guests for a dinner aboard the Smolensk to promote the line among shippers and 
migrant agents. Wierdsma urged the lowering of their rates showing differentials of $10 
to $12 to avoid a large number of cancellations. The WSL and Cunard Line both lowered 
their rates to the continent to the same levels that of the RVF. 519 
 Instead of appointing fighting ships, the NDLV established a fighting line. The 
HAPAG transferred two of its steamers to the Russian E st Asiatic Company, in which it 
had acquired a controlling interest, on the route at the same rates as the RVF. Boas took 
charge of the fighting line in New York, preparing for a new battle with his former 
associate.520 The NDLV members shared the costs and the probable loss s since the route 
offered little prospects for freight and even less for cabin class passengers. To fill this gap 
the RVF called at Rotterdam. The pool members also started a feeder service from the 
Russian port to the continental migrant gateways and gave special rates and extra 
commission to obtain the business of one of the principal Libau migrant broker 
Freydberg. These were two measures to counter the British lines that attracted passengers 
from Libau. But, because it reinforced the flow through the route, that the pool lines 
eventually wanted to abolish, the measures were quickly dropped. Instead, the lines fully 
opted for special rates from the boarder control stations (Murken, 1922, 297-301).  
The growing fusion between company and pool interess i  reflected by the 
HAL’s permission given to the Russian East Asiatic to also call at Rotterdam. The HAL 
directors seemed to be well aware of the dangers of all wing a company into their 
homeport, even from a ‘friendly line’. While, at the opening of the RVF the Dutch line 
had accumulated a big plus in the westbound pool. Reducing their rates would have 
forced the other pool members to quote even lower. H nce, in the interest of the pool the 
HAL maintained its rates; let the NGL and HAPAG lower theirs to make up for their 
minus and in the meantime allowed the Russian East Asiatic Line to call at Rotterdam 
until HAL’s pool status permitted the quotation of competitive rates again. The directors 
doubted however that Russian companies, even with image building efforts such as 
                                                 
519 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters June 22, 30; July 10 and 11 1906 
and GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters July 27 and 30 1906.  
520 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter June 30 1906. 
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advertising kosher food, could become popular among Russian passengers.521 Regarding 
freight to and from Rotterdam the company did not foresee any difficulties in driving out 
the RVF by retaining the fidelity of the shippers who would not miss the opportunity to 
call for lower rates. The Dutch line expressed its satisfaction on the expediency by which 
the measures had been decided upon. Previous experinc  had shown the importance of 
prompt action, preventing the line from getting a foothold in the market which always 
proved of crucial importance in future negotiations, to either convince the line to look for 
other horizons or to limit the entrants’ share.522 
 Richard had every intention of proving the HAL directors wrong. He launched a 
vast propaganda campaign in the Jewish dailies suchas t e Jewish truth, Jewish Abend 
Post and Jewish Daily News in which he called into question the continental services. 
The NDLV members immediately countered this action by adding these to the list of 
newspapers in which they advertised. The companies doubted whether to strictly 
implement the conference rule prohibiting agents to bo k for non-conference lines. The 
fear of risking a law suit for violating the Sherman- nti trust act remained. Even during 
the rate war with the Cunard Line the lines refrained from imposing the rule for the same 
reasons. This was the case despite the reassurance of the shipping conference lawyers that 
when companies ordered the implementation of the clause separately, instead of using a 
joint circular, they left the Cunard Line without any legal base to defend their case. 
Fearing that the company might use the measure to gain sympathy from public opinion 
and obtain new favors from the British government, the lines did not withdraw the right 
from their agents to book for Cunard.  
Controls of the books of various controls of east-side agents showed that they 
remained loyal but Wierdsma would did not believe it would stay that way. Reports from 
HAL travelers showed that the RVF massively distributed posters and ticket books to 
conference agents and that not everyone had resisted the temptation of booking for the 
line. The HAL travelers ordered the agents such as Mr. Cooper of Denver, to return the 
ticket books to the sender. Mr. Cooper did not object but inquired as to why someone like 
                                                 
521 The Line was not the first to do so. HAPAG and at le st one other English Line also served 
kosher food at the time. By 1912 RSL and NGL followed, yet despite being very popular among the 
Russian Jews the Dutch Line never did. GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Department, Letter April 22 1912.   
522 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter July 12 and 17 1906. 
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Richard who represented the Prince Line in the Mediterranean conference also obtained 
permission to represent the RVF.523 Cooper exposed one of the weaknesses of the 
conference, its incapacity of driving well established migrant brokers such as Richard out 
of business. The lines had allowed the Prince Line into the conference because of 
Richard’s threat of suing the companies for violating the anti-trust acts.  
The conference members hoped to neutralize his disturb ng impact on the 
Mediterranean market’s stability by including him, despite his often ‘unreasonable’ 
demands which obstructed adaptations or renewals of Mediterranean agreements. In the 
meantime he systematically accepted the head-agency of every new line which tried to 
penetrate the North Atlantic passenger market; sometimes with success, such as the 
Lloyd Italiano and Austro-Americana sometimes not, as with the Atlantic or 
Scandinavian-American Line.524 The situation also limited Richard’s actions who 
denounced the boycotting of non-conference lines through the agent-network in the press, 
yet as a member of the Mediterranean Conference refrain d from engaging in a lawsuit 
where he may have to appear both as plaintiff and accused. Wierdsma reported that Lloyd 
Italiano and Prince Line tried to make the Mediterranean Conference fall apart, 
suspecting Richard to prepare judicial procedures against the conference system.525 
Therefore the board of directors formulated the following policy in regards to strictly 
applying conference rules to agents on both sides of the continent:  
Similar matters, if brought before a court, may lead to further investigation of the 
present methods employed by the steamship companies, which in many respects 
would cause unsatisfactory results. The course followed by the steamship 
companies to maintain control of the agents under th ir supervision is in many 
ways very arbitrary, and although for the Steamship Companies perfectly 
justifiable may be condemned if brought before an investigation. Proceed 
slowly!”526 
 
                                                 
523 Ibid., Letters June 17; October 21 1904; June 15; August 17; September 28; October 18, 20, 25, 
26 and 27 1906. 
524 The Scandinavian American Line was established in 1904 and harmed the continental lines 
because the company also tapped Russian passengers through Libau. Members of the Mediterranean 
conference accepted the Lloyd Italiano without a fight because the Genoese entrepreneur and driving force 
of the former Florio Rubathino, Mr. Paiggio were behind the scheme.  
525 Ibid., Letters September 16 1896; April 12 1904; April 4; June 2, 9 1905; September 13 and 
October 1906. 
526 Ibid., Letter September 7 1906.  
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By the end of the year, the New York head agents started to send alarming messages that 
the RVF had corrupted the market and had gained ground. By hiring an ‘army’ of two 
hundred peddlers, which he placed under bond and allowed them to sell tickets on 
installments plan giving three months credit, Richard threatened to ruin the efforts of the 
conference lines to discipline the agents. Especially because the Russian East-Asiatic 
Company was forced to discontinue its service, the conference lines no longer gave an 
alternative to its agents to remain competitive with non-conference RVF agents offering 
lower rates and offering better facilities. The fighting steamers appointed by the NDLV 
Lines did not stop the RVF’s rising popularity. In the meantime, the British lines 
continued to stimulate the development of Libau as a migrant gateway to the detriment of 
the Continental lines.527  
 The NDLV attempted to reopen negotiations with the Russian company, yet it did 
not yield. In the meantime, the trust-busting climate in the US had reached the shipping 
industry. In the case of H. Thomson et al, versus Union Castle Steam Company et al., the 
court pronounced for the first time as to whether conference agreements violated the 
Sherman act.528 Judge C. Hough did not see any infraction of the federal law by the 
conference. The only aspect that raised some doubts was the use of “fighting steamers” 
yet Howe saw it that these steamers instead of: “restraining trade commerce and stifling 
up competition, in and of themselves constituted a violent competition”.529 A second case 
soon followed. This time the Cosmopolitan Lines denounced the HAPAG before the 
Interstate Commerce Commission for pooling and maintaining monopolies in restraint of 
trade. The former general agents of the American Lie, maintaining a freight line 
between Philadelphia and Rotterdam, questioned the legality of the Baltic pool. The cases 
inspired Richard to hire the prominent law firm Kurzman & Frankenheimer to start action 
against the conference for their Clause 9 stipulating hat: “agents are prohibited from 
booking passengers for any steamer, except those of the lines, members of the 
Continental, Mediterranean or North-Atlantic passeng r Conference.” Harrington 
                                                 
527 Ibid., Letter September 18; December 21 and 31 1906. 
528 Union castle steamer ran a service between South Africa and New York on which it organized 
the trade through conference agreements.   
529 Ibid., Letter January 16 1907 Copy of Court decision H. Thomson G. Feddersin VS Union 
Castle St Co, C Cayser et al. 
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Putnam, Judge Choate and ex-Senator John Spooner (R-Wi) took charge of the defending 
the last two cases, thoroughly convinced of the legality of the Clause 9.530 
In the meantime, the Russian East-Asiatic steamers fell under control of the RFV 
owners who reopened the service by appointing E Johnson & Company as New York 
head-agents. The appointment of the well established migrant broker specialized in the 
British-Scandinavian market suddenly threatened the English Libau interests. The 
continental and British lines disqualified him, yet the Cunard Line did not follow suit 
fearing that the North Western Scandinavian busines under Johnson’s control would go 
to the Canadian Pacific Line. An investigation on the New York eastside agents in 
September 1907 revealed that solicitations for prepaids via Libau had superseded other 
European ports. This had happened because of the prot ction given by the Russian 
government to the national lines; the low rates givin  them differentials of $7 to 
Rotterdam, $6 to Antwerp and $5 to German ports, paying commission of $3 to $4, the 
good service, and the immunity given by the Cunard Line to some agents to book for the 
RVF. To maintain the loyalty of the agents the HAL new head-agent  
Adrian Gips suggested forcing the Russian lines into the pool, to allow some 
agents to book for these lines under certain conditions, or to introduce very competitive 
rates for passengers going via Libau. The NGL saw it that the excessive demands of the 
Russian lines cancelled out the first option. The German line pushed for the cheapest 
second solution having less direct interest in the business never having catered much for 
the Russian business. Yet HAL and HAPAG believed that it exposed the weakness of the 
lines towards the agents and leaving them at their m rcy. The Dutch Line instead favored 
the costly option of lowering the rates from Libau nd border control stations and 
appointing a fighting line -either from Antwerp or Rotterdam- which would 
systematically undercut the RVF’s rates, with costs to be divided among pool members. 
Even without the collaboration of all the pool partners, Gips suggested immediate action 
as HAL’s percentage of the Russian business was so large that the company at the very 
least could afford to loose their hold on the busine s.531 
                                                 
530Ibid., Letters April 27; June 4; October 18 and December 3 1907, Complaint before Interstate 
Commerce Commission, Cosmopolitan Line vs. HAPAG.  




4.2) Price fluctuations 1903-1908 and the foundation of the Atlantic Conference 
 
 Despite the accumulating external pressures due to the lack of a new agreement 
with the British Lines and the foundation of various new lines the HAL managed to 
maintain high rates. Comparing HAL average rates for the westbound traffic from 
Rotterdam to those of the Cunard Line to Liverpool indicates the success of the price 
policies of the continental pool. 
Graph 4: HAL and Cunard trimestrial average rates in dollars for the total steerage 
























But, how long this success could last became questionable as the growing external 
pressures also accompanied with increased internal te sions between the NDLV pool 
members.  The profit-sharing agreement between IMM and the German lines quickly put 
some strain on the collaboration, as the former failed to be profitable, forcing the latter to 
pay important annual compensations. The relations deteriorated when Griscom was 
forced to take a step down and Bruce Ismay of the WSL replaced him as president of the 
IMM. As manager of both the RSL and American Line, Griscom had often acted as 
                                                 
532 Drew Keeling calculated these rates based on passenger revenues and equivalent adult 
passengers of both companies (Keeling, 2007, 164-165). Head taxes may have influenced the discrepancy 
by two dollars before 1907 yet afterwards all lines agreed to collect it separately when the US authorities 
raised it from 2 to 4 dollars. The price charged of four to six dollars from Liverpool to the continent further 
explains the big gap between the averages of both companies although the real cost to the continental li es 
to cover the extra distance must have been much less. Yet of importance here is HAL’s superiority over 
Cunard in containing price fluctuations and increasing rates. 
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mediator between British and Continental lines, knowi g how to balance the interests of 
both markets. However, Ismay clearly let the interest of WSL the only profit-making unit 
of the IMM, prevail over these of the other partners and this was to the detriment of the 
Continental lines. The capital increase of the HAL also illustrated the differences 
between the IMM and the German lines; the latter objecting to it, the former not. The 
rivalry among the German Lines added to the tensions between the pool members. 
Conflicts for the South-American trade, and the cruise business, threatened to spread 
towards the North Atlantic (Flayhart, 2000, 350-352; Murken, 1911, 308-316; Nathan, 
1935, 16-28).  
The continuous high demand for steerage berths neutralized the unresolved 
differences between the lines, preventing these from greatly affecting the ocean fares. Yet 
when the market forces sustaining the ocean fares collapsed during the panic of 1907 the 
tensions between the lines quickly surfaced pressuring down the rates (see graph 4). The 
depressed market conditions stimulated shipping companies to force a compromise with 
aggressive strategies before establishing a new equilibrium. Disagreements on the 
differential between WSL and the new Cunard steamers Lusitania and Mauretania sank 
the British-Scandinavian market into a rate war. By the end of the month, the rates had 
practically halved reaching $17. To force the IMM to yield to the Cunard Line, it also cut 
the freight rates in half, harming many lines of the IMM-combine that had much larger 
interests in the freight carrying. The conflict affected the continental business, especially 
with Cunard Line advertising that continental ports could be reached for an additional 
$3.5. The British company also used the rates for the Mediterranean destabilizing of the 
market. Shortly after, the rate war spread to that region where eastbound passages were 
practically sold at cost, reaching gross rates of $12. The events forced the Continental 
lines to lower their rates, but in the meantime they ad started taking measures to release 
the pressures on the NDLV-pool and contain the conflict.533  
Graph 5: HAL Prepaid and Return rates 1902-1908 
                                                 
533 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters January 10, 17, 31; April 3, 10, 15 
1908; GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters  January 15 and 20 1908 and CLA, 
Chairmen Correspondence, C 1, 63, letter July 7 1910. 
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Midway through 1907 the IMM and NDLV-lines concluded a pre-agreement for a 
pool including the British Scandinavian and Continental steerage business, both west 
(NDLV 68,35% / IMM 31,65%) and eastbound (NDLV 57%/ IMM 43%). The Allan and 
Anchor Line joined the agreement, which only left the Cunard Line to be convinced. Yet 
the HAPAG made the agreement pending the resolution of the conflict it had with the 
NGL. This materialized six months later when the NGL conceded 0.5%WB and 1%EB of 
its quota to the HAPAG in exchange for concessions  the freight market and both 
committed not to stick to the NDLV agreement- at lest until 1912. A weeklong meeting 
between the managing directors of the lines in London produced a new equilibrium 
between the British and Continental lines in February 1908. The Atlantic Conference 
pooled the British-Scandinavian and continental steerage traffic as follows:  
 WB EB 
HAPAG  19,61 12,35 
NGL 26,53 18,79 
HAL 6,63 6,1 
RSL  9,71 8,56 
Anchor 3,4 3,93 
Cunard  13,75 15,12 
American  6,68 8,72 
WSL 8,6 15,49 
Dominion  4,47 1,5 
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Allan  0,62 4,95 
CPR  4,49 
 
With the new agreement the British lines acquired 11.9% of the westbound 
continental traffic excluding the Cunard service to Fiume that increased its share from 
32,500 to 50,000 passengers; another 6.7 % of the traffic (Murken, 1922, 313-343).534 
When adding the continentals that the CPR (3.9%), Austria-Americana (2.1%) and the 
Russian lines (4.3%) acquired, the Continental lines saw their market share greatly 
reduced over the last five years. Yet, during that same period, despite conceding these 
approximate shares to British lines and new entrants the RSL, NGL, HAPAG and HAL 
doubled the number of continental steeragers travelers who landed in New York. Hence, 
if the traffic retained its levels the prospects of the NDLV-lines remained very positive. 
Maybe the NDLV paid a high price, but with the continental market expanding while the 
British-Scandinavian market had already attained its climax this concession seemed 
inevitable to prevent a costly global rate war, whose outcome was unpredictable and 
likely to have forced the Continental lines to concede a share anyway. By that time, the 
statistics of steerage passengers landing in New York showed their irrefutable dominance 
over the steerage market:  








1906 410995 179278 371883 964062 
1907 485230 183523 395485 1066145 
1908 145330 82883 90579 318792 
1909 329388 131483 329083 791863 
 
The relative ease with which government supported lines had managed to penetrate the 
booming market indicate that rates wares were avoided when the market was booming.. 
With the Atlantic Conference, the Continental lines not only ensured steerage bookings at 
profitable rates, while the same was achieved for first and second cabin passengers 
                                                 
534 The pool lines engaged long negotiations with the Hungarian government to establish the 
Hungarian American Line under the national flag andkick out the Cunard from Fiume. They also offered 
to compensate the Hungarian authorities through a head tax for each Hungarian passenger traveling through 
northern ports, which was similar to measure existing in Italy. Both financially and politically the offer 
contained numerous advantages for the both parties yet Cunard’s demands to buy out the contract proved 
insurmountable (Murken, 298-299). 
535 CLA, Chairmen Correspondence, C 1, 214, Letter October 11 1916. 
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through rate agreements. If the NDLV-lines managed to contain the competition of the 
Libau lines the whole continental market would at last be in equilibrium again.  
 
4.3) The continued fight for the Russian market and the Mediterranean Pool 
 
Immediately after the foundation of the Atlantic Conference the NDLV lines took 
measures to force the Russian competition in the agr ement or out of business. The 
establishment of another line on the Hamburg-Rotterdam-New York route underlined the 
urgency for action. The New York-Continental Line announced rates of $23 to and from 
Rotterdam through their New York head-agent, Oscar Richard in March 1908. At that 
time the other Russian lines quoted $24. The lines organized fighting steamers eastbound 
at the same rates or lower. These were appointed by a vote of majority by the North 
Atlantic and Continental Conference in New York according to the quotas in the pool and 
the sailing dates of the non-conference lines. The committee also appointed another 
steamer which in case of excess would transport the overbookings. The members shared 
the expenses. The lines postponed the announcement of the fighting steamer as long as 
possible as the bulk of eastbound steerage bookings occurred within 10 days prior to the 
sailing, hence when publishing the fares too early the steamer could be overbooked at a 
time when its effect was most needed. The lines usually announced the fighting steamers 
a week to three days prior to the sailing. The companies strictly implemented the rule 
prohibiting agents to book for non-conference lines.  
The outside lines continuously sent ticket books and propaganda material to tempt 
conference agents to work for them. They also paid more commission than the 
conference lines, $3 instead of $2. The Russian East Asiatic Line even copied the 
advertisements and rate sheets of the HAL. With the westbound traffic reaching a near 
standstill, because of the panic and the competitiv eastbound rates, the profits of the 
Russian lines which greatly depended on steerage business vanished into thin air. The 
pressures weighed on the outside lines forcing the RVF to suspend its sailings from April 
onwards and the REA to start negotiations with the NDLV pool.536  
                                                 
536 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226,Letters February 9; March 8, 26, 27; April 
8,14; May, 28; June 5, 8; July 17; August 18, 21, 28 and September 4 1908. 
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The line finally agreed to join the Atlantic Conference acquiring of the 2.5% 
westbound and 3% eastbound of the joint traffic. It committed, just as the Continental 
lines did not to transport Finns or Scandinavians. The company changed its name to 
Russian American Line and further agreed not call at any Scandinavian, British or 
Continental port, except for Rotterdam on the eastbound leg of the trip. With the support 
of the Russian authorities preparing a law exempting RAM passengers of passport 
charges and containing special railroad fares the line pressured the pool to double its 
share. The NDLV eventually gave in to avoid similar scenarios as to Italy and Hungry 
(Gottheil, 1914, 60-61; Huebner, 1914, 78; Murken, 1922, 351-353).  
The lines than concentrated their energy on a new agreement for the 
Mediterranean market. The Italian policies to stimulate the national marine through the 
migrant traffic proved successful, but it undermined the conference agreements. The 
Italian authorities fixed westbound rates in consultation with shipping companies, while a 
Mediterranean conference in New York set the eastbound fares. The only Italian shipping 
company on the North Atlantic in 1900 was joined by six new ones by 1905. During the 
following three years these shipping lines built 35new vessels mainly on Italian 
shipyards representing a brute tonnage capacity increase of 242,000 tons. Confident that 
the ascendancy could be pressed further, the Italian nes gave notice of the 
Mediterranean conference plunging the market into a rate war. The interference of the 
Italian government prevented the negotiations for a pool agreement dating back to 1901 
to bare fruit. However, with the rate wars and the crisis of 1908 the companies started 
having cash flow problems forcing companies to come to an agreement. With the threat 
that the Italian authorities might block the entry of foreign companies the Italian lines 
acquired half of the direct Italian steerage traffic (49.13 WB and 49.49 EB). The foreign 
direct lines settled for the rest while parallel agreements were concluded to divide the 
indirect traffic Italian and Oriental traffic. The direct lines, conceded to not transporting 
any continental passengers, while all lines agreed not to abuse the rates for other markets. 
Inspired by the Italian success, Greek authorities h lped national lines to acquire a slice 
of the cake soon after (Murken, 1922, 360-412) Peace on the Mediterranean was bought 
dearly but the long awaited two year agreement enabl d the foreign lines to book 
passengers at profitable rates and to prevent the market from affecting other interests. 
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In the meantime, the New York Continental Line needed to lay up its ships 
because of financial difficulties. The company failed to obtain the concession to land or 
embark passengers at German ports neither to do any passage business of any type. In 
contrast to other European countries, Dutch authorities had not adapted their migrant 
transport legislation to favor national lines against foreign competitors.  The laws of 1861 
did not impose any barriers to the New York Continental Line calling at Rotterdam. Yet 
without German concessions, the company needed to forward Eastern European 
westbound passengers to the Dutch port via Austria and Switzerland. Despite the low 
rates and high commission the line only managed to book 278 westbound passengers for 
its six sailings in 1908, eastbound, it contracted 2,789 passengers. The German 
speculators tried to force Ballin to buy out the line persevered in 1909 under the North-
West Transport Line.  
It now fully targeted the Russian market managing to at ract 9,505 westbound and 
3,341 eastbound passengers. A small special committee with representatives of the 
NDLV lines decided for each sailing as to whether it was opportune to appoint a fighting 
steamer or not. The committee systematically appointed a fighting steamer from June 
onwards, as the traffic picked up again, rates but so did the extra commissions given by 
the rival line. The outside line often postponed the sailing date once the conference lines 
named the fighting steamer, forcing them to reappoint a second fighting steamer. It cost 
the conference members a great deal of money but it seemed well spent as the North-
West Transport Line failed to make profits.537  
Nevertheless, the market share acquired by the outside line spiked the interest of a 
purchaser. The Canadian Northern Railway copied its, r val, CPR and extended its 
services to seaborne commerce. Under the name of Uranium Line, the steamers also 
called at Halifax, becoming an even bigger threat as the losses on the ocean passage now 
could be compensated by profits on railroad tickets. The measures to drive out the 
company of the North Atlantic remained the same. The conference lines appointed some 
of the most successful Uranium Line agents, yet newones immediately filled the gap- 
showing according to New York head-agents that bookings depended much more on the 
                                                 
537 Ibid., Letters March 19; April 16, 27; May 16, 20; June 4, 11, 17, 25; July 9; August 3, 17, 20; 
September 29; October 8, 22; November 5, 12, 17; December 10, 21 and 28 1909.  
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rates of a line rather than the agents it hired. Enlarging the agent-corps did not increase 
the bookings, but only divided the business which encouraged abuse and hampered 
control. Despite these efforts the Uranium Line successfully managed to sustain its 
position slowly corrupting the agent network in theUS and testing the solidarity between 
the lines.538 Midway through 1911 the British lines gave notice of the ‘fighting steamers 
agreement’ because the costly measures produced littl  result, prevented the British lines 
from getting their proper share of the eastbound continental traffic and exposed the 
companies to possible sanctions of the American authorities. The Uranium Line increased 
its eastbound carryings to 10,016 in 1910 and 13,286 in 1911 despite the fighting 
steamers.539 Ten months later the HAPAG also withdrew its support to fight the Uranium 
Line.  
Gips deplored the decision underlining the principal reason for appointing 
fighting steamers, namely to protect their migrant gents. Giving up fighting steamers 
would make it very difficult for conference agents to remain competitive with Uranium 
Line agents quoting low rates. It would quickly undermine the conference agreements 
regulating the agent’s activities and demoralize th discipline in place. Therefore, the 
New York head-agent urged to stick to the practice independently as much as possible. 
The Atlantic conference lines finally reached a compromise limiting the fighting rates to 
Eastern states. Van Doorn, the new New York head-agent, reported that Chicago agents 
not only had to compete with low rates of the Uranium Line but also with eastern 
conference agents who obtained a differential of $10 to $12 for conference vessels 
appointed as fighting steamer. The conference failed to drive out the outside line. For the 
first time the HAL had to tolerate a competitive line in its homeport which according to 
the company damaged the reputation of the migrant route through Rotterdam. This failure 
reflects the weakness of a disintegrating conference system whose existence was also 
threatened by an ongoing government investigation.540 
                                                 
538 Ibid. Letters January 11, 18, 25; February 1, 11, 15; March 11; April 6, 8, 19; June 10, 24; July 
15, August 4; September 23; October 21; November 5 and 18 1910. 
539 Uranium Line steerage passengers: 1910 WB 19642, EB 10016; 1911 WB 5846, EB 13286; 
1912 WB 13938, EB 10836; 1913 10046, EB 4316; 1914 WB 1171, EB 2404. Ibid. Letter June 30; GAR, 
HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 578 Passengers Statistics GAR, HAL, 318.02, General 
Correspondence, 112-121, Letters June 23 1911; February 24 1914 and CLA, Chairmen Correspondence, C 
1, 63, Letter May 13 1911.  
540 GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Department, 49-58, Letters April 19; September 25 1912. 
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5) The Anti-trust storm reaches the shipping cartels 
 
5.1) Impacts of the uncertain legal situation of shipping conferences in the US 
 
The Uranium Line initiated a new lawsuit against the conference beginning of 
1911 at the US Circuit Court in New York. Following the complaint by Peter Wright the 
Interstate Commerce Commission had declared itself incompetent for seaborne trade 
while Richard’s complaint seems to have been settled outside court walls. The panic of 
1907 had taken the wind out of the sails of the American Anti-trust movement, only to 
come back with force once the Supreme Court ordered th  issolution of the Standard Oil 
and American Tobacco Company, creating a lot of insecurity in the American business 
community (Seager, 1911, 611-614). Towards the end of his term President Taft and his 
Attorney general George Wickersham tightened the anti-trust policies, announcing in 
September 1911 that hundreds of corporations would be prosecuted and that some 
corporate officials would serve time (Bittlingmayer, 1996, 386-388; Weinstein, 1968, 78-
85).  
This time the ‘shipping trust’ did not escape federal investigation as the Congress 
passed the Humphrey resolution granting an appropriation of $25,000 to Joshua 
Alexander, chairman of the house merchant marine Committee for the formation of a 
special committee. The ‘Alexander Committee’ needed to examine whether; pooling, 
rebating and special agreements regarding overseas and coastal shipping, the relationship 
between steamship and railroad companies, especially the way in which railroad 
ownerships affected the competition between water and r il routes were not in violation 
with international agreements and US laws.541 The failure of the IMM had generated 
patriotic frustrations reviving attacks on the foreign shipping companies for obstructing 
the development of the national merchant marine.  
Representative E. Humphrey’s voiced these in the House attacking Albert Ballin 
in particular for dictating how and on what terms the nation transported its commerce. 
Already in 1910, these nearly led to an overall investigation of steamship conference 
                                                 
541 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters December 18 1911; January 
18; March 4, 5; April 6, 12 and June 18 1912. 
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activities. After a letter book of Gips had fallen into the wrong hands, some fragments of 
the correspondence were leaked to the press with details on the use of fighting steamers 
and on freight rebates received from railroads, a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 
Shortly later the House appointed a committee to investigate the aggressive lobbying 
activities used on the ship-subsidy question and considered to take the whole conference 
system into consideration. The lines prepared a protest through the European 
ambassadors in Washington claiming that American authorities had no jurisdiction on 
agreements concluded outside its territory and which were in accordance to the German, 
British and French Laws. Testing conference agreements for violating the Sherman Anti 
Trust Acts would represent an unreasonable interference with international commercial 
relations.542 The Dutch ambassador in Washington intervened convinci g the State 
Attorney General to put a halt to the prosecution instituted against Gips preventing the 
HAL agent from a likely severe sentence for acting against the Sherman Act.  
Congress temporarily refrained from investigating shipping cartels, yet the actions 
of the American government started to divide the conference lines on a number of joint 
activities such as the previously discussed fighting steamers and lobbying strategies. The 
following advice of Lucius Beers, lawyer of the steamship lines on lobbying campaigns 
reflect the contemporary climate:  
“Part of the educational fund has been used for the personal compensation of an 
individual who is connected with a political organization which for party 
purposes, interests itself in certain public questions such as immigration. He has 
devoted some attention to educate the public on the subject, but an important part 
of his service to the Lines seems to have been to apply directly to influential 
officials in Congress and in the administration for the purpose of preventing the 
passage of certain immigration bills. In the present state of public opinion on 
immigration and influence of corporations upon legislation, I think the risks 
involved in continuing his employment outweighs theb nefits. Not that this is 
illegal yet the consequences of the public opinion against foreign lines if this 
comes to light would be enormous. It would influenc the attitude of Congress 
and probably also of Courts against foreign lines.”543  
 
                                                 
542 In his attack against the ‘greatest and most powerful trust of today’ Humphrey did not forget to 
underline: this is the Herr Ballin whose company voluntarily withdrew two of its fastest and best steamers 
and sold them to Spain, to sink, destroy and burn American Commerce. Cunard Line Archives, Chairman 
Correspondence, C 1, 11 and 63, Letters September 13 1909; March 11; 15 June 17 1910 and NYT 
“Humphrey attacks steamship lines” June 17 1910.  
543 CLA, Chairman Correspondence, C1, 63 Letter October 10 1910. 
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The Cunrad Line followed the advice, the German lines did not. The latter repeatedly 
asked the former to reconsider and renew for instance its financial support to the National 
Liberal Immigration League. Cunard refused and feltr ieved to have given up its 
support to the educational fund and fighting steamers when Wickersham pronounced his 
clear intentions of investigating shipping lines and even more so when the Alexander 
Committee was formed.544 These activities of the shipping cartel were the most 
compromising features of the conference agreements. Immediately after the formation 
HAPAG gave notice of the ‘fighting steamer agreement’.  
The fear that corporate officials risked actual prison sentence seemed very real 
among the New York head-agents. They all received a subpoena of the D.A. creating a 
lot of mistrust about what information each agent passed through to the authorities and if 
one would compromise the others to save their skin. The concurrent sinking of the 
Titanic increased the tensions and dramatically reinforced th  feeling against the foreign 
lines.545 The shipwreck shattered the belief that the floating gigantic palaces were 
unsinkable and dented the blind optimism in technological progress.546 It also symbolized 
and accentuated the crisis that the shipping confere c  system was going through. 
Because of the increased number of interested parties and the numerous parallel 
agreements regulating the North Atlantic Passenger traffic the managing directors of the 
lines spent most of their time between 1910 and 1914 renegotiating agreements that could 
impossibly fully satisfy all members. Despite the crisis the lines jointly agreed to fight for 
their right to conclude rate and pool agreements. 
 Under impulse of the German lines, shipping companies launched a $70,000 year 
long propaganda campaign. They hired literary talen producing newspaper articles to 
educate the public on the need for conference agreement and create a public sentiment in 
favor of these. If successful the lines felt confident Congress would not be able to pass 
                                                 
544 Ibid. Letter October 28 November 18 1911.  
545 HAL director Johan Reuchlin did not survive the tragedy while owner Bruce Ismay managed to 
reach the American shore alive where he was heavily criticized in the press. The HAL reproached the IMM 
president for not making sure that Reuchlin came out of it a live, especially considering the very long and 
solid working relations between both companies. In the US a special Congress commission investigated th  
matter for possible neglect. The IMM president resigned some months later.  
546 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters April 19 and 22 1902. 
 303
legislation in opposite way.547 The use of fighting steamers against the Uranium Line 
resumed while the lobby campaigns against unfavorable immigration laws continued. 
Yet, the pending investigation put a lot of strain on some New York head-agents driving 
Gustav Schwab (NGL) to commit suicide and Emil Boas (HAPAG) to have a nervous 
breakdown with fatal consequences.548 The conclusions of the Alexander Committee 
proved however that such panic was unwarranted for. 
  
5.2) The defense of shipping cartels and conclusions of the Alexander Committee 
 
 For the first six months Alexander gathered information through District 
Attorney’s assistant, Wise, who traveled to Europe meeting with shipping directors, by 
summoning representatives of shipping companies and through correspondence with 
interested parties, such as shippers, manufacturing fi ms, producers, railroads etc. This 
was followed by public hearings, during the first two months of 1913. A typical feature 
of the congressional investigations held during the Progressive Era was the assistance of 
expert academics which Alexander found in the person of S. Huebner, Professor of 
Insurance and Commerce at the University of Pennsylvania. Both men led the 
investigation. In the meantime, the shipping companies decided on a joint line of action.  
A judgment of the circuit court against the lines would be automatically appealed 
to the Supreme Court to buy time. The directors contemplated bringing the suit to an 
early conclusion by accepting judgment on the fighting ship question. The man on the 
street could accept the decision of lines not to compete, but all condemned conspiracies 
of big corporations to put smaller lines out of busine s. For its part, the government 
which was often taunted by its enemies for the futility of the loudly trumpeted anti-trust 
suits, was likely to welcome the idea of making a little political capital of a quick 
settlement which they could claim as a victory. In short, giving up fighting steamers, 
whose advantages were questionable, could save a lot of expense and anxiety.  
                                                 
547 The cost were divided as follows: Trans-Atlantic Lines 60%, Long voyage lines 25% and 
Caribbean and West-Indian group 15% of the expenses which shouldn’t exceed 6000 dollars a month. Ibid. 
Letter April 26 1913 and CLA, Chairmen correspondence, C1, 63, Letters April 25 and July 7, 15 1913. 
548 Ibid. C1, 7 and 63, Letters May 10 1912 and December 30 1913. 
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However, in the end the lines decided to defend to wh le case on its merit, 
including the fighting ship question since it had been an inherent part of the policy of the 
conference lines from the very start.549 The secrecy of conference agreements had created 
a lot of suspicion around shipping cartels. Shipping companies decided that the time had 
come to defend the legitimacy of the system and lai their cards on the table, providing 
all the information the commission requested. For instance, on Huebner’s request, the 
conference secretary Johann Peters provided a copy of all the agreements under his 
supervision. Practically during the public hearings, the steamship companies realized the 
benefits of this strategy.550 The shipping lobbyist at Washington, Claude Bennett reported 
that the testimonies of steamship men at the hearings did a lot in clarifying up 
misinformation gathered by the committee, stating that the Alexander Committee made 
slow progress but that its intentions in the main were good. The hearings greatly 
improved the relations between the steamship men and the committee members. As a 
result, the steamship lines formed a special committee, headed by Paul Gottheil, 
providing the legislators with all sorts of documents and advice for their final report, 
which would contain recommendations for future legislat on. Aware of the sensibility of 
the public opinion regarding the close relations betwe n corporations and legislators this 
took place in a very discreet manner.551  
In addition, the “Special Committee of Steamship Lines engaged in Foreign 
Trade” launched the afore-mentioned ‘open, direct and strictly honest’ propaganda 
campaign to educate the public and to refute the comm n prejudices that politicians and 
newspaper editors had spread on shipping cartels.552 With press reports on the public 
                                                 
549 Ibid. C1, 7 and 63, Letters May 10; July 13; August 21; September 5 1912. 
550 The Americans W. Sickel and P. Franklin respective vic -presidents of the HAPAG and IMM 
illuminate the North Atlantic conference agreements during these hearings. Sickel replaced Gustav Schwab 
in New York. According to Merck, Sickel did not even speak German. Yet that Ballin attached little 
importance to patriotic sentiments at the hour of hiring personnel had already been clear when he appointed 
the Englishman R. Cortis, former agent of the WSL to replace the retiring Kunhardt & Co as General agent 
of the HAPAG in New York. The advantages of appointing the right man at the right primed over the 
indignation of German-American business community of choosing a non-German. GAR, HAL, 318.02, 
General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter September 21 1888 and daily reports on the hearing by C. 
Bennett January and February 1913. Hamburg Staatsarchiv, HAPAG, 622-1, Erinnerungen Merck. 
551 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters Gottheil to Alexander, March 
10; June 18; September 4 and 5 1913. 
552 Paul Gottheil worked for the brokerage firm Funch Edye & Co. As seen previously the firm 
acted as shipping brokers for HAPAG, HAL and others. The special committee consisted of W. Sickel 
(HAPAG), P Franklin (IMM), P. Gottheil (Funch Edye & Co), H. Barber (Barber & Co), W. Boyd (Holder, 
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hearings, public sentiment surrounding shipping lines had already started to shift. The 
campaign had to stimulate this tendency and it needed to be open and direct because most 
of the negative perceptions of the great corporations n the US stemmed from the belief in 
secret manipulations by legislators and press. The close relations between Gottheil, 
Alexander and Huebner proved that these suspicions were not totally unfounded. The 
prejudices were based on the assumption that cartels neutralized the market forces which 
guaranteed the public reasonable prices, based on offer and demand. Instead cartels 
artificially increased rates just to the limit, and ot destroy their business. Furthermore, 
the idea prevailed that foreign shipping conferences prevented the entry of new 
companies, which as Humphreys propagated, obstructed th  development of the 
American merchant marine.  
The propaganda campaign refuted these allegations and pointed to the benefits of 
the conference agreements for the American public, using contemporary events to 
highlight its importance. Shipping companies underlin d that the raison d’être of 
conferences was one of self-preservation against ruinous price competition. It allowed the 
companies to fix stable, yet reasonable, prices for freight and passenger traffic. This 
stability allowed the shift of the competition on services rendered to passengers and 
shippers. They stressed the fact that conferences facilitated far reaching progress in 
comfort, quality and safety of steerage transport. It also enabled a strict observance of the 
American government statutes, with reference to regulation of service and of the 
implementation of US immigration Laws. Due to the international character of seaborne 
trade, the shipping lines strongly objected to the on-going idea of establishing a 
commission supervising the foreign trade comparable to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission controlling the railroad rates. It would greatly harm the ocean trade to and 
from the US. Shipping conferences offered the best alternative and the consequences of 
making them illegal could not be overlooked. Continuous rate wars for the North Atlantic 
Passenger traffic would follow suit. These had a negative impact on the maintenance of 
the ships and security of the passengers. The shipping companies even used the 
                                                                                                                                      
Weir & Boyd) and A. Outerbridge (Outerbridge & Co and Quebec Line). Boyd and Barber managed 
services to South-America.  
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arguments of the Immigration Restriction League, pointing out that low rates stimulated 
the flow of undesirable migrants.  
To deconstruct the David against Goliath image, steamship men stressed that 
conferences protected, above all, the interests of small and weaker members which would 
be the first to suffer if these no longer existed. They refuted the accusation that new 
companies did not stand a chance against the cartel, insisting that any experienced 
manager with reasonable capital would not be fought of for long. Fighting steamers 
generally affected the business too much to allow its use in the long term. Bernard Baker 
took the stand in order to disprove the allegation that the conference agreements 
represented a foreign conspiracy against American shipping interests. He testified on his 
efforts to raise capital in the US for a shipping company to trade through the Panama 
Canal under the American flag, which became impossible because of the strong 
opposition of the transcontinental railroads. About to abandon the idea, Baker received 
support from Albert Ballin, who was willing to provide the capital for the project under 
the American flag and inviting American capitalist to join in. Instead of obstructing the 
American merchant marine Baker testified that Ballin was one of its sole sponsors. The 
conclusions of the Alexander Committee indicate that e shipping companies were quite 
convincing (Franklin, 1914, 155-163; Sickel, 1914, 143-154; Huebner, 1914; 243-
252).553   
As Daniel Marx denoted, the conclusions of the Alexander Committee closely 
resembled the ones reached by the British Royal Commission on the same topic in 1906. 
It recognized that shipping conferences increased th  security of capital invested in the 
shipping industry allowing it to greatly improve the quality and regularity of service. 
Conference agreements enabled the members to rationalize their service scheduling 
sailing dates and ports of call with each other, eliminating wasteful competition. The 
stability of rates it provided was appreciated by shippers, a majority of whom supported 
the system which favored the development of trade. Th  Committee did not find the rates 
fixed by the shipping rings to be excessive, but ins ead found them to be reasonable. The 
Alexander committee also concluded that it prevented weaker lines from being 
                                                 
553 CLA, Chairmen correspondence, C1, 7 and 63; Letters May 15; June 5; August 21; September 
5, 19 1912 April 25 and July 7 1913 and GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, daily 
reports on the hearing by C. Bennett January and February 1913. 
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eliminated from various trades, something the British investigators had the good 
judgment of omitting, according to Marx.  
On the other hand, the committee criticized the monop listic nature of the system 
and the secrecy of its operations, fortifying suspicions of excessive use of deferred 
rebates. Yet, the advantages outweighed the disadvantages and therefore it advised 
against prohibiting rate and pool agreements which would lead to a dangerous 
competition affecting the trade in general. Against the will of shipping companies, it 
advised to placing the agreements and rate fixing under the supervision of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, which should be empowered to cancel any agreement it found 
discriminatory or detrimental to US commerce. Finally, it suggested prohibiting the use 
of deferred rebates and fighting ships. The recommendations of the Alexander Committee 
formed the basis of the Shipping Act of 1916 (Marx, 1953, 57-67; Huebner, 1914, 243-
263).  
By the end of 1914, Lucius Beers reported that all charges were dropped against 
the shipping companies, except for the one regarding fighting steamers. Passenger lines 
could continue their business as usual. The Shipping Act created a Shipping Board to 
supervise the agreements, rates and revive the merchant marine. The Board quickly 
realized its limitations to regulate rates and agreem nts for foreign seaborne trade. It 
lacked the international authority to do so, while acting unilaterally would cause 
sovereignty conflicts whose consequences were hard to predict. Regarding their efforts to 
revive the merchant marine, these would only receive political backing with the New 
Deal (Marx, 1953, 127-136). Till that point in time foreign shipping cartels remained the 
masters of the North Atlantic. 
 
6) The success story of the continental passenger conference 
 
Similar to the bulk of academic research, most of the attention of the Alexander 
Committee went to freight traffic. They interviewed two thousand shippers on the 
working of the conference, yet they failed to solicit the opinion of migrant brokers and 
agents. As was shown previously, the need to discipl ne the agent-network was one of the 
main incentives of shipping companies for collusion because without it, stabilizing rates 
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resulted was impossible. The following chapter will analyze their success in doing this 
between 1896 and 1914. But it is important to remember the interdependence between the 
achievements of the continental conference to neutralize the internal and external 
pressures, as discussed here, and its ability to control the agent-network. The success 
story of passenger conferences greatly contrasts with the claimed ineffectiveness of the 
pre-world war one conference system, as attributed by scholars such as Bastin, Deakin, 
Greenhill or Marx (Bastin, 1971; Deakin, 1973; Greenhill, 1998; Marx, 1953; North; 
1958). To quote Greenhill; “even in the case of shipping conferences which appear to 
have lasted some time, their effectiveness in overcming market forces and in promoting 
joint-profit maximization, may in fact have been negligible (Greenhill, 1998, 71).” This 
conclusion is largely due to the sole focus of research on freight conferences. The 
downward spiral of freight rates during the second half of the nineteenth century- which 
reached their lowest point around 1900 only to rise slowly a decade later- and the 
decreasing profits of the industry sustained these theories. As Keeling rightly noted the 
passenger business presents a totally different picture which the gross rates of prepaid 
and return steerage tickets of the HAL clearly illustrate (Keeling, 1999a).  
Graph 6: HAL prepaid and return rates 1885-1914 
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The cornerstone of this success story is the contine tal pool agreement for 
westbound steerage passengers of 1892. This profit sharing agreement greatly improved 
the cohesion between the continental members, allowing them to subsequently strike out 
the tonnage clause and to fix through rates, eliminating the two most important pressure 
points, which remained. The rivalry fueled by personal antipathy and family pride 
between White Star and Cunard Line obstructed any scheme involving pooling or sharing 
out passenger revenues between British companies. The Britain-US route remained very 
competitive and chaotic and stood in strong contrast to the Continental-US route where 
pool agreements led to the culmination of a series of consolidations (Hyde, 1975, 102-
103; Murken, 1922, 223, Smith, 1906, 260).  
This internal division favored the ascendancy of Continental lines on the North 
Atlantic steerage market. By forcing the British companies to join the continental pool, 
the NDLV lines put an end to the principal external pressure corrupting the continental 
market. It used the seven years during which the agr ements held to increase the concord 
on other segments of passenger liner’s business, reinforce the ties with the Mediterranean 
market and finding ways to police the agent-network. The price evolution of the HAL, 
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which is representative of all the NDLV members, show that the inclusion of the British 
lines allowed a marked increase of the rates. These r ached very profitable levels, 
considering that companies estimated that the cost per steerage passenger remained under 
$10; especially because the market stability after 1896 put an end to the extravagant extra 
commissions paid to migrant brokers and agents which in the past ranged from $3 to $9.  
With some exceptions the commission now remained fixed at $2 and it did so 
until 1914. Also, agreements on through rates put an end to the continuous price cutting 
on railroad fares which affected the profits made on the ocean leg of the voyage. Hence, 
the higher fares after 1896 largely underrate the increase in profits the companies made 
on steerage transport. Another notable improvement was that it allowed the lines to adapt 
their rates according to their pool quotas. Lines with a plus would often increase the rates 
to encourage passengers to book with other pool members with a minus. It allowed these 
companies to fill their quotas without lowering their rates and maximizing their profits. 
These fluctuations underestimate the relative rate stability that characterized this period. 
Finally, the agreement between the lines also gradually allowed to rise of the eastbound 
rates to westbound levels, despite the much more intense competition due to the fact that 
nearly all companies arrived in New York and thus shared the same hinterland for a 
rapidly increasing yet smaller market compared to the westbound traffic- creating an 
important overcapacity.  
The failure of the IMM to include the Cunard Line ropened old wounds. The 
British line exploited the situation to obtain favors from its government to regain some of 
its lost prestige and enlarge its share of the contine al market. It successfully penetrated 
the continental market, via the Adriatic side door with the support of the Hungarian 
government. That same year, CPR and Austro-Americana obtained a share. One could 
argue that this illustrates the weakness of the NDLV in controlling its market. Yet, on the 
other hand it must be noted that this market was both oming and gradually moving 
away from the homeports of the NDLV lines. The achievement of these companies to 
control such a vast hinterland, reaching as far Bayreuth and deep parts of Russia through 
the Hamburg-Le Havre, range must not be underestimated. This is especially when 
considering that for Russian shipping lines also had to compete with the simultaneous 
eastward migration movement to Siberia (Hoerder, 1994, 108). Directing relocaters from 
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a vast continent to the US, via from the Hamburg-Le Havre range, while preventing new 
routes from developing.  
The strategy of the NDLV to prevent newcomers from demoralizing the market, 
especially those backed by their governments and thus more likely to resist ruinous 
competition for a longer period, was to tie them to the pool rather than to fight them off. 
Moreover, since they transported migrants to and from nations that backed the new 
initiatives they did not want stimulate these governments from taking measures to 
exclude them from these markets; particularly since th  market grew fast enough to 
increase their numbers despite ceding small shares. Also, the enormous financial loss to 
start a rate war when the demand for steerage berths was high would not necessarily have 
pleased the shareholders. Rather than proving its weakness, the conflict with Cunard 
underlines the increased control of the NDLV lines on the continental market. Apart from 
the mistake of rejecting the request of the Hungarian government to take charge of the 
Fiume service, and leaving the opportunity to Cunard to get a foothold on the continent, 
the inability of the Hungarian government to obstruct the nationals from migrating 
through northern ports underline the influence of Cntinental lines in routing relocaters.  
But the capacity to contain the rate war to specific regions and not the whole 
continent as the British line intended, demonstrates th ir power. While Cunard Line held 
average prices at cost price during the rate war, the HAL made average profits of $15 per 
ticket. Between 1905 and 1908 Cunard limited its commitment to rate agreements while 
trying to increase its continental share through Libau. Its perseverance paid off as it 
obtained a larger continental share once it re-joined the pool. It came at a cost, as their 
average rates during those years remained low, and they were only able to significantly 
increase them when they formed part of the Atlantic Conference agreement (see Graph 
4). Except for a very temporary drop of in the eastbound rates the Continental lines 
managed to maintain stable rates. 
The competition with the RVF, REA and Uranium Line further illustrate the 
refined defense mechanism used by the Continental li es to protect their market. Even 
before the opening of the RVF service, Ballin tried to include the government managed 
line in the pool. When that became impossible the NDLV members started a fighting line 
instead of appointing fighting steamers. The reason for the more drastic measures was on 
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one hand due to the importance of the Russian market, especially for the HAL and 
HAPAG, and on the other hand because the line called at Rotterdam and hence was 
undermining one of the members at its homeport. The fact that HAL allowed the fighting 
line to also call at Rotterdam, and that it refrained from lowering its rates to respond to 
the competition of the RVF until the members reached their quotas at profitable rates, 
stresses the increased cohesion.  
One of the weaknesses the RVF aptly exploited was the fragile equilibrium 
between the migrant agent-network and the shipping companies. Outside lines went to 
great lengths to corrupt conference agents. Brokers, with a sense of personal vendetta like 
Richard, willingly assisted in destabilizing the agent-network. The inability of shipping 
lines to drive out brokers such as Richards constituted the achilles’ heel of the conference 
system during this period. They knew the weak points of the system and did not refrain 
from exploiting the anti-trust threat to deter the conference lines from fighting outside 
lines. Yet again market forces greatly influenced the fighting strategies. The RVF opened 
its service when the transatlantic migration reached unprecedented levels. As Fiona Scott-
Morton observed, trade growth on a route negatively affects the probability of a price war 
(Scott-Morton, 1997, 699). Not only were the measure  to fight off outside lines very 
costly during such periods, but they also had less effect because of high demand made it 
harder to prevent outside lines from booking passengers. Even when the REA fell into the 
hands of the RVF, the high profits seemed to reduce the activity from outside 
competition, especially of members who had fewer interests in the sub-market where the 
pool was being attacked.  
When the market plummeted, this totally changed. When analyzing the Liverpool 
conference Robin Bastin labeled it as a ‘very inadequate rate defense mechanism’; being 
at its weakest when business was bad, while by the tim the lines reached a new 
agreement trade was already improving anyway (Bastin, 1971, 104). But, Ballin confided 
to Pirrie during renegotiations that: “I would much rather fight in a year when business is, 
in any case not good, than put it off to a year that is full of prosperity.”554 The business 
logic behind the eruption of rate wars during slumps was to reduce its impact on 
                                                 
554 CLA, Chairmen correspondence, C1, 49, Ismay, Letter May 13 1911.  
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company profits while stronger lines were better armed to go through these slumps than 
weaker ones.  
Of crucial importance here -yet that the scope of this study does not permit fully 
examining it- is that well-established passenger lines controlled cabin, freight and 
steerage traffic while new lines, such as RVF usually predominantly relied on steerage 
traffic. Cabin passengers were much more sensitive to the prestige of a company which 
took some time for a newly established line to acquire. The impact of economic 
downturns on cabin passengers was also smaller than s eerage, giving the lines revenues 
the outside lines did not have. Brokers often tied by loyalty contracts and deferred rebates 
also took some convincing before risking their relations with the established lines. The 
many outside migrant agents offered more opportunities to penetrate the market. Also, 
the RVF only drew revenues from the North Atlantic while HAPAG touched nearly 300 
ports covering eighty different services worldwide. In short, for shipping companies 
slumps represented the ideal opportunity to flex their muscles before renegotiating new 
agreement and forcing outside companies to comply with it or to go out of business. 
Moreover, the NDLV had the scope to allow the RVF into the pool, further explaining its 
permissive attitude towards the line’s attempts to acquire a foothold in the market. The 
joint pressures of the Atlantic Conference members th ough fighting steamers and the 
crisis, forced the RVF to join the pool. This allowed the conference lines to quote 
profitable rates, despite the crisis and the outside competition. 
The NDLV showed less tolerance towards the Uranium Line. Without the backing 
of national authorities, being speculative in nature and trying to get into Hamburg and 
Rotterdam, the lines never stopped fighting the lin. Only when it was taken over by 
Canadian railroad interests did the pool consider some kind of negotiations, but it seemed 
ill prepared to allow a line to establish itself at one of the homeports of the members. 
Even the threat of an ongoing lawsuit against the conference agreements and use of 
fighting steamer failed to stop the NDLV members. The entrant picked Rotterdam 
because the Dutch authorities offered little protection against foreign competitors and no 
doubt also because next to the German giants and the RSL, which formed part of the 
IMM combine, it represented the weakest link in the NDLV pool. The directors’ decision 
of a large capital increase allowed the company to enter the twentieth century with new 
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first-class steamers, enabling it to play with the ‘big guys’ and protecting itself from a 
possible takeover. It failed to prevent a large part of its shares from falling into the other 
pool members’ hands, yet the directors retained the managing control by protecting the 
company of the German lines’ attempts to slow down its growth.  
In the meantime, the HAL prospered as no other Contine al line had, from the 
continuous consolidation efforts in getting assistance to fight competition in his homeport 
while paying out the highest dividends of the North Atlantic passenger lines. For more 
than two decades, the continental pool and the side agr ements that grew out of it, greatly 
improved the market and price stability reducing the competitive pressures for the 
migrant trade. Yet, as the original agreement underlined, the aim was to reduce 
competition, not eliminate it. As Frank Broeze and Kurt Nathan underlined even for the 
driving force behind the agreements, Albert Ballin, these were not objectives but means 
to be used by the company to strengthen its position. Very much aware that weaker lines 
reaped the greatest profits from his efforts, Ballin decided to flex his muscles to claim a 
bigger share of the market, most especially from the NGL (Broeze, 1991, 11 and 1993 
420; Greenhill, 1998, 64, 73; Nathan, 1935, 4-12). WOI disrupted his plans, and while 
the conflict would totally change the dynamics which governed the transatlantic steerage 
market. 
As Gordon Boyce observed, the strength of internal ties not only depended on 
relations among shipping companies but also between conference members and other 
agents such merchants, agents and government (Boyce, 1995, p 113). Because of their 
military importance, shipping companies usually maint ined close relations with their 
national governments. But, as pioneering global companies, their relations with 
authorities reached much further than their national governments. The sovereignty 
vacuum over the international waters offered a lot of protection to the freedom of 
organizing their trade. Yet, as national administrations gained control and responsibility 
over an increasing number of issues it became an important external threat, not only to 
the conference system, but even more so for the migrant trade. The joint action of the 
conference lines to defend the legality of the system, in light of the federal investigation, 
are only a small indication of the joint efforts of the shipping companies to prevent the 
passage and enforcement of American maritime and migration laws which could harm 
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the steerage trade during the Progressive Era. Volume LV of the Annals of the American 
Academy and Social Science, entitled Government Regulation of Water Transportation, 
compiled by the shipping representatives and academic members of the Alexander 
Committee explained and defended the need for shipping conferences for the broader 
public. This characterizes the increasing connections between corporations and 
legislators; the growing importance of public opinio  and acting according to ‘public 
interests’ and the growing significance of scientific opinions to suggest or assess policies. 
How this affected American maritime and migration laws will be discussed in chapter III 
and IV, but the relations between shipping companies and migrant agents need to be 
discussed first. 
 
Chapter II: The rise of Immigrant Banks: The sale of prepaid and return tickets 
through the American migrant agent network 1896-1914 
 
To date, business history has focused a lot more on big business managerial 
corporations than on smaller entrepreneurial firms. With the focus on the Holland 
America Line this study does not escape criticism. Yet, this big business only attained its 
scale as a result of the network of many smaller entrepreneurs supplying passengers to 
the shipping companies (Boyce, 1995, 3) The concentration of migrants in ethnic 
communities generated demands for specific products and services which created 
opportunities for uniquely qualified immigrant entrep eneurs to fill these (Massy, 1999, 
39, Hoerder, 2002, 17). Of crucial importance was the sale of ocean passage tickets and 
banking services for these entrepreneurs whose ethnic diversity increased as the 
migration fever spread to Southern and Eastern Europe. As Delheim noted the role of 
ethnicity has received limited attention despite its influence on business activities and the 
formation of the American business community (Delheim, 2004, 229-231).  
This was especially the case for migrant business as will be illustrated by the 
analysis of the immigrant-banking boom in the US at the end of the nineteenth Century. 
Ethnic ties played an important role for newcomers who often found in immigrant 
bankers emissaries ‘to America within America’ . The phenomenon of immigrant banks 
has been largely overlooked by historians, as noted by Day; the first to present a 
systematic cross-ethnic analysis describing the general features of these financial 
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institutions (Day, 2002, 77-78).555 Migrants using short term deposits as part of their 
migration strategies represented a large segment of the saving banks’ initial clientele 
(Wadhwani, 2002, 43). But because migrant entrepreneurs were often kept from playing 
an active role in local banks managed by natives, they opened their own. Sharing the 
same background helped them considerably in earning the trust and goodwill of migrants 
(Bodnar, 1985, 131-132).  
These immigrant banks deserve more attention, especially since ethnic banking is 
back in vogue. Some scholars have observed the growing phenomenon of ethnic banking; 
how on a micro level modern banks use culture and ethnicity for both client orientation 
and market differentiation. For instance, the Spanish-American community has become a 
very competitive market for banks in the US offering specialized services in which ethnic 
ties provide a strategic advantage. Language is crucial (Armstrong and Haiss, 2007, 1-3). 
Yet what is true today was even more so a century ago. Immigrant banks mushroomed as 
transatlantic migration became less permanent and svings became the primary goal of 
the move (Hourwich, 1911, 632; Piore, 1979, 56; Wyman, 1993, 59). The private banks, 
of various scales, spread nationwide wherever migrant communities established 
themselves. Banking generally only represented a part of their commerce and often 
entrepreneurs in small towns rolled in the business rather accidentally through other 
activities. The lack of legislation regulating these ‘unincorporated banks’ prior to 1914 
enhanced their rapid dissemination. Language skills and specialized services, especially 
administrative ones, allowed immigrant bankers to tie certain ethnic clientele. Especially 
the first generation migrants greatly depended on cl se and personal relations before 
entrusting their hard earned savings. As the market expanded, the American bankers tried 
to get their hands on the business by investing in the foreign departments of their banks to 
provide similar services, something American banks are rediscovering today. 
Indispensable facets of immigrant banking business consisted of money transfers or other 
means to send back remittances and the sale of ocean passage tickets. The former is still 
an important facet of ethnic banking, today the latter is not, at least not yet (Armstrong 
and Haiss, 2007, 10-11; Born, 1977, 176; Reports of the Dillingham Commission, 1911, 
vol. 37, 203-355). 
                                                 
555 For an overview on the sparse historiography about immigrant banks see: (Day, 2002, 65). 
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Immigrant bankers represent a key link in the migrat on process, connecting the 
individual migrant to shipping companies and national authorities. They are the 
middlemen on, what Hoerder labeled the meso-level of mediating networks and 
interacting segments linking individuals to world-systems (Hoerder, 1996, 84). The 
management of local markets through a multi-ethnic migrant agent network constituted a 
challenging endeavor for maritime enterprise where, as Boyce underlined, social and 
cultural affiliation had always played an important role in generating mutual trust 
between principals and agents (Boyce, 2001, 4-5). In 1897, there were 2625 official 
immigrant savings banks spread of 146 American cities. New York City showed the 
highest concentration of these (Cinel, 1991, 31; Grebe , 2006, 237). To these, numerous 
unofficial ones must be added. By further analyzing the relation between the shipping 
companies and the agent network some new facets of the turn of the century immigrant 
banking, and the importance of ethnicity will come to light.  
The introduction of steam-shipping had not only made it easier for migrants to 
cross the Atlantic but also for merchants involved in the migrant business. As discussed 
earlier, migrant brokers opened branch offices in New York allowing some Jewish 
brokers to nearly takeover control of the prepaid market. For this successful strategy, 
brokers entrusted the management of New York offices pr ferably to family members in 
order to neutralize the principal-agent problems. If this was impossible they recruited a 
person of trust almost exclusively from the same ethnic group. Trust was essential in the 
migrant business, where the distance and the lack of effective international juridical 
means to offer protection from abuse, reinforced the principal-agent problems. Family 
and ethnic ties proved to be the best remedy against opportunistic behavior and in 
obtaining reliable information.  
Similar policies were adopted by the HAL who, after he start-up phase of 
recruiting locals in the US sent an increasing number of personnel from Rotterdam for 
various functions. The Dutch line preferred to recruit nationals who had familiarized 
themselves with the company’s philosophy in the home-country, trusting them much 
more than foreigners recruited abroad. For the HAL, personnel with overseas experience 
usually formed part of the process in climbing up the company hierarchy, which was still 
 318
dominated by family ties, but was opening up for successful managers.556 After Cazaux 
van Staphorst ,all the New York head-agents returned to join the board of directors at 
some point before 1914. As distances between both wrlds grew less directors and head-
agents made the crossing more frequently to discuss important issues and to reinforce 
business relations, which letters and telegraphs did not fully permit. It also allowed the 
directors to retain their predominant position in the decision-making process, delegating 
only a minimum of responsibilities to their American representatives and hence not 
partaking in the managerial revolution that was taking place in the US (Chandler, 1977, 
189-192; Gottheil, 1914, 74).  
In the meantime, while solidifying the internal business structure, the efforts to 
improve the collaboration between the lines resulted in a general agreement involving all 
the principal North Atlantic Lines. It allowed the HAL to strengthen the ties with the US 
migrant-agent network. The relations had reached a low point during the rate war of 1894 
as Jewish migrant brokers had positioned themselves between the two. How did the 
company regain control? What was the impact of the c ange in migrant origin on the 
agent-network? How important were ethnic ties in the migrant business? Who were these 
migrant bankers and what did their activities consist of? How did the American banking 
world react to their ascendancy? To answer these questions the continental conference 
minutes of the Standing Complaint Committee, correspondence of the New York head-
agent of the HAL, sporadic reports of HAL travelers vi iting the migrant bankers and the 
volume of the Dillingham commissions on immigrant banks are used.  
 
1) The foundation of the New York City Agents Association 
 
When the British and Continental lines finished the n gotiations on the 
conference agreements, some of the biggest brokers formed an association to reorganize 
the business in New York. The New York City Agents A sociation (NYCAA) came to 
life when the British lines, close to an agreement with the Continental lines, decided to 
                                                 
556 The following New York head agents joined the board of directors; W. Van den Toorn (1899-
1906), J. R.  Wierdsma (1906-1936) and   A. Gips (1912-1933). To those three the following completed the 
board before WOI; W. van der Hoeven (1873-1884); A. Plate (1874-1880), J.V. Wierdsma (1881-1916) O. 
Reuchlin (1873-1919), J. Reuchlin (1906-1912). The list underlines the predominance of the Wierdsma and 
Reuchlin families (Wentholt, 1977, 14-15).  
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drastically reduce the number of agents and stopped aying commissions to runners.557 
The first continental conference of 1885 prohibiting the use of sub-agents and limiting 
the sale of tickets to the agent’s office, in theory, reduced all brokers to simple agents, yet 
in practice this could never be implemented. A clear hierarchy within the agent-network 
persisted in which some agencies at the biggest Atlantic ports and inland cities attracted 
the bulk of the business. The niche created by the price difference between cash and 
prepaid tickets engendered the order-system, reinforci g this hierarchy. Especially 
Hamburg brokers, predominantly Jewish, opened branch offices on both sides of the 
Atlantic delocalizing the market. Due to the lack of c ntrol by the shipping lines and the 
keen competition between the brokers a wide network of small agents, runners, and 
peddlers spread nationwide. This proliferation also affected the brokers’ profits. The 
agreement between the shipping lines forced the brokers, who feared the establishment of 
joint tickets offices managed by the lines, to unite in various city agents’ associations to 
draw up terms with the companies. In New York, ‘capital of ocean passage sales’, 
president, A. Falck, and the Secretary, M. Rosett, of he NYCAA, took the initiative by 
urging the Continental lines to follow the example of the British lines. They saw an 
opportunity to concentrate the business in a limited number of hands while the reduced 
numbers made the network for the Continental lines more manageable and offered an 
opportunity to make an end to the order business.558 How did it affect ocean passage 
sales? 
The agreements caused a big shake up in the migrant business. A lot of European 
correspondents to the New York agents could no longer forward the passengers at special 
cash rates formerly obtained by the companies. Some corr spondents refused to honor the 
orders drawn on them, obligating the New York agents to rebook the passenger as a 
regular prepaid. It put some agents in serious trouble as van den Toorn reported on the 
‘Banking, Passage and Exchange office’ of Max Kobre:  
“As all agents he entrusted until recently his money and passage business with an 
expedient in Europe, in his case Karlsberg & Co in Rotterdam. Just as all bigger 
prepaid agents he drew orders on expedients and left it up to the Karlsberg how to 
                                                 
557 The agents in Chicago soon followed. An agent associati n in Minneapolis and Saint Louis was 
established in 1897 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564 Min 238 July 16 1897.  
558 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters June 14, August 6, 23, September 5 
1895.  
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forward passengers, unless Kobre specified a route. Yet against Kobre’s advice 
Karlsberg sent most of his passengers indirectly through England upon which the 
New York agent decided to withdraw the money order business, worth 30.000 to 
40.000 a month. Karlsberg then refused to continue forwarding Kobre’s passenger 
despite having received the remittance covering the crossing leaving them 
stranded in Bentheim and Rotterdam.”559 
 
The incident greatly harmed Kobre’s reputation; who tried to rebook the passengers at 
own cost. In the meantime Karlsberg sent an assistant to explore the opportunities of 
opening a branch office in New York, yet the contacts with Spiro and Scharlach still 
guaranteed him enough business. The relation between Karlsberg and Kobre highlights 
the high risks attached to the business, the importance of strong trust relations between 
the European correspondent and the New York agent and the increased mobility of 
merchants. A lot of European houses offered the possibility to New York agents of 
drawing orders on them as a means to expand their market, yet a lot of the biggest 
brokers kept the business within the family; like for instance Jarmulowsky, Scharlach, 
Missler, Falck etc. The incident also reveals that shipping companies had lost control 
over the routing of passengers drawn on European expedients. The latter contacted the 
passengers and arranged their inland trip to the port of embarkation. On arrival the 
expedients booked them as they pleased.  
The truce between shipping lines allowed the re-imposition of the use of prepaid 
tickets instead of orders. The old conference rules tying the agents to exclusive patronage 
were reintroduced. Agents drawing orders or violating other rules risked disqualification. 
Parallel agreements with the British-Scandinavian and Mediterranean conferences stated 
that any agent disqualified for violating rules common to every conference would have to 
send back the ticket books of all conference lines. Only some smaller lines remained 
outside of these conference agreements, meaning that disqualification practically 
excluded them from ocean passage sale, a crucial aspect of the immigrant banking 
business. By limiting the concessions authorizing someone to act as an official agent the 
NYCAA received enough guarantees to secure a fair sha e of the business. Members 
needed to deposit a $250 bond. To control the abidance to the conference rules the 
Continental lines, including the French line, established a Standing Complaint Committee 
                                                 
559 Ibid. Letter September 19 1895. 
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in New York for the East and in Chicago for the West. The lines relied on one hand on a 
self-denouncing system among the members of the NYCAA, and on other hand hired 
private detectives controlling the agents. The use of numbered prepaid tickets instead of 
orders made it much easier to trace the abuses. Van den Toorn reported that the 
agreement had a very positive effect, yet he realizd that abuses would never totally 
disappear. Little could be done to impede the smaller outside agents to corrupt the 
business forcing official agents to follow suit.560 What follows is an analysis of most 
important reoccurring abuses presented to the New York Complaint Committee.  
 
2) The implementation and violation of the conference rules: the relations between 
shipping companies and the agent-network 
 
2.1) The credit-system and sale of tickets through peddlers 
 
At the first meeting between the agents and the lines, Falck strongly 
recommended striking out the clause prohibiting the sal  of tickets on credit. The custom 
was so common that it seemed hardly conceivable to put an end to the practice. The lines 
refused, fearing that giving credit stimulated excessive competition, just what they sought 
to prevent.561 Yet, especially among the East Side Jewish agents the practice of selling 
tickets on installments through peddlers was well-established.562 Peddling was a common 
employment for newly arrived Jews who willingly adde  the sale of ocean tickets to their 
trades (Supple, 1957, 143 -178; Olegario, 1999, 161-189 and Kahan, 1978, 235-258). 
Nearly seventy five percent of the two million Jews ho arrived in the US between 1881 
and 1914 remained in New York. They came from Hungry, Galicia, and Romania but 
above all from Russia where nearly three quarters of the Jewish community originated 
from (Binder and Reimers, 1995, 114-115). This concentration explains the important 
numbers of Jews involved in the New York immigrant banking business.  
                                                 
560 Ibid. Letter October 18 1897 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, minutes 1-138 
of the Standing Complaint Committee, September 26 1895 till December 6 1896.  
561 Ibid. Minute 6, September 26 1895.  
562 Selling tickets through traveling salesmen was not limi ed to Jewish agents. For example agents 
E. Johnson and Paulson & Co who were particularly active on the Scandinavian market were renowned for 
doing a lot of business that way. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter July 23 1901. 
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Their sales did not limit themselves to co-religionists but also extended to other 
ethnic groups. Just as Italian immigrant banker/employer agencies dominated the 
Mediterranean market, so did the Jewish immigrant bkers for the Continental market in 
New York where an important share of the American sales was transacted. By 
introducing new selling methods, such as cheaper cash-orders, which they spread through 
peddlers they managed to pierce through the ethnic barriers common to immigrant 
banking. Other ethnic groups were underrepresented or even totally absent but in other 
parts of the US the ethnicity of the banker still strongly depended on the origins of the 
communities living in certain districts and settlements. The competition between the lines 
had enabled the rise of the Jewish immigrant brokers, much to the dislike of the HAL. 
The shipping company continued to mistrust migrant broker and agents, especially the 
Jewish ones. Two years after the agreement with the British lines Van den Toorn reported 
that abuses had greatly reduced, yet Jewish agents co inued to corrupt the business. He 
described agent A. Kass, a former employee of Bruno Weinberger, as: “typical sly, mean 
Jewish usurer using every possible trick to enrich himself.”563 Because of them, selling 
on installments through peddlers proved impossible to radicate.  
The Standing Complaint Committee occasionally fined agents for those reasons, 
while Thomas Fitchie, in charge of Ellis Island complained about a growing number of 
passengers arriving not only without funds but with debts needing to pay off the ticket 
bought on installments. After being caught, the Markel Brothers stated in their defense 
that some East-side agents did most of their busines  that way, leaving them no choice 
but to follow suit. The Continental lines sent out the Pinkerton detectives on a wide-range 
investigation catching Kass, Kobre, Scharlach, S. Jarmulowsky, Barasch, Markel 
Brothers, Falck, Zweigel and Germansky. The surcharge for buying on installments 
averaged at around one third of the ticket. Usually the  required a down payment of $5 to 
$10 followed by weekly installments of one dollar.564  Fines imposed did little to deter 
the agents. As Rosett pointed out, it remained an open secret that East-side agents 
                                                 
563 Ibid. Letter September 17 1897.  
564 Van den Toorn gives the example of Goldberg paying 59,5 dollars for her passage and that of 
her child from Antwerp to New York while the gross rate charged by the lines amounted to 44,25 dollars. 
Ibid., Letter July 8 1899. Same margin was used by S. Barash and by Kobre selling through Forsyth GAR, 
HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, minute 122 October 22 1896, 541 August 15 1900. S. Frank paid 
41 dollars instead of 33 Ibid., minute 765, 28 February 1903. 
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conducted most of their business that way. A circular threatening with $500 fines and a 
six months suspension created a shock-effect. It reveal d that some agents had up to 
$15,000 outstanding for peddler tickets. They petitioned the lines to reconsider, stating 
that it would drive the business to Europe:  
“They explained that the low rates made by some of the English lines would be an 
inducement for agents to cover the prepaid business through cash transactions on 
the other side and that the peddler although doing the business himself on 
installment, would advise through agents the entire cash amount by money order 
to the correspondent in Europe. Some of the agents went as far as claiming that 
about 80 percent of their business was transacted through peddlers. They would 
prefer to give up the Continental agencies and make use of Anweisungen. Agents 
agreed to place the peddler business under our contol i  exchange we withdrew 
measures stipulated in said circular. Outside New York peddlers can not be 
tolerated and the rules there still stand. The agents will in the future be 
responsible for all cancellations either by cable or letter, in other words when a 
prepaid passenger should be on his way to Rotterdam and the peddler not being 
paid by the purchaser of the ticket would request the agent to cancel the same, 
who in turn notifies us, you will have the right to forward the passenger, the agent 
being required to take the full responsibility. Very pleased with the working of 
this rule, since one of the greatest abuses of the peddler system was the many 
cancellations of tickets, resulting in great hardship to the passengers not knowing 
that the ticket was bought in void, sacrificing home and work, suffering thus 
distress and misery.” 
 
The agents also committed to stop selling through unauthorized agents and breaking off 
their order business connections in Libau, Wilna, Brest Litowsk and Bialystock. At the 
time, the Cunard Line had just broken away from the conference agreements; hence 
consolidating the working relations with the agents was of crucial importance.565 The 
agreement gave official recognition to peddlers who gained influence. Keen competition 
broke out between the East-side agents to tie these trav ling salesmen to their agency. 
The British lines disqualified M. L. Jarmulowsky for using illicit means in doing so and 
the conference lines had to follow suit. Yet the peddl rs formed a union to fight his 
disqualification at the Standing Complaint Committee, and with success. From then on, 
peddlers appointed a representative to defend their int rests at the meetings.566  
                                                 
565 Ibid., Minute 334, April 13 1898; 415, 417 December 20 1898; 421-432 February 23 1899; 770 
February 5 1903 and 777 March 26 1903.  
566 Ibid., Minutes 801-817 Meetings July 2 and August 3 1903.  
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Shipping Companies were unable to restrict the practice to East-side New York. 
The HAL quickly conceded the permission of selling tickets on credit to other New York 
agents. Reports on other regions show that the practice spread nationwide. This was 
stimulated by the growing interest of American banks for the business. With the 
increased competition for migrant savings, Pittsburgh banks employed canvassers 
soliciting deposits for steamship tickets as a way to attract new clients.567 Baltimore 
Agent A. Robson even openly advertised the sale of tickets on installments. The 
Continental lines sent out a circular urging the agnts to keep their steamship ticket and 
loaning banking business seperate. The custom of buying tickets on credit propagated 
with the growing entanglement of banking and ocean p ssage sales.  
The increased competition for the Russian market with the opening in 1906 of 
direct services from Libau -by the conference members WSL, Russian East Asiatic and 
Anchor Line and the non-conference Cunard Line and Russian Volunteer Fleet (RVF)- 
corrupted the business managed by East-side agents. As he RVF also called at Rotterdam 
it infringed on the core business of HAL. The head-agent of the new line, C.B. Richard, 
hired an army of two hundred peddlers and runners quoting lower rates. To prevent the 
situation from getting out of hand the Continental lines tried to revoke the concession of 
working with peddlers. The implementation needed to be postponed several times to give 
the agents time to clear up their business and becaus  of the growing popularity of the 
RVF. Conference agents quickly lost ground, both on the money transfer and ocean 
passage sales market. Instead of getting facilities revoked they asked for more protection, 
especially lower rates, to remain competitive. The conference lines eventually needed to 
give in to the agents not only allowing them to continue the peddler business but also 
granting permission to some East-side agents to temporarily book for the RVF.568 
The events underline the weak position of the confere ce lines towards outside 
companies and their agents. Any company trying to penetrate the market made it very 
hard for shipping companies to discipline their agents. A strict implementation of the 
                                                 
567 The shipping companies did not oppose agents to accept deposits on eastbound steerage 
passengers on account of passage tickets and made official by taking it up in the conference rules. Ibid. min 
456 October 24 1899. 
568 Ibid. Min 849 April 24 1904; 891 October 27 1904; 911, 923 May 11 1905; 1015-1047 January 
17 until August 5 1907. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters February 14 1904; 
December 30 1906; September 10 and October 26 1907. 
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conference rules in periods of increased competition weakened the position of their 
agents. But even without the pressure of outside rivals the shipping companies were 
unable to prevent agents of selling tickets through peddlers on installments. The 
concession granted to the East-side Jewish agents allowed them to improve the regulation 
of the peddler business, especially to the benefit of the migrants. Yet, they proved unable 
to restrict it to New York. The growing number of canvassers, peddlers and runners 
stimulated the excessive competition which they tried to contain. 
 
2.2) The problem of outside agents 
 
Because of the limitation of the number of agents a ignificant number found 
themselves shut out of the market in 1895. However, the contacts through which they 
previously sold tickets did not disappear overnight. Most outsiders fruitlessly applied to 
obtain the concession from the conference lines. In the meantime, they sought other ways 
of getting their hands on ocean passage sales, which Day describes as: “the most common 
service and the most powerful anchor of private ethnic bankers” (Day, 2002, 67). Two 
options were available; representing one of the few r maining non-conference lines or 
selling illegally for conference lines as a sub-agent of authorized European or American 
agents. The agency of Pollowe, Mogilewsky and Werner eflects the creative means by 
which ethnic bankers sold ocean passage.  
The associates started off as clerks in St Louis Scharlach & Company, but decided 
to start out on their own when their employer moved from 391 to 362 Grand Street, New 
York. Behind Scharlach’s back they arranged to take ov r the old building, opening a 
banking, exchange and passage office called the Austro-Russian Bank. The experience 
acquired under Scharlach, and their prime location, served as guarantees for success. The 
only problem remaining was getting hold of ticket books. Quite naturally they needed to 
deal with Scharlach’s vendetta. He made sure that no line hired them as agents, except for 
the dissident Atlantic Line, managed by C. Richard, who was still supporting any 
initiative harming HAPAG’s interests. Yet, the agents found it difficult to route Eastern 
Europeans through Genoa, the homeport of the Atlantic Line. Scharlach gathered 
testimonies of unsatisfied customers on the disadvantages of the long journey through 
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Genoa and passed these on to local newspapers. The Austro-Russian Bank also sold 
orders drawn on European houses yet only the concession as conference agents presented 
the desired growth opportunities.  
Pollowe took some correspondence between Scharlach’s New York and Hamburg 
offices to the head-agents of HAL and HAPAG revealing significant abuse of the 
conference rules. Other outside agents also used this s rategy of supplying inside 
information, as a means of buying their way into the select club of conference agents.569 
This helped the situation, but the line’s most important criteria for acceptance was the 
amount of new business the agents could contribute to the pool. Building up that business 
proved to be a gradual process. While awaiting their appointment the Austro-Russian 
bank started to conduct business for the authorized ag nt  
A. Kass. Many official agents could not resist using the networks of outside 
agents to increase their sales. The unauthorized agnts were rewarded with clients, for 
money exchange sent his way, or a share of the commission. Selling prepaids for Kass 
and drawing orders on the correspondents Hermer & Knie (Libau) and Haimsohn & Co 
(London) which allowed them to undercut prepaids by $2, the Austro-Hungarian Bank 
started to make a name for itself. The possibility of selling on installments, the exemption 
of paying cancellation fees and not needing to remit the money until the arrival of the 
passenger instead of on purchase gave non-conference agents important competitive 
advantages. The Austro-Russian Bank no longer seemed sure to want to join the select 
club, while complaints of conference agents grew stronger. In the meantime, Scharlach 
tried to convince Austro-Bank-passengers who traveled with the Beaver Line via Canada, 
but had booked for direct passage, to sue his former e ployees. Despite his efforts to 
obstruct their business Pollowe, Mogilewsky and Werner rapidly expanded their 
business.  
In violation with the agreements the French line, in trying to get a foothold into 
Russia, secretly accepted passengers from the agents. When caught, the agents lost that 
                                                 
569 For instance Harry Oppenheim, a former clerk of Kobre, supplied the names of the European 
correspondents working for the Beaver Line; Knie Falck & Co,  O. Ramler, (Libau), E. Kriskowsky, L. 
Gerschenowitz, (Wilna) L. Nierenberg (Brest-Litowsky), I. Kahan (London), P. Canon (Antwerp) and  
Freydberg (Rotterdam). He offered to fully disclose th  methods and connections of the Beaver Line in 
exchange for the conference agency. The information d d not immediately lead to his appointment, yet h 
eventually managed to create enough goodwill. Ibid., Letters August 28, September 10 1901, and 
September 12 1907.   
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business but were still doing well by working for the Beaver Line. The British line did 
not renew its membership of the North Atlantic Passenger Conference, seeing a lot more 
opportunities to increase its market share by remaining outside the agreements tapping 
off continental passengers. As long as the Beaver Line refused to join, little could be done 
to prevent outside and unscrupulous official agents from booking for the line. To force 
the Beaver Line back into the agreement and to prevent the CGT from moving into the 
Russian market, the Continental lines appointed the Austro-Russian Banks as official 
agents; on the condition they posed bond with a survey company amounting to a 
$1000.570 The Austro-Russian Bank quickly became one of the biggest continental agents 
of the city. The agency survived the deaths of Pollowe and Mogilewsky because their 
widows maintained their interests. Yet, like many other immigrant banks the ‘shipping 
agency, foreign money exchange and private bank’ failed during the economic crisis of 
1908 (Day, 2002, 76). 
The Austro-Russian Bank is a representative example of how other banks, such as 
the Hungarian agents Lengyel, Kraus & Comapny tried to work their way up. Kraus 
started off as clerk at Falck & Company but joined Lengyel, owner of the newspaper 
Magyar Trasulat to launch themselves in immigrant banking.571 Not making the shortlist 
of conference agents, they sought alternative ways to contract business. Other than 
Pollowe, Mogilewsky and Werner, Kraus remained on good terms with his former 
employer. Agents usually built up expertise as clerks, before starting out on their own, 
yet doing that in the building of the former employer was quite exceptional. The 
Complaint Committee caught Falck, on various occasions selling through Lengyel, Kraus 
& Company. Falck paid his fines but never gave up his ties with the agency. The 
perseverance of the Hungarian immigrant bank in drawing orders on European houses 
and selling for various authorized agents eventually paid off. Yet, changing the business 
practices from illegitimately contracting passengers to working as conference agents, 
                                                 
570 Ibid., Letters May 7, 18, June 28, September 17, October 29 1897, January 21, April 1 1898, 
October 27, December 30 1899 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, min 444, October 24 
1899.  
571 Not all of them remained in the US to move up. Some returned to the home country starting an 
agency there to work as correspondents for contacts hey established in the New World. For instance C. H. 
Nekritz returned to Russia establishing an office in Slutz. When soliciting for the agency of the HAL the 
Dutch company obtained information on him through Max Kobre for whom he used to work in New York. 
GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter February 2 1901. 
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proved a difficult process for Lengyel & Kraus. They were caught sending 10,000 
circulars to potential clients and correspondents across the country, advertising the 
possibility of buying tickets on installments. They also continued the cattleman business 
(see below).  
Because of the repeated abuses, their appointment was short-lived and they were 
forced back into their old ways of doing passage business.572 Like the situation with 
peddlers, the lines could do little to prevent outside agents from getting their hands on 
shipping tickets. Especially their business through orders on European houses led to 
abuse. Sometimes, passengers got stuck in Rotterdam without a valid ticket because the 
American agent did not remit the full amount to thecorrespondent in Europe. The New 
York office of the HAL usually tried to track down the unauthorized agent responsible 
for the sale and urge him to remit the money deposited with him. If that failed to work 
they asked authorized agents, more aware of the inside tracks, for assistance. In the 
majority of these cases, this left the defrauded purchaser with the choice of either paying 
for a new ticket or seeing his family or friends being sent back home. The purchaser 
usually chose the first option. It meant losing themoney to the so-called agents because 
when the purchaser addressed the court for redress, in the majority of the cases, it was not 
upheld as the party to which he paid the money could show that passengers arrived via 
the port over which the order had been drawn. The assistance provided by the HAL gave 
these agents a stronger foothold, yet by taking no action the business would be diverted 
elsewhere. In 1906 the company considered discontinui g the practice.573  
Limiting the armada of middlemen between the company d the purchasers of 
third-class ocean passage remained a very difficult task. When considering firstly, the 
geographic expansion of business activities across the US; secondly the growing ethnic 
diversity and thirdly the increase of passengers transported, the HAL succeeded in 
limiting the number of authorized agents totaling 1,400 in 1884, 2,000 in 1893 and 1,700 
in 1906.574 Also, in New York the Continental lines managed to contain the number of 
                                                 
572 Ibid., Letters March 30 1898 October 24, November 11 and  December 12 1899 and GAR, 
HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, min 453-77, August 23 1900. 
573 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters August 2 and September 7 1906. 
574 Based on the amount of circulars printed to be sent to the agents containing an update of the 
conference rules an approximation can be given of other companies. In 1905 the HAL printed 2500 
circulars while Gips stated a year later of numbering 1700 agents. The other companies mentioned printed 
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agents notwithstanding the numerous applications (see appendix 6). Some of these were 
hard to refuse such as, Joseph Senner as president of the Austrian-Hungarian Immigrant 
Home. Senner had provided great services to the lines, both as manager of Ellis Island 
and as president of the Pro-Immigration League. In spite of this, the lines politely refused 
on two occasions, fearing that his appointment could destabilize the Austrian-Hungarian 
market.575  
The companies even refused the application of the Transatlantic Trust Company 
opened by Hungarian government. Again the companies wanted to protect their 
Hungarian agents from this attempt by the Hungarian authorities to take full control over 
the steam-shipping, money transfer and exchange business between the countries. While 
favoring concentration of the business, shipping lines did not want migrant banks to 
control too much business either; and probably for the same reason the American Express 
Company did not make the cut. The company had managed to obtain the concession to do 
all the money transfers from Ellis Island. Subsequently, American Express lobbied in 
Albany to convince New York State representatives of withdrawing the right of 
steamship companies to draw money orders, drafts and sign out traveler-cheques.576 If 
they were unable to get their hands on the ocean passage sales, then it would prevent the 
lines of getting theirs on banking business.  
What the lines could not control was the number of unauthorized agents. The 
increasing transatlantic dimension of the middlemen network opened up new 
opportunities for the agents, especially because price difference between both continents 
persisted allowing the order business to continue.  
   
2.3) The circulation of European cash orders in the US 
 
                                                                                                                                      
the following amount of which the figures of the HAL give an indication how much these overestimate the 
actual number; Cunard 5400, Austria-Americana 750, CGT 2000, RSL 4000, HAPAG 4500 NGL 4000, 
NGL Baltimore 1000. Ibid., November 25 1893 and December 10 1906; GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage 
Department, 564, min, 930 August 10 1905. 
575 Ibid., min 688 October 31 1901and 780 April 30 1903. 
576 Ibid., min 615, March 9 1901. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter July 1 
1908 and GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Department, 48-59, Letters September 19, October 18 1912 and 
March 7 1913.  
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Despite the threat of disqualification for drawing orders, the lines seemed unable 
to prevent their agents from taking that risk. Within the first year of the agreement S. 
Baros got caught and was fined a $100 for drawing an order on Karlsberg & Company. 
Van den Toorn suspected Kobre and Scharlach of doing the same on other European 
correspondents, but he lacked proofs. However, evidence of this was supplied by Pollowe 
showing that Scharlach did most of his through orders and also that a number of 
passengers booked for HAL and HAPAG were rerouted through England. One of 
Scharlach’s clients, A. Hauptmann even made his wayto the Complaint Committee 
testifying that the three passengers he had bought tickets for on installments arrived 
through Canada instead of directly through New York. The committee imposed a $150 
fine together with a warning of disqualification on the next breach. They showed less 
clemency for Kobre; who was caught for sending Russian passengers from Libau to 
England, to Canada and than to New York through the Beaver Line. With the detectives 
sent out by the lines, agents no longer used their own orders or advice slips, but used 
receipts of regular money transfers. The correspondent then forwarded the passenger 
according to the amount received. Kobre refused to grant the lines access to his books, 
upon which, in deliberation with the English lines the committee disqualified him. A 
month later, Kobre, on the verge of bankruptcy, wasreinstated after paying a $160 fine. 
The lines feared that with his contacts in Libau and London he could pull away a lot 
business from the pool if by associating himself with the Austro-Russian bank. The 
practice was not limited to the East-side agents. M Rosett, the biggest Hungarian broker 
and Zwilchenbart, Grasser & Company the number one Swiss agency of in the city, also 
used their European offices to transport their prepaid clients as cash passengers.577 
Van den Toorn endlessly repeated his requests to se equal prices and 
commissions on both sides of the Atlantic. A profit margin of 60 cents was enough for 
brokers to use orders instead of prepaids. Especially the higher commissions paid out in 
Europe, usually 15 marks compared to $2 in the US created the discrepancy. The HAL 
head-agent also complained that the rate of exchange used had always been too high for 
order business, suggesting using $0.24 to the mark instead of $0.245. In 1898, the 
combined differences reached $2 again, despite quoting equal gross rates. Yet, if setting 
                                                 
577 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter January 6 1900. 
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equal prices seemed impossible, van den Toorn urged the irectors in Rotterdam to make 
European houses liable for disqualification if they maintained connections for drawing 
orders with parties in the US.578 What had started as a local phenomenon in Hamburg 
quickly spread to other European ports and major inland transit points. The HAL 
resolutely tried to eradicate the practice from its home port and also in Eastern Europe by 
boycotting expedients in that area together with the RSL.579  
However, the British Beaver Line hampered the efforts, diverting part of the 
continental traffic through Karlsberg at Rotterdam for their Canadian service. Although 
being part of the North Atlantic Passenger Conference the line took the risk to increase its 
share of the continental market without validating them for the pool. The main problem 
for the lines was to get their hands on proofs of these well masked practices. Even for 
private detectives it was hard to track down people, because of the frequent use of false 
names and the lack of conclusive means to identify passengers.580 Once the Beaver Line 
withdrew from the agreements these proofs no longer mattered. Pressures to force the line 
back in were in vain. Through the order system, the British line continuously created 
problems for the Continental lines in the US. Following the numerous cancellations of 
Roumanian prepaid Jewish passenger, the HAL also found ut that the line gave special 
rates to Baron Hirsch to attract the business of the Hebrew charity associations in 
Canada. Genken Wierdsma urged to finding a way to ge  rid of the line. Shortly after, the 
CPR took over the British shipping company.581 This did not solve the problem as outside 
agents and even conference agents continued to use rders, and new rival lines kept on 
popping up.  
Only after the panic of 1907, which sent a shock wave through the transatlantic 
migrant agent network, did the practice seemingly come to an end. The source is not 
conclusive hence no answers can be given either on how or why orders which had 
disrupted the American market during the previous two decades no longer posed 
                                                 
578 Ibid., Letters June 14 1895; July 311896; May 7, 14, 25 September 17, October 15 1897, April 
4 1899; March 20 1900 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, Minutes 188, 194, 195 and 215 
May 5 and 11 1897; min 329 Mach 30 1898.  
579 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters March 2 and 23 1897. 
580 Ibid., Letters May 21, June 2, 11, September 21 and 28 1897. 
581 CPR took over the Beaver Line in 1903. Ibid., Letters February 14 1901, August 2, and 
September 7 1906 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, Min 699, February 10 1902. 
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problems.582 And yet, the biggest mystery remains why the lines which apparently could 
have easily put an end to it by setting equal rates nd commissions on both sides of the 
Atlantic never did so during that period. Why did the directors allow European brokers to 
compete for the American market from the old continent? More research is needed on the 
organization of the European market of ocean passage les to shed more light on this. 
No clear organizational benefits, or important financi l gains, are apparent from the 
American side of the transatlantic market, quite on the contrary. Even the agreement 
between the lines in 1896, putting an end to the excessive competition which had 
generated the order-system in the first place, ceased to halt the practice. Only after 1908 
do references to the order system completely disappear, indicating that with the Atlantic 
Conference agreement the lines took measures to finally put an end to this system. Yet 
not only the price difference between Europe and the US upset the American market, so 
too did the price divergence between the Continental a d Mediterranean market.  
  
2.4) Interference of the Mediterranean market: the case study of Zotti & Co 
 
 The same conditions as on the Continental market existed on Mediterranean 
market, where agents in Europe received a 20 lire commission and their American 
counterparts only $2.583 As van den Toorn deplored: “We have always failed to see why 
agents on your side should have higher commissions than here, especially in the case of 
Italian agents, who we well know have always endeavored to do crooked business some 
way. It is a pity that such considerable difference should exist.”584 An additional problem 
was that the booming Mediterranean business attracted a lot of new lines trying to get a 
market share. In that battle, the Italian government made sure the national lines got a 
decent share of the market. The forces at play on the new market made it less stable than 
the older British-Scandinavian and Continental market. The unstable market and the fact 
that the shipping companies used their oldest ships on that route all contributed to lower 
prices compared to the continental fares. Notwithstanding the route being much longer, 
                                                 
582 The minutes of the complaint committee are not preserved beyond 1907. Yet in the 
correspondence of the New York passage agency the subj ct no longer pops up whereas previously it was a 
popular topic. 
583 The exchange rate for the lire to the dollar at the time was 0,193 dollars to 1 Lire. 
584 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter April 25 1899. 
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the cheapest of Mediterranean lines; Fabre and Anchor Line quoted gross prepaid rates 
from Naples from anywhere between $16 and $21 and estbound between $14 and $17 
from February 1897 until February 1899.585 During the same period, the HAL, at that 
time still the cheapest Continental line quoted gross rates fluctuating between $27 and 
$31.5 for prepaids and from $25 to $27 eastbound.586 A gentlemen’s agreement existed 
between the lines so that the special Italian and Oriental rates only be used for those 
ethnic groups. Therefore, Croatians considered as continentals could not be routed 
through Italian ports and needed to pay quite a bit more than their neighbors across the 
Adriatic. This opened up opportunities for scalpers such as Frank Zotti to move into to 
the passage business sales.  
The owner-editor of the Narodni List quickly made a name for himself controlling 
a good part of the Croatian and Dalmatian eastbound business.587 Being outside of the 
conference agents Zotti had to get tickets through conference agents at first. Yet, because 
of his growing influence, Wierdsma granted him the permission to secretly book for the 
HAL in exchange for the regular commission. Being uable to prove that CGT and NGL 
preceded him, the head-agent decided to follow suit to prevent getting shut out of that 
market. Wierdsma asked the directors in Rotterdam to start corresponding with Mr. 
Kuijic in Susak, Croatia. He received the address of Zotti claiming Kuijic controlled a lot 
of the westbound cash business, which could be directed to Rotterdam. Yet Zotti soon 
moved into the westbound market, establishing contacts with European correspondents 
such as E. Charvoz and J. Desiré of Modane. Through special arrangements with the 
CGT he also started booking eastbound Croatian passengers through Genoa instead of Le 
Havre and forwarding them through his connections i Modane to Karlstadt.588 The 
collaboration between Zotti and HAL was short-lived as the Dutch company only 
                                                 
585 Rates to and from other Italian ports and Marseille cost 2 dollars more. GAR, HAL, 318.03 
Passage Department, 565, Telegrams with rates from 1896 – 1905. 
586 Ibid. 
587 The Narodni List also circulated in Dalmatia, being one of the most popular newspapers in 
South-Austria. The issue in the home country tended to highlight the positive aspects of emigration. If both 
papers actually worked together, remains to be explored. Antić correctly noted that newspapers still have a 
lot to reveal as a secondary source for research on migration (Antić, 2001, 25-35). This study highlights 
that a thorough check on the background of the editors can be useful to determine whether the paper may 
be biased because of the editor’s connections to the migrant transport business. 
588 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter January 2 and February 10 1901 and 
GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, Min 731 July 31 1902. 
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accepted to route passengers via Rotterdam and not through Modane. To counter Zotti the 
pool lines warned travelers heading to South Austria against the scalper, organizing a 
wide advertising campaign through their recently appointed Dalmatian agent Frank 
Sakser proprietor-editor of the Glas Naroda.589 As a result of the CGT, the broker 
continued his ascendancy. The French line participaed in the continental conference on a 
gentlemen’s agreement yet never joined the pool. Not fully bonded by the agreements, or 
by the interests in the pool CGT had a lot to gain by moving its way up into the South-
Austrian market. The New York head agents sent alarms as to the amount of business 
Zotti defrauded from the pool, urging the directors to put an end to his connections with 
CGT.  
A breakthrough materialized in 1903 when the disruptive French line could 
finally be convinced of joining the pool. Zotti took ne of the first steamships to Paris to 
negotiate new arrangements for his business. But telegrams from all the New York head 
agents beat him to the punch. By the time he set foot in the head quarters of the CGT the 
pool lines had made sure the French line did not forget its commitments to the 
Westbound-pool. The next step consisted of getting hem into the eastbound-pool. 
Wierdsma noted that CGT used all means possible to increase its share, before starting 
the negotiations. The French had always allowed unauthorized agents to bring in business 
either through Zotti or directly. The same had been do e for the westbound agreement, 
the percentage; allocated to the line was based on the passengers transported during the 
years 1900-1902. Zotti, gladly helped using the special Italian rates in forwarding Agram 
passengers through Genoa. Even on the westbound route he still booked for the CGT 
using special rates. It proved that his trip to Paris did not turn out to be a mere ‘city-trip’ 
after all.590  
Finding no solution to contain Zotti the lines appointed him as conference agent. 
The Croatian editor accepted, but immediately made it apparent that he had no intention 
of abiding by the rules. Disqualification followed, but with his wide network of sub-
agents managed from his offices in Pittsburgh and New York the lines hoped that the 
                                                 
589 Sakser later also opened an office in Cleveland. Ibi ., Letter December 1 1899 February 19 
1904, min 679 October 31 1901. 
590 Ibid., Letters April 24, May 1 1903 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, min, 
795 May 12 1903 and  Agreement G between NDLV and CGT 1903.  
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CGT could make him change his mind.591 Cunard’s rejection of prolonging the 
agreements, and the opening of a direct line to that region from Fiume, and subsequently 
from Trieste, served to complicate the matters. The CGT refused to stop its collaboration 
with Zotti because of the increased competition in the area. In the meantime, Wierdsma 
complained that the special rate of the CGT allowed Zotti to quote $5 below the normal 
rates. His fares drove the regular continental agents out of business in Pittsburgh. Rumor 
had it that Zotti concluded a five year deal with Tattet, dealing directly with him in Paris, 
and bypassing the New York head-agency of Treyvoux. While trying to escape the 
impasse, Wierdsma started accepting business from Ztti again at regular rates, paying 
commission at the end of the year so as to leave no pro f for the other lines. In less than 
fout months he sold six hundred tickets for the HAL.592 
 The lines reached an agreement for the eastbound pool in the spring of 1904. It 
contained a clause allowing Continental lines to control the CGT and American Line 
passengers before embarkation, as these companies did not have separate ships serving 
their Continental and Mediterranean service. As both traveled on the same ship, controls 
on the dock was the only way to verify if the lines booked eastbound continentals at 
special Italian rates. The lines made sure to closely monitor brokers known for abusing 
these rates.593 The rate war with the Cunard Line postponed its imple entation when the 
renegotiations established a new equilibrium at the various conferences a year later. 
Conference agents received a circular stipulating that: “only bona fide Italian and 
Oriental passengers could be booked through Italian ports, no Austrians, Germans, 
Hungarians, Dalmatians, Croats, Galician, Russians or Slovenians.”594 Apparently, CGT 
no longer foresaw any room for Zotti in this new equilibrium. In his newspaper Zotti 
strongly lashed out at the French line using the circular to denounce the price 
discrimination: 
“Imposition upon Common sense and against the Law! A Frenchman bound for 
home has to pay 34 dollars for Le Havre and 36,5$ for Paris with a CGT steamer 
                                                 
591 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter December 14  1903 and GAR, HAL, 
318.04, Passage Department, 564, min 825 November 11, min 829 December 17 1903.  
592 Ibid. Min 842 February 3 1904 and Letters December 14 1903 and January 8 1904. 
593 These were Zotti, Bertini and Sakser (NY); First National Bank and Louis Moeser (St. Louis), 
Fugazi en Zapatini (San Fransico). Ibid. Letter April 29 1904; min. 860, April 28 1904 and GAR, HAL, 
318.04, Passage Department, 242, Agreement L between NDLV and CGT 1904.   
594 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Circula  May 25 1905. 
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while an Italian on the same ship pays 20$ for Genoa or Naples. In other words 
the French Line contracts to transport an Italian on one of their steamers from 
New York to Havre on one of their boats, from Havre to Marseille by rail, and 
from Marseille to Napels by boat for the sum of twenty dollars and a Frenchman 
himself must pay fourteen dollars more for his transport only to Havre. While the 
rate from New York to Milan is only 21,75$ and another 5$ to Trieste by rail the 
French rate to Trieste is 45,55 dollars. The passenger is overcharged 18, 80 
dollars by the French Line.595  
No law in this country allows asking a certain price for one passenger while 
charging a much higher one for another. Such discrimination has been going on 
for years unnoticed and must stop! We invoke the American press, ass always to 
right wrongs, to investigate the matter affecting the poorest class of American 
citizens, greatest sufferers and with no protection against the monopoly of such 
big Line.”596 
 
Zotti showed the way to right wrongs by hiring a lawyer forcing the French line to board 
eight Croatians at the Italian rate. All lines immediately broke away from Zotti as the 
conference agreements stipulated that all ticket books and advertisements were to be 
withdrawn from papers that attacked a member.597 The HAL, which even paid extra 
commission to the broker at the time, followed suit. As an alternative for the region 
shipping companies had Sakser as official agent, yet he did not display the same zeal as 
Zotti. He opened two branch offices in Pittsburgh and in Chicago, where together with 
his offices on Greenwich Street and in the Bowling Green Building, New York, he did: 
“ a tremendous banking and money order business.”598 For the passage business, the 
entrepreneur decided to take matters into his own ha ds by founding the Frank Zotti 
Steamship Company. He bought and restored a former HAL-ship the Obdam and 
christened it Brooklyn. Wierdsma admitted that Zotti would have no problems filingl the 
ships, “yet there is a big difference between opening a line a d running one.” No matter 
                                                 
595 The big difference must have been unusual and caused by the fact that the conference lines had 
already come to an agreement and raised their rates while the Meditaranean Lines still negotiated using low 
prices to exercise pressure. Also in the Mediterranean conference were gradually raised. When they came 
to an agreement on July 25 the CGT quoted 34 dollars to Naples and 35,75 to Milan while Fabre and 
Anchor offered passage between 28 and 32 dollars nearly doubling their rates used at the end of the 19th 
Century. Ibid. Letter July 25 1905. 
596 Ibid. Narodni List “CGT (French Line) Overcharging and discriminating against steerage pass” 
June 5 1905. 
597 The HAL did not maintain this, allowing Zotti to book through the company at regular rates 
and commission. Ibid. Letters June 9 and September 14 1905 
598 The rent alone for his prime location in Pittsburgh on Smithfield Street cost 8000 dollars a year. 
In Chicago he moved in the former offices of the American Line on the corner of Washington and 
Dearborn Street whereas his offices in lower Manhattan didn’t come cheap either. Ibid. 
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how much support Zotti could mobilize, the head-agent did not consider him capable of 
maintaining a regular service. Anticipating his failure, Wierdsma recommended keeping 
doing business with him as he would need to get rid of his bookings when that happened. 
Despite the rumors Wierdsma praised him for being reliable, prompt and honest. If the 
relations were discontinued the business would be lost for the pool and go to the Cunard 
and Italian lines. 
Wierdsma’s insights proved to be quite accurate. Th Italian authorities refused to 
give him a license, preventing him from calling at It lian ports. Not even a year after the 
maiden voyage of the Brooklyn, Zotti had sold the ship and flirting with bankruptcy, 
anxiously tried to obtain the agency of the conference lines. While all the other lines 
preferred to have the disturbing element under control and urged for his reappointment as 
conference agent, the CGT categorically refused to let him back in. Wierdsma blamed the 
personal antagonism of the CGT, interfering with business interest, driving Zotti to the 
RVF. The issue dragged on creating serious tensions between the lines. Cunard decided 
to reappoint him, without the consent of the CGT upon which the French line declared 
that it would no longer to consult the conference when appointing its agents. 
Disagreements hindered the disciplining of agents. With the impasse dragging on Zotti 
lost patience. As General Agent of the RVF and editor of a new newspaper, Rail & Sail, 
he lashed out at the conference lines once again. Zotti survived the economic downturn 
but never regained his preeminence over the South-Astrian market.599 
 Zotti demonstrates that shipping companies still strongly depended on migrant 
brokers to direct business from the sub-markets. This was not only the case for new 
booming markets such as the South Austrian, but also for older markets such as the Swiss 
where Zwilchenbart Gasser & Company dominated. Owning a newspaper proved to be 
an important asset in attracting migrant business. Both Zotti and Sakser advertised their 
business and tried to gain the trust of their co-ethnics through their newspapers.600 Much 
information spread through the American foreign language press on the situation in the 
                                                 
599 Ibid. Letters September 14 and December 8 1905 January 9, September 9, October 26, 
December 12, 1906, 6 July, September 13 1907 April 16 1909 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage 
Department, 564, min. 1030, July 7 1907. 
600 For instance, the HAL gave exclusivity for oriental business to John Boras, proprietor of the 
Forward, a Greek newspaper in which a lot of advertisements for the HAL appeared without charge. Ibid. 
Letter February 14 1901. 
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home country, and also on how to return or have frinds and family to travel over. 
Migrant brokers and agents greatly influenced the routing of the migrants, tempting 
shipping lines to break the conference rules through special incentives. Giving 
enticements proved much easier than taking them back. Zotti’s attack of the CGT 
illustrates the importance of remaining on good terms. Yet, no matter how much business 
the middleman managed to control it proved impossible to bypass the shipping 
companies. His attempt to do so clamorously failed, just as that of the Hamburg brokers 
during the 1890s. The substantial rate differences between Continental and 
Mediterranean passage indicate that through shipping conferences the lines gradually 
extended their control over the North-Atlantic transport market; it is not so much the fact 
that brokers defrauded the lines by routing continetals at special Italian rates that is 
striking, but rather that shipping lines managed to contain the abuse and maintain the 
price discrimination. 
 
2.5) From Cattlemen passages to delimiting the business area 
 
Besides the order-system, selling on credit, unauthorized agents and price 
difference between various markets many other practices used by the brokers and agents 
undermined the strict implementation of conference rules. For instance, cattlemen 
booking advertised the possibility of returning on a workmanship at cost of only $6 to $8. 
With the growing return movement, shipping companies took advantage of migrants 
willing to work their way over and even to pay a small amount to do so. Passenger liners 
themselves used the practice, hiring return migrants wi h little means and collaborated 
with three agencies to supply them with workforce for the return leg of the trip.601 
Especially for cattle transport, men were recruited because of the imposition of the 
Department of Agriculture of a certain number of so-called ‘cattlemen’ per animals 
carried.602 These agencies started posing problems when they launched aggressive, 
                                                 
601 The name of the firms: Jacobs (Canal Street), Interna ional Shipping Company (Clinton Street) 
and Johnson (Hoboken). 
602 Most of the passenger liners also managed cargo sevices such as the HAL with the -dyk ships. 
It seems that cattle transport was done as much as pos ible with these ships, yet combining cattle and
passenger transport on the same ship was not uncommon. Lines quoted special rates for these ships, usually 
a dollar less than the regular price. 
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misrepresentative advertising campaigns luring away e stbound passengers away from 
the migrant agents. Allegedly, the agencies even forced some people into accepting a 
cattlemen position while all they wanted were eastbound tickets. By sharing their 
commission with migrant agents, cattlemen agencies spread their network for contracting 
candidates. An estimated 3,000 to 5,000 people left as emergency workers on board of 
ships from New York alone. As the problems persisted, despite various warnings to the 
cattlemen agencies, conference lines opened a joint-agency to recruit personnel.603 
After the 1896 agreement, price cuts on the tickets still persisted yet these were 
much smaller, ranging from 50 cent to $1 and were lss common. The lines were in large 
part responsible for the decrease. With the agreements, the shipping companies reduced 
the practice of paying extra commissions to the most l yal agents. This strategy was 
cheaper and more effective in increasing the market share, than lowering the rates. Yet, 
van den Toorn reported that the system of having lies with a plus in the pool raise their 
rates so that the ones with a minus could catch up without decreasing theirs improved. 
Incentives to agents, such as reduction on ocean passage when they traveled overseas, 
dinners onboard of new steamers, reduction on railroad transport, free board and lodging 
still occurred, yet not as frequently. As soon as the outside competition increased, the old 
habits increased again.  
During the rate war with Cunard the HAL exempted Kobre, Kass and the Austro-
Russian Bank from paying the extra $2 charged to Russians to cover board and lodging 
expenses before embarking. The last two agencies had been appointed by the ‘Kischeneff 
Relief Committee’, known as the Central Relief Committee consisting of prominent New 
York Jews, to issue prepaid tickets for Russians who needed assistance and whose 
relatives were unable to pay in full for the passage. Applicants paid $10 to the agents 
while the Committee paid the balance.604 The agents had managed to send all passengers 
through HAPAG and HAL, yet the pressures of Cunard, Anchor and Allan Lines 
underselling the Continental lines by $6.5 were being felt. As the relief committee’s 
                                                 
603 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, min. 496, February 5; 573 October 4 1900; 773, 
March 3; 778 April 30 1903; 955 June 14 and 1002 December 20 1906. 
604 The HAL also made special arrangements with ‘Montifiore’ the Rotterdam Hebrew charity 
organization to make sure the English Lines quoting lower rates would not lure away that business from 
them. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter August 30 1903. 
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priority was to help as many as possible it based th  balance on the lowest rates available. 
Wierdsma reassured the directors that the control over the East-side agents ensured their 
loyalty in the competition with Cunard. To safeguard the relief committee’s business for 
the HAL and HAPAG the agents convinced the applicants, whenever possible, to pay the 
extra charge for routing their family through these lin s. The exemption of the board and 
lodging charge facilitated that task.  
On rare occasions, the HAL still resorted to the plain form of extra commission 
granting, for instance, two more dollars to Zotti when fighting the competition of the 
RVF. Compared to the earlier period prior to the agreements with the British lines, when 
an extra commission of $2 was common and at times reached $5, the following two 
decades the abuse of extra commissions greatly diminished. This implied that the margin 
for agents to cut the rates also became much smaller, limiting the abuses. And, at the 
same time when given to an agent, extra commissions proved much more effective to 
increase his business.605 
The denouncement system also improved with the organization of the New York 
City Agents Association. Most especially the secretary, M. Rosett, initially vigorously 
controlled the adherence of the agents to the confere c  rules. Agents increasingly 
denounced each other backed by test tickets and affi avits of the purchasers. Yet 
sometimes the agent’s reason for denouncing was not so much to protect his business 
from illicit practices but more to take over the business of a rival. In this process, the 
personal connections within the community of migrant gents and shipping agents played 
an important role; as for instance the complaint of Hugo Lederer against H. Schnitzer of 
the Hungarian Association illustrates. Both of these individuals had offices right across 
each other, on Avenue B, creating a lot of tensions. Emil Lederer, head of steerage 
business of the HAPAG helped his brother after-hours, and so did his nephew Arthur 
Lederer, member of the passage department for the RSL.606 Emil and Arthur represented 
                                                 
605 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, min of C mplain Committee 1-1052. GAR, 
HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters February 2 1902, November 20 1907. GAR, 
HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters Ltter January 12, May 27 1898; May 21, June 24 
1902, March 25, April 1, 24  1904; January 4, February 10 and December 20 1905. 
606 Emil Lederer started his career in the migrant business as traveler for the HAL, yet in 1895 the 
HAPAG lured him away to take charge of the steerage department. The competition for good personnel 
often created tensions between the lines. GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter 
July 8 1895. 
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their respective companies at the Standing Complaint Committee and took of advantage 
of the absence of Mr. Nyland by representing the HAL, to disqualify Schnitzer for no 
valid reason. When Nyland returned from Europe, he managed, together with the NGL to 
reverse the decision off the Standing Complaint Committee. To put an end to the 
excessive rivalry Schnitzer moved to Washington Street.  
Cases like these were exceptional and shipping companies generally welcomed 
the developing practice of agents denouncing each other, because doing it themselves 
remained a very delicate issue. For instance, Van den Toorn hesitated in denouncing 
Rosett when he caught him cutting rates by drawing orders for the European inland 
transport in connection with NGL steamship tickets. He acknowledged the importance of 
strictly disciplining the agents, yet he saw it also that the company ought not always be 
the first in taking the initiative. It would not only greatly harm the popularity of the line 
with one of the biggest brokers of city, but also with all the other New York agents. 
Therefore, when signs of widespread abuse surfaced, th  lines took the strategy of jointly 
hiring Pinkerton detectives to share the responsibility. It proved to be an efficient way to 
discipline the agents.607 
American agents sometimes expanded their sales territory overseas recruiting 
passenger directly or through an intermediate at the source. They usually contacted 
companies beforehand to obtain the commission on these sales and to obtain special 
favors, if possible. For instance, Wierdsma gave free steerage passage and a letter of 
introduction to H. Bier, father of a renowned Californian, who was traveling to the lower 
Wolga region in Russia where German Mennonites and Lutherans were concentrated. 
Bier wanted to convince fifty families to travel back with him to Nebraska and 
California. The letter of introduction served to arrange the commission issue and obtain 
information from the board of directors in Rotterdam on how to proceed to avoid 
problems with the passport issue and the different difficulties which beset Russians in 
crossing the frontier.608  
                                                 
607 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226,  min of Complain Committee 1-1052 and 
GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters February 2, July 9, 20 1897. 
608 Same story for instance for Agent Klay of Rock Valley, Iowa. Ibid. Letters May 19 1902 and 
May 8 1906. 
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Yet, the easiest way remained to staying put and relying on chain-migration 
networks to do the work. Delimiting the territory of these agents in the US remained a 
difficult issue. Conference rules restricted the sal  of tickets to their officially appointed 
office, yet as discussed previously eradicating theuse of runners, peddlers and 
unauthorized agents used by the brokers to expand their territory proved difficult. New 
York agents did a lot of business through correspondence. They frequently sent out 
circulars advertising their agency to potential clients. Most of these brokers also opened a 
branch office in and outside of New York, and someti s with the help of the steam 
shipping companies.609 The HAL temporarily gave A. Kass $1 extra commission when 
opening a branch office in Philadelphia to enable him to move into the market. The 
reason to delimit the territory was to prevent excessive competition, but as Gips noted, it 
tended to discourage activity of efficient agents while contributing to the inefficiency of 
established agents. He did not believe that the energ tic attempts to attract business of an 
agent outside his area should be restricted, even if it interfered with a local agent. 
According to Gips, the latter had the advantage of being on the spot and thus he should 
have no problem taking on the competition. If he failed, it proved his inefficiency. As 
long as the New York agents observed the through booking rule, obligating the agents to 
sell a railroad ticket to the final destination along with the prepaid passage, the lines 
seemed to tolerate the practice.  
Most of the eastbound passengers kept on buying their tickets in New York 
shortly before the departure of the steamer, making it hard for companies to estimate the 
spare capacity long beforehand and to try to fill it with something else. Return migrants 
made their way to one of the New York agents with wom they corresponded 
beforehand, in order to limit their stay in New York as much as possible. As lines sought 
to restrict the armada of agents to enhance control over them, concentration of the 
business was likely to be preferred at the place whre the lines had their head-quarters. It 
                                                 
609 Rosett had various in New York and one in Youngstown Ohio, but complaints kept on flowing 
in of using subagents in other territories. As has been mentioned Zotti opened branches in Chicago and 
Pittsburgh, Kass one in Philadelphia, ...  
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explains why an important part of the American ticket sale kept on being transacted 
through New York agents.610  
Overall, the control over the agents greatly improved even though it was never big 
enough to allow a strict implementation of the rules. The relative harmony among the 
lines drastically reduced the brokers and agents’ opportunities to play the companies 
against each other and to corrupt the business. Thi harmony was never complete, always 
leaving room for opportunistic behavior, yet the opening of joint offices underline the 
improved collaboration between the lines.  
 
3) Joint Ticket Offices 
 
 To put an end to the numerous abuses midway throug the 1890s the shipping 
companies had tried to cut out the middlemen by restricting the sale of ocean passage 
tickets in New York to the offices of the shipping companies. The drastic measure of 
vertical integration clamorously failed yet it underscored the desire of the lines to 
concentrate the business. To do so, they continued op ning new company offices in the 
biggest cities and key transit points on both sides of the Atlantic during the following 
decades. As the collaboration between the companies improved, an increasing number of 
lines decided to rationalize by merging their offices to reduce the costs.  
When opening new offices at key locations companies partly recouped the extra 
costs by increasing the direct bookings for steerage and cabin passengers. If established 
in cities where a general agent managed the business, the company took over his tasks of 
coordinating the agent-network in the area, keeping the one dollar extra commission paid 
on each ticket for themselves. Smaller companies, such as the HAL, trailed the bigger 
companies in doing this. Yet, the opening of new offices of rival lines created 
opportunities to hire the former general agents of competitors who were forced to take a 
step down. Often having a wider network of sub-agents than the general agents of the 
HAL, and keen to retain as much business as possible, these new general agents proved 
to be an asset to the HAL. In Boston, for instance they hired F. Houghton & Company a 
general agent for the New England states. The former general agents of the RSL and 
                                                 
610 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter April 21 1904 and GAR, HAL, 
318.04, Passage Department, 564, min 502, February 5 1900; min 663 September 5 1901. 
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WSL were relegated to regular agents, when the INC decided to only have one 
representative for both the RSL and American Line i the area. He received the same 
financial responsibilities as Thomas Cook & Son (San Francisco) and Bartlett Catrow 
(Philadelphia). He received $2 per cabin and $1 per st erage passenger booked in his 
area. The HAL transferred an annual contribution of $500 for advertisements, telegram, 
postage and other expenses.  
However, not all general passenger agents received th  same conditions. The 
foreign department of the International Bank in Saint Louis received 2.5 percent 
commission on first-class tickets, $1.5 on second-cabin and one $1 on third-class. The 
HAL gave them $100 for expenses. The Dutch line mistrusted the bank however and 
looked for a substitute. Van den Toorn suggested appointing R. Bain, the general agent of 
the WSL and representative of Thomas Cook. The busines  of the WSL was not in 
conflict with that of the HAL and the collaboration with a first-class steamship line would 
add to the company’s prestige. At a meeting in New York, Van den Toorn reached an 
agreement with Bruce Ismay, the manager of the line who welcomed the opportunity to 
reduce the costs of the office adding up to $8000 a year. Cook covered $1000, the HAL 
$1500 and WSL the rest -including the general passenger agent’s commission. The Dutch 
line budgeted $350 for advertising expenses. Van den Toorn wanted to appoint many 
WSL sub-agents for the HAL in the region including Missouri, Arkansas, Texas and 
Louisiana. Frequent visits of the HAL-travelers were planned to stimulate the agents in 
these states Moreover, the collaboration offered the opportunity to start business in the 
unexploited Indian territory and Oklahoma, which showed promising perspectives. Many 
Germans lived in the Southwest yet they had not drawn much business from the area. 
Moreover, van den Toorn believed that the agreement could be a stepping stone to a more 
intense collaboration similar to the one existing between RSL and AL honoring each 
other’s tickets. The agreement was valid for a year and could be ended with three months 
notice.611   
With the joint general agency both firms extended their collaboration, which had 
started a decade earlier, when the Dutch line started buying the old steamers from the 
British line for their service. The HAL opted to follow the WSL policy centering its 
                                                 
611 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters April 1, November 25 1898. 
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efforts on service rather than speed.612 In the meantime, the HAL had allowed their own 
ships to be built by Harland & Wolf, the same shipbuilders as the WSL vessels, yet the 
good relations between the lines remained.613 The fact that Genken Wierdsma, son of the 
HAL director and later general agent of New York, did an apprenticeship at the British 
company in Liverpool, under Ismay, underlines this.614 The joint agency proved to be 
successful and they extended the practice to the northwestern territories. However, to 
gain a solid footing in the territories west of Chicago, Van den Toorn appointed a 
traveler, Van der Stadt to cover Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa, Nebraska, 
Wyoming, Colorado and Kansas. He considered it of the greatest importance that for the 
next few years the territory would be continuously visited in order to appoint the right 
kind of agents and encourage them to book for the HAL. Frequent visits to Bain were 
also necessary to put some pressure on him; otherwise most of his bookings went to the 
WSL.615 
 The IMM took the rationalization of the business administration a step further. 
The members of the combine made an agreement on the i terchangeability of the cabin-
class tickets, giving the demanding tourists more flexibility to organize their trip.616 
These could be exchanged at the growing number of joint offices which opened on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Instead of appointing commission based general agents, the 
combine encourafed the practice of appointing salaried managers to run the offices. P. 
Wright pressured the HAL to join, yet Wierdsma was reluctant to take him on. Giving up 
the offices in New York and Chicago was out of the question, but even in other places, 
such as Boston the head-agent felt inclined to work with their own agents. Through these 
                                                 
612 In 1888 they started with buying the Baltic and the Republic followed by the Arabic. From1895 
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14 1888 and GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters October 5 1888, October 29 
1889, September 10 1895. 
613 As Van den Toorn put in 1898: “with our new material we no longer lag behind the other lines 
so even during slumps we now manage to remain competitive”. GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt archief , A 
12, 1-2, annual report 1898. 
614 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, Letter April 28 1891.  
615 Ibid. Letter June 3 1901 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters 
February 2 and April 19, 1901. 
616 Members to the agreement committed to exchange cabin tickets for all their steamers without 
extra payment as long as the price of the ticket isn’ lower than the minimum cabin rate of said steamr. 
GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 211-226, Letter February 20, April 17 1903.  
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these three offices, the company secured 95% of their bookings.617 The Dutch line agreed 
for a trial period in St Louis, Minneapolis, San Francisco and New Orleans where the 
companies divided the costs of exploitation according to the business received through 
the joint offices.618 Joint advertisements in leading newspapers in these r gions also 
represented an effective strategy to cut costs and quickly spread to other places such as 
Buffalo and Baltimore. All parties to the agreement could pull out without notice.  
Although it allowed them to also save on commission, Wierdsma doubted as to 
whether it was worth the risk of loosing a big part of the business to the RSL or other 
joint office members. Especially in New England, from where they drew a lot more 
business than the RSL, they feared loosing bookings. When the initial results, except for 
those in Minnesota, proved relatively satisfying, the HAL agreed to concede for Boston 
as well. As part of a compromise they retained F. Houghton as their general agent, yet he 
moved to the IMM buildings where Maynard & Child managed the business for the 
combine no longer on commission, but instead on a salary basis. Both could book for all 
the lines. Montreal and Toronto, which had initially remained under the management of a 
separate general agent, soon followed suit. As the business expanded further west, the 
lines opened another joint office in Winnipeg.619 The IMM pressured the HAL to move in 
their Chicago office, yet the New York head-agent made it clear of having no intentions 
whatsoever to give up the control over their Chicago nd New York offices through 
which they did the bulk of the bookings.  
                                                 
617 As the HAL depended largely on the Russian passengers, many of whom remained in New 
York these percentages are likely to have been higher than for steamship lines tapping from other ethnic 
markets showing greater tendencies to spread througout the country. Nevertheless for all the steamship 
companies alike American ocean passage sales concentrated in New York and Chicago throughout the 
period. 
618 The territory was divided as follows: Toronto, the Province of Ontario; Montreal, the rest of 
Canada; San Francisco, Oregon, California, Nevada and southern part of Idaho; St Louis, Kansas, 
Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, Indian territory and terri o y of Arizona, Oklahoma en New Mexico; 
Minneapolis, north and South Dakota, Washington,  Minnesota, Montana, Northern part of Wisconsin and 
Idaho, upper peninsular of Michigan; Chicago, all the territory reporting to Minneapolis plus, southern part 
of Wisconsin states of Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming and parts of Michigan and 
Indiana; Boston included the  maritime provinces, New Brunswick, Prince Edwards Islands, Nova Scotia 
and parts of New England still to be determined. Ibid., Letter February 17 1902. 
619 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 211-226,  Letter January 27, February 20, March 24, 
December 8 1903, December 8 1904, December 12, 15 190 ; December 7, 14 1906; December 16 1907; 
December 18 1908; August 20 1910; January 14 1911 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-
121, Letter January 4, 1904 March 14 1911.  
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The percentage of the other outside offices remained low, yet as noted by 
Wierdsma small things can add up to big differences. When the IMM suggested opening 
a new joint office in Pittsburgh, the HAL politely declined any interest. After the initial 
stage of encouraging results, the enthusiasm for the joint offices rapidly ran sour as the 
bookings decreased. By 1913, the HAL withdrew from the Minneapolis and Boston joint 
offices opening their own and appointed David Brattstrom & Company as general agent 
in Seattle for the states of Idaho, Washington and Oregon.620  
The joint offices proved effective in reducing the costs of exploitation, yet the 
number of bookings ebbed which increased the mistrust of the Dutch line of IMM of 
them using the joint agencies to gradually take over th ir market share. The apprehension 
in getting a fair representation for the line at those offices always prevailed. Morgan 
clearly attempted to introduce the same business structures that proved successful for 
railroads and steal enterprises into steam shipping. Instead of working with commission 
based general agents he appointed salaried ‘managers’, such as Maynard & Child in 
Boston, to supervise a subdivision of the business. Yet the HAL and the German lines, 
with which the IMM made separate agreements, could never be convinced to fully 
centralize the administration for the American market and even less so on the European 
continent. Even the lines forming part of the IMM merger remained a federation of the 
autonomous lines. Contrary to railroads the gains from administrative coordination were 
far less significant in shipping (Chandler, 1977, 189-192). The horizontal combination of 
the shipping companies increased over the years, but never enough to allow a far-
reaching vertical integration to take place and cut off the various layers of middlemen 
from the ocean passage trade. As the importance of the steamship tickets sales for 
banking business increased, the ‘bigger’ commercial banks and trusts moved in the 
market previously controlled by unincorporated ‘smaller’ immigrant banks.   
 
 
4) Immigrant banks vs. American banks: their profile, marketing strategies, 
banking methods and legislation 
 
                                                 
620 GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Department, 49-58, Letters December 6 1912 and February 21 
1913 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121,  March 14 1911; April 4, 10, June 6 1913 
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 Migrants contributed to the rapid growth of saving banks during the nineteenth 
century. Research showed that fifty percent of the new accounts at the Philadelphia 
Saving Fund Society were opened by foreign-born, who at the same time represented a 
much smaller proportion of the city population. But, the financial institution did not fully 
value these new clients, at first, especially because of the way they used their accounts. 
Migrants opened accounts for short term target accumulation as part of their migration 
strategy, either moving elsewhere in the US or returning home. For the increasingly 
mobile migrant community, these accounts met their liquidity needs. Migrants 
effectuated more transactions and closed their account more rapidly than natives. Among 
the various ethnicities, new migrants built up their balances and closed their account 
more quickly than the old-stock migrants. With a few xceptions, savings institutions 
were generally hostile to short-term saving depositor . Partly due to legal constraints, 
these banks reinvested in long term placements. Short term migrant-deposit accounts, 
which could be demanded on short notice threatened th  stability of the institutions. The 
Philadelphia Saving Fund Society’s attempts to change migrants’ use of their accounts 
proved unsuccessful. As they also required a lot of paperwork in return for small 
earnings, savings banks made no special efforts to attract migrants and often were 
unwelcoming and unaccommodating for them. They did little to invest in language skills 
and did not provide special assistance which migrants required (Dillingham Reports, vol 
37, 1911, 215-216; Alter et al, 1994, 735-767 and Wadhwani, 2002, 46-62). Therefore 
migrants predominantly turned to the immigrant banks.  
 
 4.1) The profile of the Immigrant banker or Migrant  agent 
 
 Due to lack of first hand material from immigrant banks research has been 
constricted to the use of volume 37 of the Dillingham Commission Reports in the 
analysis. To complement and test the findings of the Dillingham Commission wherever 
possible, sporadic reports of HAL travelers on the ag nt-network in certain regions from 
1904 to 1913 are used. Shipping companies appointed these ‘travelers’ to promote the 
line among the agents. They also controlled whether mig ant agents and brokers observed 
the conference rules and if the company received a fair share of the business. Travelers 
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pressured the agents that failed to produce satisfying results to increase their bookings or 
to replace them by other agents. Their reports alsoserved to evaluate the local market 
conditions and future business perspectives. Whenever possible, travelers also tried to 
encourage migration directly. For instance, when strikes broke out in coal mines 
Schleissner traveled to the region to ensure bookings. Or, when visiting the Dutch 
colonies in California the HAL traveler Mr. Van der Laan tried to stimulate the residents 
to write home to convince people to follow in their footsteps.621 When doing this, 
travelers used many precautions not to leave any traces of the company’s direct 
involvement. The reports of these travelers allow fr refining the activities and profile of 
immigrant bankers as outlined by the Dillingham Commission. The commission’s report 
was influenced by the economic crisis preceding the inv stigation and by the nativists’ 
prejudices towards the new immigrants. The commission described immigrant-banks, 
which were predominantly located in new immigrant communities, as follows: 
“These banks bear little resemblance to regular banking institutions. They are 
without real capital have little or no legal responsibility, and for the most part are 
entirely without legal control. Immigrant bankers, as a rule, are also steamship-
ticket agents, and usually conduct some other busines  as well. Consequently the 
"banks" are, for the most part, located in groceries, saloons, or other 
establishments which are natural gathering places for immigrants.  
Besides handling the savings of his patrons, the immigrant banker performs for 
them many necessary services. He writes their letters receives their mail and is 
their general adviser in what to them are important ffairs. The ability and 
willingness of the banker to render such services naturally gives him an advantage 
over regular banking institutions, which would not, and, in fact, could not, attend 
to such matters. In this way immigrant banks and immigrant bankers are 
important factors in the life of the newer immigrants (Report of Dillingham 
Commission, 1911, vol. 37, 204).” 
 
According to the Dillingham Commission, the predominant feature of the 
immigrant banking consisted of its interdependency with selling steamship tickets. Of the 
116 banks the commission investigated, 94% combined both. Migrant trusted their 
money with steamship-agents with the same ethnic background, representing well known 
lines rather than American banking institutions. They did this for safekeeping rather than 
investments, not expecting any interests on it. Because of this, trust steamship agents 
quickly accumulated capital and developed banking functions. The steamship agency was 
                                                 
621 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 211-226,Letters November 26 1897, May 22 1902. 
 350
the most general antecedent of the immigrant bank. Providing banking services allowed 
most agents to quickly expand their business.622 The Dillingham Commission described 
these representatives as, intelligent men possessing co siderable influence in immigrant 
communities, that with their good command of English could provide essential services 
to newly arrived, illiterate immigrants. Involvement i  the local church or ethnic societies 
of all sorts increased their prestige in the community.623 Sharing ethnic ties with patrons 
was essential. Sometimes these ties needed to go as far back as the province of origin, yet 
most bankers’ potential to draw clients depended on their language skills. Compatriots 
represented the easiest targets but the longer the banker stayed in business, the easier it 
became to break through ethnic barriers. The locatin of the office in official buildings 
for instance helped with this.624 But, the longer the immigrant remained in the US, the 
less importance he attached to ethnic ties. Besides oc an passage sales and migrant 
banking the majority of these entrepreneurs also carried out some other type of related 
business. Out of a sample taken, banks combined one or more of the following; notaries 
office (40), real estate, rental, insurance and colle ting agencies (27), saloon keepers (21), 
grocers, butchers, and fruit venders (14), labor agencies (13), book, jewelry and foreign 
novelty stores (12); postal substations (11), general merchants (9), boarding bosses (8), 
wholesalers and importers (7), barbers (2), printers (2), pool-room keepers (2), furniture 
dealer (1) and one undertaker. Eighty percent of these banks were not only privately, but 
also individually and locally, owned. Only a dozen New York banks had branches in the 
interior. Others rarely did, except in some cases, but always in the vicinity of the main 
office. The Commission underlined that the conference rules restricting the agents’ sale 
of steamship tickets to the office he had been appointed to, limited the propagation of 
                                                 
622 For instance in Youngstown Ohio a leading iron andsteel center one of the five HAL agents in 
the city G. Hamory managed to rapidly increase his bu iness by adding a savings department to his 
steamship ticket office. Ibid. Letter October 18 1906 
623 A young lawyer, Frank Burszynski owed his appointment as a HAL agent because of his 
presidency of several polish societies and recent el c ion as member of the Polish Assembly of his district 
in Buffalo. A Rusin thanked his appointment in Syracuse being the brother of and living together with the 
priest of the Polish Roman Catholic Church. Rusin claimed that 5000 Poles were connected to the church 
which assured him a good base to draw from. Sometimes the link was even more direct as the appointment 
of V. Alexand, Russian priest of the local church in Ansonia illustrates. Ibid. Letter November 2 1906 
February 9 1909. 
624 The HAL agents Westerhoff and Peolstra who controlled the Dutch business in Patterson, New 
Jersey reported that the opening a branch office in the Post Office building of city allowed them to establish 
contacts with Poles and Russians. In two they sold twelve tickets to Poles opening promising perspectiv s. 
Ibid. Letter July 29 1910.  
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branch offices. It classified the immigrant banks into three types. The first, a minority, 
consisted of state incorporated banks, highly organized and thoroughly responsible. 
Second, the majority investigated by the commission were steamship, labor and real 
estate agencies advertising banking services without legal authorization. A third 
predominant type consisted of grocers, saloon keepers, boarding bosses etc. for whom 
banking activities were incidental and conducted in a very irresponsible way. In some 
cases these classes overlapped somewhat (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 206-214, 222-226). 
What the Commission did not underline is that most banks of the second and third 
category were run as a family business. Sons, daughters and women played an important 
role assisting in, or even managing, the business.625 
 
4.2) The variety of extra services offered 
 
The variety of parallel business activities immigrant bankers combined reflects 
the number of extra services rendered to newcomers and explains why they attracted 
immigrants. Directly or indirectly immigrants often secured work through these banks on 
which they could rely for credit, when they were in-between jobs. Especially Greeks and 
Italians known for their ‘padrone’ system combined immigrant banking with labor 
agencies, much more than Slavs and Jews (Day, 2002, 72). Many unskilled migrants 
filled seasonal occupations and needed to survive bleak periods. The agents were also an 
important link with the fatherland by managing the correspondence of their patrons. As 
legal advisers and notaries they assisted them in settling disputes and irregularities, both 
at home and in the US. He obtained all sorts of legal documents such as birth, death, 
marriage or leave of absences for military service certificates, settled wage, heritage and 
property issues, etc. For instance, when traveling through Pennsylvania, Henry 
                                                 
625 Agent Rainke of Frankford was hardly ever home leaving the business to his wife. After the 
death of Mr. Roth of Roth, Firestone & Co in Mckeesport his sons and son in law took over the business. J. 
Klauck, the biggest agent in Buffalo received assistance of his son and two daughters. In the same city the 
daughter of F. Grosky managed the business, yet when s  remarried the and left her parents, sales rapidly 
decreased. Mrs. De Booy assured that all the Dutch business of the surroundings of Kenosha went through 
the HAL. Mrs Dejaegher of Moline, a small industrial center for Agricultural implements dealt with the 
Belgians. Finally traveler C. Van de Stadt labeled Mrs. J. Chemma as best HAL-agent of South Chicago. 
Wisconsin went to the HAL. Ibid. Letters September 28 October 18, November 2 1906, July 24, 30 1907 
and April 4 1908.  
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Schleissner reported that agents frantically helped their patrons to obtain their 
naturalization papers before the more restrictive laws went into effect.626 Through 
shipping companies and the network of migrant agents o  both sides of the Atlantic the 
information on immigration and naturalization regulations quickly spread, allowing 
migrants to be very responsive to these.627 Furthermore, these mediators often carried a 
line of novelty products from the home country which strongly appealed to the 
newcomers. Through the services, they developed a paternalistic attitude which was 
especially pronounced among boarding bosses (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 206-214, 222-
226).  
The newly arrived, working in industrial communities, usually relied on the 
‘boarding boss’ system for accommodation. This group household offered washing, 
cooking and lodging for $2 to $3 a month. Willing to be crowded into a room, which only 
served for sleeping purposes, allowed them to reduce the cost per capita. Moreover, by 
buying food and preparing it in groups immigrants kept monthly living expenses below 
$15. The Commission analyzed the average annual wage of more than 22,000 
immigrants, eighteen years of age or older, which amounted to $455 (Lauck, 1912, 
207).628 An unskilled newcomer, right of the boat earned less than this average of $38 a 
month, yet by denying himself many comforts thrifty migrants managed to save relatively 
quickly (Hourwich, 1911, 632-633). As a Croatian boarding boss testified to the 
Commission his boarders deposited ten to $20 a month with him. A Bulgarian banker 
even mentions $30 (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 242, 316). As Eva Morawska showed at 
the turn of the century Southern and Eastern laborers managed to save 60 to 70 percent of 
their monthly earnings (Morawska, 1991, 280). Finally, the greater accessibility of 
immigrant banks, as opposed to American banks both ecause of the more familiar 
                                                 
626 Ibid. Letter September 28 1906.  
627 The responsiveness to migrant regulation and impact on hain migration patterns has been 
underlined by G. Jasso and M. Rosenzweig for later periods (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1987, 1212-1244). 
628 Lauck was a member of the Dillingham commission. The collection of German migrant letters 
shows that boarding houses offered good housing altern ives for migrants seeking opportunities outside 
their family network throughout the nineteenth century. Prices for board and lodging are sparse but they do 
not indicate great fluctuations. In 1855 Martin Weitz paid 9 dollars for a German boarding house in 
Rockville, Ct.  Matthias Dorgathen mentions 14 to 15 dollars in mine districts in 1881 (Kamphoefner, et. 
al., 1991, 344, 428). Abbott’s estimates of unskilled laborers’ daily wages in 1905 fluctuated between 1,37$ 
and 1,57$ in 1890 (Abbott. 1905, 358). 
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environment and the longer opening hours all contribu ed to the competitive advantage of 
the former. Advertising campaigns made sure it stayed that way. 
 
4.3) Advertisements  
 
 Advertising campaigns of the HAL mainly focused on promoting the cabin class 
passage.629 These advertisements added prestige to the line, which indirectly positively 
influenced third-class bookings. Various excursions a d special rates for conferences also 
contributed to the reputation of the line among all classes of passengers; like the Knights 
Templar or Magyar excursion; the Young men’s Christian Association conference in 
Basel; and the Americanists conference in New York.630 Reports on these gave the 
company extra publicity in the press and helped in building a reputation among certain 
target groups. Schleissner reported that the daily articles published by Mr Kohany, HAL-
agent  and editor of the Szabadsag, some of which were taken over by the Austrian-
Hungarian press in Europe, greatly contributed to the increase in popularity of the line 
among the Hungarian community.631  
The company only promoted steerage passage explicitly on rare occasions. For 
instance, to counter the attacks of Zotti or with the increased competition for the Jewish 
market caused by the RVF, they placed ads in the four biggest Hebrew dailies in New 
York. Conference agreements between the lines regulated the ads in the foreign language 
press to neutralize excessive campaigns caused by competition. The members handed a 
list of the papers they advertised to the secretary. An  line could freely advertise in any 
of these papers. If they wanted to enlarge the list, the secretary needed to be informed. 
When one company published in a certain paper, others usually followed- especially if 
the owner also acted as migrant agent for the lines. This way of creating goodwill with 
                                                 
629 Same goes for other companies. M. Merck, director of the HAPAG (1896-1919) recalled in his 
memoirs that Ballin attached enormous importance to advertising. He established a ‘literary department’ 
led by K. Thiess and K. Himer who constantly provided the German and foreign press with praising articles 
about the company. According to Merck you couldn’t open a German newspaper without bumping into 
HAPAG somewhere before WOI. They also drew brochures. All the other advertising material ranging 
from rate sheets, posters, pamphlets etc were looked after by the separate printing office. Hamburg 
Staatsarchiv, HAPAG, 622-1, Erinnerungen Merck. 
630 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 211-226, Letters November 2 1897; January 14 
1898; April 24 1902; May 15 1906. 
631 Ibid. Letter October 26 1906.  
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agents to favor bookings for a certain line was a hidden form of extra commission which 
the conference agreements tried neutralize. In 1908 it was decided that; “no lines should 
advertise in any publication of any sort published directly or indirectly by agents.”632 The 
rules also stipulated that papers attacking a line would lose support from all the members. 
Yet generally migrant brokers and agents took respon ibility for advertising their 
business, including the sales of passage tickets and the steamship lines they represented. 
Through the general agents, steamship lines provided th  agents with handbooks, 
illustrated publications, pocket books, agenda’s, show-cards, posters, steel plates, 
pamphlets, guides, almanacs, time and rate sheets, tc. Up to 1907, the HAL directors 
still printed most of these materials in various languages in Rotterdam, despite the 
repeated requests of the New York head-agent to give h m carte blanche on these 
matters.  
If migrant agents advertised through means other than e materials provided such 
as newspaper ads, they did this at their own cost. Many agents printed their own booklets, 
rate sheets etc. Conference rules stipulated that agents could not make any comparisons 
between the lines in their ads. Also, when advertising, all the names of the lines 
represented needed to be included (Stevens, 1914, 125).633 That many agents also 
published their own newspaper, did not escape the att ntion of the Dillingham 
Commission. They strongly opposed the combination of banks, employment and 
steamship agencies with foreign language press, accusing the banks of using the 
newspapers to delay the Americanization process in order to protect their source of 
income. Advertisements aimed at stimulating migration, underlining favorable labor 
conditions, and offering to advance the money for the ocean passage. One ad required 
only $3 of an advance payment. Agents also sent mailing packages of printed matter to 
their regular and prospective customers containing the following: a general paternalist 
circular offering free advice in all matters to gain confidence of countrymen, a second 
circular explaining how to transfer money back home through the bank, a third including 
a money-forwarding rate list, an address book to fill out the names and addresses of 
countrymen living in his locality, transmission slips for deposits and withdrawals, post-
                                                 
632 GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Department, 49-58, Letter April 4 1912. 
633 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564,  min. 598, October 4 1900 and GAR, HAL, 
318.04, Passage Department, 211-226, Letter December 7, 10 1906. 
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office money-order application blanks, business cards, a steamship-ticket poster, a sailing 
list, return addressed cards and envelopes.634 Their offices were decorated with numerous 
posters of steamship lines, even if they did not represent them, to attract the clients for 
other businesses (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 228-231).  
This way of advertising through correspondence helps in explaining how 95 
percent of the bookings occurred through Chicago, Boston and New York. With this form 
of direct marketing, keeping address lists of former and potential clients was of capital 
importance for migrant agents. As discussed before, the unauthorized Hungarian agents 
Lengyel, Kraus & Company had a list of at least 10,00  such clients. We can only guess 
as to how big the lists of well-established migrant brokers were. Spreading little address 
books was one way of enlarging the list, but surely newspapers acquired through 
subscription also greatly helped. The importance is illu trated by the reluctance of the 
HAL to appoint the Olin Brothers as conference agents in their fight against the Uranium 
Line. The agents were cousins of the conference agent, A. Mandel, who gave them a 
training in banking and passage business. Yet, they left, on the first possible opportunity, 
with his address lists through which they artificially accumulated business to the 
detriment of Mandel. The HAL decided to stay loyal to Mandel, who had given the line 
on average $50,000 worth of business annually, overa decade. Along with the use of 
peddlers and runners, sending circulars based on a meticulously well-kept database of 
potential clients represented the two most important ways for migrant agents to attract 
customers.635 
 
4.4) Banking methods 
 
                                                 
634 The HAL started doing this directly on a large scale for their cabin business in January 1907. 
Besides newspaper ads the Dutch Line sent 12000 special individual circulars to selected physicians, 
college professors, art teachers, school teachers and principals receiving good incomes, artists, select d 
dress makers, milliners, and wealthy subordinates in Connecticut, New Jersey and New York States 
including the first cabin rates and sailings. Furthe  about 10.000 circulars in German addressed to selected 
German tradesmen covering greater New York and Jersey towns enclosing second cabin pamphlets with 
rates and sailings. They further distributed 5000 of each in Chicago, 7500 in Boston, 2500 in San Francisco 
and 5000 in St. Louis and Kansas. In the meantime they had also started printing their own ‘Holland 
America Line Monthly’ for the same purposes with app rent success. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage 
Department, 211-226 Letter December 13 1906. 
635 Ibid. Letter June 15 1911. An investigation into the runners and peddlers in New York State 
estimated their number at probably 5000 to 6000 and at least 3000 (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 228). 
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The four main banking services offered were deposits, loans, money exchange 
and remittances. Other than savings banks, only a minority of the immigrant banks paid 
interests on deposits. Patrons deposited the money for safekeeping, until enough was 
accumulated for a remittance or the purchase of a ste mship ticket. Deposits were even 
for shorter terms than in savings banks. Migrants rarely left their money for longer than a 
year, three months being the average. One hundred dollars appeared to be the limit of 
accumulation of savings money. Because of the lack of control on these banks often their 
bookkeeping practices remained basic while they could dispose of the money entrusted to 
them as they wished. The migrant enjoyed very little protection against abuses. As proof 
of his deposit, he usually only received a receipt. Immigrant bankers reinvested the 
money in their own business; redeposited it at 2 to4 percent interest, with regular banks 
or invested in real estate and stock. Nevertheless, banks claimed that all deposits were 
subject to immediate withdrawal on demand. This wasusually done only when returning 
to Europe. When moving somewhere else in the US, migrants often continued using the 
same bank through correspondence. Therefore, New York bankers located at the main 
port of arrival found themselves in a privileged positi n to bind the newcomers to their 
business. It explains the much higher concentration of immigrant banks in that state than 
any other.636  
These unofficial financial institutions also offered loans. The most common form 
consisted in advancing the money for steamship tickets, and in a few cases for a 
remittance home or food supplies. The banker requird no security for the transaction, it 
being of personal and private nature. Only the biggest banks made loans against an 
interest of 5 to 7 percent, but these were exceptional. Most of the money exchange 
business occurred in New York. Prepaid passengers exchanged their money before 
continuing their journey inland, while return passeng rs did not convert their dollars to 
another currency before reaching the port of departure (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 237-
258). 
                                                 
636 In New York State a special commission estimated their number around 1000. Not including 
bankers of class such as grocers, shopkeepers, barbers etc. the Dillingham Commission counted 575 
immigrant banks in Illinois, 410 in Pennsylvania, 175 in Massachusetts, Ohio 150, New Jersey 80, 
Wisconsin 60, Connecticut 65, and other states approximately 50 (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 213). 
 357
For deposits, exchanges, ticket sales and loans, immigrant banks acted 
autonomously, yet for transmitting money to Europe, th  most important transaction of 
their business, they relied on other institutions. A number of large banking houses in New 
York City dominated the remittance business because of their extended network of 
foreign correspondents, through which they offered immigrant banks ready facilities for 
transmission to small European towns. This way the small bank did not need to maintain 
balances or clearing reserves abroad. They provided mmigrant banks with printed 
money-order forms, allowing them to use their name and reputation yet without taking 
any responsibility for their actions, seeing them as mere correspondents, not as agents. 
The system used for prepaids also applied to money rders, consisting of a stub to be 
retained by the immigrant bank as a record, an advice or direction slip to be returned to 
the banking house, an advice slip to be sent to the pay e, and a receipt for the purchaser. 
To attract this business, New York banking houses and some steamship companies 
involved in foreign exchange advertised in newspapers, mployed solicitors and sent 
circulars. The estimate of the Dillingham Commission f r 1907 indicates the importance 
of this business. Migrants remitted approximately 275 million dollars to Europe, half of 
which went through immigrant banks. This amount equals 20 % of the net annual growth 
in the individual deposits in all American banks and trust companies combined for that 
same year. Banks involved earned a commission of anywhere between one to three 
percent (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 260-284; Wadhwani, 2002, 48). 
The Dillingham Commission did not mention the names of their subjects of study 
but specified that an Italian shipping company also engaged in the money transfer market. 
As seen previously, even during the 1890s some shipping lines launched themselves in 
the money transfer market. Less for financial gain they used the market to counter the 
competition of migrant brokers and as a marketing strategy to contact potential clients 
and to anticipate laws prohibiting the sale of prepaid tickets. Some migrants still 
preferred to transfer money rather than sending a prepaid ticket. By offering that 
possibility the lines hoped to influence their route along with doing the transfer. It may be 
a mere coincidence; however it is worthwhile to note that the average remittance in 1907 
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amounted to $35.18, approximately the equivalent amount of a steamship ticket.637 The 
HAL also experimented with transfers during the 1890s yet quickly abandoned the 
project. The Vienna office of the company pushed re-entering that business in 1908 and 
1914 as a means to increase the third-class business, yet New York strongly objected:  
“Opening a money transfer department would never becom  sufficiently 
important to compensate all the trouble and responsibility attached to it. We can’t 
merely advise agents that we will accept money for transmission to addresses on 
the other side, but in view of the care, accuracy and promptness that the business 
requires we would have to establish a full-fledged money department. HAPAG 
some years ago maintained a money sending department for a time, but did away 
with it due to unsatisfactory results. The RSL still maintains such department 
more as a part of the IMM traveler cheques and money rder branch, than as a 
typical RSL institution. The RSL have their money order business in the hands of 
most of their agents, and handle enough business to pay two experienced clerks 
employed constantly at the department. There is positively no financial profit in it, 
as the competition with other money order firms andthe post offices, forces the 
exchange rate to the lowest level, while on the other hand they run the additional 
risks if an agents remains in default or fails to lose the money not only for the 
outstanding tickets but also of the money orders. Yet RSL does believe that it 
helps the business in a general way and the Antwerp offices cherishes the idea 
that it allows them to collect addresses, giving the opportunity to get in touch with 
them and secure whatever cash business, connected wi h it, but the sale of 
prepaids does not seem to profit from that. In regards to draw up a database with 
interesting addresses we could obtain this by having the purser collect these from 
all eastbound passengers whereto they are returning in Europe. But if you want us 
to experiment to increase the cash business on your side, more than willing to do 
so.”638 
This fragment illustrates the far-reaching connections between shipping and banking 
worlds. Despite the fierce competition of important New York banking houses, the IMM 
managed to maintain its position on the money transfer market and this was to the great 
consternation of the American Express Company. Not all lines agreed on the profitability 
and advantages of the system. That the IMM persisted its well with the business 




                                                 
637 The average per nationality amounted to 28,5 dollars for Italians, Greeks 37, Hungarians 30, 
Hebrew 33, Poles 36, Croats 42 and Bulgarians 68 (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 277). 
638 GAR, HAL, 318.03 Passage Department, 168, Letter April 2 1914.  
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The panic of 1907/8 exposed the weaknesses of the syst m. Escaping any legal 
supervision, most immigrant banks started out withou  much capital and maintained little 
reserve. Without restrictions on how to reinvest the money, a lot of bankers found 
themselves unable to meet the liquidity demands of the great number of people jointly 
withdrawing their deposits. A lot of the bankers did not hold out and many others 
absconded; while no laws existed which prevented them from doing this. The panic 
demonstrated that the speculative banks’ assets fell largely short of their liabilities. Gips 
reported that, especially the Jewish banks on the Eastside and in Brooklyn crashed, some 
of which he did not expect to. As the line had develop d the habit of holding their agents 
under bond and only handing out books of five or ten steamship tickets at a time, they 
were covered for losses.639 The immigrants, on the contrary, had no protection. The 
Commission underlined that most of the immigrant banks were honestly conducted and 
pointed to the fact the better managed ones continued to lend out money during the panic, 
while American Banks no longer could. Yet, the lack of any legal base to support the 
whole system made it impossible for the migrant to pin down the responsibility on 
someone in case of abuses while the situation of 1907/08 and subsequent failures showed 
the urgent need to regulate the business, according to the Dillingham Commission (DC 
Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 248, 305-314).  
In many states, laws regulating private banking exist d, yet nearly all lacked the 
means to implement them. Only New Jersey (1907), Massachusetts (1905), New York 
(1907) and Ohio (1908) passed laws specifically for immigrant banking.640 They proved 
effective in the first two states, yet not so much in last two which failed to include 
measures for supervision. In general, they stipulated that if steamship or labor agents still 
wanted to combine their business with banking they n eded to obtain a certificate from 
the authorities and file a bond up to $20,000. The bond needed to be executed by two 
sureties, owners of real estate. The four states set fines for people doing banking business 
in violation of these laws. Out of fear of harming the American private banking interests, 
authorities were reluctant to pass a more restrictive and effective system. The crisis of 
                                                 
639 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 211-226, Letters September 10 1897; March 10 
1908.  
640 Surprisingly the commission forgot to mention Connecticut. The State passed a law requiring 
agents handling money orders to place a bond of 10.000$. It forced some agents like Herman Baurer of 
Union City both out of the money order and steamship ticket business. Ibid. Letter February 9 1908. 
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this time eventually convinced the last skeptical group, the New Yorkers, to follow the 
Dillingham Commission’s advice. It recommended: (1) to collect a fee for licenses only 
to be issued after a control of the banking books and proof of property ownership of 
certain value, (2) a guarantee in cash to be deposited with the State, (3) frequent 
examination of the books and (4) requiring the maintenance a certain percentage of the 
money received in reserve. With the amendment of the s atute of Private Banking on May 
23 1910 only banks meeting these requirements could label themselves as such. 
Simultaneously, the state amended the Wells laws of 1907, regulating ticket agents 
requiring licenses to sell ‘transportation tickets or orders for transportation to or from 
foreign countries’. This license needed to be obtained annually from the comptroller, 
upon proof of good moral character, for a fee $25. A surety bond of $1000 to $2000 
needed to be filed. When found guilty of fraud, misrepresentation or failing to account for 
any moneys paid in connection with the sale of tickets, or orders for transportation by 
steamship, the comptroller could revoke the license. People doing such business without 
a license were guilty of a misdemeanor. Pennsylvania soon followed suit (Day, 2002, 75; 
DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 317-333, 349-357).641  
Seventy five years after impositions regulating migrant agents and brokers began 
being introduced in Europe, American authorities undertook a similar initiative. The need 
to regulate the banking business, which had developed around the sales of ocean passage, 
led to the passage of these laws. Steamship companies welcomed the authorities’ support, 
increasing the supervision on their sales.642 Why it took so long for a country, which even 
during the 1840s pressured European governments to prevent abuses on the sales of 
steamship and American railroad tickets, to effectiv ly regulate ticket sales at home is 
remarkable. The abuses were not really affecting natio ls,however, the lack of pressure 
from the predominantly foreign business interests involved certainly played a role; yet 
further research is needed to explain the lacunae. 
 
4.6) The elaboration of foreign departments of commercial banks and trusts 
                                                 
641 Ibid. Letters December 6 and 12 1911 and NYT “Immigrants’ Savings” May 26 1910.  
642 Ibid. Letter August 30 1907. 
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Especially, American banks managing a foreign department urged for strict 
regulations to enable them to move in the market more rapidly. As the reports of the HAL 
travelers confirms, a growing number of American trus s, commercial and savings banks 
started targeting migrants at the turn of the century. They opened foreign departments 
staffed by managers and clerks from the targeted ethnic clienteles. The Philadelphia 
Saving Fund Society for instance started off by hiring a clerk assisting migrants with their 
money transfers overseas. By 1916 it ran a foreign department with clerks able to assist 
migrants in fifteen different languages. It adapted heir investment policies on a more 
short term basis to meet with the demands of this market (Day, 2002, 70; DC Reports, 
1911, vol. 37, 316; Wadhwani, 2002, 60-61). Their efforts concentrated in big cities and 
industrial centers, whereas in rural areas immigrant banks retained their position. For 
example, in Newcastle where the tin plate industry employed 8000 men at an average 
wage of $1.9 a day, the Lawrence Savings & Trust Company acted as HAL agents. As 
the factories still needed more workers, the foreign department asked for extra copies of 
the third-class booklet, which they found very usefl to increase their sales.643 Yet the 
sales of ocean passage did not only attract the lowr class of immigrant laborers, but also 
the booming traveling public of Americans and ‘old-stock’ migrants. The names of the 
steamship-agents in Cincinnati illustrate both the growing importance of bigger banks in 
the business and that ethnic identification remained important for well established 
migrant communities. Traveler C. Van de Stadt labeled it as ‘German City’ where 
steamship business was entirely in the hands of the banks’ foreign offices. The First 
National Bank, German National Bank, Western German B k, Atlas National Bank and 
Brightson German Bank strongly competed for the cabin-class passengers, even 
organizing their own excursions.644 The Dillingham Commission also documented this 
evolution pointing to Pittsburgh where national and state banks had absorbed the 
immigrant bank’s business in less than a decade. Thir foreign departments were 
primarily directed to the sale of steamship tickets and handling of remittances. Their 
aggressive marketing strategies included advertising in foreign newspapers; sending 
broadcast circulars, pamphlets; all printed in different languages; the employment of 
                                                 
643 Ibid. Letter October 18 1906. 
644 Ibid. Letter October 26 1906, June 5 1909. 
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solicitors traveling the country; and the opening of branch offices. All these measures 
contributed to their rapid ascendancy (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 219-220). Traveler 
Nyland stated that First National Bank in Pittsburgh had a foreign department with a 
working force of about 40 people. It quickly positioned itself as the most important factor 
for steamship business in that city, controlling sixty percent of the first-class business.645 
This illustrates how serious American banks became bout acquiring the business. It 
explains why some banks’ foreign departments, like th  Provident Savings Bank and 
Trust Company founded in 1902 developed into one of the largest American traveling 
agencies still operating as a subsidiary of the bank in the 1970s and selling trips 
worldwide up to this date (Born, 1977, 178). Yet naional banks’ dependency on the 
goodwill of the steamship companies to obtain their agencies put them in a weak 
position. As the manager of the foreign department of a leading banking house declared 
at the Dillingham Commission: 
“The steamship and immigrant banking business are almost inseparable. As a 
matter of fact, the sale of foreign exchange follows upon the establishment of a 
steamship agency and rarely comes before. In view of this important relation it 
would appear that the steamship companies are entirely too free in the manner in 
which they establish agencies. A public suggestion o that effect might be a 
healthy one (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 318).” 
 
It explains the frustration of the American Express Company which must have been 
shared by many others pressing the State authorities to pass laws regulating the steamship 
ticket sales and immigrant banking. An increasing number of states did. The bonds made 
it harder for smaller agents to remain in the busine s, driving it into arms of the bigger 
concerns. But, sometimes these laws backfired. Becaus  of a misinterpretation of the 
valuation for securities, assets and reserves new legislation passed in Pennsylvania the 
First National Bank was forced to close its doors t the great surprise of all the steamship 
lines. Yet , most of the outstanding business was already covered and they immediately 
appointed Mr. Rovensky, manager of the steamship department in the failed bank, who 
with his chief assistant W. Frank and W. McCormick had at once entered into a 
partnership under the name The National Steamship Agency of Pittsburgh. They swiftly 
moved up in the market by continuing the passenger business of their former employer 
                                                 
645 GAR, HAL, 318.03 Passage Department, 97, Letter Feb uary 21 1913. 
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and taking care of all bookings made by the First Na ional Bank, still in process. While 
trying to restrict the numbers of representatives the pressures of obtaining the agency 
increased given the growing importance of passage sle in the banking world. Steamship 
companies never had any trouble in finding someone t  fill the gap when an agent failed 
and retained the freedom of appointing whoever they wanted, despite the pressures of the 
American banking world.   
 
5) Migrant agents/bankers: essential guides in the transatlantic migration process 
and barriers to vertical business integration 
 
Apart from financial services such as money transfers, money exchanges, 
safeguarding earnings and giving credit immigrant bankers became, as Day put it:  “in a 
larger sense the economic and social gatekeepers of the American dream, whether that 
dream was bringing over family and friends from theold country, buying a property, 
getting a job, saving money or simply finding a place to live. They were central actors in 
the social networks that coordinated the process of immigrant relocation”  (Day, 2002, 
67). The many business opportunities created by mass migration allowed established 
entrepreneurs to prosper from the relocation of co-ethnics. The sale of ocean passage 
tickets and basic banking operations played a central role in this ‘migrant business 
market’. The fact that American financial institutions initially showed little interest in 
attracting the migrant clientele because of their short term target accumulation, favored 
the development of an unofficial banking network based on ethnic ties. They escaped the 
supervision of state authorities, who only started to take interest in the matter because of 
the crisis of 1907 and the increasing interests of American banks to take over what they 
realized to be a lucrative market. The sale of ocean p ssage tickets was an essential 
element to penetrate this market and therefore a keen struggle to acquire the agency of 
steamship companies broke out.  
The keen competition between the passenger lines during the 1880s stimulated the 
proliferation of migrant agents, making it relatively easy to get one’s hands on ticket 
books. Yet, with the increasing number of migrant agents, the shipping companies 
gradually lost control over their business. Organizing the network of migrant agents had 
been one of the main incentives for passenger linesto collude in shipping conferences. 
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However, the many rules and regulations to discipline the agents remained 
inconsequential as long as shipping companies failed to find an effective way to deter the 
lines from cheating on these agreements. Pooling the traffic represented the cornerstone, 
relieving the competitive pressures between the Contine tal lines, allowing them to 
pursue their common interest. By forcing the British lines to join the pool agreement, 
passenger lines increased their grip on the agent-network and finally started using the 
keen competition to obtain the shipping agency to their advantage. The Continental lines 
reduced the number of agents, withdrew the special facilities to tie certain agents to the 
company and stopped paying extra commissions- which greatly restricted the 
opportunities to tamper with the rules. They set up a special committee taking charge of 
the implementation and abuse of the conference regulations. To do this the committee 
relied on private detectives and the internal denouncements system.  
These agents who needed the sale of ocean passage to attract clients and to 
develop other aspects of their migrant business started to be much more cooperative. 
With the harmony among the lines and the exclusive patronage system, loosing the 
conference agency meant loosing the access to ocean passage tickets since practically all 
passenger lines joined the agreement. Bit by bit the lines neutralized the conference 
violations which had destabilized the American market. The practice of drawing orders 
on European agents did not fully disappear because the higher commission and exchange 
rate still made it profitable for agents to sell these tickets instead of prepaids. As this 
occurred on a much smaller scale it no longer had te disruptive effect on the market as 
before 1896. By 1908, European cash orders seemed to have disappeared. With the 
commission fixed at $2, no longer resorting to extra commission and fixing the railroad 
rates on both sides of the Atlantic agents were left with little opportunity to cut into 
transatlantic fares. Occasional rate cuts did not exce d $1, significantly limiting the 
competitive advantage of migrant agents of using these in increasing their market share.  
The lines managed to reduce the ‘army’ of peddlers and runners yet not to 
eliminate them. Some practices were so well-established such as selling tickets on 
installments through peddlers, that these seemed impossible to eradicate. To contain the 
situation the lines temporarily recognized a certain number of peddlers. Agents kept on 
using every window of opportunity to increase their business as the cattlemen bookings 
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illustrate. The ability of the Continental lines to prevent the low Mediterranean rates from 
significantly affecting the continental market illustrate the increased influence on the 
agents, yet at the same time it shows that lines could not permanently resist the strains. 
Moreover, strictly imposing conference rules such as prohibiting the agents to book 
continentals at Italian rates exposed the lines to accusations of violating the Anti-trust 
Act. Due to the importance of shipping business for immigrant banks the system also 
suffered from continuous pressures from outside agents. The lines could not prevent them 
from getting their hands on passage books through conference agents willingly taking the 
risks of being fined to increase their sales. In short, the situation was much more one of 
containment than control; the fragility of which was exposed whenever an outside line 
tried to penetrate the market. New lines never encou tered problems to find agents who 
failed in obtaining a conference license to work for them. The low rates and higher 
commissions paid out allowed them to quickly acquire a market share for new lines that 
did not refrain from tempting and often with success conference agents booked for them. 
Exclusive patronage was difficult to maintain, especially in rural areas where the control 
was limited to scarce visits of company travellers. But again the situation never got out of 
hand, even when the lines gave up the fighting lineagainst the RVF offering no 
alternatives to the agents to counter the very competitive rates. Shipping lines often 
overlooked some abuse, as long as the majority of the business kept on going their way, 
and because strictly implementing the conference rul s would have cost a lot of 
money.646  
It is noticeable that even the conflict with the Cunard Line did not corrupt the 
agent network, which had become much more loyal than prior to 1896. It underlines the 
market stability that the conference system established on the overseas passenger trade. 
As noted by Keeling these horizontal combinations were much more successful than 
similar entities attempted by American railroads in the 1870s and 80s (Keeling, 1999a, 
198). Early railroading and overseas shipping companies encountered a lot of similar 
problems regarding to the principal-agent relations a d delegating power. Moreover, both 
worlds have always been closely inter-related, yet as Chandler underlined the sheer 
volume of the railroads’ economic operations greatly surpassed those of any other 
                                                 
646 GAR, HAL, 318.04 Passage Department, 221-226, Letter September 7 1906. 
 366
industry leading to its pioneering impact on busines organization (Chandler, 1988, 215-
218). However, apart from the business volume, other differences, such as the success of 
shipping conferences and the organizational features of the ocean passage trade, may 
explain why the merger movement in the shipping world only represented a ‘pale 
imitation’ of what occurred in the railroad industry.  
Maybe one of the reasons that the IMM also failed is that there was so little to 
rationalize. The way the shipping companies had organized the sale of ocean passage 
tickets was so cheap that only small benefits could be drawn from vertical integration. 
Why would a company want to integrate forward into marketing in a system where 
agents; (1) battled to sell the product, (2) advertis d in local newspapers, hired canvassers 
and sent personal circulars at costs to promote the product, (3) provided offices 
nationwide at the heart of where the demand for the product centered, (4) provided 
market specific language skills and ethnic ties, (5) over which the company had no direct 
responsibility, and who had a bond protecting them from eventual losses (6) supplied 
information on rival lines and fellow salesmen, and ll this for the modest commission of 
$2 which more or less represented a mere ten percent of the profit made per ticket? 
Another dollar commission ensured that the network was supervised by general agent 
who took charge of the control and efficiency of the network for the shipping company. 
The financial benefits of opening joint offices, ran by salaried managers, in this system 
were negligible and certainly did not outweigh the organizational difficulties of 
guaranteeing equal returns for all lines- a problem which did not exist with general agents 
working under exclusive patronage.  
Moreover, railroad agreements suffered much more from government pressures 
while shipping companies were spared these until much later. This freedom allowed the 
passenger lines to continuously improve the conferece agreements governing their 
business over time. Other than American railroad magnates it allowed shipowners, 
predominantly Europeans, to retain most of the decision-making in ‘family’ hands 
limiting the need to delegate power to salaried managers. The rise of managing directors 
also took place in Europe, be at different paces from country to country and sector to 
sector; from which the shipping world did not escape this, as the ascendancy of Albert 
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Ballin clearly illustrates. But, families ties kept on dominating the pre-WOI European 
business world (Cassis, 2001, 63-88). 
 
Chapter III: The ‘visible hand’ of the shipping lobby on US maritime and migration 
policies: the ship-subsidy and educational bills 1895-1905 
 
  As Claudia Goldin appropriately observed: “The perplexing part of the legislative 
history of the US immigration restriction is its timing. More astonishing than the closing 
of the door in 1921 is that it remained open despite twenty five years of assault during 
which 17 million immigrants from among the poorest na ions in Europe found refuge in 
America” (Goldin, 1994, 223). The calls for restriction during this period focused on the 
passage of the literacy test, which was first suggested in academic circles and later picked 
up by Massachusetts Senator Henry C. Lodge. The most ardent defender of the measure 
in Congress first introduced it in 1896, constituting an important reorientation moment in 
US migration policy (Bemis, 1888 and Lodge, 1891, 27-36; Zolberg, 1996, 307). Goldin 
analyzed the influence of the foreign-born population in each state, the economic 
fluctuations and the actions of the various interest groups on the voting behavior of 
Congressmen on the literacy test- which was voted on seventeen occasions and vetoed 
three times before becoming law in 1917. The pressur  groups discussed are the labor 
unions, capitalists, immigrants and agriculturalists of rural America, forming coalitions of 
strange bedfellows, cutting across party lines. Goldin ascribes the absence of radical 
restrictions before the outbreak of the War to shifting political interests, generally 
favorable economic times and sheer luck (Goldin, 1994, 252).  
Yet, because of the lack of differentiation within the capitalists group Goldin 
overlooked an important sub-lobby faction which played a key role in opposing 
restrictive measures. As noted by Prescott Hall, secretary of the Immigration Restriction 
League: “This test has already been adopted by the commonwealth of Australia and by 
British Colombia, and would have certainly been adopted here long since but for the 
opposition of the transportation companies” (Hall, 1904, 183). Although the role of 
steamship companies in obstructing immigration restrictions from being adopted may 
have been exaggerated by the IRL, previous chapters pointed to the increased 
organization of passenger liners in cartels, enhancing the collaboration in defending 
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common interests. This happened while party politics declined and important institutional 
changes materialized, offering new means to interest groups to influence polices 
(Clemens, 1997; Kolko, 1963; Tichenor, 2002). Public opinion gained importance, hence 
mobilizing it become an integrated part of the shipping lobbies’ strategies. How the lines 
reacted to the institutional changes, mobilized the public opinion and organized their 
lobby campaigns will be discussed here. This will be looked at, not only in the context of 
the establishment of the Immigration Protective League, but also the hiring of lobbyists to 
extend their influence among Congressmen. The latter increasingly relied on them both to 
obtain information on how to vote on bills and to formulate arguments to defend or 
oppose bills (Logan and Patten, 1929, 55-57; Clemens, 1997, 30).  
The impact of these companies on the passage of immigration laws, and the 
implementation thereof, will be further discussed. Despite the non-passage of the literacy 
test, the racialist approach gained grounds in American legislation and the selection 
process. The introduction of the ‘list of races and people’ in 1898 further differentiated 
the growing European immigration influx into various degrees of whiteness (Weil, 2003, 
273). As the percentage of migrants from southern and eastern Europe surpassed the old 
stock of Northern and Western Europe, calls to restrict he influx based on the racist 
belief that the new wave threatened the integrity of the American race and institutions 
became more prevalent.647 During the Progressive Era more and more commission  were 
formed to investigate the true nature of the ‘immigration problem’ culminating with the 
formation of the Dillingham Commission (Zeidel, 2005). In the meantime no restrictions 
were adopted in Washington yet the racist ideology infiltrated controls stations, which 
was reflected by their interpretation and implementation of the existing laws.  
Maybe even more astonishing than the tardy restrictions of immigration is that 
maritime policies, preventing the decline of the American merchant marine, were only 
adopted with the New Deal of President Roosevelt. Neither the Spanish-American War 
nor the formation of the International Merchant Marine Combine, by J.P. Morgan, moved 
Congress to alter the passive policy and revive the fleet under the Stars and Stripes. This 
failed to occur despite the presence of two Presidents, who openly defended a subsidy 
                                                 
647 In 1895, 54.7 percent of arrivals came from northen and western Europe and 43.2 percent 
from southern and eastern Europe. These numbers revers d in 1896 with 57 percent coming from Southern 
and Eastern Europe and 40 percent from northern Europe (Lund, 1994). 
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policy and who were backed by the Republican Party that openly supported subsidies 
(Vale, 1984, 51). The foreign flag dominated the lucrative migrant trade and went great 
lengths to keep it that way. The issue set up the for ign lines against the US International 
Navigation Company did not undermine the working of the cartel agreements.  
The foreign control over the traffic reinforced the mistrust of American 
immigration inspectors and public opinion against steam shipping companies. The policy 
of putting the responsibility of placing ‘undesirables’ out of the country by rising the 
costs and fines for their deportation was reinforced. Yet this did not affect the dividends 
paid out by the companies whose market of selling ocean passage steadily shifted from 
the old to the new world, with the growing prepaid nd return ticket market. Indeed the 
period discussed here, is characterized by what failed to happen rather than what did. To 
what extent the foreign shipping lobby is responsible for this will be analyzed here 
through the reports of the New York agent of the Holland America Line on immigration 
and maritime legislation.  
 
1) The immigration problem: ‘Tant de bruit pour une omelette’ or ‘a great and 
perilous threat for the very fabric of the American race’? 
  
1.1) ‘Literates Only’: The Educational bill as a means to sift European immigrants 
according to various degrees of whiteness 
 
Early 1896 van der Toorn informed the HAL directors that a law based on the 
report of the immigration commission formed by Senner, Stump and Edward McSweeny 
was being considered in Congress. All immigrants older than 14 years would have to be 
able to read five lines of the US constitution in their own language. As the head agent 
underlined: “knowing that more than 20% of last years’ arrivals would not have passed 
this test says it all. Most illiterates are transported by the Continental Lines. I therefore 
urgently recommend that the three pool-lines organize a propaganda campaign against 
this law.648 Most of the British lines whose market mainly consisted of literate 
Scandinavians, Irish and British passengers saw little harm in the test and fended off 
                                                 
648 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence 112-121, Letter January 28 1896. 
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contributing to the lobbying costs.649 The American owned RSL and American Line in 
trying to obtain advantages over foreign shipping lines from Congress worked with 
different lobbyists. Even the NGL hesitated, fearing that the lobbying costs with the 
hiring of two influential journalists -countering the agitation of the Immigration 
Restriction League in 1895 and the yearly salary of the lobbyist G. Glavis amounting to 
$9,000- would weigh too heavily on the budget. Conversely the HAPAG and HAL 
representatives in New York urged Glavis to agitate against it, especially in the South and 
the West where migrants were desired. He also needed to introduce amendments that 
would weaken the bill by limiting the test to women.650  
As noted by Freeman; “immigration tends to produce concentrated benefits and
diffuse costs, giving those who benefit from immigrat on greater incentives to organize 
than persons who bare its costs (Freeman, 1995, 894).” The previous chapters illustrate 
the growing activity of the shipping and corporate lobby advocating liberal policies 
throughout the nineteenth century. The organization of restrictionists on the other hand 
lacked continuity and was too tied up in party politics, as was the case for example for the 
Know Nothing Party or American Protective Association. The Immigration Restriction 
League, on the contrary, transcended party politics creating a solid and lasting platform 
for restrictionist using direct means to influence policymakers. The IRL drew together a 
group of upper class academics, businessmen and politicians who considered the growing 
influx of new immigrants as a threat to the Anglo Saxon character of the nation’s 
population (Tichenor, 2002, 16-17, 76). Using scientific arguments, the movement 
increasingly openly expressed its xenophobic sentiments against the influx of Italians, 
Slavs and Jews. It claimed that the US could no longer safely assimilate the mass of 
‘ignorant and debased human beings’ coming from those sources.  
Building further on the arguments of Bemis and Mayo Smith, the league’s 
message was that with the disappearance of the American frontier, immigrants 
increasingly concentrated in city slums. They formed ghettos, according to ethnic groups, 
preventing the assimilation process. Moreover, many of these migrants were birds of 
passage with no intention of becoming American citizens. They kept wages down and 
                                                 
649 The Dillingham Commission calculated that between 1899 and 1909 35,6% of the new 
immigrants would have been excluded but only 2,7% of the old stock (Hoyt, 1916, 447). 
650 Ibid. Letters July 17 1895 and February 14 1896. 
 371
had a deteriorating effect on working and living conditions. The IRL also picked up 
Francis Walker’s argument that immigration had a negative impact on the natural growth 
of the American population. Furthermore, the movement used statistics to prove that the 
foreign-born population showed a greater tendency towards criminality and pauperism. 
More problematic was the importation of organized crime movements from new 
European countries, like the mafia. Events such as t e lynching of eleven Italians in New 
Orleans were used to prove the dangerous consequences of this and stigmatized certain 
ethnic groups as criminals.651 New immigrants corrupted the American institutions. The 
natural barrier of selecting desirables from undesirables, during the era of sailship had 
disappeared with the introduction of steam- by lowering the costs while increasing the 
quality of the transport. The immigrants from new regions showed inferior physical and 
mental capacities compared to the traditional migrant egions, bringing in less money, 
being of a poorer health and a great part of who were illiterate. Therefore, when the 
imposition of consular certificate system proved unfeasible, restrictionist quickly adopted 
the literacy test over a physical, race or economical test as the preferred measure to limit 
the influx (Chandler, 1893, 1-8; Hall 1897, 393-402, 1904, Lodge 1891, Noble, 1892 
232-241).  
Although not so innovative regarding the arguments as to why and by what means 
to restrict immigration, the IRL’s main contribution was the use of new strategies to 
obtain policy changes. These consisted of using social s ience research, mass publicity 
and the hiring of a lobbyist in Washington to directly influence the national 
policymakers.  A year after its foundation the League counted 531 members, recruited 
from among the elite and thus securing the much needed funds for the lobby campaigns. 
The members gave speeches for all sorts of associations, and distributed propaganda 
leaflets throughout the country to gain public support for the literacy test. A screening of 
the American press by the IRL had shown that about 300 newspapers supported 
restrictionist ideas. The League provided them with articles which were also sent to other 
newspapers to spread their ideals. The following year the list of newspapers receiving and 
publishing their materials had increased to 500. The IRL also closely followed the 
                                                 
651 In 1891 eleven Italians, suspected of the murder of a l cal policeman were lynched to death by 
a mob of Americans who had broken into prison. I caused a big uproar in the press and used by 
restrictionist as an alarm bell for new immigration laws (Noble 1892, 232-243 and Lodge, 1891, 602-612). 
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academic debate on the issue and promptly reacted to articles advocating liberal 
policies.652 The movement’s close ties with the academic world contributed to the 
extensive use of scientific arguments to motivate th ir claims. To strengthen its ties in 
political spheres it opened an office in Washington headed by James Patten, a Harvard 
lawyer. With this appointment the restrictionist movement finally had a lobbyist creating 
a counterpoise to the transport and corporate lobby. Patten collaborated with Congress 
members, who favored the cause, trying to increase political endorsement by distributing 
memoranda to all Congress members and monitoring bureaucratic developments. The 
establishment of the Committees on Immigration in both houses of congress in 1890 
created institutions drafting reform legislation which were open to formal input from 
immigration activists and experts from both sides of the spectrum. With outspoken 
restrictionist members such as Representative Samuel McCall and Senators Lodge and 
Chandler, the IRL had an excellent mouthpiece with hom Patten wrote amendments and 
devised plans of campaign (Zeidel, 2005, 17 and Higham, 1955, 103-107, Tichenor 76-
81).  
The economic recession between 1893 and 1897 facilitated the IRL’s attempts to 
gain public support for the literacy test, while the sweeping victory of the Republicans 
during the 1894 elections increased the anti-immigration vibes in Congress.653 Lodge and 
McCall introduced and took charge of the educational bill drawn up by the League in the 
Senate and House. By the end of 1896, the test passed in Congress with an overwhelming 
majority. An amendment added a provision making it illegal for aliens, except Canadians 
and Americans, to enter the US to work while maintaining a home in another country 
(Hutchinson, 1981, 112-116). This measure to block ut the birds of passage coming 
from Europe reflects the increasing influence of the labor unions in Congress.  The pro-
immigration lobby seemed to have lost its influence. Van den Toorn expressed his fears 
that it was likely to become a law; American politics are hard to predict because 
Congress, at least the Senate, at times looks more like a lunatic asylum than a 
                                                 
652 As articles appeared in the North American Review r flect, Hall and Ward promptly wrote 
replies fighting the arguments of liberalists. See for example Hall’s “Immigration and the Educational test” 
as a reaction to Croswell’s “Should Immigration be restricted” (1896); Hall’s “Italian Migration” versus 
Senner’s “Immigration from Italy” (1897) or Ward’s “Restriction of Immigration” versus O. Austin’s “Is 
the new Immigration dangerous to this Country? (1904).  
653 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence 112-121, Letter January 25 1895. 
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deliberating institution. Cleveland is likely to approve the law shortly.654 The bills were 
sent to a conference committee to harmonize them and the final draft included even more 
drastic measures than what had been proposed.  
In the meantime, the influential German press launched a lobby campaign against 
the law which was followed by the other foreign language newspapers. With the 
presidential elections pending it did not leave Congressmen unaffected (Higham, 1955, 
104). Glavis continued his efforts in Washington to prevent its passage and confidentially 
reassured Van den Toorn that President Cleveland would veto the bill if it seemed 
unlikely that it would be overridden by Congress.655 A week later the lobbyist reported 
that the bill which came out of the conference committee only passed the House by a 
margin of fourteen votes.656 Yet his efforts had been compromised by a cable of the NGL 
that fell into the hands of Lodge revealing the German steamship company’s involvement 
in opposing the bill in Washington.657 Van den Toorn reported as a result of the work of 
Glavis and friends the law would not have passed, or at least would have been stripped of 
objectionable features, had the NGL not been so clumsy.658 To Glavis’ regret the bill was 
sent back to the conference committee. He had the guarantee of a veto against the bill as 
it stood and hoped that Lodge would not strip the law of the objectionable features. The 
lobbyist received the ‘powerful’ help of Senator Arthur Gorman against the bill (D-
Ma).659   
In the House their inside man was chairman of the Immigration Committee 
Richard Bartholdt (R-Mi). However, he became increasingly isolated being the only 
                                                 
654 Ibid. Letter December 22 1896. 
655 Ibid. Letter January 17 1897. 
656  The bill with amendments had passed the House on May 10 1896 by a vote of 195 to 26, while 
the rewritten bill passed on January 27 with 131 to 17, 102 members not voting. The bill was resent to 
conference adapting it to the original version and passed the House on February 9 by 217 to 36 
(Hutchinson, 1981, 119-121). 
657 This telegram of the NGL to unknown people, yet likely German associations throughout the 
US: The immigration law will be considered in the House of Representatives next Wednesday; telegraph 
your House delegate on our costs that you protest against the foreseen restrictions requesting him to vote
against it, whereby you mention that a positive vote on the law from his side will result the Representatives 
defeat during the next elections (Just, 1988, 224). 
658 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, January 29 1897.  
659 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, February 5 1897. Senator Gorman proposal 
of tariff revisions in 1894 raised plenty of dust. The New York Times described him as not a Democrat, not 
a Republican and only in legal form a Senator being in reality simply an agent of the Sugar Trust and the 
iron and coal interests of the country. Maybe the Times could have added steamship interest to the list. See 
New York Times, “To meet Gorman” July 19 1894.  
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member to give a negative advice on the bill in January. For reasons unknown to Glavis, 
Bartholdt was forced to sign the subsequent report on the bill, making it unanimous. The 
new version now passed the House with a big majority and the veto was at stake.660 
Glavis found more support in the Senate where it passed by a small margin. He felt 
confident that it would be vetoed and would not be overridden, especially since the 
economic conditions improved, decreasing the pressu for restrictions.661 Cleveland 
eventually vetoed the bill reproving its hypocrite un-American character and although the 
House overrode it, the Senate took no further action, meaning that they would have to 
start from scratch during the next session.662  
Glavis awaited the appointment of the new chairman of the House Immigration 
Committee to go to New York and to introduce him to the representatives of the 
steamship lines. He welcomed Boas’ initiative to establish an organization representing 
the various religious and ethnic groups to fight the IRL on humanitarian grounds and the 
lines’ decision to exert more influence on the western senators. The lobbyist hoped to 
have some peace for the summer, yet the IRL made it cl ar that he could not rest before 
the enactment of a literacy test. They believed that e next President would be more 
receptive their demands. Glavis mentioned that he had:some friends at his house, among 
them several senators and members of the Immigration C mmittee including Senator 
Faulkner. Promises were given that nothing would be done regarding immigration 
during the extra session.663 Van den Toorn praised Glavis for his excellent maneuvering 
and trustworthy predictions in the matter.664 But with the Republican ticket having won 
the elections the educational bill would be hard to prevent.  
Glavis doubted as to whether to continue the radical opposition and to run the risk 
of having stringent measures adopted or to collaborate with the advocates and weaken the 
test as much as possible. He proposed trying to exclude women, direct family of 
                                                 
660 Ibid. Letters February 8 and 12 1897; NYT, “Immigration bill: Agreed to by all conferees 
except one”, January 22 1897. 
661 Ibid. Letters February 18, 25 and March 7 1897 and GAR, HAL, 318.02, General 
Correspondence, 112-121, February 26 1897. 
662 In the final version the amendment excluding birds of passage made no exception for 
Canadians. This gave President Cleveland, not wanting to trouble the relations with the northern neighbors 
another good argument to oppose the bill (Higham, 1955, 105). 
663 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters February 18, March 7 and 12 1897. 
664 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence 112-121, Letter March 5 1897. 
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admissible migrants and men under twenty one. Glavis sked each of the pool members 
to calculate the effect the current test would have on their traffic, especially for Italians, 
Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Hungarians, Bohemians, Poles and ‘last but not least Russian 
Jews’ who restrictionist wanted to exclude The HAL supported the strategy, but although 
literacy was on the increase in Europe nearly forty percent of its Austrian-Hungarian and 
Russian passengers would be excluded.665 Considering also that collaborating gave no 
guarantees of a stricter test being adopted afterwards, the companies decided that 
prevention was better than cure. 
 
1.2) The Immigration Protective League: Shipping companies’ involvement 
in the organized protest of various ethnic and nationality groups 
 
The near passage of the bill called for extra measur s to oppose the restrictionists 
before Congress reconvened. In the meantime, the new president McKinley had 
appointed Terence Powderly as Commissioner General of Immigration; while the 
chairman of the House Immigration Committee favoring liberal policies, Richard 
Bartholdt had been replaced by a restrictionist. As van den Toorn reported: 
“Nothing good can be expected of both men. Hoping that the ameliorating 
economic conditions will turn the public opinion infavor of immigration, to 
influence it and go up against the IRL, the HAPAG and NGL elaborated a plan to 
establish a Pro-Immigration Leaugue. Dr. Senner, journalist and former 
Commissioner of Immigration of New York has been appointed to lead the 
League and set up branches nationwide. He will travel throughout the country, 
hold lectures and recruit members, especially in the West. The membership fee of 
one dollar will be let off to recruit as many as possible. To cover up their 
involvement the League will distance itself complete y of the steamship lines and 
even create the impression to oppose us. The expenses of Senner have to be 
defrayed and he reached an agreement with the German Lines who will pay him 
500$ a month from October first till April first and that for the subsequent twelve 
months his salary would amount to 2000$ plus expenses which can not surpass 
3000$. Hence the cost for the next 18 months would not exceed 8000 dollars. The 
Germans asked to contribute, yet not to mention it to any other lines out of fear 
that it may leak out.”666 
 
This letter indicates that it was the joint efforts of three steamship lines, instead of 
associations representing various ethnic and nationality groups, which formed the 
                                                 
665 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters April 3, 9, 15 and May 1 1897.  
666 Ibid. Letter November 16 1897. 
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cornerstone of the Immigration Protective League.667 Being unable to openly oppose 
legislation, shipping companies established contacts with various ethnic groups to voice 
their claims. Although the literacy test would hardly affect the German immigrants, quite 
naturally the German lines first turned to the German speaking community; not only 
because its close affiliation with it but also because the weight this community had on 
American politics. The influence that the HAPAG and NGL had built up among the 
German speaking community in the US over fifty years, s the main carriers of goods and 
passengers between both countries, can not be overlo k d.  This explains why the 
strongest protest against the bill originated from an ethnic community which would have 
suffered much less from the test than Slavs and Italians.668  
Due to the later arrival, the latter communities lacked the organization and 
political power required for a successful campaign.669 However, slowly but surely, the 
new communities, especially the Jewish one joined th  movement. As a result of the long 
record of service in the migrant business these shipping companies developed strong ties 
through their migrant agent network with the immigrant communities and associations, 
defending the interests of the various ethnic groups nationwide. These connections would 
increasingly be used to agitate for liberal policies. Another marked advantage of the 
steamship lobby over the IRL was the close ties betwe n shipping companies and 
American newspapers, because of their constant advertising campaigns. As Hall noted a 
part of the press is: “more or less muzzled by steamship advertising” (Hall, 1913, 748). 
As was seen previously, shipping conferences agreed to withdraw all advertisements 
from newspapers attacking the lines. The amount these annual revenues from the Holland 
America Line amounted to is shown in (appendix 7). Moreover, many of the foreign 
newspaper editors worked as migrant agents for these companies. Hence, the conflict of 
                                                 
667  See Highman, 1955, 107; Tichenor, 2002, 81; Zeidel, 2005, 12 and Zolberg, 2006, 222. 
668 As the NYT reported most of the associations supporting the League were German yet others 
nationalities were interested .The societies mentioned were the North American Gymnastic Union, German 
Roman Catholic Society of North America, the Arion, the United Singers of Brooklyn, the German 
Catholic Central Union of Michigan, and many others across the nation. The prominent figures leading the 
League were: W. Bourke Cockran, the president; J. Senner, the secretary and Oscar Straus. See NYT “To 
Protect Immigartion: a protective Leaugue a million strong to oppose the Lodge Bill”, Januray 7 1898. 
669 From their side British lines although initially giving the impression not to fear the educational 
bill also lobbied against it. As pointed by Flayhart Vernon brown, head-agent of the Cunard Line managed 
an ‘educational fund’ for lobbying purposes at Washington and creating favorable working relationships 
with some of the New York newspapers and journalists (Flayhart, 2000, 328).  
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interest of a good part of the American press favored the pro-immigration lobby to create 
goodwill among the public opinion. 
To lead the Immigration Protective League the lines appointed Austrian-born 
Joseph Senner. As a foreign-born journal editor, who had headed Ellis Island over the 
four years prior, and whose report on the immigration question was used to introduce the 
literacy test in Congress, Senner had the perfect profile to lead the propaganda campaign 
against it.670 During his term as Commissioner of Immigration, his strict application of 
the laws initially created discontent with the lines, yet afterwards the relation between the 
lines and the commissioner improved, as his engagement clearly illustrates. Senner 
published various articles on immigration, reflecting his views before his appointment. 
Initially, just as his predecessor Weber had done, he did not press for any restrictions. He 
also praised the deterring effect the laws of 1891 and 1893 had on the decreasing influx 
of undesirables, by putting the financial responsibility for them on the shipping 
companies. Especially the clause referring to ‘persons likely to become a public charge’ 
afforded: “great opportunity to use the greatest discretion and good judgment not only as 
to the individual seeking admission, but also bearing in mind the general conditions of 
this country” (Senner, 1894, 499).  
In the midst of the agitation by the IRL against the ‘new’ migrants, the 
Immigration Commissioner defended the Italian migrants. With quantitative and 
qualitative data he refuted the notion of their rapidly increasing numbers and their 
inability to assimilate.671 He blamed restrictionists and the popular press for making; 
“Tant de bruit pour une omelette!”(Senner, 1896, 655). Senner shared the notion evoked 
by Eugene Schutler reacting to the depiction of Italians as semi-barbarians by Powderly; 
“ they are a desirable element to fuse with our motley population bringing to us the 
                                                 
670 Joseph Senner studied law in Vienna after which he moved to New York to become the foreign 
editor of the ‘New-York Staats-Zeitung’ in 1880. He b came president of the national organization of the 
German-American journalists and the German Social Scientific Society. He also was for a moment vice-
president of the Liedekranz. He had supported the Democratic bill of Cleveland campaigning for him in the 
mid-west. See NYT, “New Commissioner of Immigration” March 29 1893. Senner’s connection with the 
‘New-York Staats-Zeitung’ facilitated the support of the paper the shipping line’s cause just as the fact that 
the HAPAG New York agent, Emil boas was married to aughter of the newspaper’s owner. This anecdotal 
evidence illustrates the close ties among the German speaking community in the US. Hamburg 
Staatsarchiv, HAPAG, 622-1, Erinnerungen Merck. 
671 Senner started to collect statistical information on who had been in the US before and who 
were joining direct family per nationality. From 1896 onwards this was expanded to all immigrant control 
stations.  
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logical qualities of the Latin race, and they show in the long run the effect of an 
experience which no other people in Europe has had – of over two thousand years of 
civilization”  (Schuyler, 1889, 495). In the conviction that the American society had the 
power to assimilate all people, regardless of race, th y were joined by Richard Mayo 
Smith. The social scientist had previously expressed his doubts on the benefits of 
immigration for the American society, but now he advocated a nationality based on unity 
of institutions, social habits and ideals instead of unity of blood (Mayo-Smith, 1894, 426-
444 and 649-670). The commissioner tended to favor  moderate educational test, fearing 
that too big an inflow of the immigration would lower the standards of living and wages, 
yet people joining immediate family had to be exempt from it. However, he did not 
believe that the country could risk excluding desirables, whom it would still need for a 
long time to come, while the existing laws managed to exclude a majority of 
undesirables.672 A new test of eligibility was considered unnecessary, but a better 
distribution of the migrants, according to their skill  and to the localities where they were 
especially needed. He therefore recommended the establishment of a national Clearing 
House at Ellis Island, with a branch office inland, as the solution to increase the benefits 
and to prevent the possible dangers of immigration (Senner, 1894, 493-499; 1896, 648-
657 and 1897 1-17).  
 In the article in the New York Times announcing the establishment of the League, 
Senner openly stated that the purpose of the association was to oppose the Lodge bill. He 
used the same arguments as in his previous articles with special attention to obtaining 
political support from Western and Southern States, stressing that immigration was a 
national question; “Western and the Southern States where immigrants were largely 
needed for their further development had equal rights to decide on the policy as the 
East.”673 Yet with the IRL, Senner faced a well run adversary to campaign against. Hall 
got his hands on correspondence from Senner to varius German associations, in which 
                                                 
 672 To prove that the existing laws sifted the desirables from the undesirables the commissioner 
pointed at one hand to the increasing percentage of d barred over the last five fiscal years: 1891-92, (1727 
of the 445 987), 92/93 (817 of the 343 422) 93/94 (2022 of the 219 046) 94/95 (2077 of the 190 928) and 
95/96 2512 of the 263709. While on the other hand the number of deported sent back for becoming a public 
charge within the first year of arrival were rapidly eclining from 637 in 92, 577 in 93, 417 in 94 177 in 95 
and 238 in 96. For Senner this proved that the controls were baring fruit (Senner, 1897, 7). 
673 NYT, January 7 1898 “To Protect Immigration:, a protective League a million strong to oppose 
the Lodge Bill”. 
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he warned that a strong Anglo-Saxon movement pushed for the literacy test whose true 
intention aimed at suspending migration and ruining the German element politically and 
economically. Hall claimed that the support for theIPL was based on misrepresentations 
of the bill and by misleading the German community into believing that the future of 
German schools, language, churches and newspapers in America were at stake. The IRL 
released a circular denouncing Senner’s hypocrisy, and highlighted on it some quotations 
from his article published right before his appointment with to the IPL; in which he 
advocated a moderate form of the test and claimed to have practically introduced it on 
Ellis Island without being forced by law.674 Hall concluded that the flood of protest in to 
newspapers and congress against the bill, which had been nearly absent in the past two 
years, could only come from an outside influence.675  
 Yet, this influence could not prevent the Lodge bill from passing the Senate on 
January 17 1898. Restrictionists hoped that the House, which had approved the bill twice 
before with a seizable would quickly act on it and with the Republican president 
McKinley in power a second veto scenario was not anticipated. Yet, McKinley’s rise to 
power was partly due to his tolerant stance towards Catholics and the foreign-born, an 
electoral support which he did not want to loose (Tichenor, 72-73). Van den Toorn 
reported that after the passage of the law in the Senate the President called a meeting with 
the Republican members of the House Immigration Committee urging them to go slow 
on the matter. According to Glavis no immigration laws would be considered in the 
House. In the event that this was confirmed, van den Toorn intended to ask him how far it 
could be useful to start agitating for alterations of the existing laws, regarding persons 
likely to become a public charge, contract laborers and those carrying loathsome diseases. 
The HAL agent complained about the autocratic power of immigration officials, because 
the laws did not clearly delimit these categories of excludables.676 The IRL did not give 
                                                 
674 In the article Senner repeated that his support for he bill was based on the fact that too many 
illiterates would lower the standard of living and wages, exempting people joining direct family. By sa ing 
that he practically introduced the bill in 1896 he probably alludes to the fact that under the pretext of ‘likely 
to become a public charge’ he started sending back some illiterates which he believed to be undesirable 
(Senner, 1897, 15). 
675 Harvard Open Collection Program: Immigration to the United States 1789 -1939. IRL circular 
January 24 1898; “The surprising circular of the Immigration Protective League: purpose and operation of 
the Lodge bill greatly misrepresented” and (Senner, 1897, 15).   
676 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence 112-121, January 25 1898. 
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up as easily. Glavis reported that they pressed to rep rt the bill in the house on March 15. 
As the tendency among the Congressmen seemed to be to postpone the bill he did not 
foresee any problems in obstructing the IRL’s attempt.677 Two months later, another 
attempt failed to materialize.678 By then, the Spanish-American War had broken out 
shifting Congress’s priorities. 
 
2) The merchant marine problem: The rise of American jingoism and the need for a 
strong national fleet to back it up  
 
 2.1) The American versus Foreign shipping lobby  
 
 Due to the passage of the Postal Aid Act the first-class steamers City of Paris and 
City of New York passed from the British to the American registry, while two more were 
ordered on American shipyards. The patriotic celebrations for the formal passage of the 
City of New York to being under the American flag and the launching of the Saint Louis 
and Saint Paul reflect the emergent feelings of Americanism at the close of the nineteenth 
century (Flayhart, 2000, 173-193). The ships gave some more credibility to the American 
jingoist pretences, yet the naval power still lagged far behind many other maritime 
nations. Using this, the International Navigation Company continuously tried to obtain 
measures either to their advantage or to the disadvantage of its foreign rivals. Such was 
the case with the lobby efforts of the INC for the abolishment of the exemption of tariffs 
based on the treaties between ‘most favored nation’ of German and Dutch rivals. Van den 
Toorn traveled to Washington to make arrangements with the Glavis and Weckherlin, the 
Dutch envoy to lobby against it. The issue received consideration in Congress because of 
new tariffs adopted by the German government obstructing American imports. Hence, the 
commotion was especially directed against Germany yet van den Toorn got his hands on 
evidence proving that INC strongly agitated the matter also trying to make them 
reconsider the treaty with the Netherlands.  
 According to the HAL agent, Griscom was generously distributing free passages 
to Congress members and their families while complaining that they continuously trailed 
                                                 
677 Ibid. Letter March 11 1898. 
678 Ibid. Letter May 13 1898. 
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behind other lines. He organized diners with Congressmen pointing to the disadvantage 
of American ships compared to German and Dutch lines b cause of the lack of such 
agreement between the US and Brittain. Van den Toorn met with the Minister of 
Agriculture to point to repercussions tonnage dues could have on American exports to the 
Netherlands. He then asked the Standard Oil Company for assistance. The company, 
which ran a line of oil tankers, and was directly con erned by the issue, was represented 
on the board of directors. That Standard Oil Company had an important influence on the 
American Line became apparent by a visit of James Wright, the vice president of the 
INC, the very next day during which he reassured van den Toorn that the company would 
never do something to harm the pool members. Nonetheless, assistance to the American 
line’s lobbyist to oppose the bill was refused, quite logically according to van den Toorn 
since he introduced it. The NGL did not consider it worth opposing new tariffs since it 
only meant an extra cost of $20,000 to $30,000 a year, while HAPAG’s Albert Ballin on 
the other side of the Atlantic pressured the German authorities to reconsider their tariffs. 
In earlier cases which were similar, Glavis earned a commission of 25 to 50 percent on 
taxes he recuperated based on the ‘most favored nation’ resolution. This time, the Dutch 
company refused, claiming he was earning enough as it was.679 As a result, on two 
occasions Glavis failed to intervene for the company d the new tariff bill passed the 
House.  
 Together with the HAPAG agent, Emil Boas, Van den Toorn immediately 
traveled to Washington to meet with Senators. From one of them, Senator Stephen Elkins 
(WV-R) he expected pressure to buy coal from his mines in exchange for his support. 
Their efforts led to a redraft of the report of thebill in the Senate committee yet they lost 
their most important ally, Senator Murphy, due to scarlet fever. To ensure success, Glavis 
proposed contributing to the campaign fund of both parties. The steamship agents agreed 
to pay $5000 in cash if the committee made a majority report with negative advise on the 
bill. However, Glavis could not guarantee that no minority report favoring it would be 
introduced. If the law was not reported or did not pass another $3000 would be 
transferred for the upcoming campaign in September. The costs were divided, based on 
the pool participations and with the NGL agreeing to contribute to it amounted to $735 
                                                 
679 Ibid. Letters January 21, February 14 and 28 1896. 
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for the HAL, $2085 for the HAPAG and $2180 for NGL. Van den Toorn admitted that it 
created a dangerous precedent but fortunately the personnel of political parties changed a 
lot.680 The scheme worked fine until the German government d cided to introduce new 
tariffs obstructing American imports, upon which President Cleveland immediately 
abolished the exemption of tonnage dues for German ships.681 The Holland America Line 
managed to keep its privilege as ‘most favorite natio ’.  
 This tariff issue illustrates the venal atmosphere reigning in Washington where 
the voting behavior of Congressmen was easily influe ced by their own financial interest, 
as illustrated by Senator Elkins. Apparently, reports of Congressional committees were 
also up for sale to replenish the campaign funds for upcoming elections. Through the 
intermediacy of a good lobbyist, a lot could be obtained. The issue also underlines the 
limitations of the Continental Conference in harmonizing the common interest of its 
members. The lines tried to obtain benefits from their national governments to gain 
competitive advantages against one another, which created continuous tensions. As Van 
den Toorn’s comment on Griscom illustrates; “he is a hypocrite and a continuous threat 
for all European Lines.”682 The HAL depended on German legislation for the transit of 
its passengers, and on American legislation to landthem, while other members did not 
depend in any way on Dutch policies which put the company in a weak position.  
 In Europe, the HAL joined forces with the INC to protest against German 
regulations obstructing their business, while in the US it allied with the German lines 
against the INC. The Dutch company proved to be very loyal to the German lines in the 
US. During the commotion surrounding the tonnage tax and tariffs, van den Toorn 
reported that the INC managed to pass a law to expedite the delivery of imported parcels 
with value less than $500 giving it control over this business. He immediately contacted 
Weckherlin and Planten to obtain the same rights as the American ships based on the 
                                                 
680 Ibid. Letters March 24 and April 3 1896. 
681 Ibid. Letter December 4 1896. 
682 Despite his hard feelings towards Griscom van den Toorn used all means to keep a good modus 
vivendi with him. When the American Line ship Saint Louis saved all passengers of the sinking Veendam 
he urged to get a decoration for him from the Dutch authorities. Weckherlin was not so convinced with the 
idea of decorating a man who had monopolized the express package business and had tried to rob the 
country from its “most favored nation” status. Yet van den Toorn claimed that the decoration would just 
help obtaining the favor of Griscom in these matters. Moreover the HAL would badly need his support at 
the next pool meeting and this could help. A few days later a ceremony was held on the deck of the 
Spaarndam. See Ibid. Letters November 25 1897, March 11 and 15 1898. 
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treaty of 1852. Even though it did not really affect their business, they protested for two 
reasons: first because of the moral effect it had on the American Line in fighting for 
every single facility they lobbied for, second to allow the German companies who could 
not rely on such a treaty to obtain the same rights as on the basis of ‘most favored 
nation’.683 Fortunately, the HAL could rely on big American corp rations, such as the 
Standard Oil Company, who had little interest in seeing the competition between foreign 
and national carriers being reduced. However, growing nationalistic tendencies, during 
the 1890s, on both sides of the Atlantic started to pose a threat for the further existence of 
the line. Not only did it fear laws impeding its business, it also had to fend off various 
German, British and American attempts to take over th  line.  
 
 2.2) The Spanish-American War 
 
 As Van den Toorn observed; “it looks like that at the close of the nineteenth 
century everyone is looking for a fight.”684 The increasing international tensions caused 
jingoism to supersede nativism as the most aggressive expression of late nineteenth-
century nationalism in the US. Yet, as Sheryl Shanks observed, defending and controlling 
the borders fused into the issue of American sovereignty, into which immigration 
restrictionists would increasingly appeal to defend their cause (Shanks, 2001, 39). In the 
wake of the New Orleans lynching of Italians, diplomatic tensions between the US and 
Italy almost led to an armed conflict. A near conflict with Chili and Great Britain 
followed for seemingly unimportant motives (Higham, 1955, 75-76). Spain was next in 
line and as van den Toorn stated regarding the Cuba crisis: 
“I believe that the odds for a war between both countries are very plausible if 
Spain does not act more wisely then the U.S. Congress.  The Americans take a 
pleasure in interfering with matters that do not concern them. If it wouldn’t have 
such negative consequences for us if wouldn’t mind someone to teach them a 
serious lesson. Since the US acquired some war-vessels the ‘war party’ has been 
                                                 
683 Despite Weckherlin’s zeal and van den Toorn’s efforts to mobilize the various American 
express companies against the law it was adopted in 1897. The American Line who first tried to get thesole 
privileges together with the Adams Express company (PRR) came to an arrangement with the three biggest 
American express companies breaking down our opposition. Weckherlin feared that the treaty would not 
allow him to obtain the privileges but was going to d  further archive research to investigate the matter. 
Ibid. Letters June 16 1896, March 5 and 18 1897. 
684 Ibid. Letters June 16 1896, March 5 and 18 1897 and 25 February 1898. 
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reinforced and if a second or third rate opponent can be found I am afraid a 
conflict will brake out.”685 
 
In this context, the Republican Party made the revival of the merchant marine an 
electoral promise during the 1897 electoral campaign. In the previous session, Senator 
Elkins had introduced a differential bill imposing an extra duty of 10 percent ad valorum 
on all goods and merchandise imported on non-American ships. This indicates that HAL 
refused his ‘offer’ of buying coal from his mines. Simultaneously, another bill had been 
introduced proposing to charge $10 ‘head money’ for every migrant landeding by foreign 
ships.686 But, these proposals entailed having thirty three treaties with other nations 
robbed of their reciprocity clause. Out of fear of retaliation, the Commissioner of 
Navigation, Eugene Chamberlin, a rigorous supported of the revival, did not support the 
bills.687 The new tariff introduced later that year did not c ntain such provisions.688  
Advocates of the revival needed to find other means and these were discussed in 
Washington. Glavis reported on a ‘kind of love feast’ held in the Senate committee room 
of Commerce, attended by representatives of American shipping interests among whom 
were Griscom, C.H. Cramp, A. Vanderbilt, Senators Mark Hannah (Oh-R), William Frye 
(Ma-R), Gerorge Perkins (Ca-R), Lodge and their ‘mutual friend’ Elkins. The basis of the 
discussion was a plank in the republican national pl tform to substitute discriminating 
duties by bounties in the way of mail subsidies or on tonnage favoring American ships.689 
The foreign shipping lobby indirectly tried to obstruct the movement by putting free trade 
advocates in key positions. However, their attempts to have Chamberlin replaced failed. 
As Glavis noted: “I am sorry to say that Mr. Chamberlin is still Commissioner of 
                                                 
685 Ibid. Letter November 22 1896.  
686 Ibid. Letters March 24 and June 19 1896. 
687 NYT, “Opposed to Elkins Bill: The Commissioner Chamberlin says it would provoke 
retaliations” December 10 1896. 
688 Again the HAL agents praised Glavis and Weckherlin’s efforts in influencing the tariffs 
according to Dutch interests. Although the majority of the tariffs were on the increase he mentioned a 
lowering on wine tobacco and herring coming from Sumatra while flower bulbs were put on the duty free 
list. A final revision however included a charge of 25% on the flower bulbs while the increase on cheese, 
vegetables, sugar and chocolate would no doubt affect th  trade with the Netherlands. Ibid. Letters May 7 
and July 23 1897. 
689 The complete list of people present at the meeting E.C Bliss (Red D Line), H. Booth (Ward 
Line) W.P. Clyde (Clyde shipping Co), F. Firth and C.H. Keep (Lake carriers association), C.P. Huntingto  
(shipbuilder), T.W Hyde (shipbuilder), S. Sewell (shipbuilder) GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 
221-226, Letter April 19 1897 and NYT, “For the Merchant Marine” April 8 1897. 
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Navigation. I have tried my best to get him out, bu he is evidently too useful to our dear 
friends of the American Line.”690  
But, despite electoral promises, the continuous lobby efforts of Griscom and the 
build up towards a military conflict saw no change into the American maritime policy. 
The Spanish-American conflict laid the shortcomings of the American maritime force 
bare. A year and half after his prediction on the outbreak of a war, the HAL agent noted 
that the will was there, but that the materials were lacking to engage in it.691 During the 
spring of 1898, the American Navy informed itself of prices and the availability of 
steamships from foreign companies. Due to the urgency, foreign lines had a unique 
opportunity of selling their ships at a very good price and of modernizing their fleet. The 
HAL joined in the fierce competition which broke out between the foreign lines, offering 
the Amsterdam, Obdam and Edam. To abide by the Dutch neutrality provisions, the s ips 
had to be in the US before the outbreak of the war.Initially, the American Navy tried to 
rely, as much as possible on the steamers of the Amrican Line and American coastal 
ships, yet during the war it became apparent that these were insufficient.692  
They bought seven steamers from the American-owned Atlantic Transport Line 
and the Obdam of the Holland America Line.693 In consultation with the Dutch 
authorities, the company sold the ship through a third-party to circumvent the neutrality 
provisions.694 When the New York press enquired about the possible violation of 
neutrality, van den Toorn clearly disassociated the company from the sale: “so careful 
are we to observe our duties as neutrals, that shortly before the war, when we saw it was 
imminent, we refused to sell to the Spanish governmnt, which wished to purchase ships 
from us.”695 With his statement, the HAL agent referred to the sal  of ships to Spain by 
                                                 
690 Ibid. Letter December 1 1897. 
691 Ibid. Letter March 7 1897. 
692 Foreign ships were excluded from the US coastal shipping because of privileges awarded to 
American ships. Ibid. Letters April 15, 19 and 21 1897.  
693 The Atlantic Transport Line was founded by Baltimore merchant Bernard Baker in 
collaboration with the PRR and Baltimore Ohio Railroad. It ran a line between Liverpool and Baltimore, 
branching of to New York in 1891 when it started a passenger service. The Atlantic Line and the INC were 
the two larger American owned liner services on the North Atlantic (Flayhart, 2000, 277 and Vale, 1984, 
33-35) The Navy clearly adopted a policy of doing business with nationals first. 
694 The sale was arranged by Glavis again underlining his importance for the HAL. The HAL 
received 230.000 dollars net for its old steamer after deducting Glavis’ commission of 20.000 dollars. 
GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters 1, 10, 21 and 27 June 1897.  
695 New York Evening Post, s.t., June 25 1898. 
 386
NGL and HAPAG. This sale greatly added to the growing anti-German sentiment in 
Washington and in public opinion. The Dutch hoped to capitalize on these feelings to 
attract more of the American traveling public.  
 
2.3) The American Ship-Subsidy Bill  
 
With the end of the conflict, the US came into posses ion of Cuba and 
Philippines- increasing the importance of expanding the merchant marine under the ‘Stars 
and Stripes’. This created the ideal circumstances for Griscom, whose ships had rendered 
great services during the war, to push for a ship subsidy bill. Rumors circulated that it 
was a matter of life and death for the American Line. The company failed to pay out 
dividends for seven year in a row after the passage of the Postal Aid Bill and it urgently 
needed capital to modernize the fleet.696 Despite the bad results Griscom found his much 
needed sponsor in J.P. Morgan who was convinced that Congress was about to grant 
important subsidies to the line. The financer had an ambitious plan of buying his way into 
the steel and shipping industry to create a vertical merger expanding across the Atlantic 
(Flayhart, 2000 259-291, Navin, 1955, 302; Vale, 1984, 44). A growing number of 
capitalists started to speculate on the passage of the ship-subsidy bill as the previously 
discussed interests of the Vanderbilts to take over th  HAL illustrated. The speculators 
supported Griscom’s efforts for the ship subsidy bill. If these would pass the law 
providing for the transfer to the American registry of the City of New York and City of 
Paris would be used. This meant that the Vanderbilts would need to construct the 
equivalent of the Dutch fleet on American shipyards. Representative Payne and Senator 
Frye introduced bills in the House and Senate respectively, under which the syndicate, if 
                                                 
696 Ibid. Letter, August 23 1898. After the economic crisis and the conclusion of conference 
agreements on the North Atlantic the passenger busines  boomed and so did the profits of the passenger 
liners. Conversely to other companies the America Line paid out little to no dividends, underling the 
unprofitability of an American registered line on the North Atlantic. Griscom repeatedly claimed in Senat  
that the subsidy did not compensate the extra cost of ailing under the ‘Stars and Stripes’. To meet the 
speed requirements of the Postal Contract ships were often pushed to the limit leading to various 
breakdowns and shipwrecks forcing Grisom to consider discontinuing the service (Flayhart, 2000, 289-315 
and Vale, 1984).  
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it succeeded in taking over the HAL, could benefit from a yearly subsidy of one million 
dollars.697  
The HAL directors were not very enthusiastic about the bid and ordered Van den 
Toorn to agitate against the ship subsidy bill. TheNGL again showed little interest for the 
matter while HAPAG, as usual, actively contributed. Senner had to gain support of public 
opinion through the popular press, yet more was needed. However, the unexpected death 
of Glavis had created an important vacuum in Washington which proved hard to fill. 
Bruce Ismay of the White Star Line came over to New York to discuss the appointment 
of his successor with the head agents of the princial passenger liners concerned.698 The 
British lines also wanted to avoid, at all costs, the passage of the bill. As was the case 
with the opposition of immigration laws, the shipping lines needed a cover to voice their 
protests, because for some Congressmen, finding out that foreign shipping companies 
were plotting against the bill, would be the reason to vote for it.  
To lead the lobby campaign in both the press and Congress the German and Dutch 
lines appointed John de Witt Warner, member of the Reform Club. J. Wierdsma, in 
replacing van den Toorn who returned to Rotterdam to join the board of directors, 
reported that the efforts of the lines paid off, with the majority of the newspapers 
opposing the bill and a good number of Congressmen gave speeches against it.699 Boas 
and Wierdsma involved Mr. Gottheil700 and Mr. van den Bergh, vice president of the 
Nashville Railroad Company in their campaign. If the subsidies were granted the two 
biggest Eastern railroads could acquire an important advantage over southern and 
Western railroads. Van den Bergh received a list of arguments to stir up the idea that the 
bill was a new scheme of an eastern industrialist to extend their control on southern and 
western states.701 Warner made sure that amendments weakening the bills infiltrated 
Congress to prevent action on it. Under the guise of the Reform Club he published 
                                                 
697 Ibid. Letters January 11 and 24 1899. 
698 Most of the lobbying activities of Glavis for the HAL usually occurred in collaboration with the 
German Lines. The source does not reveal direct involvement of the British Lines. Nevertheless Glavis was 
clearly also on the payroll of the British Lines. Apart from the different international treaties the British and 
Continental lines’ interests usually coincided.  
699 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters February 17 and 21 1899. 
700 Neither the first name nor his function is mentioned. Possibly is alludes to Paul Gotheill, the 
subsequent president of Funch Edye & Co.  
701 Ibid. Letter December 22 1899. 
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articles in journals, magazines and newspapers. Warner also scorned the annual 
conferences of labor unions, manufacturers etc. to gain their support. He approached 
Congressmen personally and found strong allies in Senators A. Clay, Teller, Tillman and 
especially Jones. He provided them with arguments, which during a filibustering session 
opposing action on the bill by the Senate, came in ha dy. Especially the fact that the bill 
formed part of a scheme to place all transportation facilities under one central control was 
underlined. Only favored interests advocated the bill and would to allow; “a select coterie 
of ship owners to loot the Treasury.”702  
The lobbyist also spread anti-subsidy propaganda to all the members through the 
Congressional Information Bureau. Founded in 1897, by the lobbyist Claude N. Bennett, 
the bureau published a daily newsletter concerning activities of the US Congress relating 
to immigration and the steamship industry. Bennett also prepared data for congressmen 
on these issues.703 Warner hired one of his employees to spread arguments against 
subsidies. Wierdsma was happy about the results as well was the moderate costs of the 
campaign. However, at the end of 1900, HAPAG and NGL stopped financing Warner.704 
Boas did not believe that the bill would pass the next session and he doubted that 
Warner’s waning influence in Washington could prevent it if necessary.705 Another 
reason may be that the German companies started their negotiations with the combine 
and perhaps they did not want to compromise these talks.706 Following the advice of their 
lawyer in Washington, Mr. Putnam, the HAL financed the campaign alone. It did so up to 
1902, signing Warner off with an extra bonus to make sure he would not leak their 
involvement to the press. That same year Marcus Hannah, chairman of the Republican 
                                                 
702 Ibid. Letters April 16 1900 and December 23 1901; NYT “The Shipsubsidy Bill: Senator Clay 
does not think it will pass this session” January 1, “Opposed to the Shipsubsidy bill: Reform Club issue  a 
statement making great charges”, January 24 “Protests against the Shipsubsidy bill” January 29 “Against 
the Shipsubsidy bill” January 31, “Night session on the Shipsubsidy bill” February 6, “Ship Subsidies 
opposed by the Reform Club” November 21 1901.  
703 The Congressional Information Bureau still exists today and I want to thank the current 
president Bob Cazalas for providing useful information on the organization. See also (Marquis Who’s 
Who, 1966, vol. I, 84).  
704 After nearly two years of campaigning the cost of Warner’s efforts amounted roughly to 1700 
dollars each. Ibid. Letters March 7 April 16 and 17 1900.  
705 Ibid. letters November 16 1900 November 22 1901 December 23 1901. 
706 Traces of negotiations which led to the later agreem nt between the IMM and German Lines go 
back to at least early 1901. With the combine the fragile equilibrium regulating the North Atlantic traffic 
through shipping conferences was at stake. The architect of this equilibrium, Albert Ballin tried to preserve 
it and make sure that the interest of his company would not be jeopardized by the merger.  
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Party, introduced a ship subsidy bill which passed the Senate with a vote of 42 against 31. 
Among the opponents were six influential members of the Republican Party raising 
Wierdsma’s hopes that the House would not consider the bill.707  
In the meantime, Morgan’s plans to move his way into the North Atlantic 
shipping business developed into organizing a trust to monopolize the trade.708 His 
scheme generated a lot of feelings of apprehension on the both side of the Atlantic. No 
shipping company seemed completely safe from seeing its stocks falling into the hands of 
American investors. Both in England and Germany, this evolution was regarded as a 
threat to the national security.709 The negotiations involving many of the established 
steamship companies needed to remain secret not to c mpromise the passage of the bill, 
yet the interests involved attracted the attention of the international press where sporadic 
information on the combine found its way into the pr ss.710 The basic agreement of the 
IMMCO was signed on February 4th leaving Morgan sixty days to start the acquisitions 
or to cancel the whole thing. Hannah and Morgan’s celebration lunch after the passage of 
the bill in Senate, proved to be premature. Morgan stayed in Washington using all 
possible means to get the bill approved by the House before mid-April. (Flayhart, 2000, 
338-342; Navin, 1953, 316).  
As Senator Vest clearly underlined, the Democrat Par y had taken a clear stand 
against the bill. Instead of subsidies Vest favored a ‘free ship policy’ allowing all 
American owned foreign ships to be put in the American registry but denying them 
eligibility for both subsidies already approved and the privileges to enter coastal 
shipping.711 Democrats only played a secondary role because the Republican Party 
supporting the bill held the majority in both House and Senate. Yet the vote in Senate 
                                                 
707 Ibid. Letter March 14 1902. 
708 It included American, Red Star, White Star, Atlantic Transport, Leyland and Dominion Line. 
709 See (Vale 1984) and NYT, “American competition agit tes Germany: Fear that Congress may 
press the ship subsidy bill” October 15, “American Interests in German Steamships” November 17 1901, 
“The Shipsubsidy bill; London times says the measure if passed would be a very serious attack on British 
shipowners” February 20 1902. 
710 As for example an article of the New York Evening Post of November 22 1901illustrates when 
rumors started circulating about the takeover of the White Star Line: “one of the reasons for this secrecy is 
the plan that has been brewing to induce the Us Government to make an annual contribution to the profits 
of such combination. To achieve this, the component of American companies must continue to act in the 
role of infant industries until the Ship-Subsidy bill has passed. Capitalists are much less to blame for the 
scheme than politicians who tell them that there is a large surplus in the treasury to be applied for such.”  
711 NYT “Ship-Subsidy bill may Fail: All House Democrats and some Republicans oppose the 
measure” January 24 1900 and “Fight on the Ship Subsidy Bill” January 22 1902. 
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showed that the party did not manage to close its ranks on the subject. Especially Western 
Republicans voiced their discontent and feared electoral repercussions in the fall if the 
bill was passed.  
The fierce struggle concerning the Cuban tariff question had increased the 
division between Eastern and Western members of the party.712 Following the conflict 
over the Cuban tariff the New York Times reported; “there is very general disinclination 
to risk a further split over the ship subsidy bill.”713 Information on Morgan’s shipping 
combine appeared in the press during the negotiations but it was only when the contract 
was made official that the enormity of the trust of $170,000,000 became apparent to the 
American public. Defending the idea of granting taxp yers’ money to that trust, as the 
main beneficiary of the bill, became increasingly difficult. Tycoons could not count on 
the sympathy of the public opinion and more and more questions were raised about both 
the economic effects and the legitimacy of trusts (Neuman, 1998, 321). In various 
speeches, President Roosevelt even suggested to changing the constitution to put 
restraints on trusts and combinations. As the New York Times observed;  
“It is, we think, increasingly improbable that after having signed a bill authorizing 
the Attorney General to take the trust bull by the horns, President Roosevelt 
would sign another bill instructing the Secretary of Treasury to increase the 
animal’s ration.”714 
 
The events strengthened the Republican opposition. Griscom, Charles Cramp and 
Morgan’s attempts to distance themselves from the pro-subsidy lobby and disassociate 
the bill from the combine were to no avail.715 Charles Grosvenor (Oh-R), chairman of the 
                                                 
712 The Cuban tariff question regarded tariff reductions and the signing of a reciprocity treaty to 
stimulate the economy on the Island. Eastern chambers of commerce pleaded in favor while southern and 
western tobacco and sugar producers opposed it.  
713 NYT “Ship Subsidies opposed by the Reform Club” November 21, “No Ship-Subsidy Bill 
likely to pass” November 24 1901, “Favorable report on the Ship-Subsidy bill” January 17, “The Ship-
Subsidy bill” March 5, “Facts about the Ship-Subsidy bill” March 8, “Mail Pay and Ship-Subsidy” March 
11, “Mr. Depew Defends the Ship-Subsidy bill” March 12, “The Ship-Subsidy bill” March 13, “The Ship-
Subsidy debate” March 14, “Republicans divided on the Ship-Subsidy bill” March 15, “Ship-Subsidy bill 
passes the Senate” March 18, “Ship-Subsidy an issue” March 21, “The West and the Ship-Subsidy bill” 
April 7, “Ship-Subsidy’s fate part I” April 18, “Ship subsidy’s fate” April 20, “Ship subsidy Bill views” 
April 21, “Ship-subsidy and the Tariff” November 26, “Ship-Subsidy Bill shelved” December 7 1902, 
“Ship Subsidy Bill: Congressman Belmont’s view” February 19, “Ship-subsidy bill again; senator Hannah 
is trying to force action” February 19 1903. 
714 NYT “Ship-subsidy and the Tariff” November 26 1902. 
715 Shipbuilder Cramp had delivered the St. Louis and St Paul to the American Line. If the bill 
passed he would receive significant new orders from the IMM.  
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House Committee on merchant marine and fisheries and outspoken advocate of the bill 
did not find an opportunity to enact it. Even befor the announcement of the combine he 
met with the opposition of David B. Henderson, speaker of the House from Iowa. Two 
Senators from his state, with whom he shared their point view, had voted against the law.  
Since other pressing matters, such as the bill codifying immigration laws, needed to be 
discussed during the session he disposed of a good excuse to kill the bill. Waiting in vain 
for a good moment to report on the bill the chairman postponed a vote on it in the 
committee until the end of the session. The majority voted not to report on the bill and 
killed it.716 With it, Griscom and Morgan’s aspirations to build out a fleet under the 
national flag received a terrible knock. Foreign flagged ships would continue to bring in 
the increasing number of immigrants to the American shores.  
 
3) From Washington to New York, from theory to practice: The immigration 
policies as implemented at Ellis Island 
 
 While at Washington fierce debates were held for further restrictions, the New 
York Commissioners of Immigration seemed quite happy with the laws of 1891 and 1893 
as means to stem the influx (Weber, 1892, 424-438 and Senner, 1894, 494-499 and 1897, 
1-19). Especially the clause ‘likely to become a public charge’ allowed the inspectors to 
send back immigrants they believed to be undesirable, without too much burden of proof; 
this was not as easy in the case of ‘contract laborers’ for instance.717 Although the nativist 
movement failed to pass the literacy test, the racialist approach of sifting desirables from 
undesirables filtered in at very early stages among gate keepers.718 A further step in this 
policy was taken with the creation of a ‘list of races and people’ by the Immigration 
Bureau classifying new arrivals not only by country of origin but also explicitly on ethnic 
backgrounds (Weil, 2003, 273).719  
                                                 
716 Six republicans voted to report the bill but oppositi n of six democrats and four western 
Republicans killed the bill. NYT “Kills Ship Subsidy Bill” February 24 1903.  
717 This policy still stood forty later when president Hoover reassured Congress that there was no 
need for new immigration laws restricting immigration to the remedy raising unemployment rates during 
the economic recession. By a strict enforcement of he ‘likely to become a public charge’ clause the 
movement could easily be reduced (Zolberg, 1999, 75). 
718 See the quotation of Weber of 1891 Part II chapter IV.  
719 The list of races remained in effect from the July 1 1898 until 1952 and included: African 
(black), Armenian, Bohemian, Moravian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Montenegrin, Chinese, Croatian and 
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During his term, Senner displayed rigorous activity in keeping statistics with 
detailed information of all third-class arrivals based on the passenger manifests.720 This 
tradition was upheld and elaborated when Powderly took charge of the Immigration 
Bureau as Commissioner General of Immigration. With the Progressive Era looming this 
data would frequently be used and abused by both the pro- and anti-immigration lobby. 
While both sides fought a legislative battle in Washington immigration officials 
optimized the controls at the port of entry by increasing the financial burdens on shipping 
companies to deter the arrivals of excludables. To what extent the interpretation of the 
laws were abused to discriminate some races depended i  a large part on the Immigration 
Commissioner in charge at Ellis Island and on outside pressures. The Commissioner 
General of Immigration in Washington on his part, had the means to improve existing 
controls as well as presenting recommendations for new legislation to enhance the 
selection. What follows is an analysis of the policies applied by the duos of the Ellis 
Island Immigration Commissioner and the Commissioner of Immigration in charge, 
between 1897 and 1905.  
 
3.1) Powderly – Fitchie: The era of strengthened health inspections but also of 
mismanagement at Ellis Island 
 
 With the appointment of Terence Powderly and Thomas Fitchie as Commissioner 
of Immigration of New York, steamship lines feared the strict implementation of the 
existing laws at American control stations and increased pressure for restrictive measures. 
First because new commissioners usually strictly applied the laws to the letter at the start 
and second because Powderly had repeatedly voiced hs support for restrictions. Yet, in 
his yearly reports he never recommended the literacy test or any other restrictive 
measure. Neither did Thomas Fitchie nor his assistant Edward McSweeny who even 
opposed the test.721 The main recommendations of Powderly were limited to; increasing 
                                                                                                                                      
Slovenian, Cuban, Dalmatian, Bosnian and Herzegovian, Dutch and Flemish, East Indian, English, 
Filipino, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Irish, Italian (north), Italian (south), Japanese, Korean, 
Lithuanian, Magyar, Mexican, Pacific Islander, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Ruthenian (Russnik), 
Scandinavian (Norwegians, Danes and Swedes) (Weil, 2003, 273).  
720 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter November 15 1895. 
721 See testimony of both gentlemen before the industrial commission investigating the 
immigration problem. Powderly opposed both the educational and property test. The industrial commission 
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the authority of his bureau to investigate contract l bor violations, upping the head tax to 
$2 and reinforcing the health inspections.722  
Steamship companies had expected more difficulties from Powderly, yet they 
wanted to avoid an augmentation of the head tax- not so much because it increased the 
price of the crossing, but because it would create an normous fund from which different 
appropriations could be made and thus could facilitte the adoption of new restrictive 
measures.723 With the intensified health controls becoming a hevy burden on the lines, 
funds for immigration commissioners implementing these controls needed to be kept as 
low as possible. The two diseases that created the biggest problems were favus and 
trachoma. The former is a chronic contagious skin disease especially of the scalp, while 
the latter is a contagious infection of the eye. Favus had been considered a dangerous 
disease since the passage of the 1891 law, while trachoma only made the list in 1897 
when an investigation by the US Public Health and Marine Hospital service showed that 
the disease spread rapidly. It was associated with the growing influx of eastern and 
southern European migrants who had to be checked (Abbott, 1924, 70-72 and Dillingham 
Commission, 1911, vol. 37). The reports on trachoma moved Powderly to put improved 
health inspections on top of his priority list.  The percentage of those who were denied 
admission for medical reasons rapidly increased (Kraut, 114, 2006).  
 
3.1.1) The imposition of an effective system to keep out contagious and loathsome 
diseases 
 
Favus was easy to identify and was specially widespread among young 
immigrants. Therefore, it particularly affected migrating families who ran the risk of 
being separated at control stations. The cholera scare had put health inspections on the 
agenda of the American authorities. During the temporary appointment of American 
health inspectors in Europe the impact of strict controls were felt for the first time by 
shipping companies. In Rotterdam, Doctor Woodward withheld thirty to fifty passengers 
a day for favus or other skin diseases. The company isolated them but sometimes after 
                                                                                                                                      
decided to base their report on Powderly’s views. GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, 
Letters August 1 and 7 1899. 
722 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters November 22 1898, October 31 
1899 and November 22 1901. 
723 Ibid. Letters November 22 1898 and December 6 1901. 
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weeks of special treatment some still were rejected. It was not only Russians, but also 
Dutch families who were afflicted by the disease, which often placed them in a dilemma 
when detected at Ellis Island; separation of the family or collective return meaning 
financial ruin. It was therefore important not to let the family come over until every 
member was cured. The Holland America Line hired a ermatologist at the port of 
embarkation and started sending back cash passenger with a serious affliction. In some 
cases, like for instance when the head of the family sent prepaid tickets but one of the 
members showed only the initial symptoms, but stood a chance of passing through the 
Canadian controls, the company booked them that way.724  
Yet, the separation of families also caused uneasins  and embarrassment among 
the American inspectors (Powderly, 1902, 58). To prevent this, the whole family was 
often transferred to the Ellis Island Hospital until the disease no longer represented a risk 
of contagion. This depended, from case to case. The norm used by the health inspectors 
was that only one member younger than 15 could be afflicted, otherwise deportation 
followed. The maintenance costs were charged to the shipping company that landed the 
family. Van den Toorn tried to recoup the costs from the family, friends or the passengers 
themselves whenever possible but met with little success.725 The expenses for medical 
treatment of prepaid passengers at Rotterdam proved impossible to recuperate. Shipping 
companies tried to put the legal responsibility for the increasing deportation and 
maintenance costs on the purchaser of the tickets. The HAL inserted a clause on the 
prepaid ticket stating that: “diseased persons and those unable to support themselves for 
any cause whatever are barred by the law from landing and may be sent back by the 
immigration authorities and if so returned, the purchaser of the pre-paid ticket agrees 
herewith to pay for the passage back and expenses”. The HAL directors were not sure as 
to whether it would have any legality in courts.726  
When Powderly took charge, the deportations for healt  reasons increased 
significantly. Because of the fire that burnt down the control station at Ellis Island, 
contaminated migrants were transferred to city hospital  increasing the maintenance cost 
                                                 
724 Ibid. Letters June 2 and July 31 1893 
725Ibid. Letters October 18 1894 and December 24 1895.  
726 Shipping companies discussed the adaptations to the tickets during conference meetings and 
received legal advice on it from their lawyers. Ibid. Letters May 19 1896 and February 5 1897. 
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from one to $2 per day.727 The treatment could take as long as six months. For the period 
April through November 1897, fourteen HAL passengers had been cured in American 
hospitals costing $540, excluding the maintenance costs of accompanying family 
members. Of these, van den Toorn only managed to recoup $50 in cash and to obtain 
another bond for $50. Most of the detained prepaid ssengers were between 15 and 20 
years, who normally should have been deported. Through Glavis, the shipping companies 
called for clear directives in choosing a line of action.  
The HAL wanted to send back all suspicious cases in Rotterdam but since it was 
not acting under American authority the company ran the risk of being sued by the 
purchaser of the ticket.728 The American authorities declined various requests of he HAL 
to take responsibility for the consequences of refusing transportation of afflicted 
passengers in Rotterdam. Therefore, the HAL decided to allow the diseased to travel to 
the US anyway. If refused, Van den Toorn needed to deport them straight away, unless he 
had the assurance of recouping the maintenance cost in the US. Yet, the decision to 
detain or deport the passengers laid in the hands of the immigration inspectors. Inspectors 
received a lot of critique in the press for separating families and were often more inclined 
to detain instead of deporting diseased persons who were under twenty one years. The 
companies tried to obtain the right to decide about their passengers, for whom they were 
financially responsible. The HAL considered it dreadful to deport favus patients, but 
since most of them were Russian Jews, the group of passengers who initiated the majority 
of legal proceedings against the line, the company showed little sympathy for their 
cause.729 In theory, a relative or guardian accompanying them or someone already in the 
US should return to the place of departure with the sick child, yet because of the 
                                                 
727 The rates were than adapted as follows: Care of contagious diseases other than the ones cured 
at the hospital of the Health Department adults and children one dollar per day, care of contagious diseases 
cured at the hospital of the Health Department adults and children 2 dollars per day, care of sick 
immigrants, none-contagious cases adults 90 cents, children under twelve 50 cents per day, burial of 
deceased immigrants of contagious cases 14 dollars of non-contagious diseases 23,75 dollars and 
transportation of sick immigrants 3 dollars each  Ibid. Letter June 23 1898.  
728 This was especially so for passengers traveling on prepaid tickets. Not only could cash 
passengers more easily be refused they often also obtained a guarantee covering the costs in case of 
deportation.  
729 Ibid. Letter October 12, 26, November 9, 19, 30 and December 17 1897. 
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difficulty in implementing this in practice they were often classified as ‘likely to become 
a public charge’.730   
 The shipping lines planned to fight the classification of favus as a dangerous and 
contagious disease. But, because Powderly showed so much zeal for the matter, the lines 
postponed the protest. They feared a radicalization of Powderly’s measures; he who tried 
to add the diseased children from naturalized Americans to the list of excludables, but 
who was met with significant protest. The children of immigrants who were in the 
process of applying for citizenship did not enjoy that privilege. Powderly also considered 
using the clause imposing fines of up to a $1000 on shipping lines for bringing in 
passengers belonging to the prohibited classes.  
New York head-agents telegraphed the European directors to urgently limit the 
arrivals of diseased migrants to avoid new harmful measures. The directors sent out the 
message to the main transit points at the German-Russian border and Vienna to send back 
all favus patients; cash and prepaid passengers alike. The lawyers assured the shipping 
companies that the clause prohibiting the import of excludables would cover them in 
trials accusing them of breach of contract. In the m antime, the company rehired the 
dermatologist that had been working under Doctor Woodward during the enforcement of 
the New York quarantine regulations abroad.731 The following table shows the evolution 
of the percentage of aliens debarred because of loaths me and dangerous contagious 
diseases reflects the effectiveness of Powderly’s policies:  
Table VII: Debarred aliens at US points of entry and their cause for the fiscal years 

























1892 579.663 2164 1 to 268 3.7 1.0 46.3 43.1 6.0 
1893 439.730 1053 1 to 418 7.7 1.0 40.9 49.2 1.1 
1894 285.631 1389 1 to 206 1.1 0.6 57.7 39.8 0.7 
1895 258.236 2419 1 to 107 0.0 0.2 70.9 28.7 0.2 
1896 343.267 2799 1 to 123 0.1 0.4 71.8 27.7 0.0 
                                                 
730 Ibid. Letter December 17 1897. 
731 Ibid. Letters January 15 1898 February 9. 
732 These figures are taken form the annual reports of the commissioner general of Immigration 
and apply to the fiscal years starting from July 1 1891 to June 10 1892 (Dillingham Commission Reports, 
vol. 4, Emigration Conditions in Europe, 1911, 73). 
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1897 230.832 1617 1 to 143 0.1 0.4 79.0 20.3 0.2 
1898 229.299 3030 1 to 76 8.5 0.4 74.6 13.8 2.7 
1899 311.715 3798 1 to 82 9.2 0.5 68.4 19.5 2.4 
1900 448.572 4246 1 to 106 9.3 0.8 70.0 19.6 0.3 
1901 487.918 3516 1 to 139 8.8 0.6 79.6 9.3 1.7 
1902 648.743 4974 1 to 130 14.3 0.7 79.3 5.5 0.2 
1903 857.046 8769 1 to 98 20.2 0.3 66.3 12.4 0.8 
1904 812.879 7994 1 to 102 19.5 0.6 60.0 18.8 1.1 
1905 1.026.499 11879 1 to 86 18.5 1.1 66.5 9.8 4.1 
1906 1.100.735 12432 1 to 89 18.3 1.9 56.9 18.6 4.4 
1907 1.285.349 13064 1 to 98 29.3 1.7 52.6 11.0 5.5 
1908 782.870 10902 1 to 72 26.6 11.4 34.0 17.7 10.2 
1909 751.786 10411 1 to 72 22.9 7.0 42.3 11.3 16.6 
1910 1.041.570 24270 1 to 43 12.9 2.8 65.6 7.4 11.3 
  
Because it was much easier to send back migrants under the pretence of likely to 
become a public charge, this category includes an unknown number of excludables 
belonging to the other classes.733 Yet, the spectacular increase of debarred diseased aliens 
from 1898 onwards illustrates the impact of Powderly’s health policies. No specific data 
is available for what diseases the aliens were sentback, but the HAL correspondence 
indicates Favus as main cause. The HAL agent reportd a few cases of trachoma in this 
period. The tendency reversed in the following years nd is corroborated by the data 
collected by the Dillingham Commission. The data for the subsequent period also shows 
that health reasons were responsible for the great majority of debarred migrants in 
Europe, a number which exceeded the total number of deported aliens from American 
ports.734 Powderly laid the foundation of this evolution by increasing the financial burden 
on shipping companies for landing diseased migrants d threatening the imposition of 
fines. This policy would be further developed by his successors.  
 
3.1.2) The era of corruption, blackmailing and physical abuses at Ellis Island 
                                                 
733 This seems to be true especially for the period 1893-1897 during which Senner was in charge 
of Ellis Island. He had openly admitted of using this clause to send back any migrant whom the inspectors 
considered unfit (Senner, 1897, 16). 
734 During the fiscal year of 1907 German control stations at the Austrian and Russian borders 
refused 11.814 passengers out of 455.916. Of these 9.916 were denied access because of medical reasons 
while during that same period a total number of 13.064 passengers were refused entry at US landing 
stations. Furthermore between December 1st 1906 and  December 311907  another 3.178 passenger did not 
pass the controls at the port of Bremen, another 2.694 in Hamburg and 340 at Le Havre nearly all 
exclusively because of health reasons (Dillingham Commission, 1911, vol. 4, 96-102). 
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It remarkable to note that the efforts of the labor leader who pushed for the 
passage of the contract labor law focused on debarring diseased aliens rather than 
contract laborers. Surprisingly, the deportations of c ntract laborers even decreased 
during his service as Commissioner General of Immigration. Powderly did introduce 
some other measures, such as keeping statistics based on ethnic origins and new 
questions were asked by immigration inspectors upon arrival, to further define the ethnic 
and religious background of immigrants.735 He also started to fine shipping companies 
$10 for each omission or error on passenger manifests. This improved the quality of the 
manifests used during interrogations and for statistical data on immigration.736  
Just like Senner, he tried to extend the use of passenger manifests and some form 
of inspection of first- and second-class passengers, on their arrival. The commissioners 
wanted to put an end to the loophole for better off excludables avoiding inspections by 
traveling in cabin class. The passenger advisory committee of the conference lines 
immediately pointed to the drawbacks of such measure; “What would American 
Congressmen think if upon arrival they were asked whether they were polygamists, 
beggars or had been in prison before?” At the same time, asking these questions of cabin 
passengers was just not done. Powderly weakened the measure by excluding Americans 
and from tourists of these obligations and in the end revoked the possibility of executing 
the interrogations and completing manifests for cabin passengers.737  
Powderly’s actions were limited by two factors; the first was modest interests in 
immigration issues in Washington and secondly there was a very passive Commissioner 
of Immigration at Ellis Island. The shipping conference closely monitored the movements 
regarding immigrant legislation in Washington, yet due to the lack of introduction of 
definite propositions for immigration bills, no definite action was taken by the shipping 
lobby.738 One of the reasons for the inactivity was the passage of a bill introduced by 
Bartholdt appointing a non-partisan commission to investigate and recommend 
legislation to meet ‘the problems presented by labor, agriculture and capital’. Three years 
                                                 
735 The Barge office added four new questions upon arrival; (1) Nativity, country and province, (2) 
mother tongue, language or dialect, (3) subject of which country and (4) Religion. Letter July 8 1899. 
736 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter February 21 1901. 
737 Ibid. Letters November 7, 20 and December 20 1898. 
738 Ibid. Letter December 12 1901.  
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elapsed between the passage of the bill and the completion of the report of the Industrial 
Commission (Hutchinson, 1981, 124-125; Zeidel, 2005, 20). 
 It would not be the last time that anti-restrictionists used the commissions to 
prevent restrictive bills from being passed and to freeze immigration debates during the 
next sessions of Congress. Moreover, the victory in the Spanish-American War and the 
growing economy removed the ‘immigration problem’ from the public eye. Congressmen 
showed no intention of changing this; neither did the Commissioner of Immigration, 
Thomas Fitchie who, conversely to his predecessors and successors, remained in the 
background in the immigration debate and showed little initiative in innovating 
inspection procedures at Ellis Island. Fitchie partly deplored the debarring of contract 
laborers, describing them as ‘immigrants of the best kind’- much better than the many 
penniless newcomers who were often left with no other choice than to accept jobs for 
terrible wages.739  Possibly this explains for some part in the drop in deportations of 
contract laborers under Fitchie and Powderly. The Ellis Island commissioner displayed 
little sympathy for the new wave of immigrants. Especially for the growing number of 
Italians the examination was, as a rule, very strict.740 Fitchie’s assistant, Mc Sweeny 
pleaded for a law denying the entry of ‘birds of pass ge’ from those regions.741  
Fitchie’s leadership was characterized by the constant rumors of bribery, 
incompetence and brutality at Ellis Island. Both Powderly and the Secretary of Treasury 
led internal investigations.742 The scandal of the Gascogne eventually led to a 
reorganization of the personnel at the control station. The steward of the French line 
vessel, Ernesto Sapelli was caught bribing an inspector to give citizen certificates to nine 
Italian passengers. This document made immigrants exempt of controls. An investigation 
showed that citizen certificates had been issued with no record made on the stubs of the 
books from which they had been torn, a practice which ad been going on for months.743  
                                                 
739 NYT “Immigration of Aliens” September 27 1900. 
740 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter June 20 1901 
741 NYT “Immigration law flaws” July 25 1899. 
742 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter April 17 1900. NYT “Powderly is 
investigating” March 10 1899, “Abused at Barge Office” June 6 and “For abusing immigrants” August 31 
1900. 
743 NYT “La Gascogne Steward accused of bribery” August 21 and “Immigration frauds” August 
28 1901.  
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Fitchie’s successor, William Williams, wrote a devastating report on the abuses at 
Ellis Island ranging from immigrants being rudely hustled; overcharged for their food; 
deliberately upholding immigrants carrying above avr ge sums by the board of special 
inquiry to extort money; and the inefficient working of the board failing to debar many 
who had been declared unfit by the medical inspectors, etc.744 Some shipping companies 
also complained about preferential treatment of befriended lines of the Immigration 
Commissioners.745 The shipping lines tried to use the venality of immigrant inspectors to 
their advantage. When the newly appointed Greek and Arab interpreter at the control 
station Mr. Seraphic asked the HAL what they could do for his brother in Asia-minor the 
company did not hesitate to offer him free cabin passage. Charged with the registration of 
the immigrants and often appearing on the Board of Special Inquiry, Mr. Seraphic could 
render great services to the company.746 Because of the abuses of the positions Powderly 
and Fitchie, became unsustainable. President Roosevelt r placed them with Frank Sargent 
and William Williams.  
 
3.2) Sargent – Williams: Implementing the law by the letter  
 
3.2.1)  The iron fist of William Williams and the clean sweep of Ellis Island 
 
Williams made a clean sweep at Ellis Island and led the landing station with an 
iron fist. Soon after his appointment, the HAL agent Wierdsma predicted a clash between 
the shipping lines and Williams, who as a lawyer, had surrounded himself with 
colleagues to strictly implement the law by the letter. Immediately, the lines reported a 
marked increase in deportations. Especially, older migrants needed to present a strong 
case not to be sent backif they were considered as likely to become a public charge. As 
Wierdsma reported for people older than 45 years, having family ties in the US 
practically became a condition for admission:   
“In case said immigrants have a close relation in this country namely parents, 
brothers or sisters danger is less great, but they may be physically able, may have 
money and railroad tickets to destination, without relatives, in which case they 
                                                 
744 NYT, “Immigration abuses officially charged”, November 28 1901. 
745 NYT, “Commissioner Fitchie soon to be removed” December 21 1901.  
746 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter April 24 1901.  
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exceed the above mentioned age under the present system, the are very likely to 
be debarred. Commissioner is of the opinion that immigrants of said age are not 
very desirable. Naturally an appeal can be taken but a re-hearing is not likely to be 
granted except with very strong arguments. It is rumored that this action towards 
the 45+ is caused by chief clerk Mr. Lederhielger to create a bad feeling between 
the lines and the new commissioner in order to show them that the former 
immigrant authorities administered the laws to much great satisfaction than 
present incubements.”747 
 
As the letter indicates, the strict controls were pobably also a kind of retaliation 
by the Ellis Island personnel against the shipping li es for their lack of support for the 
previous administration when the scandals broke out.748 Again, immigration authorities 
targeted Italians. The HAL transported few Italians, but for example out of the 16 
passengers of the Noordam withheld for this reasons all but one Russian and o e 
Hungarian came from Italy. Some of the debarred hadalready been in the US and 
returned with their son.749 Williams also reinforced the controls for contract laborers and 
those carrying loathsome diseases.750 The number of families detained at hospitals at 2$ a 
day, regardless of age, drastically increased. Williams tried to find a way to fine the lines 
for such cases but in the interim they swelled medical bills in order to penalize the 
lines.751 He also consequently fined the lines for every little omission or mistake on 
                                                 
747 Ibid. Letter May 13 1902. 
748 The name of Mr. Lederhilger was mentioned in newspapers as one of the persons involved in 
the abuses and likely to be discharged during the inv stigation of 1900. Yet the chief clerk remained in 
position until Williams finally fired him in September 1902. Ibid. Letter September 29 1902. 
749 Ibid. Letters May 16 and June 20 1902. 
750 Wierdsma reported on eight Austrians miners arriving with Statendam sent back because of a 
misinterpretation of the Contract Labor law. He asked for a re-hearing and would appeal the case if 
necessary. In a letter to the North Atlantic Passenger conference Williams accused the doctors of the 
Calabria and Gascogne either of being incompetent or of criminal intent for trying to circumvent the 
American laws for the landing of three obvious cases of Favus. Ibid. Letters May 23 June 4, 22 July 11 and 
13 1902. 
751 For example the health inspectors detected trachoma on one of the two sons traveling with Mrs. 
Elterman on April 21 1902. The family appealed the deportation and was transferred to the hospital. July 9th 
they mother and her child were still at the hospital New York while the healthy child had joined his father. 
The diseased had little chance of being cured within any reasonable time and the medical bill swelled to 
240 dollars. The company tried to recoup the costs n the family but without success. The appeal showing 
little progress Wierdsma finally obtained the permission to deport the mother and child on August 29th. The 
HAL needed to cover the cost of deportation and the medical of approximately 400 dollars Ibid. Letters 
July 9, 12, 14, August 1, 22 and 29 1902. Other lines such as the Prince Line experienced the same. Whn 
the Prince Line could not recoup the cost on the father in the US it asked permission to deport Antonia 
Franzina and her two children. Williams strongly opp sed stating: “There was not the slightest excuse for 
your bringing here this diseased women and having done so the law rightly places on you the expenses for 
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passenger manifests.752 The immigration commissioner also intended to impose the use of 
manifests for cabin passengers. He strongly criticized the practice of upgrading steerage 
passengers who might have been debarred, to second-class during to voyage and warned 
that all such cases would be transferred to Ellis Is and.753  
At each arrival the chief clerk of the HAL steerage department and his assistants 
screened the passengers at the dock, accompanying them to Ellis Island. They collected 
information on those most likely to be detained first, then contacted relatives and friends, 
if they had any. The clerks also helped them, wherever possible, when they were before 
the Board of Special Inquiry where the company filed appeals on behalf of the passengers 
when possible.754 Yet, it was clear that Williams intended to send back a record number 
of passengers, for whatever reason. The head agent of the HAL believed that the situation 
called for joint secret action of all the lines in Washington. The conference lines had 
established a special ‘Ellis Island Committee’ to deal with such matters. The committee 
sent a report and letters of the shipping companies’ lawyers to Williams to convince him 
that a strict application of laws was impossible.  
In the meantime, the lines had received confidential information that the 
Washington administration did not favor the direct a ion of Ellis Island, which might 
disturb the existing friendly relations between thereasury department and the steamship 
lines.755 The conversations with Mr Ingen, chief counsel in Washington, were promising. 
Williams also stressed that he only intended to impose a manifest for second-class 
passengers. Relations between the lines and Williams slowly improved. Meanwhile 
newspapers were filled with stories of deportations a d family separations. The New 
Yorker Staats-Zeitung knew that Williams’ policy would soon lead to his dismissal. 
Wierdsma was less optimistic and did not believe that e would resign until high 
standards of inspections were put into place at Ellis Is and. With the far reaching abuses 
which had nestled themselves in the control station the HAL agent estimated that it would 
take at least another year before Williams could think of leaving. But, in the meantime 
                                                                                                                                      
caring for her. It is a matter of indifference to the Government how much your illegal action may costy u” 
Ibid. Letter October 12 1902.  
752 These quickly added up. HAPAG paid 540 dollars for the last ship arriving at Ellis Island, 
Anchor Line 180, Fabre Line 150 and White Star Line 110 dollars. Letter June 6 1902.  
753 Ibid. Letters May 30 and June 13 1902. 
754 Ibid. Letter June 4 1902. 
755 Ibid. Letter June 10 1902.  
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the reported stories started to affect the bookings. A ents reported a great drop in their 
sales, out of fear of seeing the passengers being rfused at the gates.756 Besides the press, 
Congress also renewed its interest for the immigrant influx and its selection process 
which eventually led to a new immigration law in early 1903. 
 
3.2.2) A quick loop back to Washington: The Immigrant Act of March 3 1903 
 
The completion of the nineteen volume report of the Industrial Commission put 
immigration legislation back on the congressional agenda. It coincided with the 
ascendance of Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency, who in his message stressed the 
need for new immigration laws containing provisions to exclude anarchists, illiterates and 
persons failing to meet certain economic standards. This moment marks the beginning of 
the Progressive Era in which pragmatic and fair soluti ns were sought for the evils that 
plagued the industrial society. Problems such as immigration were subjected to expert 
inquiry which had to enable Congress to formulate ad quate legislation. The Industrial 
Committee, consisting of ten congressmen and nine pr sidential appointees 
recommended the following revisions of the immigration laws; augmenting the head tax 
to $3, improving the inspection on land borders, inspecting of cabin passengers, 
exclusion of the anarchists, prolonging the Chinese xclusion, extending the period of 
deportability to five years after entry; prohibiting shipping companies from advertising 
foreign traffic and fining $100 per passenger who landed with a loathsome or contagious 
disease. The influence of Powderly, who was used as key witness by the Committee, is 
noticeable. Besides Powderly, testimonies of Egisto Rossi, the chief of the Italian 
Immigration Bureau, and P. Hall of the IRL, made up the bulk of the Committee’s 
immigration report. Despite the efforts by Hall, only two members supported the literacy 
test (Hutchinson, 1981, 127-128; Tichenor, 2002 122- 3 and Zeidel, 2005, 20-21).  
A. S. Anderson advised the shipping lines to prepar fo  a fight in Washington 
and he urged the lines to gather all possible arguments or proof in combating new 
                                                 
756Ibid. Letter August 22 1902 and January 6 1903. Articles ar  mentioned of the New Yorker 
Staats-Zeitung, New York Herald and the Jewish papers of New York but are no longer attached to the 
letter in the archives.  
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measures.757 The manager of the Philadelphia passage business of the American Line 
substituted Glavis as a lobbyist against immigration restrictions for the passenger lines. 
His appointment indicates a closer collaboration betwe n the shipping companies. The 
HAL no longer took action against restrictions in deliberation with the German lines.758 
The conference lines appointed special sub-committees usually consisting of one 
representative of the three conferences by which the passenger market was divided; the 
British-Scandinavian Continental and Mediterranean. With working groups such as the 
‘Ellis Island’, ‘Railroad’, ‘Immigration inspection’ and ‘Immigration law’ committees the 
passenger lines increased the efficiency of defending common interests. The lines 
appointed Emil Boas (HAPAG) to represent the Continental lines, Gustav Schwab (NGL) 
for the Mediterranean and John Lee (WSL) for the British lines to fight the various 
undesirable laws which had been introduced, some providing for health inspection at 
ports of embarkation, other to increase the head tax or imposing a literacy test. Given the 
delicate nature of the committee the lines decided not to record minutes of the 
meetings.759 Claude Bennett of the Congressional Information Burea  provided detailed 
reports on the debates held in the Immigration Committees and in Congress. He obtained 
inside information from congressional members confidi g with their opinion regarding 
immigration issues; allowing the shipping companies to better coordinate their lobby 
efforts. 
During the hearings on the desirability of the educational test held by the House 
Committee of Immigration and Naturalization, Hall blamed the shipping companies for 
the non-passage of the bill during the 54th congressional session. He claimed that the 
stock of the NGL had dropped by three percent when t  bill was  passed in Congress.760 
Also, in his scientific publications the IRL leader blamed the visible hand of shipping 
companies even more for preventing the passage of immigration restrictions in 
                                                 
757 Ibid. Letters November 25 and December 6 1901.  
758 Shortly after the German lines and the HAL concluded an agreement with the IMM shipping 
combine further tying the interests of these shipping l nes. However on the question of ship subsidies and 
discriminating duties the lines remained opponents in Washington. 
759 In 1896 Van den Toorn was appointed to preside the Immigrant inspection committee in which 
all the lines on the North Atlantic were represented to formulate the complaints against certain laws of 
inspection. GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter July 17 1896 and 318.04, 
Passage Department, 221-226, Letter January 3 1902.  
760 Ibid. Letter of Bennett to HAL January 15 1902 
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Washington (Hall, 1904, 173).761 The Immigration Protective League had in the 
meantime disappeared off the scene as pressures for restrictions decreased during the 
investigation of the Industrial Commission.762 The influence is hard to measure yet 
clearly the shipping lobby was the IRL’s main opponent in Washington. After defending 
the adoption of the fine-system for bringing in disea ed, at a committee hearing the 
attorney of the Bureau of Immigration, Mr. Campbell was approached by Paul Hilken 
(NGL) and Mr. Anderson. The steamship men made Campbell admit that his proposition 
contained flaws and he ended up asking Anderson to draw up an amendment which he 
would bring in front of the committee. The companies even convinced McSweeny to 
testify against the bill, yet the committee objected, finding that a subordinate of a 
Department could not criticize a bill drawn up by his superiors. In the meantime, the 
‘Immigration Law committee’ of the conference lines mobilized the railroad companies 
that shared common interest in the immigrant question to oppose the bill.763 The railroads 
appointed Hugh Fuller, general passage agent of the Chesapeake Ohio RR. to voice their 
claims.764 The house committee. chaired by William Shattuc (Oh-R), reported on a bill 
along similar lines as those suggested by the shipping companies. Yet Shattuc could not 
prevent the important movement pushing for a literacy test and to introduce an 
amendment in the House.765 It was inserted into the bill by a vote of 86 to 7, and it passed 
the House on May 27 (Hutchinson, 1981, 132).  
                                                 
761 Ibid. Letter Bennett to HAL January 15 1902. 
762 When exactly the Immigration Protective League ceased to exist remains unclear but the 
initiative was short-lived. As soon as the shipping lines judged that pressures no longer warranted th 
expenditures the League the lines stopped financing it. Senner than became the President of the Austrian 
Association of New York. He still appeared every now and again to defend the shipping interests as for 
instance at the National Civic Federation meetings on migration or to guide around Franz Kaltenbrunn a 
Austrian commissioner investigating the situation in the US to advise the Austrian Reichstag working o a 
new immigration bill. See (Just, 1989, 240) NYT “Watchorn asks envoy from Austria to help him” April 
26 and “Immigration the topic of the Civic Federation” June 20 1905.  
763 The bill contained a clause putting the responsibility both of the character of the aliens coming 
from Canada and of their inspection on the railroad companies. Another clause tried to put an end to the 
temporary migration of Canadians in the US. Especially the New England territories where many 
Canadians worked would be affected by the measure. Railroads in that region would loose an important 
business transporting these.  
764 Especially the big Railroads of the East supported th  shipping companies whereas the western 
railroads initially hesitated. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Pass ge Department, 221-226, Letters January 28, 29 
February 3, 8, May 7 and July 11 1902. 
765 Shattuc opposed the literacy test, considered the imposition of fines for bringing in diseased to 
be unjust and favored steamship advertisements promoting the US as a place for immigrants abroad. 
Shattuc assured Bennett that the House committee would not come to a vote on the educational test. To 
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 The anti-restrictionists first tried to delay the actions of the Senate Immigration 
Committee as the congressional session came to a close. Railroads postponed their 
petitions from being heard until the last minute to gain time. However, the committee 
reported the bill but many senators who still wanted consideration for their ‘pet projects’ 
and deferred consideration for the bill. The congressional elections which followed the 
next short session further stalled discussions on the bill. This gave the shipping lines the 
time to reorganize their opposition. Schwab prepared pamphlets, pointing to the 
objectionable features of the bill, to be distributed among Senators.766  
Senator Elkins, Anderson, S.C. Neal, legal counsel of the IMM, representing the 
steamship companies, and Judge Fayson, J. Hill and Mr. Dudley, on behalf of the 
railroads, opposed the bill when the hearings reopened at the end of the year. Both
however lacked in having a person of influence on the Immigration Committee to 
obstruct the passage of the bill. Despite the heavy pressure by interests opposed to the bill 
the chairman of the Immigration Committee, Senator B ies Penrose (Pen-R), championed 
the bill defying major corporations from his home state such  PRR and the IMMCO. In 
this, he received the strong support of committee mmbers Lodge and Charles Fairbanks 
(Ind-R). They kept the hearings short and quickly reported the bill so that even if 
opponents overloaded it with amendments in the Senate, there was still time to prevent it 
from going over to the next session. But, as Bennett reported, a lot of hard work had been 
done by the railroad people, manufacturers and employers to convince the Senators 
individually to vote against the bill. For instance the zeal of Fairbanks had greatly 
diminished since the actions of the Topeka and Santa Fe Railroads. Bennett suggested to 
Lodge omitting the educational test, yet the Massachusetts Senator, although aware that 
the clause jeopardized the whole bill, did not want it out. Senator A. Clay (Geo, D) 
                                                                                                                                      
gain time he considered the literacy test apart in an effort to shelve it. He planned to hold a secret vote, 
preventing the voting behavior from leaking to the public. Committee members would then feel more 
inclined to vote against it. This had to prevent the matter from being discussed in the House. Yet he fail d 
to stop Representatives Watson (In-R) and Underwood (Al-D) from discussing the test in the House and 
introducing an amendment containing the test.  Watson suggested excluding the Italians like the Chinese 
and blamed Hungarians and Russian Jews of filling up American jails and almshouses.  He knew that test 
stood a better chance to pass when attached to the immigration bill than when discussed apart. Efforts of 
Grosvenor (Oh-R) and Kleberg (Tx-D) to block the amendment failed. Ibid. letters January 15 and 29, 
April 1 and May 19 1902 and NYT “Steamship Lines will fight the immigration bill” December 7 1901, 
“Immigration Bill taken up” May 22 and “Hungarian Citizens” May 25 1902. 
766 Ibid. Letters June 17, 24 July 11 and 12 1902. 
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opposed the test, a feeling shared by many senators. Representatives from American Line 
and PRR pressured Senator Mathew Quay who would try to prevent consideration by 
stretching the debates on the Statehood Bill (Penn-R).  
In the meantime, the American Federation of Labor called off its legislative strike 
not believing the bill would pass the session. Senators Gallinger (NH, R), W. Mason (Ill-
R) and J.B. Foraker (Oh-R) also joined the oppositin, making it likely for the bill to go 
over. Just before the session came to a close Fairbanks unexpectedly brought up the 
bill.767 Senator Elkins had assured that he would call the w ole bill in its entirely, to be 
considered and the report to be read which would have defeated it. But, the opposition 
was disarmed by the acceptance of any amendments they proposed. The educational test 
was stroke out, John Dryden (NJ-R) reduced the head tax to $2, and the contract labor 
provisions, which would have moved the application t  being under the Commission of 
Immigration instead of the Department of Treasury was taken out to prevent obstructions 
of Canadian immigrants.768  
Yet, both sides knew that the House would try to defend its version, calling for a 
Conference Committee where these amendments could be reinserted. With a President 
who had advocated the literacy test, the liberal immigration lobby could not count on a 
veto as it had in 1897; hence they looked for guarantees from the conferees. Conference 
committee member Shattuc committed to strongly oppose any attempts to attach the 
literacy test.769 When Senator Elkins failed to kill the bill he  required the Senators, 
Lodge, Fairbainks and McLaurin (Mis-D), likely to serve as conferees in the case of 
differences with the House, to pledge not to recede from the amendments, striking out the 
literacy test and freely allowing Canadian migrants to New England. Despite protests, 
Elkins’ persistence made the conferees to give into the pressures. In case they violated it, 
Elkins and Gallinger were prepared to defeat the bill by filibustering it.770  
However, this did not prove to be necessary. The novelties of the bill were; 
exclusion of anarchists, prostitutes, the insane and epileptics, an increase of the head-tax 
to 2$, a fine system of $100 for passengers who landed with contagious and loathsome 
                                                 
767 Ibid. Letters December 3, 5, 8, 9, 13 1902, January 7 10, 16, 19, 24, 27 and 31 1903. 
768 Ibid. Letters February 27 and 28 1903. 
769 Ibid. Letter January 10 1903. 
770 Ibid. Letter February 28 1903 and NYT “Immigration Bill Passed, Educational clause out” 
March 1 1903.  
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diseases, and whose illness should have been detected at the port of embarkation, 
enlarging the definition of the contract labor, prohibition of promises of employment in 
US through advertisements in foreign publications, regulations for escorts of physically 
handicapped and minor debarred aliens, extension of the period of deportability of aliens 
unlawfully in the US to three years and of immigrants becoming a public charge from 
one to two years.   
As Shattuc put it:“its passage is the best thing that could have happened to the 
shipping companies’ interests because it prevents the passage of a measure by the next 
Congress which would have been much more objectionable to them.”771 To diminish the 
influence of the senators who championed the bill, the shipping lines supported a 
movement to replace Senator Penrose by Dryden or William Dillingham (Ve-R) as 
chairman of the Immigration Committee; to decrease the probability of strict immigration 
laws. Before his substitution Penrose passed a bill that transferred the jurisdiction over 
immigration laws from the Secretary of Treasury to the Department of Commerce and 
Labor, which is where the Bureau of Immigration and the Commissioner General of 
Immigration had moved to.772   
 
3.3.3) The implementation of the law by the Commissioner General of Immigration 
F. Sargent and the Ellis Island immigration commissioner W. Williams 
 
The successor to Powderly, Frank Sargent, also had a l bor union background as a 
former Grandmaster of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Fir men and his appointment was 
generally seen as a change for the worse by the shipping companies. His views on 
immigration diverged little from his predecessor, and he supported the aspects of the bill 
that had been written up by Powderly. Sargent managed to insert a clause into the law 
allowing him to dispatch officials across the Atlanic to investigate any irregular schemes 
directing migrants to the US.773  He initially favored the literacy test, yet when it 
                                                 
771 Ibid. Letter March 4 1903. 
772Ibid. Letters February 6 and March 4 1903. 
773 He appointed Marcus Braun, a Hungarian by birth, as special Immigration officer for European 
ports to report how undesired migration can be stopped from the interior and European ports. These 
investigations needed to uncover schemes like that of the Rumanian authorities which resulted in a virtual 
expatriation of their Jewish subjects to the US Ibid. Letter October 18 1902. 
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endangered the passage of the bill he withdrew his support.774 The Commissioner 
General of Immigration did not hide his antipathy for the new immigrants stating that; 
“ the very undesirable class from Southern and Eastern Europe which had taken the place 
of the Teutons and the Celts” (Sargent, 1904, 155).  
His absolute priority was not so much the literacy test but more to find ways of 
assuring a better distribution of the aliens congested in cities to where labor was needed. 
He wanted the Bureau of Immigration to furnish information to all desirable migrants, 
directing them to the localities where their skills could best be used. He planned to 
organize an exhibition hall at Ellis Island showing all the industrial resources in each 
state. Sargent also pressed for the building of a hospital at Ellis Island instead of 
spreading the diseased around the New York hospital; and he had success in this 
endeavor. The procedures for deportation were adapte . Henceforth no appeal would be 
considered after someone had been transferred from the Immigrant station for 
deportation. Also, at the second hearing of the board of Special Inquiry, friends and 
relatives would not be allowed and new evidence could no longer be brought forward 
during the appeal. Representatives of steamship lines could not be present at the first 
hearings, but got permission to be there do so during the appeal.775 The dialogue between 
Sargent, Williams and the shipping lines seemed to improve until the stricter 
implementation of the new laws midway through 1903. 
 Williams initially only sporadically used the $100 fine to bring over migrants 
with dangerous diseases. Because of Powderly’s focus n health inspections, shipping 
lines had greatly intensified controls at the port of embarkation, improving their relations 
with the US health department. The new outbreak of bubonic plague in 1899 in Europe 
illustrated this. The temporary reappointed of health inspectors to supervise quarantine 
and controls at ports of embarkation occurred a lot smoother than in 1893.776 Contrary to 
the first experience with American inspectors, the HAL reported no complaints and 
willingly complied with new requirements such as the acquisition of new disinfection 
                                                 
774Ibid. Letters May 17, July 12, October 18 1902 and February 13 1903. 
775Ibid. Letters January 3, September 5 and October 29 1902and NYT “Little State fares for the 
immigrants” March 23 1905.  
776 Antwerp and the Red Star Line constitute one notable exception to this. After the experience of 
1893 the Belgian government refused to delegate any authority to American officials during the inspection 
of immigrants. 
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apparatus, vaccinations of passengers, etc. With trac oma pushing back favus as the main 
cause for rejection the company hired an eye-specialist. Over the years the Dutch line 
built up good relations with A. Dotty, chief health officer of the port of New York; giving 
free ocean passages to his brother’s family and warmly welcoming him at Rotterdam 
when inspecting ports in Europe.777  
The company managed to greatly improve the reputation of the line among 
immigrant inspectors. Taking this into account, Williams initially only imposed a $10 
fine for wrongly manifesting diseased migrants as being healthy. Yet, as the number of 
trachoma passengers landed by the HAL increased, the line’s reputation quickly 
deteriorated. Williams’ forbearance towards the lin vanished, imposing the $100 fine for 
passengers with advanced-stage diseases that should have been det cted at Rotterdam. 
The New York head-agents reported that the controls at Ellis Island intensified reducing 
the number of passengers inspected by two doctors a Ellis Island from five to four 
hundred per hour. The law did not foresee an appeal against their decision yet Wierdsma 
advised not challenging them. It would increase their expenditures for detainees and set 
the inspectors against the line.  
This fear hindered joint action of the lines on this matter. Costs quickly added up, 
as illustrated by the fine of $1000 imposed after the arrival of the Statendam later 
returning with forty eight deported passengers; thirty seven for trachoma eleven others 
accompanying them. Wierdsma urged for stricter controls at Rotterdam suggesting to 
adopt HAPAG’s reward system of five marks for each case of trachoma spotted by its 
medical team at Hamburg.778 Headed by Cortis of the White Star Line, the Ellis Island 
Committee of the shipping lines asked Sargent to reappoint American doctors at the port 
of embarkation as a means to make an end to the fines. However, Sargent feared protests 
from European governments. Wierdsma strongly opposed a permanent presence of 
inspectors in Rotterdam and asked the directors to urge the Dutch authorities of to protest 
                                                 
777 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters October 10, November 27 
1899, January 29 April 6 1900 and July 7 1901. 
778 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters April 21, May 18, June 8, 9 15, 26 
and 30 1903 
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against the measure.779 In the meantime, the company hired an extra doctor using new 
methods; succeeding in decreasing the arrival of passengers affected by trachoma. 
While the remote control system for diseased passengers started to function very 
well, the contract labor law remained a dead letter. As a former labor union man, Sargent 
in collaboration with Williams, tried to remedy this. This led to the discharge of Mr. Van 
Ingen who had advocated a liberal interpretation of the contract labor law, opposing the 
bringing into practice of new applications of the law. With his dismissal the lines saw an 
important ally in this matter leave the Bureau of Immigration in Washington.780  
Williams started to center his efforts on specific reoccurring contract labor abuses. 
For instance, to reduce the increasing arrival of young Greek bootblacks making their 
way through a padrone system, Williams started to deport all Greek passengers who were 
between eleven and eighteen, who had no direct families in the US - uncles or cousins 
with limited means did not help. Being minors, Williams could not deport them for 
violation of contract laborers yet he used the ‘likely to become charge’ (LPC) clause to 
do so.781 Groups of passengers manifesting the same final destination, such as a group of 
thirty one Italians booked to Uniontown, Pennsylvania, were sent back not as LPC’s, but 
as contract laborers enabling immigrant authorities o underline their efforts against 
contract labor in statistical reports and in newspapers.782  
But, as Wierdsma pointed out, had it not been for the negligence of the HAL 
purser, this would have never happened. Shipping lines usually displayed great care in 
preventing passengers and manifests from raising the suspicions of being contract 
                                                 
779 The advantages of the system consisted of putting an end to the fines and being relieved from 
the costs of medical inspections at the port of embarkation. Anchor WSL and NGL supported the idea. Yet 
the decision of the doctor was final and with the bad experience of 1893 in mind the HAL pointed to 
danger of depending on the personal interpretation of such doctor. Moreover, it would only stimulate 
further interference of American authorities. Ibid. Letters July 24 August 28 1903. 
780 Ibid. Letter June 22 1903.  
781 Out of the 810 Greeks landed by the HAL in April 65 were deported for these reasons. CGT 
and HAPAG sometimes numbered 60 to 70 of these cases per ship. In the statistics showing the reasons fr 
deportation contract labors had dropped from 49% of the cases in 1893 to an all time low 5.5% in 1902. 
The two following years the figure increased with 13% while the number sent back as LPC decreased. See 
Table I and Ibid. Letter April 24 1903. 
782 Another example is for instance the deportation of forty Welsh coal miners on their way to 
Ellsworth Coal Co, Pennsylvania claiming that these were induced to come by Welsh agents of the 
company. The strict policy also prevented a million dollar project of Duke de Litta Visconti Arese to bring 
in Italian laborers for the development of the silk industry in California. Former attempts to stimulate this 
industry had always failed. Usually laborers for new industries were exempted from the contract labor 
provisions. Ibid. Letter October 20 1903. 
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laborers.783 When competing for a share of the booming Bulgarian market the head agent 
underlined the great care to be used in preventing their deportation as contract laborers. 
Ellis Island targeted this group yet Wierdsma managed to release fifteen Bulgarian 
passengers of the Noordam from detention. HAPAG had less luck with thirty seven 
Bulgarians being deported because one of them carried a newspaper ad from their 
European migrant agent promising to arrange work for his customers.784 
Williams also set new standards for defining LPC’s. He introduced the policy of 
detaining all passengers, even skilled, able and healthy ones possessing less than $10. He 
considered the sum as a minimum for new arrivals to ge  by during the initial days, while 
looking for a job or joining trying to join family and friends. Hence prepaid passengers 
booked through to final destination, who formerly never encountered any problems at 
Ellis Island, were now being detained until family or friends wired money to the landing 
station, the amount of which could easily supersede the minimum if inspectors deemed 
necessary. It created a lot of extra work for the companies. Beginning in June 1904 
Wierdsma reported that for the last two steamers that had arrived, sixty agents needed to 
be contacted to trace back family and friends to wire money. The company sent out a 
circular to its agents requesting them to strongly recommend purchasers of prepaids to 
also provide the passenger with $10 besides the tick t to final destination.785  
The number of deportations increased yet so did the total immigrant influx. 
Proportionally, less aliens were expelled by Williams and Sargent than under Fitchie and 
Powderly. Yet, the number of debarred for medical re son further increased and with the 
fine system this constituted a serious burden on the s ipping companies.786 By the 
beginning of 1905, the companies had reached boiling point and they held a special 
meeting to consider joint measures. However, simultaneously the New York press 
reported on the resignation of Williams.787 The zeal of the Ellis Island manager had not 
only led to the discontent of steamship lines. The for ign press also heavily criticized his 
administration and politicians were not indifferent to the political repercussion the press 
                                                 
783 Ibid. Letter September 22 1903 
784 Ibid. Letter March 24 and April 12 1904.  
785 Ibid. Letters May 23, 28, 31 and June 3 1904.  
786 See Table I. 
787 Ibid. Letters January 13 and 20 1905. 
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could produce. It moved Roosevelt to visit Ellis Island and to appoint a special inquiry to 
investigate claims of irregularities under Williams by the foreign press.  
The inquiry did not reveal any scandals and on the contrary the New York Times 
praised the commissioner for clearing the control station of abuses, ensuring a humane 
treatment of new arrivals and sifting out the male-fid  personal and missionary 
associations of the place.  In this article, Williams declared the immigration laws to be 
inadequate to reduce the increasing flow of undesired migrants by lowering the American 
living standards while being: “unfitted mentally and morally for good citizenship. 
American legislators could easily solve this problem yet they need a clear signal of the 
population that such is desired. Aliens have no inherent right whatever to come here and 
we need to keep out those who do not meet certain economic and physical standards”.788  
Apparently this signal failed to materialize and politicians in the meantime 
preferred to oppose restrictive policies and controls, so as not to upset their electorate 
which they tried to keep as broad as possible. Even th  outspoken restrictionist President 
Roosevelt altered his views on the immigration question for the same reasons. With his 
publicity stunt of visiting Ellis Island ordering an inquiry he courted the foreign-born 
vote for the upcoming elections in 1904 and 1905. The patronage appointment, a practice 
which Williams had tried to eradicate, of Joseph Murray as Chief-Assistant served as a 
check on the Commissioner. Williams instead gave in to the pressures and resigned. The 
President replaced him by Robert Watchorn of who he expected a less controversial lead 
(Tichenor, 2002, 134-135).  
 
4) Setting-up the foundations of the global wall against poor immigrants 
 
As Zolberg pointed the Chinese exclusion acts and lws regulating the European 
influx from the 1880s onwards were; “the first stones of a global wall erected by the rich 
industrial states to protect themselves from the “invasion” by the world’s poor” 
(Zolberg, 1999, 73). But, that this wall blocking the entry of Europeans took so long to be 
                                                 
788 NYT “Roosevelt starts special Ellis Island Inquiry” March 19 1903; “Williams Out” January 
15, “Four years of progress at Ellis Island” February 12 1905. 
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erected is for a great part because of the shipping lobby. The rising nativist movement did 
not facilitate their efforts.  
As Williamson and Hatton pointed out, the economic convergence between the 
US and the European countries supplying migrants since the sail-shipping era, slowed 
down movement from these areas (Williamson and Hatton; 1998). While shipping 
companies saw their traditional markets dry up, they sought and found new ones in 
Eastern and Southern Europe. By 1896, the influx from new immigrant regions surpassed 
that of the old stock. The following years, the flow swelled, constantly beating new 
records of arrivals (see appendix 2). Yet, the change of origin of European migrants 
triggered a new wave of nativism, gaining intensity as the movement increased. With the 
foundation of the Immigration Restriction League thmovement acquired political power 
using new strategies to influence policymakers and public opinion. It gave the nativists a 
lasting lobby platform, transcending party politics, forming a counterpoise to the 
advocates of liberal policies in Washington.  
The pro-immigration lobby was already well established by then, confirming 
Gary Freeman’s theory of diffuse costs and concentrated benefits explaining the lag of 
restrictionists on liberals to organize themselves (Freeman, 1995). Yet, so far for if this 
period this has not been overlooked, it was at least underestimated by migration 
historians often dating a well organized pro-immigration platform after the foundation of 
the IRL with the protest of associations representing he different ethnic and nationality 
groups.789 The fact that initially predominantly German and Irish associations protested 
against a literacy test, which would hardly have any effect on their movements and not 
the targeted Jewish, Italians or Slavs, remained unxplained. 
This lacuna can be clarified by another difference between the lobbies on both 
sides of the spectrum. On one hand restrictionists, who despite taking longer to organize, 
shared the same arguments such as protecting the inegrity of national institutions, 
employment and living standards of citizens. Labor unions or xenophobic associations, 
the driving force in this case, had little or no reasons to hide their direct involvement 
                                                 
789 See for instance Higham: “Of all the groups who, through confidence or conviction helped to 
turnback the tide of nativism, none was as resolute as the immigrants themselves”  (Higham, 1955, 123). Or 
Jones: “Business interests were depicted as the chief defenrs of an open gate policy. But this became only 
true after about 1905. …but the most strenuous opposition came from the immigrants themselves” (Jones, 
1992, 219,224). 
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defending these ‘noble ideals’ in convincing politicians and public opinion. On the other 
hand liberals, here led by the shipping lobby protecting their main source of revenue 
defended, just as employers and capitalists, solely their economic benefits. Therefore, 
they needed to base their arguments on common interests that immigration benefited the 
economy, contributed to the industrial development and the American wealth in which 
the population participated. Yet immigrants, industrial development and wealth were 
geographically unfairly divided; with the South and West lagging behind the North and 
East. Shipping companies played out the disequilibrium and the historical tensions 
between North and South. Their lobby campaigns concentrated on Western and Southern 
states where they stressed the need for immigrants in order to catch up. Yet especially 
shipping companies had to cover up their involvement in lobby campaigns so as not to 
jeopardize their aims. To gain favor of the public opinion and pressure politicians they 
had to find someone else to voice their claims. Because of this secrecy we know little on 
the strategies of the pro-immigration lobby and a lot more of restrictionists, leading to a 
neglect of the former while overemphasizing the latter in research.  
The activities of the shipping companies reveal important insights. The two 
constant actors in the immigration debate, known for its strange-bedfellow coalitions 
were the shipping lobby and IRL. Views of employers, capitalists, labor unions, and 
Congressmen of various regions changed overtime. Up to the foundation of the IRL, the 
shipping companies’ close connections with the press through advertising and temporary 
hiring of journalists seemed sufficient to manipulate public opinion. Yet the pressures of 
the IRL forced them to organize a well structured counterpoise that could openly voice 
pro immigration arguments. The German shipping companies used their close ties with 
the important German-American community to agitate against restrictions. By 
establishing the Immigration Protective League they institutionalized the movement 
which they sought to expand among other foreign born communities. The electoral 
importance of these communities did not leave politicians unaffected. Through lobbyists 
in Washington shipping companies tried to make Congressmen aware of the importance 
of immigration, not only for the country, but also for their political careers. In Congress 
their strategy against restrictive laws existed to various degrees; first to avoid 
consideration for the issue and then by trying to obtain enough support to vote against 
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restrictions. If that proved impossible they used numerous strategies to delay action on it, 
for as long as possible, so as to kill the bill. If the pressures proved too big they 
sometimes collaborated to pass a bill, yet not withou  introducing amendments adjusting 
it as much as possible to the shipping interests.  
These interests were predominantly in the hands of foreign companies which also 
lobbied against maritime policies attributing competitive advantages to American 
shipping companies for the migrant trade. The International Navigation Company 
representing the only American passenger liner involved constantly and used its influence 
the other way around. Just like the IRL, they tried to take advantage of the favorable 
international climate to achieve their goals. The tendencies in countries such as France 
and Germany to view immigration more and more as a domestic question rather than an 
international one reinforced the trend of regulating he movement unilaterally.  
The rise of nationalism worldwide at the turn of the century clearly manifested 
itself in the US through the decreasing loyalty towards international treaties, changing 
tariff policies, the foundation of the IRL and rising jingoism leading to the Spanish-
American War. The power of the nation was measured by its naval force in which the 
merchant marine played an important part. The war had put the decline of the American 
merchant marine high up on the political agenda. Subsidies, differential tariffs or 
measures favoring the American flag for migrant transport were brought forward. Similar 
measures had been adopted by the European governments, y t surprisingly the US 
although in a privileged position as receiving country did not. Again using the utmost 
secrecy, foreign lines used their influence in Washington and sponsored the Reform Club 
to oppose the subsidies. Previous experience with the large subsidies had not proven 
successful. Moreover, using tax payers’ money to finance big business was not a popular 
decision to take with the rising antitrust sentiments. The leak on the formation of the 
IMM combine to the popular press ended the hopes of the ship-subsidy bill advocates. 
The combine also linked the interests of the American Line with that of foreign lines 
decreasing the pressures of the former to obtain competitive advantages shedding more 
light on why the European trend was not followed by the Americans. 
But, the shipping companies could not prevent the authorities from improving 
their selection procedures at control stations where racist ideologies gained ground. The 
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development of new policies highly depended on the Commissioner General of 
Immigration and the Immigration Commissioner of Ellis Island. The ambiguity regarding 
the clause ‘likely to become a public charge’ continued to provide immigrant inspectors 
with a means to increase deportations under that excus , if the situation called for it. As 
permanent remote controls carried out by consuls and American health inspectors proved 
to be practically and diplomatically unworkable, the authorities put the responsibility for 
those more and more on transport companies. Powderly laid the basis for an effective 
remote control system to keep out passengers with dangerous and loathsome diseases. By 
increasing the maintenance costs and by introducing fines for bringing in these types of 
passengers medical, inspections of shipping lines at European border control stations and 
at ports of embarkation markedly improved. Stricter bo der controls with Canada and the 
examination of second cabin passengers needed to close down the loopholes in the 
system.  
Yet, as the controls became stricter, the efforts of the shipping lines to guarantee 
the landing of their passengers expanded. Their importance, first as a link in chain 
migration patterns tracking down family and friends in the US to guarantee the right of 
passage of detainees, and second as a link between h  immigrant and the state in fighting 
deportations increased. The number of deportations and the loopholes at the control 
stations depended a lot on the Immigration commissioner in charge. However, both 
extremes of lax and rigid rule were not appreciated by politicians appointing the Ellis 
personnel. Presidents usually preferred to keep Ellis Is and out of the public eye for 
electoral reasons.  
Although drastic restrictive laws blocking the entry of the European poor did not 
materialize, American authorities passed legislation further refining the selection 
procedure and measures improving the control system. By the time Congress finally 
enacted the literacy test and quota act to erect a restrictive wall, immigrant inspectors had 
laid the foundations to build it rapidly and to manage it efficiently. 
 
 
Chapter IV: The Dillingham Commission and Immigration Legislation: between 
Progressivism and Corporate Liberalism  
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With his influential book Races of Europe W. Z. Ripley imported the division of 
the white race in ‘Teutonic’, ‘Alpine’ and ‘Mediterranean’ from scholars in Europe. This 
classification attributed superior racial features to old stock immigrants in comparison to 
the more primitive immigrants from eastern and southern Europe (Ripley, 1898). Ripley 
gave scientific arguments on which the Immigration Restriction League developed their 
most powerful ideological weapon culminating in Grant’s The passing of the Great Race; 
namely that due to the absence of immigration restrictions the country was committing 
racial suicide (Alexander, 1960, 73-90; Grant, 1916; Higham, 1956, 224). Despite Boas’ 
refutation of this threat, the Dillingham Commission compiled a Dictionary of Races 
based on Ripley’s division ,using it to advise immigration restrictions blocking the entry 
of the ‘primitive’ races (Dillingham Commission Reports, Vol. I, II, V and XXXVIII).  
Yet, the Harvard Economist did not support these conclusions believing that racial 
qualities could be transformed by the American environment and pleading for an active 
program of social betterment. To enhance the assimilat on of immigrant children Ripley 
urged for a healthy environment, better schools and libraries and an adaptation of the 
factory laws to the school laws, protecting the child from greedy employers or parents. 
For immigrant adults, the government needed to guarantee decent affordable housing, 
easy access to trade unions, and social security against sickness and old age (Ripley, 
1908, 130-138). These reforms suggested by Ripley il ustrate the concerns of the 
progressives to protect the population from the changing socio-economic conditions 
generated by industrialization and the rise of big business. Some considered immigration 
restrictions to be part of these increasing the pressures on the government to intervene, 
leading to the formation of the Dillingham Commission. The growing importance of 
scientific expertise in policy-making remains an undisputed characteristic of the 
Progressive Era. The influence of the Dillingham Commission on the subsequent 
immigration policy is widely recognized by scholars, yet the backlog to implement its 
conclusions remains unclear due to the lack of integration of business interests concerned 
by the issue.  
As Gabriel Kolko, Martin Sklar and James Weinstein noted, with the rising 
corporate liberalism or political capitalism during the Progressive Era big business played 
an important role in shaping government policies, trying to make them coincide with the 
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public interest (Kolko, 1963, 1964; Weinstein, 1968; Sklar, 1988, 1992). Conversely to 
the railroads, shipping companies managed to find a equilibrium by concluding 
conference agreements mitigating the vigorous competition from 1896 onwards. Also, the 
market being international rather than domestic andpredominantly in foreign hands 
explains the particular relation of the migrant transport sector with the US government. 
Internally, foreign shipping companies opposed any measures giving competitive 
advantages to American shipping interests, while both jointly tried to prevent the passage 
of restrictive immigration laws in Washington. The foreign lines tried to obtain 
competitive advantages in Europe, but obstructed any intervention by the American 
authorities both in regulating the market and in restricting immigration. The success of 
the foreign shipping lobby -discussed in previous chapters- up to 1905 will be further 
analyzed up to 1914.  
The mobilization of foreign-born communities to protest against checks on the 
influx remained a corner stone of the lobby’s successful strategy. During this period, the 
voice of new immigrant groups gained importance while associations representing the old 
stock continued to support the cause. The struggle of the ‘in-betweens’ to get recognition 
of equality with their predecessors from northern and western Europe intensified. David 
Roediger described the process by which new immigrants became ‘white ethnics’. At the 
turn of the century ,when race and ethnicity were oft n used as synonyms by race 
theorists entangling biological and cultural aspects the ‘in-betweens still had a long way 
before achieving a ‘white status’ (Roediger, 2005). Even at the gates there was a clear 
differentiation in the selection procedure in which the views of the presidential appointee 
running Ellis Island played an important role. The analysis of the impact of the 
Immigration Commissioner’s interpretation and implementation of immigration laws as 
in previous chapters will be continued. Although there were clearly various degrees of 
whiteness, Thomas Guglielmo rightly pointed that their belonging to the white race was 
granted on arrival and hardly ever questioned. This gave the newcomers unrestricted 
access to citizenship allowing them to achieve political influence and climb up the ‘socio-
ethnic’ ladder (Guglielmo, 2003, 28-30). As Desmond King underlined the ‘whiteness’ of 
American identity was constructed sociologically and historically (King, 2000, 23). In 
this process, the importance of common interests and strategies used by new immigrant 
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groups, employers and shipping companies to keep opn the gates to the New World up 
to WOI, will be discussed. 
 




 1.1) The failed attempt of the Hungarian government o control emigration  
 
As seen in chapter I,the formation of the IMM disrupted the stability of the North 
Atlantic passenger market. The growing involvement of governments in the migrant 
transport market, giving competitive advantages to certain lines, undermined the cartel 
agreements between the lines. The Cunard Line played out the growing nationalism in the 
homecountry that feared losing its dominant position at sea, to obtain royal subsidies 
(Vale, 1976 and 1984). More surprisingly was that in its battle against the North Atlantic 
Passenger Conference it managed to conclude an agreement with the Hungarian 
government which agreed to encourage migrants to travel with the English company if it 
opened a direct line from Fiume. If it failed to divert 30,000 citizens through Fiume, the 
government committed to pay out a compensation of $20 per passenger short of that 
quota. The law was in the first place conceived by the authorities to put a check on the 
emigration of nationals and on the long run to stimulate its own merchant marine 
(Murken, 1922, 241-281).  
Yet, the IMM lobby did not hesitate in misrepresenting the intentions of the law 
in the American press in a new bid to obtain competitiv  advantages. Especially the 
compensation clause rose suspicions in the US, fearing that Hungarian authorities would 
be inclined to stimulate emigration in order to avoid paying compensations. In 
Washington, Senator Dillingham worked on a bill excluding immigrants ‘encouraged by 
any government with a steam-shipping company’. Representative Serene Payne (NY-R) 
drew attention not only to the Hungarian law but also to the German, Italian and French 
laws favoring the national lines and suggested imposing a $30 tax on immigrants coming 
in on with foreign vessels. B. Penrose and H. Lodge ef nded the idea in the Senate. As 
the congressional session came to a close, A. Anderson, S. Neal and J. Wright pleaded in 
favor of the bill at the House Immigration Commission trying to get it quickly adopted 
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without debate. Yet, as the Washington Post reported, the bill was defeated not by the 
work of the Hungarian consul but because of the foreign shipping lobby pressuring 
various house conferees who forced the Senate to recede as part of the compromise for 
the Chinese exclusion bill.790 Under the American pressure and out of fear that 
passengers may be excluded on the bases of violating the ‘contract labor law’, the 
Hungarian government stroke the compensation clause o t of the agreement (Murken, 
1922, 254).  
But, the agreement triggered a rate war for the Hungarian market which spread to 
Austria. The authorities seeking to restrict emigrat on soon realized that the competitive 
forces for the migrant transport business produced adverse effects. The conference lines 
moved the diplomatic representatives of their home-country to denounce the Hungarian 
policies for infringing international agreements. The lines also obtained the support of the 
Szabadszag, the biggest Hungarian newspaper in the US to increase the pressures from 
abroad. In return, the steamship lines rewarded the paper with lush advertising 
campaigns. In the end, the Minister-President, Istvan Tisza, gave in by lifting the barriers 
for nationals traveling with non-Cunard Line tickets to reach northern ports. The lines did 
not make this news known to the public, in order not to weaken the consular protests of 
various countries demanding the same conditions for thei  national lines as those granted 
to Cunard Line.791  
After six months, the lines came to an agreement. In he meantime, the Austrian 
government reviewed its emigration laws and the German lines helped in establishing the 
Austria-Americana; offering a direct service from Trieste to New York under their 
control to avoid a similar scenario as Fiume. Because of the lack of collaboration of the 
Austrian authorities to enforce the passport requirement on Hungarian citizens to cross 
the borders and means offered by migrant agents to circumvent controls, 75 percent of 
the Hungarian migrants continued to use northern pots. The Hungarian policy turned out 
to be a complete failure neither restricting nor efficiently directing the movement of 
nationals. Moreover, the ten year contract with Cunard Line prevented the establishment 
                                                 
790 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters, April 19, 20 and 22 1904 and The 
Washington Post, “Lodge bill defeated”, April 30 1904. 
791 The Continental Lines also bought 3000 copies of the Szabadszag calendar at 50 cents each to 
demonstrate their appreciation for the support in the campaign against the Hungarian government. Ibid
Letters October 21, November 4 and 10, December 27 1904. 
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of a national line while it led to the founding of a rival Austrian Line (Murken, 1922, 
261-281).  
  
 1.2) The last convulsions of the American pro ship-subsidy lobby 
 
The Hungarian polices put measures to revive the American merchant marine 
back on the political agenda. President Roosevelt favored state intervention and 
appointed a special commission to investigate the issue.792 The American shipping lobby 
suggested direct subsidies and discriminating duties once more. The navy pointed to the 
shortage of American seamen and the naval reserve, while other nations took advantage 
of the absence of the American flag on international w ters to develop theirs. The 
Spanish-American War had illustrated that if a conflict broke out with a ‘first class 
nation’ they stood no chance.793 Despite this threat, the commission did not reach  
unanimous agreement on their recommendations to which the democrats attached a 
minority report. Based on their recommendations a bill was introduced in Congress. For 
the North Atlantic it was so moderate -containing only minor discriminatory duties- that 
G. Schwab, E. Boas and R. Wierdsma did not see a way to take joint action against the 
bill.794  
Because of the ‘most favored nation clause’ the HAL’s interests remained 
unaffected. However, the American shipping lobby managed to introduce an amendment 
canceling out the privilege for the Netherlands and i cluding direct subsidies. After 
consulting on their strategy with their lawyer, Putnam, the Dutch envoy in Washington R. 
de Marees van Swinderen, defended the company’s interests in Congress. Claude Bennet 
provided important inside information on the opinion f various Congressmen on the 
subject.795 Van Swinderen met with the speaker of the House Joe Cannon (R-Ill) who 
opposed any form of direct subsidy, and especially the amendment granting an extra 
                                                 
792 Ibid. Letters January 19 1904. 
793 Ibid. Letters November 21, 25 and 29 1904. 
794 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters January 10, 18 and February 10 
1905. 
795 For his efforts against the Frye bill the HAL rewarded Bennett with and extra 259 dollars. Ibid. 
Letter July 6 1906. 
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$250,000 a year to the American Line.796 Cannon therefore used his power to appoint 
anti-subsidy conferees representing the House to mold the bill to his liking and with 
success. To stand a chance in the anti-trust climate, the subsidy amendment for the 
American Line was stricken out; as was the measure to lift the most favored nation 
privileges of Denmark and the Netherlands. The Commissioner of Navigation, 
Chamberlin, was again behind the scheme which failed because of the continuous lobby 
efforts of C. Bennett and van Swinderen.797  
In times during which the value of international treaties began to plummet and 
unilateral decisions thrived, the Dutch envoy managed to safeguard the agreement. 
However, together with the rising nationalism, globalization created a growing need for a 
body governing international issues. The Inter-parliamentary Union for international 
Arbitration tried to answer that by meeting in Brussel  in 1905 to form a United 
Parliament of the Worl’ with natural right to deal with authority on al questions which 
fell outside the jurisdiction of any nation and whic  were by their very nature 
international. An American invitation for the Congress attributed a prominent role to the 
US in this process; “Since all nations are looking at the President of the United States to 
bring peace between belligerent countries, such as Ru sia and Japan at present, the 
inter-parliamentary Union is the best way to achieve this. If through this international 
law-making body the conflict comes to an end it canbe made the last great war in 
history”.798 The ascendancy of nationalism obstructed this interna ional optimism. The 
law of 1907 included a clause giving the President authority to organize an international 
meeting to regulate immigration issues transcending national jurisdictions. Yet, no 
President used the privilege and European countries took no initiative to reach 
international agreements either further delimiting mi ration as a national issue. 
 Other countries such Russia, Sweden and Greece later followed the European 
trend using the migrant flow to stimulate the merchant marine. The US never did and 
only adapted its policies reviving the fleet under the ‘Stars and Stripes’ with the New 
Deal. After this last surge of the pro-subsidy lobby, following the Hungarian emigration 
                                                 
796 Shortly before, the American Line renewed a ten-year contract for postal subsidies amounting 
to 700.000 dollars a year.  
797 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121and Passage Department 221-226, 
Letters December 13, 14 1905, January 30 March 23, May 25 and June 2 1906. 
798 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter June 23 1905.  
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law, the IMM gave up all hopes to obtain favors from the American authorities. The 
profit sharing agreements with German lines, and the fact that most of the IMM ships 
sailed under a foreign flag, also made these less attractive for the shipping giant. Only a 
far reaching concession of the authorities would be worth transferring the fleet under the 
national flag and breaking up the contract with theG rman lines. Giving tax payers’ 
money as subsidies to a trust, in times when big businesses were increasingly projected as 
the number one public enemy, would have been a political y unpopular decision. The 
public outbursts of 1905-1906 denouncing corruption of politicians by business did not 
help the IMM’s cause (McCormick, 1981, 259-274).  
Yet, there were many other ways to favor the nationl lines, such as 
discriminating head-taxes. The reasons for not adopting these remain less clear. Part of 
the reason must be the fear of repercussions by nations involved on the North-Atlantic 
migrant trade, which were quite numerous. Secondly foreign shipping companies being 
in the business for up to sixty years had well-established business interests in the US 
expanding their influence well into the corridors of the Capitol. In a time during which 
many other domestic industries obtained competitive advantages from the state, the 
American shipping industry did not. The foreign shipping lobby made sure it stayed that 
way, but after 1905, as C. Bennett reported that Congressmen defeated ship-subsidies 
based on general principle, rather than specific interests- making organized opposition 
superfluous the following years. By 1910, renewed lobby efforts surfaced to revive the 
merchant marine once the IMM were seen as being unable to do. Taft expressed his 
concern that predominantly foreign lines reaped the profits from transporting the growing 
American exports in his Presidential message in 1911. Republicans favored direct 
subsidies, while Democrats preferred differential duties, but the movement never 
acquired sufficient congressional backing to force a breakthrough.799  
 
2) The Southern States: from liberals to restrictionists  
 
 2.1) Go West, Go South! with a little help from the shipping companies 
 
                                                 
799 The theme only came up again to support lines to South America or Asia but not for the North 
Atlantic. GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter June 9 1909; December 7 1911. 
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The economic recovery following the recession of the 1890s eased the pressures 
to restrict immigration somewhat, yet as the influx followed the curb of the economic 
upswing it never disappeared from the public debates. The concentration in the northern 
and eastern industrial centers and big cities raised i sues on integration and assimilation 
while immigrants did not seem to reach the sparsely populated western and especially 
southern parts of the country where they were believ d to be needed most. Already 
during the 1890s immigrant officials suggested government measures for a better 
distribution of the newcomers (Senner, 1896, 657). Both Commissioners General of 
Immigration, Powderly and Sargent, saw at some point an alternative in distribution 
instead of restriction (Sargent, 1904, 152-158). Gradually, Southern States established 
immigration recruiting bureaus yet the federal government lingered in providing support. 
The census of 1900 showed that only 620,000 foreign bor  lived in the South, a mere six 
percent of the total immigrant population (Fleming, 1905, 277).  
Shipping companies willingly helped organizing these tate initiatives and 
propagated ideas of better distribution and the need for migrants in the South as a strategy 
to prevent restrictions. As Goldin noted, Southern co gressmen had, except for New 
York representatives proven to be the most loyal supporters of liberal policies during the 
1897 literacy test debates (Goldin, 1994, 231). The shipping companies wanted to keep it 
that way. As a report of the Committee of Immigration Legislation reveals: 
“on lines favored by your committee a corporation has been established to carry 
on the work in the states of Virginia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee and North 
Carolina and a considerable amount of families have be n located by the 
corporation which has been offered several 100.000 acres of land in various parts 
of the south. The Italian government has sent an age t to this country to cooperate 
with the corporation and the US government has alsopromised support, the 
President, the secretary of Commerce and Labor and the Commissioner General 
of Immigration favoring the work which is a first step in carrying out a policy of 
distribution which should get more consideration at the National legislature over 
the winter.  
The lobby efforts of the committee of the last two years should be carried on. It is 
particularly desirable that the sentiment in the south be directed to the desirability 
of Immigration as upon the sentiment in the south will no doubt depend on the 
result in Immigration legislation. Therefore the committee requests to renew its 
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funds not exceeding 15.000 dollars to continue its ac ivities which end on October 
first.”800 
 
From 1903 onwards, seven southern states organized or reactivated immigration 
bureaus distributing propaganda, organizing conventions and sending recruiting agents to 
Europe (Higham, 1955, 114). The visible hand of steamship companies in this was quite 
important. In collaboration with railroads, they organized special sailings for settlers in 
rural areas enjoying reduced railroad tariffs known as the ‘colonist rate’ between the end 
of February and beginning of May.801 Furthermore, southern railroads had started to offer 
special cheap tickets to homeseekers, which gave them wenty days to stop off as many 
times as they wanted to explore the opportunities in the South and Southwest. Each 
railroad had an immigration newspaper which it distributed in the US, Canada and 
Europe. These excursions organized by the railroad and migrant agents in the North and 
the West gave enticements to attract immigrants to the South (Fleming, 1905, 286-287). 
Southern State authorities contributed to this and mong the southern states South 
Carolina was probably the most pro-active.  
 
2.2) South Carolina and its Department of Agriculture, Commerce and Immigration 
 
At the end of 1904, the legislature of South Carolina created the Department of 
Agriculture, Commerce and Immigration (DACI) to stimulate industrial development. By 
dissiminating information the DACI needed to attrac investors and immigrants. The 
commissioner, E. Watson, was empowered to conclude agr ements with steamship lines 
and migrant agents in the US and in Europe to lure immigrants. State appropriations and 
contributions from citizens of the state funded the campaign.802 The DACI had a 
pronounced preference to recruiting from northern or western European countries, yet 
laws in France and Germany prohibited recruiting activities. It directed Watson to 
Belgium where contrary to many other European countries, still tolerated schemes to 
instigate emigration.  
                                                 
800 Report of the Committee of Immigration Legislation signed by G. Schwab, E. Boas and J. 
Wright.  Ibid. October 18 and Letter October 26 1905. 
801 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter January 10 1908. 
802Ibid., Letter June 18 1906. 
 427
The Belgian government exercised a liberal policy towards the emigration of 
nationals, tending more towards stimulating rather t an restricting the movement during 
the long nineteenth Century. Emigration was generally considered as a security valve for 
overpopulation and economic crisis, while the Belgian communities abroad could open 
up new markets creating trade opportunities. Yet, the policy did not result in mass 
transatlantic migration. When in 1888, the Argentinea  government proposed subsidize 
the transport of poor volunteers, the Belgian authorities willingly granted permission to 
recruit on its soil. But after reports on abuses the concession was quickly withdrawn and 
authorities decided to prohibit the transport of emigrants paid for by anyone else but 
themselves. Watson managed to convince the Belgian M nister of Foreign Affairs, P. de 
Favereau to make an exception, similar to the one awarded to the Canadian government 
agent Treau de Coeili (Feys, 2003, 183-195).803  
Watson appointed Oscar Van der Meersch as official delegate of South Carolina 
to recruit workers from Belgium and the Netherlands. He distributed pamphlets and 
advertised in newspapers that South Carolina was looking for 10,000 farmers and 25,000 
laborers. The announcement stressed that farmers did not require any starting capital to 
apply. Everything they needed, including transport would be advanced by the state 
authorities. Furthermore, the laborers did not need to be skilled. Training would be 
provided on site.804 The DACI planned on paying the passage for a couple of thousands 
of families, relying on chain migration patterns to develop triggering a natural movement 
financing itself. Yet, only a small number of Belgians reacted to those announcements. 
Four groups of migrants, not exceeding five hundred in number and predominantly 
Belgian left for South Carolina on board of NGL ships nstead of the Belgian RSL.  
The German company had opened a line to Galveston and could easily call at 
Charleston on its way. It allowed the company to explore the potential of that port and to 
draw what could become a constant flow of passengers for this service.805 In his 
                                                 
803 Watson obtained the permission only after giving the guarantee to pay for the return passage of 
dissatisfied migrants. This way the Belgian governme t protected itself from protests in the national press 
of neglecting the welfare of citizens in case of failure and against the increasing repatriation costs which 
started to weigh on the budget (Feys, 2003).  
804 Pamphlet distributed by  Oscar Van der Meersch 10/11/ 6, ABMFA, Emigration, 2960, 
Rapports consulaires sur les possibilités d'émigration en général et par états.  
805 Already in 1895 the president of the Gulf Railroad Co approached the HAL to open a line to 
the Gulfports. Van den Toorn’s preference went to New Orleans rather than Galveston yet doubted 
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presidential message, the president had stressed the need for a better division of 
immigrants and even suggested closing the northern po ts for a while to let the south 
catch up.806 Even if this measure was inconceivable, shipping companies liked to explore 
new market opportunities. Moreover, the pressures on the dominant position of the port 
of New York increased (Heffer, 1986). Except for immigrants, direct steamship lines 
between Europe and Southern States would also contribute to the industrial development 
of the South. Even before the Civil War, southern States had been trying to emancipate 
themselves from the dependency of North Atlantic ports as a go-between for the trade 
with Europe. Diverting part of the immigrant flow from New York would be a crucial 
step in that direction. As noted by Mr. Zangwill in promoting the port of Galveston, 
cotton and grain which used go through New York started to seek out southern routes, but 
imports were harder to divert.807  
Therefore the immigration agents of the southern railways conferred with Sargent 
to secure better landing facilities to receive immigrants at southern ports. Instead the 
Commissioner General of Immigration proposed establishing an information bureau at 
Ellis Island to direct the migrants to the South. Yet, the southern representatives 
suspected that the bureau was sending inferior newcomers southwards, and relieving the 
congested northern cities of its undesirable elements not taking the needs of the South 
into account. Moreover, it did not believe that northe n interest would support the 
development of South Caroline cotton industry to the detriment of New England cotton 
manufacturers (Fleming, 1905, 290). The mistrust was not unfounded. Established 
interests at the port of New York had no intentions f allowing southern ports to divert 
                                                                                                                                      
seriously that market conditions warranted the opening of a line; credits are sparse, climate and the Negro 
population scare off immigrants GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter June 11 
1895. 
806 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters November 9 and December 6 1905.  
807 The Louisiana Immigration League established in 1906 blamed the Western Railroads for 
diverting the south-bound flow. It also stated that New Orleans would have been an important immigration 
port if Atlantic had not obstructed its natural development. The League promoted the construction of a 
modern immigrant landing station and the necessary port infrastructure enabling the port to welcome major 
European steamship lines. The Time Democrat “Immigrat on to Louisiana” April 6 1905. In 1906 the 
Austro-American opened a temporary direct service to New Orleans. The Italian Line, ‘Navigazione’ also 
organized two direct voyages a year, yet a direct liner service did not materialize. These sporadic voyages 
in winter, the low season for passenger lines when usually some ships were laid up or used for the 
developing cruise business, indicate that passengers w re recruited by state or land-agents for these sailing. 
Some shipping companies welcomed this market opportunity collaborating with these direct transports. See 
also (Fleming, 1905, 293) The New York Times “Immigration Currents” January 4 1907.    
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part of the lucrative migrant transport market. Wierdsma reported on a special meeting in 
New York of railroads and steamship lines to discus and oppose the competition of 
gulfports.808 If the port was loosing its grip on exports it was prepared to go great lengths 
to preserve the control on imports warranting its dominant position. 
The recruiting efforts of South Carolina received a lot of attention from the 
national Immigration Bureau, which in 1904, had moved to the Department of Commerce 
and Labor. Roosevelt appointed Oscar Straus to lead the Department.809 Straus was a 
prominent Jewish pro-immigration advocate- as his involvement in the Immigration 
Protective League and presidency of the Jewish American Committee underlines. 
Together with Sargent, he strongly supported Watson’s initiative hoping to export his 
formula to other southern states. But, not everyone reacted with the same enthusiasm. 
The American Federation of Labor challenged the scheme for violating the contract labor 
agreements.810 Straus refuted this, claiming that the laws although not explicitly 
mentioned made exception for State authorities to recruit labor according to their needs. 
However, abuses by similar bureaus in North Carolina a d Georgia -recruiting under 
false representations and directly for employers in the region- meant that the protests of 
the AFL against Watson intensified. They received the support of the Immigration 
Restriction League which simultaneously organized a new campaign to pass the literacy 
test. 
 
3) The Immigration Problem revisited: the formation of the Dillingham Commission 
as a last resort to prevent a literacy test 
 
3.1) Increasing agitation in the popular press and academic journals 
 
At the beginning of 1905, Wierdsma reported on new campaigns by the ‘yellow 
press’ to convince the public of the need for restrictions blaming European governments 
and steamship companies to dump the ‘riff raff’ of the population, artificially swelling the 
                                                 
808 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter February 10 1905.  
809 With Straus’ appointment, the first Jewish cabinet m mber, Roosevelt further solicited the 
favor of foreign born voters to counter Hearst’s bid for the governorship of New York (Zolberg, 2006, 
230). 
810 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters November 16 and December 
19 1906. 
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movement. Especially the New York World and New York Herald strongly opposed 
immigration. To ease the pressures, Watchorn asked the steamship lines to provide him 
statistics of refused passengers in Europe. Yet the campaign backfired leading to an 
extensive pro-immigration campaign in other New York papers. Even the by Wierdsma 
labeled ‘loud and undesirable’ New York Evening Journal stressed that European 
governments tried to restrict emigration more and more because; “only the best citizens 
made their way to the New World shaping the character of the American people.” It 
accused the papers of hypocrisy pointing out that of the owner of the New York World 
and founder and father of the present owner of the New York Herald, were both 
immigrants.811 The same applied to the AFL leader, Samuel Gompers, who advocated 
closing the gates through which he came. Being an immigrant or of immigrant descent, 
did not necessarily mean one supported liberal immigration policies.  
More importantly, the attacks of the New York Herald on the interests of the 
shipping companies seem to refute the influence of steamship advertisements on a 
newspaper’s stance towards the immigration issue. As appendix 7 shows the Holland 
America Line spent more on advertising in the New York Herald than in any other 
American newspaper. As steamship lines usually advertised in the same newspapers in 
proportional amounts, it can be assumed that same goes for the other lines.812 However, 
the companies did not reduce their advertisements following these attacks, as conference 
agreements stipulated, indicating that the influence on big newspapers did not reach as far 
as the IRL had claimed. Other lobby groups went much f rther to monitor the press, like 
for instance, the ‘Propriety Medicine Association of America’ in its fight against the Pure 
                                                 
811 The pro-immigration stance of Hearst’s New York Evening Journal fits in the owner’s bid for 
New York’s governorship. While James Bennett Jr. spent most of his time in Paris where he was raised 
explaining why he attached less importance than his father in advocating liberal immigration policies (See 
Crouthamel, 1989, 97; Higham, 1955, 127; Kluger, 1986, 183; Tichenor, 2002, 115) and GAR, HAL, 
318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters May 9 and June 9 1905 and The New York Evening Journal 
“The Immigration problem is Serious, but for the Foreign Countries not us” June 8 1905 and The New 
York Times “Immigration Record will be broken this year” March 11 1906.   
812 The Herald became the biggest paper in the US during the 1840’s and held its position until 
midway the 1880’s when a decline set in. Despite falling behind the World, Evening Journal and later the
Times in circulation numbers the paper kept on heading the list of the advertisement expenditures of the 
Holland America Line. Steamship lines were not only good clients of the Herald in New York but also of 
its Paris paper. When the Herald in Paris doubled its rates for advertisements the steamship lines concluded 
an joint-agreement using a specific format equal to all to reduce the advertisement costs. GAR, HAL, 
318.01, Directors, 1174, 23, Advertisements in the NY Herald Paris, Letter July 3 1903; (see appendix 7 
and (Kluger 1986). 
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Food Bill in 1906. The patent medicine makers included a clause in their advertisement 
contract, making it void if any law prohibiting the sale or manufacture of proprietary 
medicine was passed in the state where the paper circulated (Logan and Patten, 1929, 6-
7).813  
The immigration issue remained in the public discourse as the first National 
Conference on Immigration organized at Madison Square Garden under the auspices of 
the National Civic Federation, illustrates. It did not manage to get labor and business 
interest in one line on the immigration issue, but it created an ‘Immigration Department’ 
to work on it (Weinstein, 1968, 26-27).814 Scientific Journals also dedicated a lot of 
attention to the topic. O. Austin, Roland Falkner and Kate Claghorn refuted the 
undesirability of ‘new’ immigrants. Based on statistical research, Claghorn contested the 
idea as the second generation of new migrants showed more tendencies towards 
pauperism than the old stock. Moreover, the second generation of unskilled illiterate 
immigrants was usually better off than the kin of skilled-literate newcomers, hence 
restrictions based on an educational test would have no effect on the growth of pauperism 
(Claghorn, 1904, 187-205).  
Using data from the census, both Austin and Falkner pointed that although in 
absolute numbers the influx grew, the percentage of immigrants in the total population 
decreased. Also, new immigrants showed lower dependency rates of welfare than the old 
stock yet. Faulkner deplored the higher return rates, but contested the inferiority of the 
new migrants and their inability to integrate. Austin, chief of the statistic bureau of the 
Department of Commerce and labor concluded also that the so-called ‘objectionable’ 
class of migrants contributed to the wealth of the nation which had not lost its power to 
assimilate newcomers (Falkner, 1904, 32-49 and Austin, 1904, 558-570).  John Trenor, 
chairman of the Committee on Immigration, sponsored by the National Board of Trade 
                                                 
813 The association monitored the state legislators’ activities and urged the papers to agitate against 
unfavorable legislation referring to the contract whenever needed. As one of the most prominent American 
advertiser appearing in an estimated 15.000 newspapers indicate the power of this lobby group (Logan and
Patten, 1929, 7).  
814 Wierdsma reported that the issue remained a hot topic f r the press. Letter December 8 1905. 
At the conference the immigration problem in relation to industrial and social conditions were discussed. 
Also the working of current and the need for new legislation were discussed. It united all parties pro and 
contra concerned for two days in which a collective visit to Ellis Island was scheduled.  The New York 
Times “Immigration Conference musters 500 Delegates” December 7 1905. 
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shared these beliefs and also argued that the foreign-born did not show greater criminal 
tendencies than natives. It was not an arbitrary educational test that was needed- better 
distribution policies had to be adopted (Trenor, 1904, 223-236).  
Conversely, the IRL pointed to the urgent need for restrictions in which the race 
discourse gained prominence. Based on the Darwin’s ‘survival of the fittest’ theory, and 
that by way of artificial selection better breeds of animals and plants could be obtained, 
Hall stated that the US was in a privileged position t  apply this to humans through 
immigration controls. Instead Hall reproached, the authorities left this selection and 
control entirely to shipping companies. The migration movement from southern and 
eastern Europe was not natural, but was artificially instigated by steamship companies 
which selected the worst kind of individuals. An educational test would have long been 
adopted was it not for the transportation companies. Ward, reacting to Austin’s article in 
the North American Review pointed that blame at the shipping companies (Hall, 1904, 
169-184 and Ward, 1904, 226-236). The IRL seemed well aware of who they were up 
against to get the educational bill passed in Congress.  
 
3.2) The House taken hostage by some anti-restrictionists  
 
The agitation did not leave Congressmen unaffected. Bills containing a literacy 
test, measures for a better division of migrants or radical augmentation of the head tax 
were introduced. Senator W. Dillingham (R-VT), chairman of the Senate Immigration 
Committee worked on a moderate bill taking the various propositions into account.815 
Neal and Anderson, for the steamship lines, and Patten, for the IRL, appeared before the 
House and Senate Immigration Committees. Both sides tried win over congress members 
for their cause. C. Bennett reported that conversely to the Senate, the House committee 
favored big changes; however the speaker of the House did not share the committee’s 
views. Nevertheless, the Dillingham bill to which Lodge added an amendment containing 
a literacy test swiftly passed the Senate. Augustus Gardner (Mass-R), Lodge’s son-in-law 
and chief sponsor of restrictions in the House Committee, reported a radical bill 
                                                 
815 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters December 14 1905, January 10 and 
February 24 1906. 
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containing an educational test, an increase in head tax and the obligation of the  
possession of a certain sum of money.  
Yet, committee members William Bennet (R-NY) and Jacob Ruppert Jr. (D-NY) 
attached a minority report to the bill, together with a copy of President Cleveland’s 
message against the educational test when vetoing it  1897. The Speaker, Joe Cannon, 
intended to find all sorts of other priority issues to avoid consideration for the bill.816 Yet 
also the President felt the need for the passage of some kind of immigration law, asking 
the opponents to collaborate with the passage of a bill. Advocates tried to bring up the 
bill under a special rule to get it considered and reworked dropping the most drastic 
features such as the sum required on arrival and moderating the literacy test. The Speaker 
seemed likely to give in if this happened, hence C. Bennett warned the lines that the bill 
would likely pass in that session. Everything that could be done against it needed to 
happen fast. Any influence on the President was welcome and therefore Representative 
Edward Morrell (Pen-R) accompanied a delegation of the Philadelphia Italian Society on 
a Presidential visit to voice their arguments against the educational test. R. Bartholdt did 
the same with the German-American Alliance. He planned to propose, as a substitute for 
the educational test, that a committee be appointed to investigate the whole subject of 
immigration when the bill came up.817  
Some days later, a delegation led by Joseph Barondess representing the federation 
of Jewish organizations in New York State and the Jewish Trade union traveled to 
Washington. David Robinson of the Southern Immigraton Commission followed in their 
tracks, just as Mark Katz of the National Liberal Immigration League had. They all came 
to protest against the bill and were taken around by William Bennet. They interviewed 
the Speaker the Commissioner General of Immigration and the President. C. Bennett 
                                                 
816 The power of the Speaker on the decisions of the House had increased with the revision of the 
House rules during the 1890’s consolidating the control of the majority party leadership. The speakership 
reached its apogee under Joe Cannon (1903-1911) who despised organized labor and was known for his 
pro-business sympathies. Fed up with his tyranny a majority of Representatives stripped him of his powers 
in 1910 (Tichenor, 2002, 116 Higham 1955, 128). 
817 Already in January 1906 Congressmen Benjamin Howell (NJ-R) and Joseph Goulden (NY-D) 
met with Cannon to discuss the idea of an investigation commission (Zeidel, 2005, 31). Both congressmen 
defending the economic interest of America’s biggest port tried to anticipate the restrictionists attempts to 
block out part of the lucrative business on which the dominant position of New York was partly based. Yet 
the speaker allegedly categorically refused at the tim , while six months later he strongly supported he
idea. 
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noted that the influence of the foreign communities was being felt among Congressmen 
who started to doubt whether it would be wise to press for the bill. At the most critical 
moment, Bennet helped in organizing a mass meeting under the auspices of ‘New 
Immigrants’ Protective League’ where all organization jointly voiced their protest against 
the bill.818  
As noted by Zeidel, surprisingly not the traditional anti-restrictionist such as 
Bartholdt or the Jewish Democrat Adolph Sabath (Ill-D) led the charge in the House 
against the bill but multigenerational American Republicans, J. Cannon (Ill-R), C. 
Grosvenor (Oh-R) and James Watson (In-R). Their actons were linked to pressures from 
President Roosevelt, not wanting to openly expose his opinion on the literacy test (Zeidel, 
2005, 27-32). But what has been overlooked to date is that most of the actors can be 
linked to shipping interests. Grosvenor had been one of the leading advocates of the ship 
subsidy bill, and maintained close ties with the American shipping interests. During the 
literacy test debates in 1902 he had already tried o block out an amendment containing 
the literacy test. That amendment had been introduced by Watson himself who at the time 
suggested to: “exclude the Italians like the Chinese and blaming Hungarians and Russian 
Jews of filling up American jails and almshouses.” The reason for his radical change of 
heart cannot be linked to shipping companies and seem  to confirm Zeidel’s 
hypothesis.819 C. Bennett mentions Watson as, Cannon’s legislative assistant, who he 
controlled and appointed to the chair.820 Conversely to Grosvenor, Cannon opposed ship 
subsidies but likewise had been approached by shipping interestsof foreign origin. The 
same applied to William Bennet who, like all the prceding Congressmen from his state, 
defended the commercial interests derived from the migrant transport contributing to the 
dominant position of the port of New York- and for whom the high concentration of the 
                                                 
818 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters March 6, 8 May 22, 23 June 6, 9, 12 
15, 1906 and GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters June 25 July 3 1906 and 
NYT, “For Fair Immigration Law” June 10 1906.  
819 See chapter III. To make his behavior even more incoherent Watson reintroduced an 
immigration bill at the end of 1907. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter December 14 
1907. Hence there must have been strong external pressures on him to repudiate his anti-immigration ideas 
in 1906. As W. Bennet later declared if Watson, thepr siding chair of the House had conceded to 
Gardner’s protest declaring the amendment substituting the literacy test by an investigation commission as 
nor germane to the bill, nothing could than have prvented the passage of the literacy test (Zeidel, 2005, 
30). 
820 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter June 25 1906. 
 435
foreign-born in the state also had strong electoral re sons to oppose restrictions. Their 
joint efforts managed to defeat the literacy test and motion for an investigative 
commission.  
That the bill even made it to the House floor to be considered with the opposition 
of key members regulating the procedures was a major chievement for the 
restrictionists. Yet Cannon set floor rules designed to prevent the passage of the literacy 
test. Grosvenor proposed an amendment substituting the literacy test by an investigative 
commission during the closing minutes of the debate. Watson, the presiding chair, 
refused to consider the amendment as not being germane to the bill, as claimed by 
literacy test advocates and he called for a vote. Th re it was defeated by a small majority, 
but W. Bennet and Cannon managed to obtain renewed consideration through a role-call 
vote approved by Watson. In the chaos which ensued, Cannon worked the floor as a 
trojan horse forcing some of his party members to redress the vote in favor of the 
amendment.821  The new bill containing the substitution of the literacy test by a new 
commission and without mention of the increase of the head-tax swiftly passed the 
House. To avoid the literacy test of being reintroduced in the conference committee, 
Cannon appointed Bennet, Ruppert and Benjamin Howell (NJ-R)- all three, not 
coincidently, represented the interests of the world’s biggest migrant hub. Conversely, 
Senate conferees Dillingham, Lodge and Anslem McLaurin (D-Mi) backed the test 
blocking the debates in the conference committee for ight months (Tichenor, 2002, 125-
129 and Zeidel, 2005, 28-34).   
 
3.3) The minority wins again 
 
Restrictionists, for whom the perspectives to pass the test had never looked so 
bright, fumed at the idea of another commission preventing of consideration for the 
coming years. The pro-immigration camp celebrated; yet only moderately being aware 
                                                 
821 They argued that the voting procedure by simple division, meaning that the chair counted the 
pro and contra votes by having the representatives stand up, was not sufficient. The new ‘teller vote’ forced 
representatives to pass through official tellers stationed in the well of the House where they were 
confronted personally with Cannon (Tichenor, 2002, 126) and Ibid. footnote 30.  
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that they still had a long way to go, as Wierdsma repo ted about the work of G. Schwab 
and E. Boas of the Committee of Immigration Legislat on against the bill: 
Thanks to the pressure on the Speaker and House Representative Ruppert the 
immigration bill has not been approved in its original form. Schwab warns to be 
very confidential with this information because if it leaked out that steamship 
lines are involved it would backfire against us. Rumor goes that advocates of the 
law hired private detectives to trace this. Due to the importance of the law the 
committee asks for more funds to fight it. So far all lines except Cunard spent 
15.000 dollars on the campaign and the German Lines would like to increase it to 
60.000 dollars based on a contribution of 10 cents per passenger transported in 
1905. Do you agree? The committee is trying to involve Cunard that is contending 
to conduct their own campaign. The IMM has their pesonal representatives at 
Washington but is prepared to contribute.822  
 
The shipping companies used the same strategies as n 1897; forging key alliances 
in Washington to obstruct restrictive measures while mobilizing the various foreign-born 
groups to intimidate politicians with the ‘ethnic’ vote. The shipping lobby, jointly with 
big businessmen such as Andrew Carnegie, financed th  foundation of the National 
Liberal Immigration League (NLIL). Initially, a predominantly a Jewish initiative, 
organized by Nissim Behar and presided by the Republican Party member Edward 
Lauterbach, it was soon broadened to include represntatives from German and Irish 
ethnic organizations. Through mass meetings and press campaigns it spread propaganda 
to mold public opinion, while the organization tried to influence Congressmen through 
their lobbyist James Curley. They underlined the importance of immigrants for the 
American economy and challenged the undesirability of immigrants from South and 
Eastern Europe, as long as these were distributed where work could be found (Zolberg, 
2006, 221 and Just, 1986, 200).  
Shortly later, the Catholic Ancient Order of Hibernia s and German American 
Alliance, representing more than a million and a half members, agreed to jointly fight all 
immigration restrictions (Higham, 1955, 123). Then, in November 1906, the American 
Jewish Committee (AJC) was established to preserve the religious freedom and prevent 
restriction- it also actively participated in the pro-immigration debate. With Oscar Straus, 
Louis Marshall and Jacob Schiff it had three influential Republicans on board. 
Conversely to the NLIL’s aggressive strategies of de ending the immigrant cause, the 
                                                 
822 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter July 3 1906.  
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AJC used its influence discreetly in the corridors f Capitol Hill (Zolberg, 2006, 222 and 
Just, 1988, 210). The low return rates of the Jewish community, compared to the other 
new immigrant ethnic groups, probably explains their l ading role in defending the 
interest of the entire movement.823  
 Because of the economic downturn and subsequent social unrest midway through 
the 1890s employer organizations had remained absent from the pro-immigration 
campaigns, but came back strongly at the turn of the century. The National Board of 
Trade and the National Association of Manufacturers organized pro-immigration 
campaigns of their own, opposing the literacy test. Especially the latter, established in 
1907, proved to be very active by creating an immigrat on committee and hiring James 
Emery as lobbyist, fighting new restrictions and pleading for a relaxation of the 
immigration controls in effect.824 Within the National Civic Federation, founded in 1900 
on the principle of the tripartite uniting business, public and labor but dominated by big 
businessmen, the latter tried to pressure labor unions to abandon their restrictionist 
claims. The establishment of this corporatist body by M. Hannah, and to which J.P. 
Morgan and partners also collaborated, denotes the influence of the shipping industry in 
this organization. Yet, the AFL leader and vice presid nt of the NCF, Gompers, did not 
give in and on the contrary radicalized its restrictive stance, supporting the literacy test 
(Higham, 1955, 115-116; Logan and Patten, 1929, 8; Weinsten, 1968, 7-39 and Zolberg, 
2006, 218-229).  
The AFL and IRL kept on collaborating for restrictions. With his article Pending 
Immigration bills, Ward still hoped to redress the situation. He denounced the idea of yet 
another commission as scheme; “from those who are selfishly interested in having 
                                                 
823 Little is known on the other nationalities. Higham mentions the Hungarian Republican Club of 
New York building up federal patronage at the time. There was also the Polish editor Louis Hammerling 
influencing foreign language newspapers for the Republican Party through his advertising agency 
‘American Association of Foreign Language Newspapers’ (Higham 1955, 126). Italians also organized to 
defend their interest. The Vatican supported the Italian emigration movement and also the Italian 
government sent an agent Egisto Rossi founding an It lian Immigration Bureau to protect nationals 
overseas. Rossi became a key witness for immigration issues during the investigation of the Industrial 
Commission. Further research needs to shed more light on their impact.  
824 The association formed the National Council for Industrial Defense numbering 250 member 
associations throughout the country with the sole purpose of effectually influence state and federal 
legislation. It established a legislative bureau, a legal bureau and bureau of publicity and education 
centralizing and coordinating the efforts. The associations in the interior needed to ensure that the ‘right 
minded’ legislators would be elected. In Washington the association made sure that these ‘right minded’ 
men took part in House and Senate Committees to defen  their interests (Logan and Patten, 1929, 8-9). 
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conditions continue as at present.” The literacy test had passed the House on four and the 
Senate on three different occasions needing no further investigation on the need for the 
measure. The IRL leader insisted that the increase in h ad-tax be reinserted, allowing the 
improvement of landing facilities and inspections. Also, the assisted immigration through 
prepaid tickets needed to be restrained. The President of the board of health of New 
York, Thomas Darlington warned for the dangers of becoming a ‘degenerate nation’. To 
prevent this he urged; “we must act, decision is needed now” (Ward, 1906, 1121-1133 
and Darlington, 1906, 1262-1271). 
The threat of a serious diplomatic conflict with Japan broke the deadlock between 
the House and Senate conferees to report on the bill. Segregation excluding Asians from 
San Francisco schools had upset the Japanese authorities. With their victory in the 
Russian-Japanese war, Roosevelt did not want to go lightly on the issue. He obtained the 
exemption of Japanese in exchange for an amendment in the immigration laws which 
would, although without referring to them explicitly, ban the Japanese from the 
continental US (Tichenor, 2002, 127 and Zeidel, 2005, 32). To enact it, conferees needed 
to reach an agreement on the pending immigration bill. House conferees had the upper 
hand being in a position to defeat any bill by holding out against the Senate leaving it 
with the choice to yield or have no bill at all.825   
The compromise consisted in dropping the literacy test and raising the head tax to 
$4. It provided that the $100 fine system be extended to passengers with tuberculosis, 
feeble-minded, imbeciles and epileptics. It added aliens with mental or physical defaults 
which may affect the ability of such aliens to earn  living to the excludable classes. The 
same restrictions were applied to children under 16 years of age unaccompanied by one 
or both of their parents. The period of deportability for illegal aliens and immigrants 
becoming a public charge was extended to three years. For ill and minor passengers an 
attendant would be appointed at the expense of shipping companies. It gave the authority 
to the President to call an international conference on immigration. The laws introduced 
manifests for outgoing aliens and approved the appointment of an investigation 
commission. Furthermore, the Commissioner General of Immigration received the 
                                                 
825 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters December 12 1906 and January 26 
1907. 
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authority to establish a division of information to promote the distribution of aliens. 
Besides the last minute amendment concerning Japanese migration, another one from 
Oscar Straus was introduced concerning the Passenger Act of 1882 and increasing the 
minimum deck space requirement per passenger by twenty five percent (Hutchinson, 
1981, 142).826  
According to C. Bennett; Lawson Sandford, Hartfield and Neal didexcellent 
diplomatic work against the new space requirements. Yet the urgency with which 
Roosevelt wanted to pass the bill to avoid an escalation of the diplomatic conflict with 
Japan, did not allow these men to have the amendment dropped. Instead, the date of 
implementation was postponed to January 1st 1909. The requirements predominantly 
affected older ships on the Mediterranean route.827  
Ward was very skeptical about the new law. The increase in space requirements 
and of the head tax would not alter the; “unenviable position of being about the cheapest 
place for Europeans to emigrate to.”828 The extension of the excludable classes was 
largely nullified by giving the Secretary of Commerc  and Labor authority to admit 
physically defected and unaccompanied minor aliens under bond. Moreover, failing to 
extend the fine system on shipping companies for each rejected immigrant weakened the 
controls in Europe, according to Ward. The system seemed arranged for the 
accommodation of the ship-owners whereby he mentioned the statement out the 
Congressional records from General Shattuc, chairman of the House committee of 
immigration at a hearing of the Senate Committee. On observations made by Anderson, 
passenger manager of the American Line, on the Immigration Act March 3rd 1903 
Shattuc replied: “He wrote most of the bill. He ought to be satisfied with it.” Implicitly he 
blamed shipping companies for the lack of radical restrictive measures in the new law 
(Ward, 1907, 587-593).  
Yet, the restrictionist did obtain a small but important victory. The House 
Immigration Commission brought the recruiting practices in South Carolina before the 
                                                 
826 Ibid. Letter February 15 1907.  
827 Of the 175 ships landing passengers in the Us in 1906 only 75 need to make adaptations to 
conform to the new regulations. Ibid. Letters February 13, 17 and 28 1907. 
828 Already in 1893 Schulteis reported that a trip from Italy to New York cost a bout 8 dollars less 
than to Brazil. Therefore, he deducted that the US attracted to poorest and least desirable migrants 
(Schulteis, 1893, 42). 
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Attorney General Bonaparte who overruled Straus’ decision, declaring the activities to be 
illegal because of the close involvement of private companies.829 The decision put an end 
to the recruiting campaigns of South Carolina and also hindered those of other southern 
states.830 To compensate for their loss the authorities establi hed a new branch of the 
Bureau of Immigration, the Division of Information headed by Powderly responsible for 
a better distribution of the immigrants. The former labor leader became a strong advocate 
of liberal immigration policies and a true ally of the shipping companies. They closely 
collaborated in spreading the information on work and settlers opportunities nationwide 
both in Europe, on board of ships and in the US in the native language of the various 
migrant communities.831 The AFL accused Powderly of enticing migration and pressured 
Congress to close down the bureau. It delimited Powderly’s activities to farm laborers 
and domestics but managed to keep a position at the Bureau of Immigration until 1921.832  
Yet in the meantime IRL’s ideas gained ground in the South and among Southern 
Congressmen through anti-immigrant publicity campaigns in local journals and through 
Patten’s lobby efforts in Washington. After the decision of Congress on South Carolina 
the South leaned more and more towards restrictions resulting in state resolutions aimed 
at excluding Russian Jews and Italians. The census of 1910 showed that despite the 
efforts to divert immigrants, the foreign-born population in the South had decreased to 
                                                 
829 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter February 28 1907. The final decision 
fell later. At a meeting at the White House South Carolina representatives received guarantees of the 
Attorney General, Straus, and Roosevelt that as long as no written contract promising work was used the 
scheme could go on. See New York Times “South can import the labor it needs” March 12 1907. 
 830 The State of Louisiana sent a delegate to Belgium d ring the summer of 1907 with the same 
intentions as Watson. However, the Belgian authorities refused to confer the same preferential treatment to 
him because of the reviewing of the immigration laws (Feys, 2003).  
831By September Powderly’s collected information on job opportunities with wages varying from 
1,25 tot 3,75 dollars per day. He also provided information on rent, cost of fuel, household expenses, 
education facilities etc.  The bureau centralized information on settling and land prices. Gradually branch 
offices were opened in the biggest cities of the country publishing reports in foreign language newspapers. 
The ‘Sons of American Revolution’ collaborated with Powderly also spreading information on the 
American way of life. By January 1909 the bureau had successfully assisted 2582 families directly. From 
1911 onwards Powderly organized annual ‘Convention of Immigration’ uniting immigration officials of 
thirty different states to increase the coordination of migrant distribution. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage 
Department 221-226, Letters June 6, July 7, August 7, September 16, 21, 1907, December 2 1908, January 
7, February 13, June 13, 14 1909; November 17 1911.  
832 Arthur Holder the AFL lobbyist at Washington tried to silence Powderly’s pro-immigration 
speeches advocating that the US thanked its wealth to migrants who were still needed for the development 
of the South. The Hayes Bill containing a 10 dollar head tax and literacy test also included a clause ending 
the activities of the division of information. Everis Hayes (R-Ca) however was a strong supporter of the 
Information Bureau. It confirmed the rumors that the bill had been written by the AFL. It underlines the 
influence of the labor union in the corridors of the Capitol. Letter November 11 1909, February 22 1910. 
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500,000 (Tichenor, 2002, 119-121). After loosing support from western states, shipping 
companies also lost the battle for southern states making it increasingly difficult to find 
allies in Washington willing to obstruct restrictions. But, with the estimate that the 
Dillingham Commission would need to operate for three years to complete its 
investigation their business was still protected for a while.  
 
4) In the meantime at Ellis Island… 
 
4.1) Closing back doors and intensifying health checks  
 
The New York head-agents had a great sigh of relief at the announcement of 
Williams’ resignation in 1905. Robert Watchorn, a former labor leader, was no stranger 
to the lines. As Immigration Commissioner of Montreal, who improved the Canadian-
American boarder controls, he had built up a reputation as an honest and righteous man. 
His views on the desirability of migration differed substantially of Williams’s; believing 
that every legal migrant, irrespective of race or nationality, contributed to the wealth of 
the country.833 But Wierdsma tempered the enthusiasm fearing that Watchorn would not 
make the life of shipping companies any easier as soon as he realized the true extent of 
his powers. What was good was that he did not see Ellis Island serving as a hotel, but 
instead he saw it as a place of inspection which gave priority to landing the migrants on 
the same day of arrival and only detaining passengers if absolutely necessary. 
Registration procedures improved speeding up the arrival of migrants. The HAL head 
agent gladly reported that maintenance bills immediat ly decreased.834 Watchorn added 
some personal touches, but in general his policy, even though it was less dominated by 
racial prejudices, it built further on the work of his predecessors. 
He continued Williams’ efforts in closing the back doors to dodge inspections. 
Williams had partly managed to close the loophole cr ated by second-class passage. 
                                                 
833 NYT “Immigration Record will be broken this year” March 11, “Getting better Immigrants” 
May 3, “Immigration is Wealth says Robert Watchorn” November 19 1906. 
834 Watchorn signed a new catering contract decreasing the cost for three meals a day from 30 to 
24.5 cents. Maintenance cost decreased from 15.3 cents p r capita in March 1904 to 11.8 cents March 1905 
and from 12.8 cents and 8.8 cents. The letter does n t pecify whether this was just for meals or for the
total maintenance costs. In 1908 Watchorn renegotiated the catering contract reducing the price to 22 cents 
for three meals. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters April 14 June 2 1905 and NYT 
“President Angers Knox” January 19 1905. 
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Despite the opposition of the steamship lines at the end of 1902, inspectors boarded ships 
in quarantine to screen the second-class passengers. If deemed necessary, inspectors sent 
suspicious cases for further examination at Ellis Island. Watchorn improved the ‘casual 
inspections’ of cabin-passengers by enlarging the inspection team with surgeons.835 In 
1905, twelve percent of the immigrant aliens landing in New York traveled second-class, 
underling the importance alternative means of entry. But inspectors sent only three 
percent of these to Ellis Island, leading to the deportation of a mere 0.1 percent of second 
cabin passengers. The deportation ratio of steerage p ssengers for the same period was 
ten times higher. These figures indicates that it had put an end to the guarantee of getting 
through by paying an extra $10 and traveling second-class, yet controls for second-cabin 
remained less extensive and still gave these passengers much better chances of passing 
through the entry procedures.836  
The new commissioner also tried to eliminate the abuses with American 
citizenship papers. He wanted to attain more uniformity in these papers, and urged the 
shipping companies to strictly control the documents of all passengers that declared them 
to be American citizens. Many claimed citizenship based on their papers of intention yet, 
Watchorn stressed that these were insufficient. To detect the abuses the Commissioner of 
Immigration considered obligating all American citizens traveling third-class to go 
through Ellis Island.837 Protests prevented the implementation of the measur  and the 
diversity of papers and regulations regarding citizenship from state to state persisted, 
making it hard for inspectors to detect false papers. The big influx of immigrants arriving 
during the initial months of his appointment made th commissioner doubt his liberal 
convictions.838  
He started to implement the laws strictly driving Wierdsma to the verge of 
despair, reporting that the situation had become worse than under Williams. Deportations 
                                                 
835 Ibid. Letters June 4, October 17 1902 and March 20 1903. New York Times November 1 1905  
“Cabin passengers to be inspected too” 
836 Of the 821 169 immigrants arriving at New York, 98 428 (12%) traveled second class of whom 
2882 (2,9%) were sent t o Ellis Island for further investigation leading to the deportation of 102 (0.1%) 
excludables. That same year of the 722.741 steerage p ssengers 7078 or 0.98% were sent back. NYT 
“Immigration Record will be broken this year” March 11 1906.  
837 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters April 12, 13 1905 and  NYT, “We 
naturalized the Kaiser” October 12 1905. 
838 NYT “Sargent sees danger in the continuing influx of immigrants” May 25 1905. 
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and fines for loathsome and contagious diseases increased, despite renewed efforts of 
doctor Haas at Rotterdam to improve controls by issuing special doctor certificates for 
the passengers he had inspected. Under Watchorn, deportations for medical reasons 
reached unprecedented numbers, swelling the medical bills of the steamship lines.839 The 
lines often contested the fines imposed by immigration authorities and let their lawyers, 
Lucius Beers and William Choate, handle these. They advised the HAL to pay the fines 
under protest, hoping to recoup the money in court whenever an opportunity to fight the 
constitutionality or arbitrary implementation of these presented themselves.840 The 
relatively low sums collected by the American authorities for these violations, on all 
shipping companies, indicate that these efforts were not in vain.841 It shows that the 
relations between shipping companies and control stations, only imposing fines for 
flagrant neglect, were not so bad after all. 
At the time, the shipping lines were engaged in a lawsuit, contesting the decision 
of Straus and Watchorn to apply the provisions for the unrighteous landing of immigrants 
on sailors who deserted ships while in anchored in American harbors. The first 
immigration laws placed the responsibility on the captain of the ship to prevent the 
landing of any passengers beforehand, passing throug  inspections. If passengers 
managed to escape the ship before, captains risked imprisonment and fines between $100 
and $1000. The stewards’ responsibility for the passengers did not stop once they left the 
                                                 
839 The profitability to care for detained diseased aliens triggered a keen competition between the 
New York hospitals to attract the business. Powderly and Williams had increased these costs hoping they 
would function as deterrent for the shipping lines to bring over diseased. Williams standardized the 
business by concluding an agreement with the Long Island College Hospital treating adults at 1.5 and 
children under twelve at 1 dollar per day. Rates for patients with contagious diseases needing isolation 
amounted to 2 dollars per day while the insane varied from 3 to 5 dollars per day. Under Watchorn the lin s 
re-obtained the right to make their own arrangements wi h hospitals for clients affected by measles and
chicken pox. HAL concluded a special agreement with Saint Mary’s Hospital treating their clients at 
charity rates. Yet on July 1 1906 Watchorn withdrew that privilege increasing the medical bills again. At 
some point the Atlantic lines considered hiring a doctor to follow up all the patients spread around i the 
different hospitals to prevent these from unnecessarily keeping the patients to artificially swell the bills. 
GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters November 24 1903, October 19 1906 and 
September 18 1908. 
840 The discrepancy between the decisions of specialist n Rotterdam and New York pushed the 
HAL to hire external specialists to refute Ellis Island health inspectors’ diagnose. The HAL used the 
external opinions to defend the reputation of their Rotterdam doctors and also to pressure the authorities to 
drop fines or loosen controls. The affidavits could later serve whenever the lines found it opportune to take 
the matter to trail. Ibid. Letter June 30, August 11 and 15 1905 August 17 September 24 1906 (See table 
chapter III). 
841 The Dillingham Commission mentions figures per fiscal year: 1904 28400, 1905 27 300, 1906 
24 300, 1907 37 200, 1908 26 700, 1909 27 400 and 1910 29 900 (Dillingham Commission, vol. IV, 1911). 
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boat; this only occurred when they reached Ellis Island. But apparently no great barriers 
existed to preventing passengers from escaping. Up to 1903, only a rope separated 
steerage from cabin passengers during their landing on the docks. Only after the escape 
of a Greek passenger jumping the rope and mingling w th the second-class passengers did 
the HAL increase its security measures. The Dutch line constructed a movable fence and 
put a guard at the gate making escapes on the dock nearly impossible, according to 
Wierdsma. The federal government spread a ‘wanted’ notice for the passenger, but due to 
the good relations with Ellis Island no fines were imposed. But, the leniency towards 
such cases ebbed away under Watchorn, extending the measures to deserted seaman. 
Authorities suspected excludable aliens of taking service as seaman to avoid controls.842 
The British line fought the $500 fine imposed for the desertion of Taylor in court. All the 
lines contributed to the legal expenses which was usual when a test case went to trial in 
the interest of all the companies. After a long, dram out procedure, the Supreme Court 
judged in favor of the lines.843 
 
4.2) Refining the Deportation procedures 
 
The rigid policy of Watchorn resulted in an increasd deportation ratio fluctuating 
between 1 and 1.5 percent over the four years.  Another indication of Watchorn’s concern 
to implement the letter of the laws was the renewed attention to the observance of the 
1882 space requirements, eventually leading to the am ndment of the 1907 immigration 
law.844 He also sent an increasing number of officials overseas to monitor the actions of 
shipping companies at sea and in Europe. However, most of the time the head-agents 
obtained the name of the investigators before their d parture and it allowed them to warn 
the home port of their arrival, making sure they received ‘special treatment’.845 The most 
typical characteristic of Watchorn’s rule was the elaboration of deportation procedures. 
                                                 
842 Allegedly the Greek Line registered some passengers as personnel members allowing them to 
land without passing through Ellis Island. NYT, “May discipline Greek Line” December 22 1910.  
843 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters April 21 1903, May 22 1906, 
October 25 and December 27 1907. 
844 Ibid. Letter August 22 1905 and January 3 1906. 
845 As for instance doctor Stoner traveling with wife and kids on inspection mission or Mr. 
Semsey, chairman of the board of Special Inquiry and Mr. Dobler superintendent at Ellis Island. Ibid. 
Letters June 1 and August 21 1906.  
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The interpretation of the deportation laws led to various lawsuits especially to establish 
the responsibility for the costs these created. Immigration authorities tried to put the 
financial responsibility, as much as possible, on the shipping companies while the lines 
claimed that these costs should to be covered by the Immigrant Fund or by the family of 
the deported.846  
In the case that someone needed to be deported, the HAL retraced the agent who 
booked their passage. For instance, when they received notice that Lowre Koterman had 
been taken up to the insane hospital in Dixmont, they sent a local agent to obtain his 
release and return him with two other passengers booked by Mawek & Company of 
Agram. This way, the HAL tried avoiding the appointment of an attendant at their cost, as 
stipulated by the laws of 1907. The costs were considerable as they included an 
eastbound third-class, westbound second-class ticket for the attendant, $2 compensation a 
day, plus incidental expenses.847 Koterman was provided with third-class ocean passage 
and fourth-class railroad tickets to Agram. The agent was then contacted to make sure his 
clients reached their final destination.848 But, the rigid implementation of the attendant 
clause caused much discontent among the lines. The exp nses for the so–called ‘leisure 
trips’ of unqualified attendants could not always be avoided and quickly accumulated 
while the medical personal on ships were perfectly qualified to attend these patients 
during the voyage, according to the lines.  
The shipping lines’ Ellis Island Committee contested the need for attendants. 
They questioned the right of American authorities to claim second-class instead of third-
class accommodation. The lines also demanded that information on personality and 
qualifications of attendants be secured. Finally, their lawyers did not believe that the lines 
                                                 
846 The law of 1903 stipulated that each alien that should come to the US in violation of the law or 
who should be found a public charge from causes exiting prior to the landing shall be deported home, at 
any time within two years after arrival, at the expnse, including half of the inland transportation t the port 
of embarkation of the person bringing such alien in the US or if this cannot be done, at the expense of the 
Immigrant Fund. Watchorn and Sargent tried to recuprate the full inland fare as the costs of maintenance 
during the voyage to the port from shipping companies. Hermann Winter and L. Sandford leading the Ellis 
Island Committee of the lines successfully countered th ses attempts. Ibid. Letter July 1 and 7 1905.  
847 In other cases the company let a relative accompany the ‘aliens helpless from sickness, mental 
or physical disability or infancy’ avoiding the payment of compensation and often also of westbound return 
passage. The HAL agreed to deport H. Wieser becoming a public charge in State Hospital of Manhattan 
after six months and provided his wife and daughter with return tickets to their final destination without 
further obligations. Same goes for Mr. Alman who retu ned with his wife. Ibid. Letters July 13 1907 and 
September 12 1907.  
848 Ibid. Letter May 24 1907. 
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should pay for the European inland transportation of the attendant because rules and 
regulations of the foreign countries regarding the forwarding of deported aliens to their 
homes applied there. In the Netherlands, an elaborate procedure existed. Upon arrival the 
HAL transferred the alien to the city hospital of Rotterdam for observation to determine 
whether the patient was in condition to continue his journey. If so, the HAL contacted a 
family member to personally, or by appointment of a delegate, pick up the alien in 
Rotterdam and accompany him back home. Wherever permitt d by foreign governments, 
the HAL appointed an employee of the company as attendant. If the alien, upon arrival, 
was not declared fit to continue the journey the HAL transferred the alien to the State 
Asylum where the Dutch authorities took charge of him and contacted the responsible 
government member to arrange the transportation.849    
  Straus, Watchorn and Sargent did not let the matter escalate to the courtroom and 
conceded.850 Yet, for each deportee needing assistance, the lines had to produce two 
reports; one about the voyage at sea, which need to be certified by the American consul, 
and a second on the trip to final destination with a proof of arrival. Wherever possible, 
the company tried to recoup the costs from the family. But, the New York head-agent 
urged caution to avoid difficulties with the American authorities. Wierdsma asked to pay 
for the railroad ticket for Leib Zweifler, if his father who picked him up in Rotterdam, 
demanded it.851 The directors were not pleased about the interference of the American 
authorities, outside their jurisdiction, on Dutch soil. However, as Wierdsma pointed out 
the compromise on deportations came about on the request of the steamship lines. Hence, 
protesting against it was difficult, especially with the growing hostile attitude in 
Washington towards foreign shipping companies.852   
 As Wierdsma had predicted, Watchorn did not make th life of shipping 
companies any easier. During his rule, he imposed special five-day quarantine and 
luggage disinfection measures for Russian passengers on three occasions because of 
                                                 
849 Some tried to abuse the regulation at Rotterdam climing to be deported in order to obtain free 
inland transport back home. The Dutch government passed a law prohibiting company agents to 
accompany insane aliens to the final destinations and took charge of them. It freed the company from the 
expenses. Ibid. Letters February 2 1908 September 27 1912 and February 22 1913. 
850 Ibid. Letters July 19, August 8, 14, 20, 28 September 3, October 18, 23, 24, 25 November 11, 
22, and December 3 1907; NYT “Find Fault with deportation Rule” September 25 1907. 
851 Ibid.Letter November 17 1908. 
852 Ibid. Letter December 16 1908. 
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cholera outbreaks.853 Although he clearly declared himself in favor of European 
immigration, even from southern and eastern Europe, deportations increased. He blamed 
both the people in America sending for immigrants with lack of assistance after arrival, 
and the shipping lines, for this. He pleaded for an expansion the fine system and made 
shipping companies refund the westbound tickets of the deported. On the efforts of the 
South to divert part of the flow by providing information at Ellis Island, the 
commissioner was very skeptical. According to Watchorn, more than 99 percent of the 
arriving aliens knew where they were going; “American wages are the honey pot that 
brings in the alien flies”. Hence, the South needed to offer better wages or to wait until 
the immigrant’s first experience turned sour and then attract him.854 Watchorn continued 
the policy of increasing the financial burdens on shipping companies as the best deterrent 
to limit the number of excludables from coming overseas.  
His strict interpretation of immigration laws and his liberal views on immigration 
earned Watchorn many powerful critics who accused him of abusing his position. James 
Reynolds of the IRL even wanted to bring him to trial. The League criticized the 
Dillingham Commission for not including Ellis Island in their investigation, claiming that 
Watchorn was incompetent and corrupt. Due to the agitation, Roosevelt did not succeed 
in reappointing him during his final days in office, l aving the decision to his successor, 
President Taft. The shipping companies supported the commissioner but failed to 
convince the new President; as the speeches of G. Schwab and Congressman Bennet at 
Watchorn’s farewell diner underline. Some months prior the pro-immigration lobby had 
seen their ally, Oscar Straus, being substituted by Charles Nagel as Secretary of Labor 
and Commerce. Nagel advised against the reappointment of Watchorn and favored 
someone leading with an iron rule. He therefore supported Taft’s candidate, a Yale man 
and personal friend of the President William Williams.855 Daniel Keefe, vice-president of 
                                                 
853 From September 1905 until June 1906; October 1907 until the beginning of 1908 and again on 
September 1908 these measures were implemented. Ibid. Letters September 2 1905, June 15 1906, 
September 16, December 3 1907, September 21 and 29 1908.
854 NYT “Immigration Record will be broken this year” March 11, “Says South must offer more to 
get migrants” June 6 and “Immigration is Wealth says Robert Watchorn” November 19 1906. 
855 NYT “Reynolds investigates Ellis Island Affaires” September 16 1906; “Recalls Watchorn’s 
name” January 6; “Straus upholds Watchorn” January 9; “Watchorn exonerated” March 2; “Watchorn 
resigns, Forced out he says” April 25; “Williams regains Immigration Office” May 19; “Watchorn praised 
as ideal Gateman” June 19 1909 and (Zeidel, 2005, 118). 
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the AFL and a more outspoken restrictionist than Sargent took up the position as 
Commissioner General of Immigration after the latter’s death. With these substitutions, 
the pro-immigration lobby saw two prominent allies in the persons of Strauss and 
Watchorn disappear from key positions in the immigration system. Generally, the new 
appointees represented a clear shift towards restrictions through which the IRL scored an 
important victory on the shipping lobby. In the meantime, the Dillingham commission 
worked diligently with its report. 
 
5) From the Dillingham Commission to the Dillingham-Burnett bill  
 
The core of the Dillingham commission, named after the Vermont senator who 
led the investigation, consisted of the House and Senate conferees; who were responsible 
for the stalemate preceding the approval of the law which led to the commission. One 
important exception was the absence of Congressman Ruppert.856 The defender of the 
shipping lobby’s interest did not partake in the subsequent elections. The fervent 
restrictionist, John Burnett (Al-D), took his position shifting the balance in favor of the 
anti-immigration lobby. The president appointed three other commissioners to 
complement the six congressmen. The interference of Lodge and W. Bennet in the 
selection of these underlined the opposing sides of the spectrum that both congressmen 
represented. Bennet prevented the appointment of James Patten, the IRL lobbyist while 
Lodge opposed the application of South Carolina governor, Earl Hayward, a pro-
immigration industrialist who supported the active recruiting policies of his state. They 
eventually settled for Charles Neill, Jeremiah Jenks and William Wheeler who were all 
less opinionated on the issue. While Lodge wanted th  commission’s work to focus solely 
on the issues in the US, Bennet insisted on investigating the matter in Europe also 
(Zeidel, 2005, 48-53).  Lodge probably wanted to keep the investigation as brief as 
possible, enabling rapid consideration for new bills in Congress, while Bennet tried to 
                                                 
856 Shortly later Senator McLaurin was unable to accept his appointment and substituted by
Asbury Latimer (SC-D) who died a year later allowing A. McLaurin to take his spot until he passed away 
in 1909. Senator Leroy Percy (Mis-D) replaced him. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, 
Letters  January 19, February 23 and 25 1907 and (Hutchins, 1981, 143).  
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slow down the process knowing that the interests he represented were best served when 
the situation remained unchanged.  
 
5.1) The European Tour 
 
Despite the fact that Powderly had just returned from a special mission to Italy 
and that a delegation of four Congressmen; John Williams (D-Mi), Theodore Burton (R-
Oh), Henry Goldfogle (D-NY) and R Bartholdt had traveled through Europe to 
investigate migrant issues in the summer of 1906, Bennet managed to include Europe on 
the Dillingham Commission’s agenda.857  Seven members of the commission sailed for 
Europe to find out whether European governments used th  US as a dumping ground for 
their criminals and paupers, with the help of shipping companies who might evade 
evading the US immigration laws and artificially swell migration. Southern and Eastern 
Europe, in particular, received a lot of attention. James Whelpley had recently published 
a sharp historical analysis of the migration legislat on and policies of various European 
countries. He observed the shift, from an uncontrolled movement regulated only by 
migration laws in certain countries and attracting the trade to national ports, towards 
growing tendencies to restrict emigration. Whelpley noted that the tendencies in Europe 
were most favorable to the US, restraining transportati n interests from inciting migration 
and regulating the overseas traffic according to American immigration laws (Whelpley, 
1905). The commissioners returned impressed by the attempts of the different European 
countries to regulate migration and could only endorse Whelpley’s views.858 In volume 
four, Emigration conditions in Europe, the commissioners concluded that the emigration 
movement was natural, mainly a result of economic conditions and that ticket agents, tied 
down by numerous laws only played a minor role as instigators. Moreover, they found no 
evidence of schemes supported by the authorities to send paupers and criminals to the 
US. Conversely, some countries including Italy tried to prevent the emigration of 
criminals. The natural barriers to emigrate had maybe deteriorated by a small anount, yet 
it still proved a difficult and courageous undertaking. Therefore, it was not the lower 
                                                 
857 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121; Letter s.d. 1906 Letters November 11 
1906 and May 3 1907 and NYT “Williams sails to Europe” June 15 1906. 
858 Ibid. Letters November 7 1907 and March 20 1908. 
 450
class of European who reached the American shores yet; “whether desirable or not 
migrants still represented the stronger and better element of the particular class from 
which it was drawn.” The numerous emigration associations informed the migrants and 
protected them from abuses but the commission found no proof of financial assistance in 
crossing of the poor. After the extensive overview of inspection procedures at boarder 
stations and European migration ports, the commissioners underlined that examinations 
on the physical condition of migrants conducted abro d were; “good, effective and of 
greatest importance, a fact which the commission believ d was not always fully realized 
by students of the immigration problem in the US.”   
The execution and involvement of American officials in these controls varied 
from port to port.859 In Rotterdam, inland migrant agents forwarded the passengers from 
Eastern Europe to the port making sure they arrived four to five days before the departure 
of the steamer on which they expected to sail. Migrants from nearby points arrived one 
day prior to the crossing. At the railroad station, runners from the HAL welcomed the 
passengers and guided them to the company’s specially bui t hotel. Instead of large 
dormitories, which were found in the majority of similar buildings in other ports the 
sleeping quarters were divided into small rooms- similar to the steerage staterooms on 
HAL ships. During their stay, the company’s medical staff -consisting of two physicians 
and two eye experts- had plenty of time to check the migrants, many of whom had 
already passed examinations at German border control stations. The final examination 
occurred three to six hours before departure. It was attended by the American consul 
general, a doctor appointed by him, the ship’s doctor, an official of the Dutch emigration 
committee and a Rotterdam police officer on the watch for fugitives. From January first 
1904 until September 1908, the examiners returned 2,523 passengers but an even greater 
number of HAL clients never made it pass the eastern controls stations.  
The procedures in Rotterdam resembled the ones used at other ports but big 
differences existed regarding the authority granted to American officials. On one hand 
with Naples leading as the European port with the number of emigrants embarking for the 
US, the final medical inspection was left entirely to two surgeons from the US Public 
                                                 
859 The commission reported on the ports of Antwerp, Boulogne sur Mer, Glasgow, Liverpool, 
Londonderry, Queenstown, Southampton, Cherbourg, Christiana, Copenhagen, Fiume, Bremen, Hamburg, 
Le Havre, Libau, Marseille, Patras, Piraeus, Rotterdam, Trieste, Naples, Palermo, Messina and Genoa. 
 451
Health and Marine Hospital service, assisted by the ship’s doctor, a representative of the 
Italian emigration commission, a surgeon appointed by the nation government and Italian 
policemen. The delegation of authority made the presence of the American consul 
redundant. When the American doctors approved their passage, the police officers 
checked their passports.860 The American health inspectors vaccinated all the steerage 
passengers prior to embarkation. They also supervised the inspection and disinfection of 
the baggage in a well-equipped plant operated by seven assistant examiners. Inspectors 
rejected 10,222 steerage passengers from December 1 1906 first until December 31 1907. 
On the other hand, Belgian authorities did not tolerate any interference by foreign 
officials in Antwerp preventing American consuls from performing their duties. Health 
inspectors from the Marine hospital, dispatched to supervise special quarantine 
regulations during cholera scares, were only welcome as mere spectators. A Belgian 
Commission of Emigration supervised the careful examin tions. Despite the lack of 
involvement of American officials, Antwerp, together with Fiume and Queenstown had 
the best deportation records at US ports; significantly lower than neighboring ports 
Rotterdam, Bremen and Hamburg, and also lower than N ples, Messina and Palermo 
which were under American control.861  
Pressures to implement American inspections at foreign ports had never totally 
disappeared after the late 1880s and the Commissioner  General of Immigration, Sargent, 
repeatedly urged for these in his yearly reports. Yet, with the remote control system in 
place, inspectors only had to debar 0.36 percent of the total influx for these reasons. The 
rejections at Naples, and German border stations, fr the fiscal year of 1907 amounted to 
5.5 and 2.2 percent respectively. For the commissioners, these figures proved that the 
inspections at the ports were thoroughly effective. Moreover, the comparison between 
Antwerp and Naples showed that American control did not guarantee better records. 
Hence, the commission did not see any reason why the would take over these 
inspections, and create additional costs for the American authorities (Dillingham 
Commission, vol. IV, 1911). The overall conclusion f the overseas adventure was very 
                                                 
860 Only in some countries the use of passports was imposed. Yet since these were not compulsory 
to enter the US, many ports did not require their passengers to carry one.  
861 The numbers rejected for diseases at US ports fromJanuary until September 1907; Antwerp 
0.18, Rotterdam, 0.36, Hamburg, 0.32, Bremen 0.61, Palermo 0.47, Messina 0.34 and Naples 0.36.  
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positive and as Zeidel summarized; “if there was an immigration problem, the 
commission did not find the roots of it in Europe” (Zeidel, 2004, 68).  
 
5.2) Are there limits to the assimilating powers of the American Melting Pot? 
 
As Claude Bennet observed; “the commission considers the questions of 
assimilation of even greater importance than the methods employed in bringing them to 
this country.”862 The bulk of the research centered on the social, political and economic 
effects of immigration in the US. How did each ethnic group influence employment, 
wages, living and working conditions of the native born? What was their relation to trade 
unions? How many criminals and paupers did the various ethnic groups number? How 
did they assimilate or Americanize? Were ethnic groups from southern and eastern 
Europe inferior and to what extent could they generate a racial suicide? How did 
transport companies affect the movement? How had immigration been regulated in the 
past and abroad? To answer these questions, the commission subdivided the work into 
sixteen committees employing, at some point, three undred people. This underlines the 
zeal with which the commissioners tried to collect a curate and scientific information on 
which recommendations for new immigrant laws could be based (Zeidel, 2004, 77-80).   
Yet, some congressmen refused to await the conclusion, and continued proposing 
new bills containing an educational test and increased head taxes. While these were very 
unlikely to be passed, or even being considered, it kept the issue on the agenda. In the 
meantime, the shipping lobby tried to alter the amendment regarding space requirements; 
they wanted to revert back to old norms which had been in place before its enforcement 
in 1909. The efforts of P. Franklin (vice-president of IMM), Thorndike Spalding 
(representative of WSL), Sandford, Neal and W. Chamberlin, Commissioner of 
Navigation, who had written section 42 in 1907, paid off. Straus proved willing to 
include their suggestions and take the existing laws of the various European countries 
involved into account. Lodge did not believe the adaptations to space requirements would 
affect the immigration influx and gave in to the steamship lines. He submitted the 
amendment of section 42 of the 1907 immigration bill, as prepared by Franklin. It swiftly 
                                                 
862 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter September 18 1908. 
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passed the Senate yet the House restrictionists, such as Gardner and Burnett, re-imposed 
increased space provisions sending the bill back to the conferees. Claude Bennet reported 
that the representatives favoring the bill, except for William Bennet, had not fought the 
measure as aggressively as they could have to get the Senate bill through the House.  
In the meantime, echoes on the findings of the full-scale investigations on 
steerage conditions led by W. Bennet leaked to the press. These varied a lot, according to 
the route and the year of construction of the steamer. On the Continental and British-
Scandinavian routes an increasing number of steamers accommodated steerage 
passengers in small state-rooms, instead of large dormitories.  The Mediterranean route 
remained predominantly served by older ships. Stories of horrendous traveling conditions 
leaked to the press, leading to an attack against the shipping lines in Congress by 
Representative Adolphe Sabath (Ill-D). That the issue remained in the public eye did not 
help the shipping lobby in their efforts to amend section 42. The agitation even moved 
Behar of the NLIL to travel third-class on board of the Rotterdam to experience the 
steerage conditions first hand.863 The managing director of the NLIL expressed his 
satisfaction as to the conditions yet it didn’t help in reversing the tide against the shipping 
lobby. They succeeded in striking the amendment providing for commodious toilets, 
lavatories dinning, smoking and lounging rooms, yet th  space requirements which they 
had managed to bring back to 15 square feet actual sleeping space was changed again to 
18 for the passenger decks below the waterline and from 12 to 15 for the others. The new 
standards not only affected older ships on the Mediterranean route but it also had an 
impact on the other routes, especially those of the German lines.864 Despite reducing the 
capacity, and hence increasing the cost for shipping companies, the prices remained 
unchanged (see appendix 3). This confirms Lodge’s apprehension that the bill would not 
have any restrictive influence on migration.  
                                                 
863 Steerage conditions on HAL ships belonged to the best on the North Atlantic. Moreover, aware 
of the presence of Behar on board the purser receivd strict orders to arrange for an impeccable crossing 
and keep a detailed report on Behar’s movements. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, 
Letters Augusts 11 and 14 1908.  
864 Much depended on the promenade deck of the ships. For HAL the changes had not a radical 
impact yet they did for German lines. For the Barbarossa and Kaiser type ships it decrease the capacity by 
40 percent GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters 1907 Letter May 3 June 21 and 
December 12 1907 February 28, December 19, 28 1908, January 5, 6 December 15 1909. GAR, HAL, 
318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter January 18 February 14, 18, 24 March 20 April 13, 14, 16 
1908 and (Dillingham Commission, vol., 37, 1911; Hall, 1913, 741). 
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Meanwhile, the shipping companies tried to influence the Dillingham 
Commission. The pro and anti-immigration lobby shared the belief that the report would 
serve as ‘the’ document to study the immigration problems influencing migration policies 
for years to come. The Italian lines joined in support of the Immigration Legislation 
Committee by contributing 10 cents per westbound passenger. Franklin, Boas and 
Schwab who conferred the lobbying plans with their lawyers Lucius Beers, Judge Choate 
and Representative Bartholdt no longer reported on their strategies to limit the chances of 
a leak to the press. A letter book of HAL agent, Gips, compromising the conference 
agreements had fallen in the hands of the American authorities. Also documents leaked to 
the press proving that the Merchant Marine League hired private detectives to research 
the private lives of congressmen opposing ship-subsidies. It pushed the House to appoint 
a special committee to investigate the legality of; shipping lobby practices of hiring 
journalists to manipulate public opinion; employing lobbyist to solicit congressmen; 
making campaign contributions to political organizations; and to influencing elections’ of 
members.  
The investigation, the private detectives hired by the IRL, and the increasing 
hostility towards trusts and foreign shipping lines drove the committee to this decision. 
The threat that the investigation may uncover their ‘educational business’ activities which 
included running a newspaper to educate the public, funding various Hebrew Societies 
and influencing congressmen through lobbyists, made the lines consider transferring the 
coordination of the lobby campaigns against restriction to Europe. Furthermore, the IMM 
and Cunard Line withdrew their contributions believing it to be safer to act on their own. 
Apart from the confession of Jerome Willburn, member of the Washington branch of the 
Associated Press, who admitted being employed by Alert Ballin to report according to 
the steamship company’s interests, the investigators found little that compromised the 
foreign lines. Two years later, the whole conference became the object of a special 
investigation with the formation of the Alexander Committee making the lines even more 
cautious. But, while the shipping lobby seemed to disintegrate a little, the pressure of 
organizations representing the various ethnic groups, especially the Jewish ones, began to 
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work. Mistrusting the findings of the Dillingham commission, the American Jewish 
Committee sponsored their own research led by Isaac Hourwich.865  
On the other side of the spectrum the IRL also tried to monitor the investigation 
closely and to influence the commissioners on every possible occasion. They looked for a 
means to discredit W. Bennet, their biggest enemy on the commission, by circulating 
pamphlets such as ‘Congressman Bennet Not a Progressive’ and ‘Jews’ attention’, yet 
with little result (Zeidel, 2004, 118). The Commission tried to fend itself from outside 
influences. It held no public hearings, trusting solely their own staff to collect the 
information. As long as the investigation proceeded, the commissioners could not be 
tempted into giving preliminary conclusions. They rsisted the pressures of Congress to 
present a preliminary report in 1909. The refusal pushed Lee Overmann (NC-D) to draft a 
bill increasing the head tax to $12, and augmenting the pressure on the Commission to 
finish its report. Also, critics in the press on exp nditures and the length of the 
investigation mounted. When the commission realized that not even half of their work 
could be fit in published volumes before being dissolved on March 1st 1910, it gave in 
reporting on completed aspects of the investigation s  as to obtain more funds and an 
extension of nine months to finish the work. Especially Representatives Robert Macon 
(AR-D) and Burnett of the Commission opposed any further delay, with arguments 
supplied by Patten, assuming it as being a maneuver to hold off the passage of a 
restriction bill during an election year.866  
The press eagerly published reports on the findings of the Commission yet what 
everybody wanted to know was its recommendations for new legislation, above all would 
it recommend a literacy test or not? Commissioners r mained secretive about their 
                                                 
865 The “American Flag” which promoted the American Merchant Marine was accused of sending 
money to a resident of Crookston where Representative Halvor Steenerson (Minn-R) resided to obtain 
information on the private affaires of the Congressman, especially as to his travel and trips abroad during 
the last five years. Once obtained the person published it in the press and contacted the member to verify 
his action on the ship-subsidy bill threatening to publish more defamatory information and write letters to 
citizens in the Ninth District. The American Merchant Marine League was also accused of hiring journalist 
to manipulate public opinion, lobbyists to solicit members and paying campaign contributions for political 
parties to influence elections of members. The Leagu  stated that foreign shipping interests instigated keen 
lobby campaigns and the House decided to investigate the matter. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 
221-226, Letter December 28 1908, December 30 1910; CLA, Chairman Correspondence C1, 11, 41, 63 
and 69 Letters September 13, December 12, 15 1909; January 2; March 3, 11, 15, 23; June 17 and August 3 
1910 (Tichenor, 2002, 129-134). 
866 Ibid. Letters December 9 1908, January 6 April 26, 27 June 15 November 18, December 15, 16 
1909 January 25, February 3 and 10 1910.  
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conclusions. Not even C. Bennett or James Patten managed to get conclusive information 
on the recommendations, creating some anxiety on both sides. The IRL consistent inside 
man, Senator Lodge, brought no relief for Patten- there was a fear that Lodge would not 
even endorse the test. Instead, Burnett became their number one man of trust to pressure 
the commission (Zeidel, 2004, 112). It seemed that e majority of the commissioners 
turned against the educational test. Therefore Patten and Arthur Holder of AFL, lobbied 
to get consideration in the House before the publication of the conclusions for the Hayes-
bill prepared by them -including a head tax of $10 and an educational test- but to no 
avail. It was only at the end that commissioners held public hearings, before presenting 
their conclusions.867 Three and a half years after its establishment, the Dillingham 
Commission finally revealed its secrets 
 
5.3) “The reading and writing test as the most feasible single method of restricting 
undesirable migration868”  
 
Despite the findings that neither shipping companies nor European authorities 
artificially swelled immigration, and that regardless of origin second generation 
immigrants merged into an American ideal type, as Franz Boas cousin of the HAPAG 
head agent Emil Boas demonstrated, the Commission recommended far reaching 
restrictions of unskilled labor.869 Based on intensive research of immigrants in industries 
and cities, the Commission concluded that because of the ever-increasing influx wages, 
and living conditions in the US would deteriorate. While not questioning the benefits 
migrants still represented for the American economy, the country could no longer safely 
assimilate the incoming masses responsible for many social and political problems. 
Especially temporary migration had a disruptive impact. They therefore suggested a wide 
range of measures to limit the influx varying from; quotas limiting the numbers of entry 
by race, exclusion of unskilled labourers unaccompanied by wives and children by using 
discriminating head taxes, limitation of the number of immigrants arriving at one port or 
                                                 
867 Ibid. Letter February 8, 22 and October 1910. 
868 See Reports of Dillingham Commission, vol. 1, 1911. 
869 Hall did not hesitate to use the family link of the anthropologist to the shipping company and 
his appointment by Congressman Bennet to refute his conclusions claiming these to be corrupted (King, 
2000, 70). 
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increasing the amount of money required on entry. And all of the commissioners, bar 
one, recommended a reading and writing test as; “most feasible single method of 
restricting undesirable migration.” W. Bennet refused to endorse the test underlining that 
the investigation had proved that new immigrants were; less addicted to intoxication, less 
dependent on charity than old immigrants and that tey numbered no more criminals than 
the native born. He did not deny the need for some check on unskilled immigrants, yet 
the educational test was by far the less appropriate one.870  
James Patten could not suppress his enthusiasm for the Commissions’ work, 
ordering ten thousand copies of the full forty one volume report and twenty thousand 
copies of ‘summary of findings’, more than ten times the number printed by the 
government (Tichenor, 2002, 131). Patten’s optimism received another boost with W. 
Bennet’s defeat for re-election in November 1910.871 That same year James Clark (Mi-D) 
substituted Cannon as Speaker, yet the position had been stripped of its powers and 
transferred to the committees- preventing a scenario as in that of 1906 to reoccur.  With 
the added support of the Dillingham Commission, the enactment of an educational bill 
seemed like a mere formality. Yet, as C. Bennett report d, the test had a lot of positive 
opponents. Not all the volumes had been published yet and it would take some time to go 
through the full report. Hence, no action was likely during the ongoing session coming to 
a close giving the liberals some time to organize. The NLIL led the way taking immediate 
steps to protest against the measures. However, rest ictionist anticipating the results of 
the Commission for years managed to get consideration for an educational test in the 
House Committee. With a vote of six against four the bill was sent to the Congress only a 
month after the Commission’s report. Yet it did not manage to be considered before the 
close of the 61st session in March 1911. In the Senate, Dillingham worked on his own 
general bill, including a literacy test which he handed in right before the ending of the 
first extra sitting of the 62nd session of Congress. Yet Burnett confided to C. Bennett that 
he suspected the Dillingham bill of being a manoeuvr  to oppose restrictions from 
                                                 
870 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter December 5 1910. See (Dillingham 
Commission, vol. I-XCII, 1911 and Zeidel, 2004, 101-1 4).  
871 At the beginning of 1910 rumors circulated that he may have a run at the New York 
governorship. A dinner organized in his honor for the services rendered to the immigrant cause in New 
York’s Little Hungry shows the unconditional support f the foreign born community to his candidacy. 
Apparently that proved insufficient. NYT “Boom Bennet for Governor” March 15 1910. 
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passing. Instead of a general law, smaller bills treating each a separate aspect stood a 
much better chance. As C. Bennett underlined, during a Presidential election year such 
kind of bill was very unlikely of being passed.872 
In the meantime, the various ethnic groups organized to get their voice heard at 
the hearings of the House Immigration Committee. Representatives of the AJC, Union 
committee of Hebrew Congregation, Independent Order of B’nai B’rith, Independent 
Order B’rith Abraham, National German American Alliance, Italian Settlement and Aid 
Societies of Philadelphia all pleaded against the educational test. Editors of foreign 
newspapers led by Louis Hammerling, president of the American Association of Foreign 
Newspapers claiming to represent 490 papers in 29 different languages having a 
circulation of 6,800,000 also argued against restrictions. According to Bennet, the speech 
by Cyrus Sulzberger, in particular, contained strong arguments, based on the work of 
Hourwich, refuting the dangers of temporary migration as posed by professors J. Jenks 
and W. Lauck in The Immigration Problem. Birds of passage worked as a security valve 
for immigration, as the return movement following the economic crisis of 1907 
illustrated. Because of these patterns, immigration adapted more aptly to the fluctuations 
of American labor demands, preventing the congestion of large unemployed contingent in 
cities during economic downturns. Isaac Hourwich’s Immigration and Labor, sponsored 
by the AJC, represents an impressively prompt scientific refutation of the Dillingham 
Commission’s conclusions by using, predominantly, their empirical data.873 Hourwich 
criticized the commission for lack of historical perspective. He denounced the advanced 
conceptual dichotomy of ‘old versus new’ immigration, for being based on racial 
prejudice and underlined the economic powers at work even out the economic, social and 
political problems, in the long run. The use of Hourwich’s work by Sulzberger illustrates 
the growing fusion of scientific research, agenda’s of various interests groups and 
policymaking marking the Progressive Era (Hourwich, 1911 and 1912; Jenks and Lauck, 
1912; Berkowitz 2003, 260-261; Tichenor, 2002, 132).  
                                                 
872 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter December 9 1910, January 13, 
Augustus 7, 28, 1911.  
873 Isaac Hourwich worked as a government statistician at Washington giving him access to lot of 
data which he used in his book. Prior to his career as government official he co-founded the first unit of the 
Social Democratic Party in New York and strongly advocated liberal immigration policies as a corner stone 
of class solidarity at the International Socialist Congresses (Berkowitz, 2003, 260-261). 
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Associations representing the old immigrant groups continued to give their full 
support to obstructing restrictive policies. J. Koeble of National German American 
Alliance, speaking, as he claimed for two million German voters, also condemned the 
inhumane practices at Ellis Island in putting too much power in the hands of immigrant 
inspectors. The hearings at the Congressional Committees gave the different 
organizations a good opportunity to underline the importance of the foreign-born vote for 
the up-coming elections. Some days later, the Democratic Congressional Committee 
convened to discuss the support of more liberal immigration laws to secure foreign votes 
for the Democratic ticket.874 They needed a scheme to counter the previously succe sful 
Republican campaigns attracting a growing number of that electorate. The Cunard Line 
sent arguments and amendments to Senator James O’Gorman (NY, D) to block or adapt 
the immigration bill and attack it in the House if need be.875  The pressures could not stop 
Dillingham Bill from passing the Senate, however President Taft in full campaign for re-
election openly declared a veto on any law containing a literacy test. W. Bennet had 
arranged meetings with prominent members of the New York foreign-born community 
underlining their electoral importance, while the scretary of the department of 
Commerce and Labor provided him with arguments against restrictions. For his 
presidential campaign, he recruited Hammerling to make sure this message came across 
to the foreign-born voters (Tichenor, 2002, 135, Zeidel. 2004, 124).876  
At the same time the IRL kept on spreading the notio  of racial suicide and the 
need for selections based on eugenic principles underli ing that; “there were much more 
stringent regulations to import cattle, sheep, hogs, dogs and horses than human beings.” 
The steady opposition of foreign newspapers, foreign communities and foreign shipping 
lines in the US obstructed appropriate selections of the mothers and fathers of future 
American children (Hall, 1912, 94-102 and Ward, 1910, 56-57). Conversely, the shipping 
companies could not explicitly protest against the educational test, yet they opposed the 
pending bills for other reasons. Represented by Beers, Robert Walker (CL), E. Wortman 
(NGL), Emil Lederer and Edward Sandford (HAPAG) thelines objected to the measures 
                                                 
874 GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Office New York, 48-58, 97 160 and 190; Letters January 11, 12, 
16, May 7 1912 and NYT “Many opponents to Dillingham Bill” May 8 1912. 
875 CLA, Chairmen Correspondence, C 1, 63, Letter March 8 1912.  
876 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter April 23 1912 and NYT “Nagel 
denounces the Literacy Test” January 25 1913. 
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for increasing their financial responsibility for maintenance and hospital bills which 
should be covered by the Immigrant Fund. Head-taxes replenishing these funds were 
amply sufficient seeing no need to augment it to $5 as the Dillingham Bill, which had 
passed the Senate, recommended.  
During the debates on the bill in the House Committee, an old acquaintance of the 
committee members reappeared. William Bennet, repres nting the Italian lines and 
various ethnic groups, tore the Dillingham bill to pieces. The former Congressman 
pointed out that an augmentation of head taxes would make it harder for families to make 
the crossing. He also denounced the ‘LPC’ clause for putting immigration inspectors in 
the ‘place of God Almighty’. In the meantime Sabath tried to get a motion voted on the 
Dillingham Bill in the house committee, preventing the passage of the bill during the 
ongoing session and hence purging it. Yet, the Illinois representative lost by one vote. He 
then placed his distribution and steerage bills as the regular order of business to delay the 
Dillingham Bill to the next session. The speaker Clark gave valuable assistance in 
obstructing the bill. The lengthy petitions against it kept pouring in, while the committee 
members did not seem to agree on the amendments to the bill. C. Bennett concluded that 
therefore consideration for the bill was likely to be postponed. However, the advocates 
inserted the Burnett educational test in the Dillingham Bill under the same name making 
it possible to pass it both in the House and Senate i  a short time. The only way for the 
opponents to still reach the bill was by filibustering it under ‘call for committees’. Yet, 
the disagreement between the conferees on some amendments hindered an agreement to 
report the bill before the adjournment of the long sitting of 62nd Congress in August. The 
last chance for the advocates to pass the bill was during the final short session between 
December 1912 and March 1913 when Congress reconvened.877 
In the House a Burnett bill containing an educational test was swiftly approved by 
a big majority. Party lines were utterly broken during the vote, as the coalition leading the 
campaign between the Republican Gardner and Democrat Burnett illustrates. H. 
Goldfogle Joseph Moore, (Penn-R) and James Curley (Mass-D) leading the opposition 
did not succeed in turning the tide. Senate approved th  adaptations of the House, which 
                                                 
877 GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Office New York, 48-58, 97 160 and 190; Letters January 21 
May 7, 21 and June 4 1912 
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resulted in the Dillingham-Burnet Bill. The Senators opposing the bill and filibustered it 
by continuously sending it back for every little mistake they detected. But, Bennet 
reported that the IRL engaged in a massive campaign dvocating the bill. It was very 
unlikely for Senators to prevent its passage leaving Taft’s veto as the last hope. Taft kept 
his word.878 Some days later, the Republican Senate overrode his veto with a sweeping 
margin of 72 to 18 but the Democratic House with 213 votes against 114 failed to do so 
by a small margin. More than two years after the Dillingham Commission’s 
recommendations to restrict immigration the 62nd session came to an end sending the 
anti-immigration lobby back to the start (Hutchinso, 1981, 154; Tichenor, 2002, 137).879  
The next session, Dillingham and Burnett rewrote new drafts to prevent the newly 
elected democratic President Woodrow Wilson from pushing the immigration reform off 
the agenda. Although deep down he probably favored th  test, the President had also 
promised the foreign-born opposition to such a bill.  Dillingham now tried to impose 
quotas on entry per nationality, instead of an educational test. The shipping closed their 
ranks again with the Cunard Line re-entering the joint lobby efforts on the condition that 
the committee restricted its activities to legal means. The budget to fight the immigration 
laws increased.880 At a meeting with representatives of all the lines and L. Beers to 
discuss the appropriate course of action against the new bills they came to the following 
decision:  
“Former congressman W.S. Bennet, who successfully defeated the Burnet bill last 
year, will be send to Washington again for an undetermined period of time. He 
will keep us informed on the House and Senate Immigration Committees and 
openly represent us whenever needed proposing measures erving the interests of 
the steamship lines. Mr. Neal, legal representative of the American Line will 
assist him. Bennet’s salary will be paid pro ratio based on the number of 
passengers carried by all the lines. According to Bennet there are five House 
committee members favoring and five opposing the bill while three others are still 
undecided. Hence there is chance to defeat the bill in the committee already, yet 
the economic downturn is not an ally. On the House floor Bennet counts on the 
support of the sixty five catholic Representatives to counter the agitation of the 
                                                 
878 The night before the constitutional limitation of ten days expired, Taft had to act on the 
Immigration Bill and invited W. Williams, S. Gompers, R. Barthodlt, W. Bennet and C. Nagel. According 
to the NYT the last three favored a veto; Williams abstained from advocating the test only getting support 
of Gompers. NYT “Immigration Bill in Doubt” February 14 1913. 
879 GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Office New York, 48-58, 97, 160 and 190; Letters 17, 18 
December 1912, January 17, 21, February 4, 13, 15, 18, 20 1913. 
880 Ibid. Letter June 2, 13, 19, November 11 December 5 1913. 
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Labor unions. Because of the dangers of a secret inv stigation on the shipping 
lobby the lines decided to no longer maintain a particular fund against restrictive 
measures881.”     
 
As the earlier support for the cause from Western and Southern Congressmen 
faded the shipping lobby now forged alliances with catholic House Representatives 
fearing the rise of an anti-religious Socialist movement. The appointment of W. Bennet 
underlines the commitment of the lines to keeping the gates at Ellis Island wide open. 
The ties with the prominent member of the Dillingham Commission makes one wonder 
to when they actually date back and to what extent i  may have influenced his work on 
the Commission. Besides contributing to the joint lobby efforts, the HAL also agreed to 
help NLIL which encountered financial difficulties in continuing its activities. Gips, 
praised Behar for his support for liberal migration policies both in the US and in Europe 
and advised contributing through Europe instead of the New York office to avoid 
scandals.882 In the meantime, the gradual takeover of Capitol Hill by lobbyists had started 
to raise apprehension among Congressmen, pushing President Wilson to appoint two 
commissions to investigate lobbying activities.  
The accumulating tensions in Europe also stimulated governments on the old 
continent to restrict the movement. The Russian authorities contemplated a law to control 
foreign mail and confiscate all prepaid tickets or letters enticing emigration. Yet the new 
New York head agent was not particularly alarmed by the news: “luckily drafting a law is 
one thing, enacting and enforcing it still another.”883 American contemporary 
restrictionist would have bitterly corroborated this view. The House and the Senate 
approved a literacy bill once more in 1915 with a vote of 253 to 126 and 50 to 7 
respectively, yet President Wilson vetoed the test. Only four votes in the House failed to 
override it (Tichenor, 2002, 136-138). His second veto against the test two years later did 
not survive the increasing pressures for restrictions. The Great War totally disrupted the 
European mass migration movement which had started a century prior. The passage of 
                                                 
881 Ibid. Letter December 12 1913. 
882 Since its beginnings the NLIL had received funds from the steamship lines. However the 
financial support from the lines leaked to the American forcing the NLIL to discontinue its activities in 
1915. Ibid Letter November 3 1913 and (Hall, 1913, 739; Higham, 1955, 132 and Zolberg, 2006, 218). 
883 GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Office New York, 48-58, 97 160 and 190; Letter, August 18 
1913. 
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the literacy test and the quota acts made sure that the flow could not regain the same 
intensity after the signing of the peace agreements at Versailles. To what extent these 
laws were enacted because of the war’s devastating effect on the organization of the 
North Atlantic shipping-cartel, and the subsequent weakening influence of its visible 
hand safeguarding the unrestricted movement of its main source of revenue on both sides 
of the Atlantic, remains to be seen.  
 
6) Beware of the Gatekeeper: Williams’ second term at the Island of Tears 
  
 6.1) The ‘financial test’: raising the entrance fees to the New World 
 
At Ellis Island Williams tried to implement what Congress failed to enact; raising 
the barriers of entry for the increasing influx of what he considered ‘low-grade 
immigrants’ meaning the poor illiterate from Southern and Eastern Europe. He started off 
by stating that every migrant arriving at New York with less than $25 in addition to the 
railroad ticket would be considered as ‘likely to become a public charge’. His declaration 
caused a lot of commotion among shipping lines; arranging an emergency meeting with 
the Commissioner. Williams showed no intention of budging an inch, continuing the 
strict enforcement of the $25 rule with special attention for prepaid tickets which he 
considered assisted passengers. Gips accused Williams of targeting the Jews with his 
policy. He sent out circulars to the migrant agents urging them send at least $10 along 
with the prepaid ticket, followed shortly later by a new circular advising to raise that 
amount to $25. Ballin urged the lines to file a joint protest yet the New York head-agents 
believed a direct intervention to be dangerous and u wise, favoring an indirect protest 
through the NLIL. They managed to pass about forty percent of the passengers who did 
not possess $25, especially those giving a bona fide address of family in the US. As Gips 
noted, Ellis Island did not dispose of the appropriate facilities to control all the 
newcomers nor to detain them in such large numbers. To give the rejected a fair chance 
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Williams allowed the shipping lines to look at the Minutes of the board of Special Inquiry 
to prepare an appeal.884  
In the meantime, the lines hired a lawyer to investigate discrimination against 
prepaid passengers. Tensions built up by the time Potsdam arrived at New York mid-July 
1909 with 679 third-class passengers. Three hundred an  four passengers were 
preliminary detained, 186 of those awaited extra money while 118 others were 
transferred to the Board of Special Inquiry. Although the bulk of these passengers 
eventually obtained the right of landing, the detention periods varying from days to 
weeks caused enormous congestion at the control station. Williams iron rule led to a 
spectacular increase of deportations which in the first week of July nearly reached six 
percent.885 Ships started to leave Ellis Island with an important contingent of rejected 
passengers who did not always peacefully accept their faith. The press reported that the 
control station stood on a verge of a mutiny. Williams blamed the shipping companies, 
especially the smaller ones such as the Uranium Line pointing to the fact that out of the 
231 passengers of the Volturno 169 arrived with less than $10, 90 of whom less than $5.  
The agitation against Williams escalated and W. Bennet voiced the complaints of 
the Jewish community to President Taft. Max Kohler of the AJC used the exclusion 
under the $25 measure of four co-religionists to make  test case under writ of habeas 
corpus at the US Circuit Court.886 Judge Hand accepted the case of the four men yet 
limited the scope of the inquiry declaring himself not to be in a position to judge on the 
good faith of the immigrant inspectors. The judge ruled in favor of the deported. In the 
meantime Williams had released them hoping to prevent Kohler from pressing the matter 
even further and use it as test case to abolish the $25 rule. By the end of July Gips 
reported that Williams gave in to the pressures, relaxing the $25 somewhat.887  Six 
                                                 
884 To handle the spectacular increase of appeals Williams established an intermediate court in 
New York to prevent congestions at the Department of Commerce and Labor in Washington. 
885 582 out of the 10.179 arrivals 
886 Kohler denounced Williams with a circular he sent to all the immigrant inspectors and 
members of the board of special inquiry asking them to put an end to the practice of certain shipping 
companies landing immigrants whose funds are insufficient to support them until they found a job. 
Williams asked to implement the 25 dollar rule in the absence of a statutory provision. According to Kohler 
this proved that Williams seriously exceeded his powers.  
887 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226; Letters June 21, July 1, 2, 9, 16, 1909 and 
NYT, “Put up the Bars on Immigration” June 5; “Our shores barred against foreign Outcasts” July 10; 
“Legal Test against Deported Aliens” July 12; “Trouble feared from the excluded” July 14; “Protest made 
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months later however, the HAL head-agent complained that Williams reinforced the $25 
rule more strictly than ever before. The inspectors refused to consider money wired to 
Ellis Island by distant relationships or friends after arrival, still making exception for 
immediate family.  
The strictness of the application of the rule continued to vary the following years. 
Passengers with direct family ties in America remained exempt of the so called ‘financial 
test’. The lines considered compelling the passengers to possess the said amount before 
embarking, especially cash passengers, who generally h d weaker ties in the US than 
prepaid passengers and who ran higher risks of being deported.888 The passenger 
manifests of the arrivals in 1912 reflect the importance of these ties with eighty percent 
claiming to be joining family, fourteen friends and only six percent mentioning no point 
of reference at all (Kohler, 1914, 99). Because of Williams’ $25 rule, the number of 
passengers detained at Ellis Island reached twenty percent while under his management 
the Board of Special Inquiry debarred two percent of he newcomers. In comparison, 
Watchorn only detained seven percent for further inquiry, excluding slightly over one 
percent of the newcomers.  
Williams’ policy created serious congestion during peak season. The 
commissioner repeatedly requested an appropriation t  enlarge Ellis Island’s 
infrastructure but Taft always refused. The President did not want to encourage New 
York’s dominant position for the migrant trade even more hoping part of it would divert 
to Southern ports, yet this hope was idle.889 The indirect impact of Williams’ policies as a 
                                                                                                                                      
to Taft” and “Williams accused if terrorizing men” July 16; “Williams to explain his test in court”, July 17; 
“Detained Russians permitted to land” July 22; “Obeying Law at Ellis Island” July 26; “Able-bodied 
Immigrants” July 27; “Immigration Laws” July 28; “Sustains Williams in barring Aliens”; July 30 1909. 
888 GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Office New York, 48-58, 97 160 and 190; Letters February 1 and 
March 1 April 15 1910, September 11, November 3, December 5, 23 1913.  
889 When conducting an investigation of Ellis Island in 1906 Reynolds stated that about seven 
percent were detained. During the fiscal year 1911 749.642 immigrants arrived at Ellis Island. The 
inspectors admitted 603.384 of them on the first control. The other 146 258 were held for special Inquiry. 
The board ordered the deportation of 14.500 people but the statistics do not indicate their race or 
nationality. For the fiscal year 1913 1.197.892 immigrants arrived of whom 19.938 were sent back. NYT 
“Reynolds investigates Ellis Island Affaires” September 16 1906; “Taft wants more ports to get Aliens” 
October 19; “Ports for incoming Aliens” October 20 1910; “Turned back 14.500 last year” November 3; 
“Undesirable Immigrants” November 14 1911; “Straus sees peril in W.B. Wilson Plan” January 20 1914. 
 466
deterrent for migration is much harder to establish. Yet travellers of the HAL reported 
that the strict implementation of the laws had a demoralizing effect on the bookings.890  
 
6.2) See you in Court: place of predilection where Williams and shipping 
companies met 
 
To reduce interference of charity and missionary organizations fighting 
deportations Williams barred a good number of representatives of these organizations 
from Ellis Island. He was backed by the investigation of the Dillingham Commission 
reporting on the dubious character of some of these institutions in abusing the 
immigrants. Williams temporarily stopped the practice of discharging to homes posing 
bonds for persons who had no money. Williams’ policies backed by Nagel represented a 
complete turnaround from the approach of Straus andWatchorn. The latter never 
imposed financial requirements except as a means to reach their final destination. Strauss 
frequently overruled deportation decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry and even 
administered a special fund to support those without means who could not get assistance 
from other institutions guaranteeing the landing of as many passengers as possible 
(Dillingham Commission, vol XXXVII, 1911; Pitkin, 1974, 42, Tichenor, 2002, 122).891  
With their lawyers, shipping companies sought ways to mitigate the financial 
repercussions of Williams’ reinstatement. The shipping lines first stopped paying the 
medical bills for the treatment of diseases, which were not included on the list of 
inadmissible for entry, such as the scarlet fever and measles; claiming that these should 
be financed with the Immigrant Fund. By the end of the year, Williams ran out of funds 
to cover these which amounted to $40,000.892 The lines had always defrayed these costs, 
hence the commissioner decided to force them to continue to do so. He carried out 
preliminary controls for these diseases on board of the ship and to prevent their transfer 
to Ellis Island. If shipping companies used section 16 of the Immigration to force their 
landing he threatened to send all steerage and cabin p ssengers to Ellis Island. To avoid 
                                                 
890 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter February 2 1911. 
891 NYT “Ousts Aid Societies from Ellis Island” August 11; “To Rid Ellis Island of Bogus 
Charities” August 12; “Third Home Ousted from Ellis I land” August 13;  “Barred From Ellis Island” 
August 29 1909. 
892 The costs for the treatment of measles for instance varied from 1.5 to 2 dollars per day 
depending on the hospital that cared for the patients. With the treatment taking on average 4 to 5 weeks, the 
average expense amounted to 55 dollars.  
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costly delays and prevent the conflict from escalating he lines paid the bills again. Yet 
despite the commissioner’s continuous letters, the companies refused to reimburse the 
unsettled bills. For two years, Williams threatened with all sorts of measures yet he did 
not want to take it to court fearing he may loose th  case. But, the commissioner lost his 
patience and dragged the lines to court. The judge ruled in favor of the HAL causing a lot 
of excitement among the lines. All of the sudden the payment of all the food and 
maintenance by the lines also seemed unsure. The Department of Justice appealed the 
decision, putting off the HAL’s claim of $30,000 inmaintenance fees. This provisional 
victory was preceded by another verdict in their favor, declaring that the White Slave 
trade Act of 1910 had no retroactive power. It exempted the lines from defraying the 
costs of people ordered to be deported for violating the act and having resided longer than 
three years in the country.893  
Not all court rulings were in favor of the lines. The lines lost a test case seeking to 
exempt children of naturalized immigrants from exclusion under the contagious and 
loathsome disease clause. Some companies brought up the idea again to include 
insurances covering the cost for eventual deportatin. But even in 1906 the HAL had sent 
circulars to agents that such insurances were a viol tion to the immigration laws. The law 
of 1907 specifically included that; “no charge for the return of any alien to be deported 
or any security should be taken for payment of said charge; any violation would be 
deemed as misdemeanor.” The Supreme Court also ruled that debarred passengers 
possessing a return ticket needed to be reimbursed for the return ticket and deported at 
cost of the shipping line. This eliminated the opportunity of forcing high risk passengers 
from buying a return ticket as well. The court activity underlines the growing tensions 
between Williams and the shipping companies. The lin s also started to refuse payments 
of food and lodging bills, denouncing the commissioner for overcharging them. When 
asking for explanations on the bills, Williams declared not to have time for these and that; 
“ the steamship companies should not take cases to court because what he said was law.”  
                                                 
893 Congress passed the White Slave Trade Act to fightthe abuses with immigrant prostitutes. For 
the first time there was no time limit on deportation for those breaking this law. GAR, HAL, 318.02, 
General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters September 21 and October 20, November 19 December 211909, 
December 17 1910, February 10 1911, 21 June July 12 19 , May 19, June 6, July 18, November 30, 1913. 
NYT, “Liners must take care of the Alien Sick” December 20 1909; “To test the law deporting aliens” 
September 10 1910. 
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His authoritarian rule earned him the title of ‘Czar of Ellis Island’, making for 
himself a lot of enemies among the foreign-born communities. Williams still believed 
that the ‘inferior’ immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, which drove away 
‘good’ immigrants from Northern Europe, to other destinations. Clearly, in his eyes new 
immigrants were not as white on arrival as the old stock, an argument he repeatedly used 
to justify his racist selections. Jewish organizations accused him of abusing the clause, by 
excluding people physically unable to earn a living and to discriminating against Jews 
through special physical tests. Williams also experim nted with the Binet-Simon test to 
track down feeblemindedness.894 M. Braun and L. Hammerling established the American 
Immigration Society advocating new immigration laws and proper administration, 
protesting against the unrighteous deportations. Taft received them together with a 
delegation of thirty prominent figures of the foreign language press coming from across 
the country whose transport was partly paid for by the shipping companies. They 
remonstrated against Williams’ policies, backed by the National German Alliance 
questioning the sanity of presidential appointee and demanding his removal. 
Representative William Sulzer (NY-D) voiced their claims at Capitol Hill obtaining a 
parliamentary investigation on the procedures at Ellis Island.  
Burnett fervently defended the commissioner blaming the steamship companies 
for the attacks:  
“you can find steamship runners all over Europe seeking to induce the worst in the 
land to come. Whenever these shipping companies do not like a member of 
Congress, there is no mistaking it. I have felt their force in their last campaign. 
They will send their emissaries all through the country for the purpose of crushing 
any man who gets in their way. They do it in a secretive insidious manner. I have 
no doubt they are trying to crush Mr. Williams in his effort to do right.”895  
 
The investigation did not yield any grounds on which to dismiss the commissioner 
leaving the pro-immigration lobby with no other choice than to await the end of his term 
to have him replaced. The first to come up for reappointment was Keefe; yet after a 
scandal of accepting free tickets for his family from railroad and steamship companies 
                                                 
894 It tested the ability to repeat numbers, keenness of observation, native ingenuity, ability to point 
out absurdities in oral test questions etc. If applied thoroughly seven percent of the new entrants would 
have been debarred in 1912 (Hoyt, 1916 460-62). 
895 NYT “Names Please, says Ellis island boss” October 9 1911. 
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Nagel forced him to resign.896 The shipping lobbyists worked hard to prevent the 
appointment of the labour-friendly Anthony Caminetti as Commissioner General of 
Immigration, but without success. Shortly after, Williams resigned to go back to his law 
firm. Byron Uhl Williams’ assistant took over temporarily as acting commissioner and it 
took Wilson another year before appointing Frederic C. Howe to take over. In the 
meantime W. Wilson substituted Nagel as secretary of the Department of Commerce of 
labour. With the personnel change in the key position of the immigrant administration the 
tensions with the shipping companies appeased somewhat. The calm before storm as it 
turned out.897  
 
7) Conclusion: The successful campaign of the shipping lobby in opposing racist 
immigration restrictions  
 
 Based on an econometric analysis of American immigration policies Williamson 
and Hatton concluded; “that racism and xenophobia did not seem to have been at work in 
driving the evolution of policy towards potential European Migrants and that eugenics 
motives never borne out at the end of the first global century.” Labor market conditions, 
and the declining quality, rather than the increasing quantity, caused the transition to 
restrictive policies. They also point to the correlation of economic downturns and 
renewed attention for immigration restrictions in Congress and stricter enforcement of the 
existing immigration laws. Higham also noted a collapse of nativsim with the economic 
recovery after 1898, and resurging in 1905 (Williamson and Hatton, 2004, 27; 2006, 161-
67, 174-177 and Higham, 1955, 110, 158). Yet, the evidence presented here for the 
period 1880-1914 does not corroborate fluctuations in nativism or their supposed 
insignificant role.  
                                                 
896 This was a violation of the 1906 Interstate Commerce Law, NYT “Asks Keefe dismissal” 
February 22 1913.  
897 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter August 20, November 15 1910 
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1911; “Lines refuse to pay Ellis Island Bills September 1 1912; “Czar of Ellis Island” July 13 1912. 
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Conversely, the movement grew from the 1880s onwards to become 
institutionalized in 1894 with the foundation of the Immigration Restriction League. The 
so-called collapse, as noted by Higham, was caused by the investigation of the Industrial 
Commission- just as the Dillingham Commission impeded any action on the immigration 
legislation in Congress. From its foundation to the passage of the literacy test in 1917 the 
IRL remained the driving force behind the restrictionist movement and never gave up the 
influencing Congress and public opinion. The movement pleaded more and more openly 
to implement eugenics’ selection criteria to protect he ‘Teutonic Americans’ from racial 
suicide caused by the growing influx of the inferior Mediterranean immigrants. Nativists 
correlated the receding quality of the migrants’ labor skills with racial characteristics 
linking social, political and economic arguments for restrictions. The growing influx and 
the economic downturns helped in placing their arguments higher on the political agenda, 
but did not determine policy changes.898 The IRL made sure the issue never left the 
public debate, even during economic upswings. Based on scientific research, they 
published in academic journals and popular press convincing an ever greater part of the 
population and politicians of the need for restrictions. As Tichenor mentioned, the 
fragmentation of power and changing institutional structures in the American 
governmental system gave interest groups constant openings for direct advocacy through 
lobbyists at Washington.  
The shipping lobby proved more successful than the IRL in using these openings 
to prevent the enactment of restrictions despite, an ever decreasing pro-immigration 
platform in Congress. The influence of the shipping lobby goes back to the beginning of 
the long nineteenth century making it the oldest, most constant and influential interest 
group in the immigration debate known for its strange-bedfellow coalitions. Divided in 
American and foreign interests, it pursued different agenda regarding the involvement of 
the government to regulate the competition for the trade in which the dominant foreign 
arm successfully obstructed attempts of the American shipowners to obtain competitive 
advantages. Regarding immigration restrictions both advocated a laissez faire policy 
joining forces after the establishment of the IRL. During the Progressive Era, they 
                                                 
898 As Tichenor argued between 1880’s and 1930’s economic downturns failed to produce policy 
changes while Congress enacted restrictive immigration laws when economic conditions were fairly 
healthy (Tichenor, 2002 19-23). 
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instigated opposition first by playing out the inter al political tensions between the 
Southern and Western States versus Eastern and Northern States; second by mobilizing 
several old stock and subsequently new migrant groups against the Anglo-Saxon nativist 
threat; third by forging alliances with employer organizations. The shipping lobby proved 
to be more responsive to the shifts in power balances both within and between national 
governing institutions.  
It used the increasing tendency of appointing scientif cally-supported 
investigation commissions for policymaking as a tool  delay action on immigration and 
they positioned inside men on these. It also made sure that their interests were 
represented in standing immigration committees to adapt the bills to their likings or 
prevent them from being reported. Apart from the lobbyists in Washington they hired the 
manager of the Congressional Information Bureau to spread favorable information among 
congressmen and to obtain inside informed on every action taken regarding immigration 
and maritime issues. With the important legislative powers designated to the House 
Speaker who collaborated with shipping lobby sharing the same views on immigration 
restriction, they prevented the enactment of bills when the great majority of 
Representatives favored these. As a last resort, shipping companies relied on the veto of 
the President who became increasingly susceptible to the electoral importance of the 
foreign born vote. By establishing, financing and mobilizing associations representing the 
various ethnic groups the shipping companies made sur  it stayed that way. The rising 
popular press also played a significant role. Shipping companies hired journalists to 
counter restrictionist propaganda. They received th unconditional support of the foreign 
language press, whose editors often acted as migrant agents and profited of shipping 
advertisements being directly interested in the migrant trade.  
The shipping companies also displayed an enormous zeal in adapting the 
implementation of the existing laws to their interests. As the immigration control system 
developed a lot of power fell into the hands of the Immigration Commissioners and their 
superiors; the Commissioner General of Immigration and the Secretary of the Department 
of Commerce and Labor. Shipping companies tried to have a voice in these presidential 
appointments because the ambiguity of the laws left a lot of room for personal 
interpretations on how to implement these. It allowed them to impose stricter controls 
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when economic or political pressures called for it. Often commissioners introduced new 
measures, such as preventing the traffic of young bootblackers or the financial test- which 
only became law afterwards. As the remote control policy gained ground the officials put 
more and more responsibility on the shipping companies to keep out ‘undesirables’. Who 
fell under that category depended a lot on the personal views of the Immigrant 
Commissioner at Ellis Island- where today more than a hundred million US residents can 
trace back their heritage.  
Apart from Williams and Weber, the heads of Ellis Island tended not to share 
strong racist restrictionist ideologies yet all contributed in optimizing the controls and 
closing the backdoors. It led to efficient health controls, elaborate deportation procedures, 
bigger appropriations to implement the laws, etc. The imposition of new measures 
usually happened in dialogue with shipping companies. The number of deportations 
increased but the barriers of entry remained relatively low and shipping companies went 
to great lengths to guarantee the right of landing of their passengers using both licit and 
illicit means. When radical commissioners, such as Williams, proved unwilling to 
moderate their views to the liking of shipping companies and foreign-born communities, 
they built up pressure to make him give in, or to obtain his removal. The interference of 
the shipping lobby both in enacting and implementing immigration policies explains why 
between 1897 and 1914 approximately ten million immgrants from South and Eastern 
Europe, by many considered as inferior, legally passed through the gates. 
   
Conclusion:  
  
 By approaching the nineteenth century transatlantic mass migration movement in 
the first place, as a trade, adds to our understanding about; (1) business structures 
sustaining chain migration patterns, (2) the structural development of passenger lines into 
large cartels turning migrant transport into big business and (3) the origins and early 
development of migration laws and enforcement methods t  regulate their movement.  
Placing one of the remaining missing pieces of the puzzle -the steam shipping 
companies- at the heart of the European mass migration story underlines their pivotal role 
in enabling, facilitating and stimulating the process.  
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 Transatlantic business networks were entangled in the transnational chain 
migration networks through which a majority of the migrants moved. Migrant agents and 
brokers, especially those selling prepaid and return passages in the US, represent key 
‘meso’ level figures connecting both. The focus on the American market underlines the 
importance of established immigrant entrepreneurs in ethnic enclaves within this process. 
Sharing the same background put them in a privileged position to gain trust of co-ethnics 
who depended on them for key services to fulfill their migration strategies. Selling 
railroad and ocean passage tickets to return home or s nd for friends, relatives or other 
third parties constituted one of these. Through prepaid tickets the agent connected the 
purchaser with the shipping company and local agents in Europe organizing the crossing 
of the passenger. Organizing meant arranging the inland transport to the port of 
embarkation and supplying information on how to bypass eventual barriers. At these 
barriers and key transit points, other agents provided assistance to ensure a smooth 
transition synchronizing the arrival at the port of embarkation with the departures of 
shipping companies.  
These middlemen provided means facilitating the passage of migrants traveling 
along these chains, yet especially in Europe they also ssisted people traveling outside of 
these. The analysis of the American market does not escape Dudley Baines critique of the 
predominant use of sources which inherently tend to overemphasize the importance of the 
friends and relatives effect (Baines, 1991, 48). Future research on the organization of the 
European market should complete some indications pre ented here on the role of migrant 
agents as distributors of information on; (1) opportunities abroad supplied by consuls, 
labor agents, landspeculators, new world employers, state agencies, etc., (2) ways to 
reach and finance the destinations, and (3) on laws regulating the passage and 
possibilities to circumvent them. This would complete the picture of the entanglements 
between business and migration closing the gap to the level where migrant decisions are 
taken both in and outside the chains. Businessmen increase their sales by influencing 
decisions to buy their product and to do so migrant agents resorted to all the modern 
advertising techniques available.  
Not so much the financial gain on ticket sales but much more the crucial 
importance of this migrant service to develop and attract other business opportunities, 
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made this product so attractive to migrant entrepreneurs in the US. To contract clients 
they used the booming popular press in which they often had interests promoting the 
ocean passage sales directly through advertisements and indirectly by reporting on the 
conditions in the home country. Personal contacts were fundamental to enlarge and gain 
the confidence of their customer base. Therefore migrant agents and brokers also resorted 
to forms of direct marketing through letters contaiing promotional material and by 
hiring canvassers and peddlers. The variety of services offered by immigrant agents also 
brought them in direct contact as grosser, notaries, eal estate agents, boarding bosses, 
saloon keepers, labor agents, etc. In sum agents not only helped migrants cross the ocean, 
they often also provided them with a job, a place to stay, land to start a new beginning, 
legal documents to do so, products and news from back home.  
The number of these services rendered varied from agent to agent, yet another 
category that they never failed to offer besides the sale of steamship tickets were migrant 
specific banking transactions such as managing deposits, money exchanges, loans and 
international money transfers. The close ties betwen banking and ocean passage sales 
spurred the sale of tickets on credit. On what scale this happened remains unclear, yet 
that it was institutionalized and that steamship companies seemed unable to put an end to 
this indicates that it was well established. The source doesn’t reveal either if 
entrepreneurs combining banking with steamship and l bor agencies advanced the money 
themselves. The combinations of the three seemed more common on the Mediterranean 
than on the Continental market yet sometimes employers and padrones financed the 
crossing instead of friends or relatives. Using first hand sources of immigrant banks, and 
hopefully the many names mentioned may lead to these, should shed more light on what 
scale this happened and give a more detailed account of the techniques employed of these 
agents to increase their clientele. Charity and philanthropic organizations financing the 
move also provided an efficient way of securing busine s for these agents although part 
of the organizations dealt directly with the companies.  
Until the turn of the century, these migrant entrepreneurs practically had a free 
hand on the market because American banking institutions failed to see any advantage in 
the short term deposits and remittance market. When t y did, they invested heavily in 
foreign departments to attract the migrant clientele. Only with their ascendancy did some 
 475
states pass laws regulating the activities of migrant gents, something which the 
European authorities had done a long time before. Future investigation needs to indicate 
to what extent the American banking lobby pressed for these laws to drive the many 
unofficial immigrant banks out of the market, just a  they tried to put an end to the power 
of shipping companies in freely choosing to whom they attributed ticket books for ocean 
passage.  
The importance of these middlemen, on both sides of the Atlantic, lifting 
psychological barriers, reducing risks and financial restraints of the move, brought the 
New World much closer in the mental maps of Europeans and have not yet received the 
attention they deserve. Migrant agents constituted a vital link in the chain migration 
pattern, but also for the ones traveling outside of these. Therefore, for passenger lines 
controlling the agent-network was essential to regulate the competition for the trade. 
 
 The commercial importance of the migrant trade triggered keen competition 
between migrant brokers, shipping companies and ports t  attract the flow dating back to 
the sailing ship era when the fundaments of the organization of the trade were laid out. 
As the scene where technological innovations were first introduced, passenger lines on 
the North Atlantic first felt the impact of increased investments and risks on the structure 
of the company. The organization in joint stock companies allowed the lines to sustain 
the required growth. The specialization of the migrant trade controlled by steam driven 
liner services completely drove tramp ships out of the trade. Nevertheless, the 
competitive tensions between the companies remained high as new entrants tried to 
acquire a slice of the cake, while existing ones tried to increase theirs. The battle between 
the lines resulted profitable for migrant agents because it increased their commission. 
Yet, especially purchasers of ocean passage benefitd rom the situation since it 
pressured down the rates while often the extra commission ended in their pockets because 
the equally keen competition among agents pushed them o use return it to the client.  
To neutralize these pressures the Holland America Line rationalized the 
organization of the business both through vertical integration and horizontal combination. 
The company took the passage business which previously was managed by migrant 
brokers into own hands, cutting down on the commission and trying to increase its grip 
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on the agent-network. The HAL also opened new inland offices at key points at both 
sides of the Atlantic. Simultaneously it entered the Continental Conference, a cartel 
agreement between the main Continental lines that sought to; reduce the competition 
between the members, fend off the continental market f om external pressures of outside 
lines and impose regulations on the migrant agents. The ultimate goal was to put an end 
to the constant rate wars and allow the lines to se stable and more profitable rates. 
Gradually the firms collaborated towards a workable equilibrium; firstly by neutralizing 
rivals at their homeports; secondly by reinforcing the internal ties to defy the dominance 
of the British lines which had introduced the conference system in the shipping industry. 
This rivalry polarized the North Atlantic Passenger Market into three sub-markets; the 
British-Scandinavian, Continental and Mediterranean.  
By concluding profit-sharing pool-agreements dividing the steerage market in 
quotas the Continental lines set the cornerstone both to take the ascendancy over the 
British lines and to acquire control on the steerag rates. Market specific features of 
passenger transport spurred collusion between the lines. Conversely to freight traffic 
where shipping brokers collaborated to obtain stable rates, migrant brokers prospered and 
managed to increase their grip on the trade as long as the market remained instable. The 
HAL saw its efforts to move forward into the market cancelled out by migrant brokers 
who played out the rivalry between the shipping companies to take control of ocean 
passage sales. This went as far as bypassing shipping lines altogether, reintroducing 
tramp ships in the passenger business. The financial strains of this situation forced the 
British and Continental lines to collude. The latter showed much greater unity thanks to 
the pool agreements than the former lacking these. This affected the positions at the 
negotiation table where lines frequently met to re-confer the agreements.  
By forcing the British lines into the Continental pool in 1896, Continental lines 
finally managed to impose the rules to discipline th  migrant brokers and agents who lost 
the possibility of playing out the companies against each other. It allowed them to reduce 
the commission and significantly increase the rates which could now be adapted to the 
pool-logic maximizing the profits. The continental pool members used the subsequent 
market stability to consolidate and expand the harmony to freight and cabin business. 
Also internally by fixing through rates and striking out the tonnage clause competitive 
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pressures were further reduced. The far-reaching collaboration enabled the lines within 
the Hamburg-Le Havre range to firmly control the growing continental market moving 
eastwards and resist the many external pressures from affecting it. While freight rates 
plummeted, passenger fares peaked as the market boomed entering the twentieth century. 
The success attracted the interest of new entreprenu s such as, JP Morgan, who tried to 
lift the consolidation to a higher level by way of merger. Instead the IMM combine made 
an end to the fragile equilibrium among the British lines undermining the whole North 
Atlantic passenger market. By containing the attacks of the Cunard Line to certain 
regions preventing a general rate reduction, the Continental lines displayed the control 
which they had achieved over the continental market.  
The continuous high demand for steerage berths on the continent helped their 
cause yet at the same time it incited a growing number of nations to develop the merchant 
marine through the movement as national tendencies built up. The pool members tried to 
avoid conflicts with new lines that received government support in countries either where 
they tapped from or delivered migrants to. Authorities started taking a more pronounced 
stance towards migratory movements and increased bureaucratization provided means to 
apply these, something the Hungarian case had clearly illustrated. Rather than risking 
both the implementation of new barriers on their trade and a costly rate war, the 
Continental lines preferred to cede a small slice of the cake to entrants rather than 
fighting them as happened with the Austria-Americana d Canadian Pacific. Sometimes 
dialogue was not sufficient to convince the entrant s the Russian case showed. When 
market conditions permitted predatory pricing strategies forced dissident outsiders either 
out of business or into the agreement. Although gradually the Continental lines saw their 
share of the continental market being reduced, the increasing number of passengers 
allowed them to retain a high volume of sales with a igh profit margin. The complexity 
of the continental agreements allowed higher rates to be quoted than on the 
Mediterranean and British-Scandinavian markets and in the meantime prevented that 
these sub-markets affected the organization of the continental business. The unity among 
the pool members allowed the lines to gain loyalty from the migrant-agent network 
despite external pressures trying to corrupt them.  The conference agency was too 
important for the general development of the migrant e trepreneurs’ business to risk 
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loosing it. Notable exceptions remained and abuses never disappeared yet these were 
contained.  
The success of the pre-world war one continental passenger conference in 
maintaining high and profitable rates greatly contrasts with similar agreements both for 
cargo carriers on the same route and for American railroads during the 1870 and 80s. 
This success and the cheap market specific organization of ticket sales through migrant 
agents may explain why so little vertical integration occurred in this business sector. Yet 
whether therefore steamship lines had the least impact on the development of ‘modern 
business enterprise’, as Chandler claimed is debatable (Chandler, 1977, 189). Only 
pointing to the obvious fact that shipping conferences are still the most common form to 
organize international seaborne trade indicates that the managerial revolution was maybe 
not the only response to changing business conditios. The American anti-trust storm 
eventually also reached the North-Atlantic shipping i dustry, yet the lobby successfully 
fought for the existence of the conference system. The delicate sovereignty issue of 
governing international waters allowed the lines to minimize government intervention 
and take advantage of the authority vacuum caused by glo alization many decades before 
other industries could. Through the migrant agent network is also used and developed 
innovating direct and indirect marketing strategies. Future research analyzing the full 
scope of how these companies managed to combine cabin, steerage, delicate goods, cargo 
and mail business on the same ship, together with other services worldwide, should 
reveal the true impact of these companies on the organization and development of 
‘modern global business’. 
 
 The direct impacts of the conference agreements on the migrant are various. The 
division in various markets and sub-markets greatly defined the routes through which 
migrants from certain regions moved. Initially these inland routes became cheaper as 
fixing rates for ocean passage increased the pressures on inland fares. Only when through 
rates were fixed did the downward spiral come to an end. The competition also moved 
towards the service offered at important transit places, the port of embarkation, on board 
and on arrival. The companies started taking full responsibility to protect the migrant 
from unpleasant experiences throughout the journey. The HAL turned the once 
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unaccommodating, risky trip into a well organized and relatively safe venture opening its 
own hotels and replacing bunk spaced steerage accommodation by a cheap version of 
second class state rooms. The passenger liners could n t yet offer a door to door service 
yet the competition for the business spurred the int gration of a transatlantic transport 
network. Finally, analyzing the HAL gross prices befor  and after the pool agreement 
shows that these nearly doubled over the period. This underestimates the true financial 
impact for the purchaser as the commissions which were often returned to him also 
diminished. How to measure the impact of this remains  hard nut to crack.  
The absence of correlation between migratory movements and third class ocean 
passage fares in this study reflects the skepticism of whether one should be looked for. 
Based on the fact that rate wars failed to redress the downward spiral of migration during 
economic recessions previous studies have tended to conclude that companies failed to 
accelerate the movement trough price policies. Yet shipping companies used recessions 
to settle tensions and renegotiate agreements to limit financial losses of rate wars, having 
no direct intention in trying to encourage migration. Nothing indicates that shipping 
companies used price policies to stimulate flows, as big fluctuation were determined by 
economic forces far beyond their reach. The influence of shipping companies is much 
more on the organizational level greatly reducing the risks of the journey, spreading 
constant propaganda on how to reach the New World and bringing it much closer in the 
mental maps of Europeans.  
As the migration fever spread on the old continent, the competition between 
shipping companies ensured that new markets were supplied with means to fulfill the 
migratory wish. Aware of the potential of chain migration patterns, the shipping industry 
developed the market of prepaid and return tickets r inforcing these and lowering the 
financial barriers of the move. The sale of tickets on credit also makes it hard to measure 
the influence of prices on flows as the move could be worked off in the New World by 
relatives or migrants themselves. Moreover, the price of ocean passage was only a part of 
the total cost of the move. The competition between the shipping companies reduced 
other costs such as loss of wages during the move and inland transport. Also other factors 
such as the long trend annual earnings should be taken into account, yet sharing the 
opinion of Williamson, Hatton and Hvidt the price of ocean passages are unlikely to have 
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caused many variations in the migrant flows, even if these doubled between 1885 and 
1914 (Hvidt, 1975; Williamson and Hatton, 1998, 14-16). The apparent lack of impact on 
the flows and deportations of Williams’ measures to possess $10 and later $25 as a 
requirement for entry also seem to point that way. The importance of the shipping 
companies is much more based; on one hand on the quality of service and means offered 
which sustained the gradual growth of the movement, and on the other hand their efforts 
to prevent the enactment of legal barriers restricting migration and providing means to 
circumvent the ones that did. 
 Shipping companies went great lengths to protect their rade and because national 
governments for a long time also in the first place considered migration as such, explains 
why laws regulating the transport preceded those regulating the entry and exit of citizens 
and aliens. The initial reluctance of taking unilater l decisions regulating trade explains 
the efforts of reaching international agreements to tandardize the transport. Yet issues of 
jurisdiction prevented a consensus between countries with emigration gateways which 
tried to minimize regulations to prevent these from bstructing the trade, while receiving 
countries tried to maximize these to start controlling quantity and quality of new arrivals 
through these. The visible hand of shipping companies was very active throughout the 
long nineteenth century, adapting itself to the institutional changes to help shaping these 
according to their interests. As nations gradually considered the movements of citizens 
and aliens as a matter affecting national sovereignty; no longer whether to exclude, yet 
much more who and how many became the dominating issue in receiving countries. To 
develop on measures how to exclude the authorities increasingly relied on the shipping 
companies increasing its pivotal role between the migrant and the state.  
 In Europe legislation continued to center more upon directing the movement to 
national ports and companies rather than regulating the flows. As nationalist tendencies 
and bureaucratization augmented, countries did so more openly and efficiently. Facing an 
increasing number of restrictions to carry out its business in regions through which 
migrants transited or from which they tapped them from, the Holland America Line 
increasingly relied on the American prepaid market where it could freely contract 
passengers. Prepaid tickets offered efficient means to the company to circumvent laws 
impeding their sales in Europe and laws restricting he emigration movement altogether. 
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To maintain this freedom on American soil the company joined forces with other foreign 
passenger lines opposing any attempts to revive the Am rican merchant marine.  
 The American laws regulating the shipping industry disadvantaged national ship-
owners on long distance routes making it very difficult to be competitive with foreign 
lines on the North Atlantic. The American Line was the only company sailing the Stars 
and Stripes but continuously struggled to be profitable and therefore never ceased to 
campaign for compensations either through direct subsidies or through discriminating 
duties and head taxes. Especially during the 1890s when American jingoism reached a 
climax, underlining the lack of material to back upits imperial pretence, the company 
managed to build up important support for its case. Yet despite the efforts to gain the 
favor of the American public, managing to obtain the support of the Republican Party, the 
Commissioner of Navigation, and the majority of Congressmen at Washington, 
significant measures to revive the merchant marine did not materialize until the New 
Deal. Foreign shipping interests used similar arms to fight the scheme which would 
strengthen the competitive position of the American Li e and could easily lead to the 
passage of analogous measures as in Europe directing the migrant stream to national 
ships. It depicted the scheme as a scandalous effort o  big business to loot the treasury, an 
argument which during the Progressive Era when public opinion turned against 
corporations for monopolizing business and corrupting politics. The efforts eem to have 
been fruitful.  
 This argument gained strength when J.P. Morgan anticipa ing the passage of 
subsidy laws worked on the IMM merger. Once this became known to the public, it 
resulted impossible for Congress to consider granting subsidies to a gigantic corporation 
without loosing its credibility in the anti-trust battle. Without subsidies most of the IMM 
ships remained under a foreign flag, and therefore the combine stopped pressing for 
advantages for their American vessels. Foreign shipping cartels retained control over 
migrant transport, yet nationalistic resentment andthe Anti-trust movement represented a 
continuous threat to the established equilibrium betwe n the lines. This threat eventually 
materialized in federal prosecution, yet the long established shipping lobby knowing the 
inside tracks on how to bring public opinion and politics in line with their interests 
successfully fought for the legality of the conferenc  system, limiting government 
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interference in their business to a minimum. Conversely, a lot of contemporary American 
companies sought the assistance of the federal authorities to lift the barriers to the 
development of a national market which the diverse state legislations posed. With the 
lack of regulations for the migrant business in the US shipping companies did not face 
this problem. To protect their international busines the only assistance these 
multinationals sought from US authorities was to leave the gates as wide open as 
possible. 
 Conversely, the federal authorities worked on ways to increase their grip on 
immigrant legislation and enforcement thereof. The s ift from state to federal control of 
immigration policies and the growing tendency to consider it a national rather than an 
international issue during the 1880s constitute a turning point for global migration 
policies and controls. This transition materialized in an international climate in which 
nation-building processes spurred the urge to take unilateral decisions. Doing so on the 
topic of migration remained a delicate issue in the Atlantic World yet as it took a central 
role in this nation building process the pressures to intervene accumulated. Shipping 
companies played a crucial role in relieving these pr ssures. To consolidate their 
influence in Washington they appointed lobbyists who kept them informed on the views 
and activities of Congressmen regarding migration and maritime issues. Based on this 
information, the shipping companies developed strategies to protect their main source of 
revenue. As party politics became less outspoken and with the growing importance of 
public opinion during the Progressive Era, the popular press became together with the 
corridors of Capitol Hill ‘the’ scene to fight this battle. Typical for the era, this needed to 
be backed by scientific arguments while their own involvement needed to be covered up 
as the popular feelings against corporations mounted.  
 Because of the institutional changes the lobbyist gained importance as middlemen 
between politicians and corporations. Through these the shipping lobby; positioned inside 
men in special investigation committees supplying recommendations on immigration 
policies, contributed to party campaign funds of both Democrats and Republicans, 
generously distributed gifts and free transatlantic cabin passages, organized fancy diners, 
etc. creating goodwill for their cause among Congressmen. It facilitated the lobbyists’ 
task to organize the opposition against immigration bills in Congress. If this opposition 
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was not big enough to prevent consideration for it, they used all possible means to delay 
action on immigration bills and introduced amendments reducing the impact on their 
business to a minimum. The list of excludables gradually expanded yet without greatly 
affecting the flows. Pressures increased when the Immigration Restriction League 
institutionalized the rising nativist movement calling to stop the undesirable and 
inassimilable new immigrant wave. With the IRL the shipping lobby faced an organized 
counterpoise at Washington while the association increasingly moved the battle scene to 
the public sphere. Lobbyists and journalists no longer sufficed to safeguard their interests 
which they only managed to safeguard right before the turn of the century by exploiting 
and amplifying the conflict of interests between coastal states and the interior.  
 The shipping lobby therefore sought means to enlarge the interest group fighting 
restrictions. By founding the Immigration Protective League they mobilized the old and 
new migrant communities although the IRL only targeted the latter. As politicians 
became more and more sensitive to the ‘migrant’ vote, it proved a very effective strategy 
to pressure them. Despite the fact that the Congressional base favoring liberal policies 
grew smaller the influence on people holding key positi ns the interest group 
continuously frustrated the IRL’s efforts. The only congressmen giving their 
unconditional support over time regardless of party ffiliation came from New York, not 
only because of the big migrant community, but also because of the crucial importance of 
the migrant trade in upholding the port’s dominant position. Because of the increased 
collaboration between the shipping companies the separate efforts to oppose restrictions 
were merged and optimized. As driving force behind the often changing composition of 
the interest group opposing restrictions, the shipping lobby managed to delay far-
reaching, racially inspired restrictive measures such as the literacy test for more than two 
decades. We can only guess about the probable impact of the test, because a lot depended 
on how the laws on paper were put into practice at the gates where the visible hand of the 
shipping companies was also industriously at work.  
 By withdrawing the enforcement of the laws from the local level, the rigorousity 
of which was often influenced by port competition, the Federal Government tried to 
standardize the measures appointing a Commissioner General of Immigration responsible 
to manage the border control stations. Together with the Ellis Island Commissioner of 
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Immigration, processing the vast majority of the arriv ls, the Commissioner General 
outlined the means to implement Congressional decisions. The ambiguity of the laws left 
a lot of margin for personal interpretation giving these presidential appointees a lot of 
influence to carry out the policies. Especially theambiguity of the ‘likely to become a 
public charge’ clause gave these men a lot of margin to express their personal opinion on 
the ‘desirability’ of immigration. By far the easiet way to debar, commissioners often 
used this reason to send home suspects of other exclud d classes as it resulted very 
difficult to prove these suspicions at the gates. Di eased migrants constitute an exception 
to this rule. It is the only category on whom the authorities managed to impose the much 
desired remote boarder control policies. For all the other categories practical and juridical 
barriers hindered the transfer of controls to the country of origin or ports of embarkation. 
Instead the authorities increased the responsibility on the shipping companies by 
augmenting the cost of maintenance and deportation nd imposing fines for brining over 
excludables.  
Gradually the immigration inspectors improved contrls and closed backdoors, 
yet at the same time shipping companies opened new ones and refined the assistance 
given to its passengers to guarantee their landing. The ones running high risks of being 
returned were sent through Canada or American ports other than New York where 
controls remained less strict. The lines prepared their passengers on board for the 
interrogations at Ellis Island and assisted the ones likely to be detained. They attended 
curable passengers in hospitals at the port of embarkation or on arrival; traced back 
family or friends to transfer money to join them, to pick up detainees at the control 
station, place bonds for them and if that didn’t work even gave free train tickets to 
complete their inland journey. If no friends or family could be traced back they sought 
assistance of philanthropic institutions. Shipping companies also used all possible means 
to gain favor of the many inspectors and translators working at the gates to facilitate the 
landing of their clients. Despite their efforts they couldn’t avoid the selections of 
European migrants based on the various degrees of whiteness from infiltrating into the 
control stations. Depending on the commissioner of immigration in charge at Ellis Island, 
Southern and Eastern European migrants were not always considered white, neither 
before nor on arrival. They acquired this constitutional status only when they passed the 
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gates, and that so many eventually did, is for a large part due to the lucrative business 
they represented for the steam shipping companies.  
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265, Correspondentie Wierdsma 
 
318.03 Passage Department 
 




1-5 Kopieboeken Algemeen 1897-1909 
 
 487
42 Brieven aan Reuchlin en Toorn NY 1902-04 
 
77 Brieven, orders NASM N .Y. 1904-11 
 
221-226, Diverse brieven NASM New York, 1887-1897. 
 
232 Wiener cartel 1892-96 
 
243, N.D.L.V. minutes. 
 
563 Continental Conference minutes, 1885-1895. 
 
564 Mediterranean Conference 1885- 1906 and Standing Complaint Committee 1896-1907 
 
565 Railroad Committee minutes 1896-1907 1-115; Immigrant Clearing house, 1886-87 and minutes of 
different meetings 
 
580 N.D.L.V. minutes. 
 
76, Diversen van den Toorn en Willmink 
 
318.14 Collectie Wentholt  
 
WA 6 Stoomvaart Amerika 1839 
 
WA 7 Stoomvaart Amerika 1850 
 
WA 8 Samenwerking met IMMCO Morgan trust 
 
WA 9.2 Plate Reuchlin en co / notullen, vennootschap, vergaderingen 
 
WA 9.3 NASM 1869 
 
WA 10.3 Voorgeschiedenis van de oprich NASM 
 
WA 12, 1-2, Jaarverslagen. 
 
WA 18.3 Correspondentie Scholten mbt kritiek op directie 
 
WA 20 Nord-Atlanticshe Dampfer Linier Verband 
 
WA 43 Corrspondentie mbt concurrentie NVSM A'dam, 1880-82 
 
WA 44 Correspondentie met hoofdagent Cazaux van Staphorst 1874-84 
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Cunard Line Archives Liverpool (CLA) 
 






Diplomatic Archives Nantes (ADN) 
 
Consulats, New York, nr. 7. 
 
Centre d’Archives du monde du Travail (CAMT / Roubaix)  
 




Bremer Staatsarchiv (BSA) 
 
 2-R-11, Shiffahrt zur See, 2a-2c Dampschiffahrt, post- und Packetschiffahrt zwischen Bremen und V.S. 
1837-1867. 
 
2-B-13 Verhaltnisse mit VS. Generalia en diversa: Auswanderung nach den US 
 
Hamburg  Staatsarchiv (HSA)  
 
HSA Consulaat Liverpool: Auswanderungsangelegenheiten 1851-68 nr 8. 
 




The New York Times Archive 1851-1980, www.nytimes.com. 
 
The Dillingham Commission Reports, vol. 1-42 (Washington, 1911). 
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Appendix 1: Long term emigration movements through Continental Ports 
 
1) Emigration figures from the port of Antwerp and Bremen 1832-1900899 
 
Year  Antwerp  Bremen  Year Antwerp  Bremen  Year Antwerp  Bremen  
1832  10344 1855 7589 31550 1878 5191 21483 
1833  8891 1856 10010 36517 1879 9828 26654 
1834  13086 1857 13446 49488 1880 9990 80330 
1835  6185 1858 4080 23177 1881 38276 122767 
1836  14137 1859 1300 22011 1882 35125 114955 
1837  15087 1860 2507 30296 1883 32644 109881 
1838  9312 1861 2115 16540 1884 26800 103051 
1839  12412 1862 3155 15187 1885 24057 83973 
1840  12806 1863 2874 18175 1886 22049 76748 
1841  9594 1864 5827 27701 1887 33793 99350 
1842  13619 1865 3507 44665 1888 36098 95270 
1843 3179 9927 1866 3491 61877 1889 39298 102923 
1844 2961 19857 1867 9048 73971 1890 36653 140410 
1845 5221 31822 1868 1810 66433 1891 48788 138457 
1846 13178 32372 1869 3071 63519 1892 43532 127029 
1847 15800 33682 1870 218 46781 1893 38067 106291 
1848 11513 29947 1871 0 60516 1894 12901 47499 
1849 10260 28629 1872 1429 80418 1895 18977 68922 
1850 6831 25776 1873 6358 63241 1896 23407 67040 
1851 8375 37493 1874 5316 30633 1897 14960 46798 
1852 14463 58551 1875 4735 24503 1898 15983 60486 
1853 15197 58111 1876 7374 21665 1899 25886 80787 
1854 25719 76875 1877 5082 19179 1900 37491 95961 
                                                 
899 For Anwterp see Veraghtert K. “De havenbewegingen te Antwerpen tijdens de 19e eeuw: een 
kwantitatieve benadering” (Unpublished PhD, Catholic University of Leuven, 1977); Table LXI and  for 
Bremen see Armgort A. Bremer-Bremerhaven-New York, 1683-1960 (Bremen, 1992); p 125. 
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Bremen  Hamburg  Le Havre  Antwerp  Rotterdam  
1846-50 150,4 32,1 163,8 56,1 44,7 
1851-55 262,6 140,2 224,5 72,2 13,5 
1856-60 161,5 107,0 112,4 31,3 2,5 
1861-65 122,3 127,1 59,5 17,4 8,6 
1866-70 312,6 217,6 101,9 22,3 17,2 
1871-75 67,6 81,8 137,6 17,8 15,9 
1876-80 70,2 78,7 89,0 49,8 23,7 
1881-85 126,9 190,3 131,7 169,5 52,5 
1886-90 271,7 300,1 165,7 180,2 53,2 
1891-95 303,3 285,3  177,8 108,3 
1896-00 307,4 225,2  124,5 83,0 
1901-05 680,9 479,3  330,9 235,9 
1906-10 749,5 540,8  423,3 229,8 
1911-14 577,0 460,8  266,4a 229,8 
   






















                                                 
900 See Van der Valk L.A. “Landverhuizers via Rotterdam in de negentiende eeuw.” in: Economisch en 
Sociaal historisch jaarboek (Amsterdam, 1976); p 151 based on the figures of  Willcox W. International 
Migrations (New York, 1929) vol 1 p 613, 678, 693, 703, 740.  
 
 
Appendix 2: Old vs. New Immigrants arriving in the US per nationality901 
 
‘OLD’ Migration 902 
Year  Belgium  Denmark  France Germany  Netherlands Norway  Sweden Switzerland  UK 
Total 
new Total 
1820 1 20 371 968 49 3 0 31 6024 7467 7691 
1821 2 12 370 383 56 12 0 93 4728 5656 5935 
1822 10 18 351 148 51 10 0 110 3488 4186 4418 
1823 2 6 460 183 19 1 0 47 3008 3726 4016 
1824 1 11 377 230 40 9 0 253 3609 4530 4965 
1825 1 14 515 450 37 4 0 166 6983 8170 8543 
1826 2 10 545 511 176 16 0 245 7727 9232 9751 
1827 7 15 1280 432 245 13 0 297 13952 16241 16719 
1828 2 50 2843 1851 263 10 0 1592 17840 24451 24729 
1829 0 17 582 597 169 13 0 314 10594 12286 12523 
1830 0 16 1174 1976 22 3 0 109 3874 7174 7217 
1831 1 23 2038 2413 175 13 0 63 8247 12973 13039 
1832 0 21 5361 10194 205 313 0 129 17767 33990 34193 
1833 0 173 4682 6988 39 16 0 634 13564 26096 29111 
1834 3 24 2989 17686 87 42 0 1389 34964 57184 57516 
1835 1 37 2696 8311 124 31 0 548 29897 41645 42009 
1836 0 416 4443 20707 301 57 0 445 43684 70053 70442 
1837 0 109 5074 23740 312 290 0 383 40726 70634 71038 
1838 14 52 3675 11683 27 60 0 123 18065 33699 34066 
1839 1 56 7198 21028 85 324 0 607 34234 63533 64151 
1840 2 152 7419 29704 57 55 0 500 42043 79932 80123 
1841 106 31 5006 15291 214 195 0 751 53960 75554 76217 
                                                 
901 The figures are taken from Willcox William, International Immigration, (New York 1929, 379-390). They are based on the statistics of the incoming ships at 
American port and represent fiscal years going from July 1 until June 30 of the year as shown in the tables. The nations represented by the ‘old immigrants’ are 
Germany, UK, Switzerland, Norway Denmark, Sweden, France, Belgium and the Netherlands while the ‘new’ immigrants include the Italians, Greeks, Russians, 
Austrians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Poles, Spanish , Portuguese, Turks  and Rumanians. The last total clumn includes all European arrivals.  
902 Norway includes Swedes up to 1868. 
 511
1842 44 35 4504 20370 330 553 0 483 73347 99666 99948 
1843 135 29 3346 14441 330 1748 0 553 28100 48682 49012 
1844 165 25 3155 20731 184 1311 0 839 47843 74253 74744 
Year  Belgium  Denmark  France Germany  Netherlands Norway  Sweden Switzerland  UK 
Total 
new Total 
1845 541 54 7663 34355 791 928 0 471 64031 108834 109302 
1846 43 114 10583 57561 979 1916 0 698 73932 145826 146312 
1847 1473 13 20040 74281 2631 1307 0 192 128838 228775 229118 
1848 897 210 7743 58465 918 903 0 319 148093 217548 218024 
1849 590 8 5841 60235 1190 3473 0 13 214530 285880 286503 
1850 1055 20 9381 78896 684 1569 0 325 215089 307019 308296 
1851 25 14 20126 72482 352 2424 0 427 272740 368590 369535 
1852 8 3 6763 145918 1719 4103 0 2788 200247 361549 362484 
1853 87 32 10770 141946 600 3364 0 2748 200225 359772 361576 
1854 266 691 13317 215009 1534 3531 0 7953 160253 402554 405542 
1855 1506 528 6044 71918 2588 821 0 4433 97199 185037 187729 
1856 1982 173 7246 71028 1395 1157 0 1780 99007 183768 186083 
1857 627 1035 2397 91781 1775 1712 0 2080 112840 214247 216224 
1858 184 232 3155 45310 185 2430 0 1056 55829 108381 111354 
1859 25 499 2579 41784 290 1091 0 833 61379 108480 110949 
1860 53 542 3961 54491 351 298 0 913 78374 138983 141209 
1861 153 234 2326 31661 283 616 0 1007 43472 79752 81200 
1862 169 1658 3142 27529 432 892 0 643 47990 82455 83727 
1863 301 1492 1838 33162 416 1627 0 690 122798 162324 163733 
1864 389 712 3128 57276 708 2249 0 1396 116951 182809 185233 
1865 741 1149 3583 83424 779 6109 0 2889 112237 210911 214048 
1866 1254 1862 6855 115892 1716 12633 0 3823 131614 275649 278916 
1867 789 1436 5237 133426 2223 7055 0 4168 125520 279854 283751 
1868 25 819 1989 55831 345 11166 0 1945 56195 128315 130101 
1869 1922 3649 3879 131042 1134 16068 24224 3650 125224 310792 291319 
1870 102 4083 4009 118225 1066 13216 13443 3075 160673 317892 313841 
1871 774 2015 3138 82554 993 9418 10699 2269 142894 254754 253848 
1872 738 3690 9317 141109 1909 11421 13464 3650 153644 338942 337762 
1873 1176 4931 14798 149671 3811 16247 14303 3107 166844 374888 381993 
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1874 817 3082 9644 87291 2444 10384 5712 3093 115728 238195 255397 
1875 615 2656 8321 47769 1237 6093 5573 1814 85862 159940 175948 
1876 515 1547 8004 31937 855 5173 5603 1549 48866 104049 114473 
1877 488 1695 5856 29298 591 4588 4991 1686 38150 87343 100067 
Year  Belgium  Denmark  France Germany  Netherlands Norway  Sweden Switzerland  UK 
Total 
new Total 
1878 354 2105 4159 29313 608 4759 5390 1808 38082 86578 95428 
1879 512 3474 4655 34602 753 7345 11001 3161 49968 115471 122046 
1880 1232 6576 4314 84638 3340 19895 39186 6156 144876 310213 308375 
1881 1766 9117 5227 210485 8597 22705 49760 11293 153718 472668 528545 
1882 1431 11618 6004 250630 9517 29101 64607 10844 179423 563175 648186 
1883 1450 10319 4821 194786 5249 23398 38277 12751 158092 449143 522587 
1884 1576 9202 3608 179676 4198 16974 26552 9386 129294 380466 453686 
1885 1653 6100 3495 124443 2689 12356 22248 5895 109508 288387 353083 
1886 1300 6225 3318 84403 2314 12759 27751 4805 112548 255423 329529 
1887 2553 8524 5034 106865 4506 16269 42836 5214 161748 353549 482829 
1888 3215 8962 6454 109717 5845 18264 54689 7737 182205 397088 538131 
1889 2562 8699 5918 99538 6460 13390 35415 7070 153549 332601 434790 
1890 2671 9366 6585 92427 4326 11370 29632 6993 122754 286124 445680 
1891 3037 10659 6770 113554 5206 12568 36880 6811 122311 317796 546085 
1892 4026 10125 4678 119168 6141 14325 41845 6886 93598 300792 570876 
1893 3324 7720 3621 78756 6199 15515 35710 4744 78767 234356 429324 
1894 1709 5003 3080 53989 1820 9111 18286 2905 52751 148654 277052 
1895 1058 3910 2628 32173 1388 7581 15361 2239 74820 141158 250342 
1896 1261 3167 2463 31885 1583 8855 21177 2304 64827 137522 329067 
1897 760 2085 2107 22533 890 5842 13162 1566 41173 90118 216397 
1898 695 1946 1990 17111 767 4938 12398 1246 38022 79113 217786 
1899 1101 2690 1694 17476 1029 6705 12797 1326 45123 89941 297349 
1900 1196 2926 1739 18507 1735 9575 18650 1152 48237 103717 424700 
1901 1579 3655 3150 21651 2349 12248 23331 2201 45546 115710 469237 
1902 2577 5660 3117 28304 2284 17484 30894 2344 46036 138700 619068 
1903 3450 7158 5578 40086 3998 24461 46028 3983 68947 203689 814507 
1904 3976 8525 9406 46380 4916 23808 27763 5023 87590 217387 767933 
1905 5302 8970 10168 40574 4954 25064 26591 4269 137134 263026 974273 
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1906 5099 7741 9386 37564 4946 21730 23310 3846 102193 215815 1018365 
1907 6396 7243 9731 37807 6637 22133 20589 3748 113567 227851 1199566 
1908 4162 4954 8788 32309 5946 12412 12809 3281 93380 178041 691901 
1909 3692 4395 6672 25540 4698 13627 14474 2694 71826 147618 654875 
1910 5402 6984 7383 31283 7534 17538 23745 3533 98796 202198 926291 
1911 5711 7555 8022 32061 8358 13950 20780 3458 102496 202391 764757 
1912 4169 6191 8628 27788 6619 8765 12688 3505 83027 161380 718875 
1913 7405 6478 9675 34329 6902 8587 17202 4104 88204 182886 1055855 
1914 5763 6262 9296 35734 6321 8329 14800 4211 73417 164133 1058391 
 
‘NEW’ Migration 903 
Year  Austria  Hungary  Bulgaria  Greece Italy  Poland  Portugal  Russia  Finland  Rumania  Spain  Turkey  Total New  Total 
1820 0 0 0 0 30 5 35 14 0 0 139 1 224 7691 
1821 0 0 0 0 62 1 18 7 0 0 191 0 279 5935 
1822 0 0 0 0 35 3 28 10 0 0 152 4 232 4418 
1823 0 0 0 0 33 3 24 7 0 0 220 2 289 4016 
1824 0 0 0 5 45 4 13 7 0 0 359 2 435 4965 
1825 0 0 0 0 75 1 13 10 0 0 273 0 372 8543 
1826 0 0 0 4 57 0 16 4 0 0 436 2 519 9751 
1827 0 0 0 0 35 1 7 19 0 0 414 1 477 16719 
1828 0 0 0 7 34 1 14 7 0 0 209 6 278 24729 
1829 0 0 0 1 23 0 9 1 0 0 202 1 237 12523 
1830 0 0 0 3 9 2 3 3 0 0 21 2 43 7217 
1831 0 0 0 0 28 0 0 1 0 0 37 0 66 13039 
1832 0 0 0 1 3 34 5 52 0 0 106 0 201 34193 
1833 0 0 0 1 1699 1 633 159 0 0 516 1 3010 29111 
1834 0 0 0 7 104 54 44 15 0 0 107 1 332 57516 
1835 0 0 0 28 61 54 29 9 0 0 183 0 364 42009 
1836 0 0 0 5 115 53 29 2 0 0 180 3 387 70442 
1837 0 0 0 4 36 81 34 19 0 0 230 0 404 71038 
1838 0 0 0 0 86 41 24 13 0 0 202 0 366 34066 
                                                 
903 Russia includes Finns and Poles respectively from 1892 and 1899 onwards. Austria includes Hungarians between 1892 and 1904. 
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1839 0 0 0 3 84 46 19 7 0 0 428 1 588 64151 
1840 0 0 0 0 37 5 12 0 0 0 136 1 191 80123 
1841 0 0 0 1 179 15 7 174 0 0 215 6 597 76217 
1842 0 0 0 4 100 10 15 28 0 0 122 2 281 99948 
1843 0 0 0 3 117 17 32 6 0 0 145 5 325 49012 
1844 0 0 0 2 141 36 16 13 0 0 270 10 488 74744 
1845 0 0 0 3 137 6 14 1 0 0 304 3 468 109302 
Year  Austria  Hungary  Bulgaria  Greece Italy  Poland  Portugal  Russia  Finland  Rumania  Spain  Turkey  Total New  Total 
1846 0 0 0 0 151 4 2 248 0 0 73 4 482 146312 
1847 0 0 0 1 164 8 5 5 0 0 158 2 343 229118 
1848 0 0 0 0 241 0 67 1 0 0 164 3 476 218024 
1849 0 0 0 2 209 4 26 44 0 0 329 9 623 286503 
1850 0 0 0 0 431 5 366 31 0 0 429 15 1277 308296 
1851 0 0 0 0 447 10 50 1 0 0 435 2 945 369535 
1852 0 0 0 10 351 110 68 2 0 0 391 3 935 362484 
1853 0 0 0 12 555 33 95 3 0 0 1091 15 1804 361576 
1854 0 0 0 1 1263 208 72 2 0 0 1433 7 2986 405542 
1855 0 0 0 0 1052 462 205 13 0 0 951 9 2692 187729 
1856 0 0 0 2 1365 20 128 9 0 0 786 5 2315 186083 
1857 0 0 0 4 1007 124 92 25 0 0 714 11 1977 216224 
1858 0 0 0 0 1240 9 177 246 0 0 1282 17 2971 111354 
1859 0 0 0 1 932 106 46 91 0 0 1283 10 2469 110949 
1860 0 0 0 1 1019 82 122 65 0 0 932 4 2225 141209 
1861 0 51 0 1 811 48 47 34 0 0 448 5 1445 81200 
1862 17 111 0 5 566 63 72 79 0 0 348 11 1272 83727 
1863 28 57 0 4 547 94 86 77 0 0 500 16 1409 163733 
1864 40 190 0 5 600 165 240 256 0 0 917 11 2424 185233 
1865 322 100 0 7 924 528 365 183 0 0 692 14 3135 214048 
1866 45 48 0 10 1382 412 344 287 0 0 718 18 3264 278916 
1867 25 667 0 10 1624 310 126 205 0 0 904 26 3897 283751 
1868 92 100 0 0 891 0 174 141 0 0 384 4 1786 130101 
1869 1495 4 0 8 1489 184 87 343 0 0 1123 18 4751 291319 
1870 4424 1 0 22 2891 223 255 907 0 0 663 6 9392 313841 
1871 4884 3 0 11 2816 535 290 673 0 0 558 23 9793 253848 
1872 4182 228 0 12 4190 1647 416 994 24 0 595 20 12308 337762 
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1873 5765 1347 0 23 8757 3338 24 1560 74 0 541 53 21482 381993 
1874 7888 962 0 36 7666 1795 60 3960 113 0 485 62 23027 255397 
1875 6882 776 0 25 3631 984 763 7892 15 0 601 27 21596 175948 
1876 5646 630 0 19 3015 925 471 4765 10 0 518 38 16037 114473 
1877 5023 373 0 24 3195 533 1291 6579 20 0 665 32 17735 100067 
1878 4504 646 0 16 4344 547 660 3037 11 0 457 29 14251 95428 
1879 5331 632 0 21 5791 489 392 4434 19 0 457 29 17595 122046 
1880 12904 4363 0 23 12354 2177 260 4854 160 11 389 24 37519 308375 
Year  Austria  Hungary  Bulgaria  Greece Italy  Poland  Portugal  Russia  Finland  Rumania  Spain  Turkey  Total New  Total 
1881 21109 6826 0 19 15401 5614 171 4865 176 30 484 72 54767 528545 
1882 20221 8929 0 126 32159 4672 42 16321 597 65 378 69 83579 648186 
1883 16385 11240 0 73 31792 2011 176 9186 723 77 262 86 72011 522587 
1884 21773 14798 0 37 16510 4536 701 11854 835 238 300 150 71732 453686 
1885 17926 9383 0 172 13642 3085 440 16603 555 803 350 138 63097 353083 
1886 16260 12420 0 104 21315 3939 238 17309 491 494 344 176 73090 329529 
1887 25009 15256 0 313 47622 6128 110 28944 1822 2045 436 206 127891 482829 
1888 30011 15800 0 782 51558 5826 23 31256 2231 1186 526 207 139406 538131 
1889 23207 10967 0 158 25307 4922 57 31889 2027 893 526 252 100205 434790 
1890 34137 22062 0 524 52003 11073 158 33147 2451 517 813 206 157091 445680 
1891 42676 28366 0 1105 76055 27497 918 42145 5281 957 905 265 226170 546085 
1892 76937 0 0 660 61631 40536 3400 81511 0 0 4078 1331 270084 570876 
1893 57420 0 0 1072 72145 16347 4816 42310 0 0 206 625 194941 429324 
1894 38638 0 0 1356 42977 1941 2196 39278 0 729 925 298 128338 277052 
1895 33401 0 0 597 35427 790 1452 35907 0 523 501 245 108843 250342 
1896 65103 0 0 2175 68060 691 2766 51455 0 785 351 169 191555 329067 
1897 33031 0 0 571 59131 4165 1874 25816 0 791 448 152 125979 216397 
1898 39797 0 0 2339 58613 4726 1717 29828 0 900 577 176 138673 217786 
1899 62491 0 52 2333 77419 0 2054 60982 0 1606 385 80 207402 297349 
1900 114847 0 108 3771 100135 0 4234 90787 0 6459 355 285 320981 424700 
1901 113390 0 657 5910 135996 0 4165 85257 0 7155 592 387 353509 469237 
1902 171989 0 851 8104 178375 0 5307 107347 0 7196 975 187 480331 619068 
1903 206011 0 1761 14090 230622 0 9317 136093 0 9310 2080 1529 610813 814507 
1904 177156 0 1325 11343 193296 0 6715 145141 0 7087 3996 4344 550403 767933 
1905 111990 163703 2043 10515 221479 0 5028 184897 0 4437 2600 4542 711234 974273 
1906 111598 153540 4666 19489 273120 0 8517 215665 0 4476 1921 9510 802502 1018365 
 516
1907 144992 193460 11359 36580 285731 0 9608 258943 0 4384 5784 20767 971608 1199566 
1908 82983 85526 10827 21489 128503 0 7307 156711 0 5228 3899 11290 513763 691901 
1909 80853 89338 1054 14111 183218 0 4956 120460 0 1590 2616 9015 507211 654875 
1910 135793 122944 4737 25888 215537 0 8229 186792 0 2145 3472 18405 723942 926291 
1911 82129 76928 4695 26226 182882 0 8374 158721 0 2522 5074 14438 561989 764757 
1912 85854 93028 4447 21449 157134 0 10230 162395 0 1997 6327 14481 557342 718875 
1913 137245 117580 1753 22817 265542 0 14171 291040 0 2155 6167 14128 872598 1055855 





















APPENDIX 3: Rates of the NDLV members for the American Market  
 
The price series presented here are based on the Continental Conference Minutes 1885-
1902 completed with correspondence of the New York head agent to the board of 
directors and telegrams sent regarding price changes. It seems that the conference 
minutes give a full account of price changes with the date of when these took effect 
except during rate wars when changes are not always taken up and for which the 
correspondence was used. The reconstruction of the HAL prices 1902-1914 are solely 
taken from the correspondence. The dates used are based on when the letter was written 
and are therefore less accurate. Whether the data is fully complete, especially for the 
period after 1902 remains questionable, yet the correspondence indicates that if there are 
gaps, these should be minor.  
 
HAL prepaid and return rates in dollars for third c lass between 
Rotterdam and New York 1885-1914 
 
Date Return Prepaid Date Return  Prepaid 
30/04/1885 23 18 20/06/1902 29 34 
15/05/1885 17 17 05/11/1902 30 34 
28/07/1885 20 19.5 01/01/1903 32 34 
10/11/1885 20 22 12/05/1903 33 36.5 
01/03/1886 20 22 01/07/1903 35 36.5 
03/08/1886 18 12 31/10/1903 35 34 
16/04/1887 21 21 13/11/1903 32 34 
01/12/1887 19.5 20.5 28/01/1904 32 31.5 
01/02/1889 19.5 20.5 21/06/1904 20 31.5 
15/10/1889 20 21 28/06/1904 17 31.5 
14/5/1890 20 19 16/09/1904 20 31.5 
07/03/1892 20 22 14/11/1904 33 33 
09/04/1892 21 26.5 03/03/1905 33 35.5 
05/05/1892 21 24.5 30/06/1905 33 37.5 
01/07/1892 21 21.5 15/11/1905 35 37.5 
27/10/1892 21 24 01/01/1906 33 35.5 
01/03/1893 21 30 02/02/1906 33 37.5 
04/04/1893 21 25 15/05/1906 33 40 
29/06/1894 18 25 06/12/1906 33 36.5 
26/07/1894 16 25 16/01/1907 33 34 
02/08/1894 16 17 15/03/1907 33 36.5 
03/10/1894 14 17 13/04/1907 33 38.5 
10/12/1894 12 17 10/05/1907 32 41 
21/03/1895 16 17 31/05/1907 32 37 
27/03/1895 16 22.5 28/06/1907 32 32.5 
05/04/1895 16 25 15/08/1907 25 32.5 
10/05/1895 20 25 04/10/1907 27 32.5 
06/06/1895 16 25 01/11/1907 27 27.5 
14/09/1895 25 25 18/11/1907 33 27.5 
14/10/1895 20 25 27/11/1907 36 25.5 
05/12/1895 25 25 20/12/1907 32 25.5 
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Date Return Prepaid Date Return  Prepaid 
06/01/1896 25 22.5 02/01/1908 28 25.5 
18/02/1896 25 27 07/01/1908 20 25.5 
13/03/1896 25 31.5 15/01/1908 22 25.5 
19/03/1896 25 34 07/02/1908 28 25.5 
09/07/1896 25 31.5 21/02/1908 30 27.5 
15/03/1897 26 31.5 31/03/1908 32.5 30 
08/08/1897 25 29.5 22/05/1908 30.5 30 
27/08/1897 26 27 22/07/1908 32 30 
15/10/1897 26 31.5 28/09/1908 32 27.5 
23/11/1897 26 29.5 07/12/1908 32 38.5 
10/12/1897 26 31.5 27/12/1908 34 38.5 
01/01/1898 26 33.5 31/12/1908 30 38.5 
23/02/1898 26 31.5 16/04/1909 33 38.5 
28/04/1898 26 29.5 31/12/1909 35 38.5 
01/07/1898 27 29.5 30/03/1910 35 36.5 
13/07/1898 27 27.0 20/05/1910 35 38.5 
23/07/1898 27 29.5 06/09/1910 33 38.5 
31/10/1898 27 31.5 05/12/1911 35 38.5 
14/03/1899 27 29.5 01/01/1912 35 40.5 
10/07/1899 25 29.5 07/06/1912 37 40.5 
01/07/1900 28 29.5 111/6/1912 37 38.5 
06/09/1900 28 31.5 13/08/1912 38 41 
01/11/1900 28 34.0 21/11/1912 39 41 
01/01/1901 28 31.5 10/01/1913 35 34 
23/01/1901 29 31.5 02/06/1913 37 38.5 
15/05/1901 29 29.5 15/11/1913 37 40.5 
12/09/1901 29 31.5 05/01/1914 29.5 40.5 
01/12/1901 29 34.0 01/02/1914 25 27 
 
RSL prepaid and return rates in dollars for third class service between 
Antwerp and New York 1885-1902 
 
 
RSL Return  Prepaid   Return  Prepaid  
30/04/1885 25 20 05/12/1895 25 27,5 
05/05/1885 20 20 08/01/1896 25 25 
28/07/1885 23 22,5 18/02/1896 25 29,5 
10/11/1885 23 25 10/03/1896 25 31,5 
01/03/1886 23 25 01/05/1896 27 31,5 
02/08/1886 21 15 01/07/1896 29 31,5 
16/04/1887 23 23 02/10/1896 27 31,5 
01/12/1887 22 22,5 12/10/1896 26 31,5 
01/02/1889 21,5 22 12/12/1896 29 31,5 
14/05/1890 21,5 20 31/01/1897 26 31,5 
07/03/1892 21,5 23 08/05/1897 28 31,5 
04/09/1892 21,5 27,5 17/07/1897 28 29,5 
01/07/1892 21,5 25 09/12/1897 28 31,5 
27/10/1892 21,5 25 02/02/1898 26 31,5 
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01/03/1893 21,5 32 01/07/1898 27 31,5 
04/04/1893 21,5 27,5 07/10/1899 26 28 
03/08/1894 21,5 21 09/01/1900 27 29,5 
03/10/1894 14 21 05/04/1900 27 31,5 
03/11/1894 14 16 14/06/1900 27 29,5 
08/12/1894 12 16 29/08/1900 27 31,5 
18/03/1895 16 16 01/101900 25 31,5 
27/03/1895 16 25 01/11/1900 26 34 
13/04/1895 20 27,5 01/01/1901 28 31,5 
11/05/1895 25 27,5 13/06/1901 28 29,5 
05/06/1895 20 27,5 01/071901 29 29,5 
14/09/1895 25 27,5 28/07/1901 31 29,5 
14/10/1895 20 27,5 27/11/1901 31 31,5 
 
HAPAG  prepaid and return rates in dollars for third class Regular, 















30/04/1885  25 20     
15/05/1885  20 20     
28/07/1885  23 22,5     
10/11/1885  23 25     
01/03/1886  23 25 21 23   
03/08/1886  21 15 19 13   
16/04/1887  24 24 22 22   
01/12/1887  23 23,5 21,5 22   
01/02/1889  23 23,5 22 22,5 26 26 
14/05/1890  23 21,5 22 20,5 26 24 
07/03/1892  23 25 22 23 26 27 
09/04/1892  23 27,5 22 25 26 30 
22/06/1892  23 24,5 22 22 26 27 
01/03/1893  23 32 22 30 26 35 
04/04/1893  26 27,5 22,5 24 28 30 
13/07/1893  26 25 22,5 21,5 28 27,5 
03/09/1893 26 27,5 22,5 24 28 30 
26/07/1894  18 27,5 16 24 20 30 
04/08/1894  18 22,5 16 19 20 25 
21/08/1894  18 22,5 16 17 20 25 
07/03/1895  18 22,5 16 17 20 25 
27/03/1895  18 30 16 25 20 32,5 
11/04/1895  18 27,5 16 25 20 32,5 
15/04/1895  18 27,5 18 25 20 32,5 
14/05/1895  20 27,5 20 25 22 32,5 
03/07/1895  22 27,5 22 25 24 32,5 
14/09/1895  30 27,5 27 25 32 32,5 
14/10/1895  25 27,5 22 25 27 32,5 















05/12/1895  30 30 27 27,5 32 35 
26/02/1896  30 31,5 27 29,5 32 36,5 
21/03/1896  30 31,5 27 31,5 32 36,5 
05/06/1896 30 31.5 27 31.5 32 34 
01/07/1896 30 31.5 27 31.5 33 34 
01/08/1896 30 31.5 27 31.5 34 34 
20/09/ 1896 30 32.5 27 32.5 34 35 
01/01/1897 30 34 27 29.5 34 36 
18/03/1897 30 34 27 29.5 32 36 
01/04/1897 26 34 27 29.5 32 36 
04/05/1897 30 34 27 29.5 32 36 
11/05/1897 30 34 27 31.5 32 36 
19/05/1897 30 36 27 34 32 38.5 
01/06/1897 30 36.5 27 36.5 32 38.5 
11/10/1897 32 36.5 27 36.5 34 38.5 
18/10/1896 32 36.5 27 36.5 36 38.5 
04/11/1896 30 36.5 27 36.5 32 38.5 
30/11/1897 30 36.5 27 36.5 32 38.5 
06/12/1897 30 34 27 31.5 34 38.5 
14/12/1897 34 34 27 31.5 34 38.5 
29/1/1898 26 34 26 31.5 30 38.5 
23/02/1898 26 31,5 26 31.5 30 36 
10/03/1898 26 31.5 26 31.5 30 34 
16/03/1898 26 34 26 34 30 36.5 
28/05/1898 26 36.5 26 36.5 30 37.5 
01/07/1898 28 36.5 28 36.5 30 37.5 
04/08/1898 28 34 28 34 30 38.5 
10/08/1898 29 34 29 34 30 38.5 
22/08/1896 33 34 33 34 36 38.5 
10/09/1898 33 33 33 33 36 38.5 
27/09/1898 33 31.5 33 31.5 36 34 
05/10/1898 30 31.5 30 31.5 35 34 
09/01/1899 28 31.5 28 31.5 35 34 
04/03/1899 27 29.5 27 29.5 35 31.5 
09/03/1899 27 29.5   28 31.5 
04/04/1899 27 31.5   28 34 
27/04/1899 27 34   28 36.5 
24/05/1899 27 36.5   28 38.5 
28/08/1899 28 36.5   30 38.5 
18/09/1899 28 34   30 38.5 
05/10/1899 28 31.5   30 35 
19/10/1899 28 31.5   35 35 
27/10/1899 28 29.5   35 34 
06/11/1899 28 29.5   37 34 
13/11/1899 30 29.5   37 34 
09/01/1900 27 31.5   30 34 
15/05/1900 27 34   30 36.5 
15/06/1900 27 36.5   30 38.5 
29/09/1900 27 34   30 38.5 
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01/11/1900 30 36.5   33 38.5 
14/01/1901 30 34   33 38.5 
01/07/1901 31 34   35 38.5 
17/08/1901 31 34   33 38.5 
01/01/1902 30 34   33 36.5 
19/02/1902 30 31.5   33 36.5 
 
NGL  prepaid and return rates in dollars for third class Regular and 



















30/04/1885 27 22 25 20 07/10/1896 32 36,5 30 34 
 15/05/1885 22 22 20 20 01/08/1896 32 36,5 25 34 
28/07/1885 25 24,5 23 22,5 01/10/1896 32 36,5 28 34 
10/11/1885 25 27 23 25 01/01/1897 32 36,5 30 34 
01/03/1886 25 27 23 25 18/03/1897 32 38,5 30 36,5 
03/08/1886 23 17 21 15 18/07/1897 32 38,5 30 34 
16/04/1887 25 25   25/081897 32 36,5 30 31,5 
01/12/1887 26 26   20/09/1897 32 34 30 29,5 
01/02/1889 26 26 23 23,5 08/11/1897 30 34 28 29,5 
14/05/1890 26 24   23/11/1897 30 36,5 28 31,5 
07/03/1892 26 27 23 25 10/12/1897 30 38,5 28 34 
09/04/1892 26 30 24 27,5 29/01/1898 30 38,5 28 34 
01/03/1893 26 35 24 32 23/2/1898 26 38,5 28 36,5 
04/04/1893 28 32,5 26 30 23/03/1898 26 38,5 30 36,5 
18/07/1893 30 32,5 28 30 01/07/1898 30 38,5 35 36,5 
30/09/1893 28 32,5 26 30 11/07/1898 33 38,5 35 36,5 
29/06/1894 26 32,5 24 30 01/01/1899 33 36,5 35 34 
26/07/1894 18 32,5 16 30 07/03/1899 28 36,5 30 34 
03/08/1894 18 25 16 22,5 05/04/1899 28 38,5 30 34 
01/03/1895 18 25 16 22,5 01/06/1899 28 38,5 30 36,5 
27/03/1895 18 32,5 16 30 23/08/1899 30 38,5 30 36,5 
15/04/1895 22 32,5 20 30 20/10/1899 30 38,5 35 36,5 
03/07/1895 24 32,5 22 30 10/11/1899 33 38,5 35 36,5 
09/09/1895 24 32,5 22 30 09/01/1900 28 38,5 30 36,5 
14/09/1895 32 32,5 30 30 12/06/1900 29 38,5 30 36,5 
25/09/1895 35 32,5 30 30 31/07/1900 29 38,5 30 34 
14/10/1895 27 32,5 25 30 01/10/1900 29 38,5 33 34 
15/11/1895 27 37,5 25 35 04/10/1900 29 36,5 33 31,5 
05/12/1895 32 37,5 30 35 01/11/1900 30 38,5 33 34 
01/01/1896 32 35 30 32,5 18/01/1901 30 38,5 33 36,5 
12/02/1896 32 36,5 30 34 14/02/1901 30 38,5 33 36,5 
20/03/1896 32 36,5 30 34 01/07/1901 31 38,5 35 36,5 





NGL  prepaid and return rates in dollars for third class Regular Service 
between Bremen and Baltimore 1885-1902 
 
NGL BT Return  Prepaid  NGL BT Return Prepaid  NGL BT Return  Prepaid  
30/04/1885 25 20 01/03/1895 13 22,5 19/08/1897 30 29,5 
15/05/1885 20 20 27/03/1895 13 27,5 20/09/1897 30 27 
28/07/1885 23 22,5 15/04/1895 13 27,5 08/11/1897 28 27 
10/11/1885 23 25 03/07/1895 19 30 23/11/1897 28 29,5 
01/03/1886 23 25 09/09/1895 19 30 10/12/1897 28 34 
03/08/1886 21 15 14/09/1895 27 30 12/01/1898 30 34 
16/04/1887 23,5 23,5 25/09/1895 27 30 29/01/1898 28 34 
01/12/1887 22,5 23 14/10/1895 22 30 11/07/1898 30 34 
01/02/1889 22,5 23 15/11/1895 22 30 07/03/1899 27 34 
14/05/1890 22,5 21 05/12/1895 27 30 19/09/1899 27 36,5 
07/03/1892 22,5 23 01/01/1896 27 30 01/10/1899 30 36,5 
09/04/1892 22,5 25 12/02/1896 27 31,5 9/01/1900 27 36,5 
01/03/1893 22,5 32 20/03/1896 27 31,5 15/01/1900 27 34 
04/04/1893 24,5 27,5 15/06/1896 27 35 01/08/1900 27 31,5 
18/07/1893 26,5 27,5 01/08/1896 25 35 01/11/1900 30 34 
30/09/1893 24,5 27,5 01/09/1896 28 35 18/01/1901 30 36,5 
29/06/1894 24,5 27,5 16/09/1896 30 35 01/07/1901 31 36,5 
26/07/1894 24,5 27,5 02/10/1896 30 34 01/01/1902 30 34 





















APPENDIX 4: HAL TOTAL PASSENGER CARRYINGS 1873-1914904 
 
Year Total Cabin Total 3rd 
1873 198 2820 
1874 270 1511 
1875 624 1815 
1876 580 2622 
1877 718 2149 
1878 820 2880 















1880 253  468 435  9558 
1881 273  672 533  15511 
1882 293  1240 472  17677 
1883 348  1866 621  18003 
1884 218  3426 523  10547 
1885 838  3064 831  6530 
1886 852 795 4089 1034 1374 9680 
1887 860 876 2687 1092 1606 16466 
1888 734 1011 6183 1270 2106 16298 
1889 1376 1430 5102 887 1919 15879 
1890 1604 1545 6103 1660 2533 18758 
1891 1712 1699 9271 1710 2877 35929 
1892 1779 1083 7891 1857 3448 31680 
1893 1350 1325 12402 1711 4192 30216 
1894 2052 1505 9696 1682 1552 11207 
1895 2020 1197 5997 1803 1238 13729 
1896 1004 2061 5215 1944 2330 13343 
1897 814 2003 4065 1044 1749 10687 
1898 715 2036 4260 843 2621 14140 
1899 1543 2672 3819 1259 2759 18025 
1900 2300 3541 7049 1829 3671 26018 
1901 2220 2543 6285 2233 3278 25762 
1902 3324 2593 8464 3122 3907 32569 
1903 2973 2817 10971 3015 5398 36812 
1904 2839 2802 11076 3029 5222 27198 
1905 3128 3380 10277 3246 6623 41319 
1906 3704 4016 15885 3833 9983 42499 
1907 3766 4830 22105 4136 11274 47725 
1908 3663 4369 20721 4078 6947 11720 
1909 4219 4170 10446 4415 12382 29738 
1910 5115 4512 12251 5336 14146 36270 
1911 4684 4218 16757 5335 12812 22758 
1912 4961 4571 14046 5575 13081 33782 
1913 4968 4127 14047 5315 15132 48820 
1914 4980 3530 18997 9781 14279 22918 
                                                 
904 GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt Archief, 1, p 1-30.  
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APPENDIX 5: Total  Passenger Carryings of Main services on the 
North Atlantic 1899-1914905 
 
 




















WB 1st EB  
1st 
Total  Total WB  EB 
1906 15410 1836 17246 284 54 338 200 55 255 17839 36 27 
1907 18080 4490 22570 0 0 0 0 0 0 22570 32 29 
1908 4646 14046 18692 0 0 0 0 0 0 18692 28 34 
1909 14968 4222 19190 0 0 0 0 0 0 19190 37 34 
1910 13052 4321 17373 0 0 0 0 0 0 17373 36 31 
1911 7952 6933 14885 776 648 1424 266 337 603 16912 31 32 
1912 13523 5278 18801 1245 692 1937 436 569 1005 21743 34 31 
1913 20035 6247 26282 1638 842 2480 465 603 1068 29830 36 31 
1914 7015 5476 12491 648 491 1139 194 568 762 14392 20 18 
 
 



















Total  Total   WB  EB 
1899 22885 9994 32879 3165 2331 5496 2958 3374 6332 44707 54 52 
1900 30635 14733 45368 5186 3914 9100 3603 3874 7477 61945 56 52 
1901 35973 11970 47943 4091 2586 6677 3159 2913 6072 60692 54 54 
1902 49502 14345 63847 4787 3278 8065 3837 3711 7548 79460 59 58 
1903 51445 10666 62111 7351 4115 11466 4019 3938 7957 81534 59 60 
1904 34665 9515 44180 6914 4112 11026 4549 4653 9202 64408 54 54 
1905 55813 8448 64261 6870 4074 10944 4950 4576 9526 84731 72 55 
1906 62400 27622 90022 9015 5437 14452 5885 5825 11710 116184 79 63 
1907 66217 36372 102589 10993 6093 17086 5758 5575 11333 131008 86 67 
1908 24003 37124 61127 8157 5837 13994 4557 4513 9070 84191 69 72 
1909 46754 19078 65832 14401 5905 20306 4452 4271 8723 94861 100 84 
1910 50934 11391 62325 16275 7129 23404 3122 4292 7414 93143 109 97 
1911 38641 29967 68608 15908 7957 23865 4511 4219 8730 101203 107 92 
1912 49777 32781 82558 16378 7805 24183 4621 4326 8947 115688 101 90 
1913 65337 29383 94720 20988 9416 30404 5250 5456 10706 135830 109 97 
1914 27306 15313 42619 12127 7467 19594 3696 3858 7554 69767 85 81 
 
                                                 
905 The following statistics were made by the Conference Secretary Peters based on the figures sent in by 
the passenger lines. See GAR, HAL, Passage Department, 580, Conference Statistics. 
906 These are the continental passengers of this Line,for the Mediterranean one’s see further. 
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total Total  WB  EB 
1899 32674 6043 38717 4559 3921 8480 2551 2898 5449 52646 63 65 
1900 49057 6698 55755 5679 5070 10749 3499 3472 6971 73475 61 57 
1901 47168 6066 53234 5618 4578 10196 2972 3032 6004 69434 53 53 
1902 68471 10164 78635 8184 5224 13408 4668 4628 9296 101339 57 52 
1903 65354 9392 74746 7083 3858 10941 2785 2664 5449 91136 48 45 
1904 77816 22089 99905 11490 7645 19135 6011 5838 11849 130889 77 78 
1905 97577 13788 111365 10173 6634 16807 7087 6114 13201 141373 76 67 
1906 116461 27316 143777 14700 8972 23672 12046 10161 22207 189656 83 76 
1907 140641 45109 185750 15707 10339 26046 13418 11598 25016 236812 101 76 
1908 36599 36972 73571 12790 10338 23128 10598 9987 20585 117284 70 70 
1909 89799 18410 108209 19631 9349 28980 10592 10368 20960 158149 74 69 
1910 96250 27662 123912 23798 11415 35213 11348 10557 21905 181030 82 71 
1911 53613 29145 82758 21027 10492 31519 10292 9404 19696 133973 75 64 
1912 85327 28449 113776 23999 10594 34593 11232 10500 21732 170101 81 72 
1913 122467 26872 149339 26826 11662 38488 13307 11635 24942 212769 87 78 



















EB 1st total  Total  WB  EB 
1899 5102 3554 8656 3216 2151 5367 3764 2666 6430 20453 18 16 
1900 10155 8055 18210 6988 5068 12056 7180 6372 13552 43818 37 37 
1901 10463 6531 16994 4870 3746 8616 6975 6425 13400 39010 32 30 
1902 10286 5941 16227 3607 2561 6168 3649 3504 7153 29548 26 25 
1903 24676 9997 34673 6948 4115 11063 5764 6125 11889 57625 37 35 
1904 3292 2263 5555 2500 1352 3852 3023 2555 5578 14985 11 9 
1905 1369 2071 3440 1935 1590 3525 2200 2300 4500 11465 7 7 
1906 1491 1713 3204 1318 1227 2545 1448 1559 3007 8756 6 6 
1907 2153 2073 4226 2045 1622 3667 1993 2050 4043 11936 8 8 
1908 1272 1649 2921 1243 1079 2322 1062 1163 2225 7468 7 7 
1909 1238 1213 2451 931 584 1515 1062 905 1967 5933 5 5 
1910 1020 1252 2272 829 633 1462 1143 793 1936 5670 4 4 
Union  
 3rd WB WB  
1899 4726 24 
1900 6565 24 
1901 5231 20 
1902 5508 21 
1903 5408 18 
1904 0 0 
1905 2421 6 
1906 10623 15 
                                                 
907 HAPAG discontinues the Union service in 1906 and opens a limited monthly freight and westbound 
steerage passenger service to Philadelphia in 1910 and shortly before WOI to Boston and Baltimore.  
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Total Total  WB EB 
1899 19878 9946 29824 4744 4672 9416 6750 6382 13132 52372 46 43 
1900 22961 13886 36847 6823 4846 11669 8378 5994 14372 62888 51 45 
1901 18426 10862 29288 5455 3512 8967 6589 5291 11880 50135 32 31 
1902 18820 15678 34498 7149 4138 11287 8272 7528 15800 61585 29 30 
1903 22896 21049 43945 9568 5110 14678 10375 8662 19037 77660 33 32 
1904 21926 18288 40214 9218 5140 14358 9929 9060 18989 73561 31 31 
1905 22065 15906 37971 10093 5903 15996 10527 9399 19926 73893 32 32 
1906 21369 22848 44217 10435 6649 17084 10149 8910 19059 80360 31 31 
1907 24628 27121 51749 11623 7346 18969 11350 9065 20415 91133 37 37 
1908 12705 20788 33493 8821 7151 15972 11080 9825 20905 70370 43 43 
1909 24036 11116 35152 8742 5190 13932 10374 8815 19189 68273 39 39 
1910 21106 15522 36628 8852 5198 14050 9746 8561 18307 68985 37 38 
1911 16362 17739 34101 9088 5025 14113 9085 7757 16842 65056 36 35 
1912 25547 18334 43881 9069 4903 13972 8315 7935 16250 74103 34 35 
1913 29420 21590 51010 10226 4738 14964 9183 8553 17736 83710 38 38 























Total Total WB  EB 
1899 33770 3489 37259 3437 2406 5843 2828 3443 6271 49373 53 48 
1900 41739 6126 47865 4548 2921 7469 3585 3445 7030 62364 51 42 
1901 58378 7818 66196 4977 2965 7942 3383 3426 6809 80947 54 44 
1902 63370 8241 71611 6491 3475 9966 2742 3187 5929 87506 57 39 
1903 65809 9520 75329 8869 4518 13387 3210 3725 6935 95651 56 45 
1904 53621 14250 67871 9150 4534 13684 3110 3535 6645 88200 58 43 
1905 66367 7411 73778 11842 5461 17303 2561 3763 6324 97405 57 50 
1906 80563 12535 93098 13557 5102 18659 2647 3279 5926 117683 64 50 
1907 100817 32808 133625 15125 6028 21153 2710 3225 5935 160713 76 62 
1908 26014 31257 57271 9917 5133 15050 3175 3105 6280 78601 56 45 
1909 67656 14327 81983 14148 5360 19508 5190 4966 10156 111647 66 53 
1910 57889 22194 80083 14437 5936 20373 6538 5647 12185 112641 64 51 
1911 35437 24262 59699 14384 6036 20420 5813 6128 11941 92060 59 47 
1912 64509 21131 85640 17341 6633 23974 7775 6792 14567 124181 70 51 
1913 101676 16037 117713 18115 6299 24414 7085 6420 13505 155632 88 58 






RED STAR LINE  
 
















Total  Total  
 
WB  EB  
1899 20129 6108 26237 3422 2839 6261 897 1097 1994 34492 52 52 
1900 31007 8778 39785 4300 3618 7918 1261 1358 2619 50322 50 51 
1901 32786 8541 41327 4462 3332 7794 1800 1598 3398 52519 52 50 
1902 47019 8325 55344 4850 3269 8119 2035 2069 4104 67567 54 52 
1903 54697 12597 67294 6375 3859 10234 2597 2911 5508 83036 51 51 
1904 39139 15792 54931 6511 4098 10609 2918 2830 5748 71288 50 50 
1905 59435 12706 72141 7560 4591 12151 3816 3760 7576 91868 53 51 
1906 64620 19425 84045 9551 4541 14092 3556 3214 6770 104907 58 49 
1907 69869 29134 99003 8438 5042 13480 3324 3319 6643 119126 55 50 
1908 21804 29448 51252 6514 4725 11239 2566 2836 5402 67893 53 53 
1909 48992 14327 63319 11438 3866 15304 3126 3285 6411 85034 51 51 
1910 50351 18779 69130 13027 4911 17938 4014 4458 8472 95540 53 52 
1911 33456 22124 55580 12798 4147 16945 3591 3347 6938 79463 51 51 
1912 52822 18623 71445 14352 4198 18550 3737 3959 7696 97691 53 53 
1913 70057 19962 90019 16623 4246 20869 3074 3106 6180 117068 59 53 
1914 24927 17158 42085 6617 2382 8999 1129 2336 3465 54549 33 31 
 




















Total Total  WB  EB 
1906 2577 0 2577 233 0 233 0 0 0 2810 5 0 
1907 10001 4932 14933 286 73 359 0 0 0 15292 17 15 
1908 6196 8082 14278 335 282 617 20 38 58 14953 17 17 
1909 14231 4581 18812 765 229 994 0 0 0 19806 21 19 
1910 18669 6316 24985 2361 714 3075 0 0 0 28060 24 25 
1911 16157 11181 27338 2982 921 3903 71 246 317 31558 23 24 
1912 20363 11639 32002 3666 1297 4963 283 240 523 37488 27 26 
1913 23169 17130 40299 5156 2101 7257 290 224 514 48070 29 29 
1914 9812 10060 19872 3401 1868 5269 97 245 342 25483 22 25 
 


















Total Total  WB EB 
1908 278 2789 3067 12 27 39 7 12 19 3125 6 6 
1909 9505 3341 12846 332 172 504 0 0 0 13350 22 21 
1910 19642 10016 29658 758 231 989 47 44 91 30738 28 28 
1911 5846 13286 19132 448 382 830 99 194 293 20255 25 26 
1912 13938 10836 24774 531 575 1106 138 212 350 26230 27 26 
1913 10046 4316 14362 702 434 1136 54 0 54 15552 21 22 
























Total Total  WB  EB 
1906 5206 799 6005 0 12 12 28 8 36 6053 5 4 
1907 21277 14290 35567 290 129 419 159 78 237 36223 21 21 
1908 3537 8072 11609 125 162 287 0 0 0 11896 8 9 
 




















Total Total  WB EB 
1899 11340 6512 17852 5989 4234 10223 8414 7275 15689 43764 46 45 
1900 16839 8597 25436 7447 5296 12743 6999 8990 15989 54168 44 44 
1901 12510 5606 18116 6030 3146 9176 6180 4129 10309 37601 39 39 
1902 20651 7312 27963 7095 4376 11471 7388 4877 12265 51699 54 57 
1903 16027 9199 25226 6084 3152 9236 4471 2793 7264 41726 44 45 
1904 28030 12422 40452 4727 2807 7534 4106 3166 7272 55258 48 48 
1905 27116 10094 37210 6731 3912 10643 5626 4404 10030 57883 50 50 
1906 26612 12701 39313 8329 3667 11996 5663 3872 9535 60844 51 50 
1907 23064 15635 38699 8261 3951 12212 5130 3955 9085 59996 48 48 
1908 6985 23893 30878 5528 3445 8973 3615 2633 6248 46099 49 49 
1909 18974 12565 31539 7332 3176 10508 3411 2372 5783 47830 50 49 
1910 14313 12252 26565 7701 2997 10698 3859 2968 6827 44090 44 46 
1911 9965 16862 26827 6539 2662 9201 3305 2107 5412 41440 41 41 
1912 11525 11147 22672 5996 2474 8470 2625 1750 4375 35517 40 39 
1913 17970 9327 27297 6660 2421 9081 2019 1130 3149 39527 40 40 
1914 9881 9913 19794 14871 9263 24134 0 0 0 43928 50 51 
 
 




















Total  Total  WB EB 
1899 20855 11809 32664 9160 7388 16548 9856 10828 20684 69896 62 62 
1900 22723 12093 34816 10798 7296 18094 9299 8847 18146 71056 51 50 
1901 19933 10314 30247 9394 6554 15948 8388 8733 17121 63316 57 57 
1902 23650 9619 33269 9070 6195 15265 7238 7107 14345 62879 51 50 
1903 33781 12273 46054 11863 7963 19826 6578 6473 13051 78931 65 63 
1904 38929 22260 61189 12197 8907 21104 5948 5907 11855 94148 63 66 
1905 38062 14387 52449 10928 7356 18284 7618 8213 15831 86564 63 64 
1906 62298 18472 80770 13899 9028 22927 9104 8772 17876 121573 68 70 
1907 61744 27533 89277 17620 11404 29024 10957 9518 20475 138776 70 68 
1908 32396 33688 66084 17650 13493 31143 12893 11783 24676 121903 80 80 
1909 42730 19699 62429 16122 11479 27601 14354 12726 27080 117110 67 66 
1910 32413 21994 54407 17940 12039 29979 15657 13666 29323 113709 63 62 
1911 36444 30865 67309 17609 11872 29481 14673 13959 28632 125422 61 62 
1912 40611 26986 67597 17243 11194 28437 13976 12022 25998 122032 59 54 
1913 48089 25701 73790 17176 10883 28059 12994 10636 23630 125479 56 56 
1914 25223 27948 53171 13742 9217 22959 13602 10430 24032 100162 50 49 
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Total Total  WB  EB 
1899 25145 13004 38149 4200 3396 7596 8514 8105 16619 62364 56 55 
1900 29365 16227 45592 5810 4548 10358 9140 8152 17292 73242 50 50 
1901 30462 14724 45186 6865 4898 11763 11306 10102 21408 78357 66 66 
1902 40215 15727 55942 7385 5737 13122 11018 9506 20524 89588 65 65 
1903 45468 25300 70768 9638 7231 16869 12451 11724 24175 111812 81 80 
1904 57784 34243 92027 10846 8643 19489 13022 12625 25647 137163 70 71 
1905 45782 18103 63885 11243 8053 19296 13527 11569 25096 108277 66 64 
1906 49452 17956 67408 12947 8265 21212 11914 9925 21839 110459 67 65 
1907 41807 20324 62131 12238 6763 19001 9110 7226 16336 97468 55 51 
1908 13674 21350 35024 9081 6659 15740 6872 6161 13033 63797 45 45 
1909 17983 10799 28782 10835 6534 17369 6845 5959 12804 58955 45 42 
1910 21986 15859 37845 12797 7995 20792 7285 6766 14051 72688 44 45 
1911 18358 22619 40977 13584 7933 21517 7684 6584 14268 76762 46 45 
1912 18253 18977 37230 12657 8006 20663 6982 6186 13168 71061 47 46 
1913 29136 17397 46533 13121 8490 21611 6238 5920 12158 80302 47 47 






















Total Total  WB EB 
1907 11719 10313 22032 6604 3443 10047 6376 5143 11519 43598 29 32 
1908 10121 24282 34403 6820 4403 11223 7448 6644 14092 59718 49 50 
1909 20114 14514 34628 8246 4056 12302 6735 5781 12516 59446 50 50 
1910 17364 10407 27771 9188 4334 13522 7580 6345 13925 55218 44 43 
1911 12335 15106 27441 8132 5091 13223 7891 7780 15671 56335 36 36 
1912 12465 9902 22367 7233 3921 11154 6031 6142 12173 45694 34 34 
1913 23035 13902 36937 10257 5558 15815 7770 7615 15385 68137 42 42 
















B) Main Non-New York services of Continental Lines and British Lines 
 
 
AMERICAN LINE PHILADELPHIA SERVICE  
 














Total  Total WB EB 
1899 6966 2284 9250 2714 2667 5381 0 0 0 14631 46 45 
1900 10405 2656 13061 3016 2431 5447 0 0 0 18508 39 40 
1901 8407 2509 10916 3280 2494 5774 0 0 0 16690 45 46 
1902 13254 2684 15938 3961 2778 6739 0 0 0 22677 49 48 
1903 17422 3632 21054 3777 2656 6433 0 0 0 27487 48 48 
1904 18428 6604 25032 3459 2443 5902 0 0 0 30934 43 44 
1905 19427 3407 22834 4094 3061 7155 0 0 0 29989 41 42 
1906 24838 3988 28826 4078 2643 6721 0 0 0 35547 38 40 
1907 28989 4608 33597 5060 3103 8163 0 0 0 41760 44 43 
1908 7554 5292 12846 3484 2938 6422 0 0 0 19268 33 32 
1909 13618 2549 16167 3386 2267 5653 0 0 0 21820 29 29 
1910 18108 3525 21633 4356 2650 7006 0 0 0 28639 30 31 
1911 11216 4843 16059 4014 2208 6222 0 0 0 22281 26 26 
1912 12687 2497 15184 3702 2214 5916 0 0 0 21100 24 23 
1913 15645 2627 18272 3491 1826 5317 0 0 0 23589 23 23 
1914 7053 2375 9428 3082 1622 4704 0 0 0 14132 26 25 
 
 
CUNARD LINE BOSTON SERVICE  
 














Total Total WB  EB 
1899 7611 1732 9343 767 606 1373 672 377 1049 11765 29 29 
1900 10230 4214 14444 1135 1124 2259 824 686 1510 18213 22 22 
1901 16683 4787 21470 2061 1368 3429 1291 1258 2549 27448 30 30 
1902 23296 5045 28341 2515 1604 4119 1676 1424 3100 35560 29 30 
1903 27747 5665 33412 3606 1736 5342 1639 1526 3165 41919 31 31 
1904 30199 11665 41864 3564 2275 5839 1767 1869 3636 51339 23 23 
1905 26750 6855 33605 3938 2228 6166 1932 1619 3551 43322 25 24 
1906 30897 7792 38689 4458 2440 6898 1734 1656 3390 48977 25 26 
1907 31538 10357 41895 5329 2811 8140 1915 1798 3713 53748 25 26 
1908 11356 9023 20379 4872 2922 7794 1643 1319 2962 31135 25 25 
1909 19120 6523 25643 6348 3028 9376 1887 1378 3265 38284 24 24 
1910 18300 4999 23299 5427 2525 7952 1688 1262 2950 34201 17 17 
1911 13681 6313 19994 5916 2565 8481 1706 1324 3030 31505 16 16 
1912 17670 8027 25697 6864 3280 10144 2599 2331 4930 40771 19 22 
1913 20822 6763 27585 7048 2897 9945 2495 1817 4312 41842 21 19 








NORTH GERMAN LLOYD BALTIMORE SERVICE 908 
 
















Total Total WB  EB 
1899 20077 1535 21612 895 675 1570 0 0 0 23182 43 44 
1900 19712 2111 21823 870 855 1725 8 343 351 23899 33 31 
1901 26719 1408 28127 843 722 1565 0 0 0 29692 38 35 
1902 48153 2432 50585 1278 1034 2312 0 0 0 52897 50 41 
1903 71002 2741 73743 2559 1409 3968 0 0 0 77711 54 40 
1904 38209 2878 41087 1814 1106 2920 0 0 0 44007 42 32 
1905 62675 1762 64437 2481 1531 4012 0 0 0 68449 54 44 
1906 63951 3169 67120 3431 1747 5178 0 0 0 72298 56 41 
1907 64774 5400 70174 3789 1591 5380 0 0 0 75554 62 45 
1908 8223 5593 13816 1593 1874 3467 0 0 0 17283 35 28 
1909 24930 1491 26421 2643 1440 4083 0 0 0 30504 36 26 
1910 32005 1971 33976 3197 1887 5084 0 0 0 39060 32 39 
1911 16759 3055 19814 2768 1623 4391 0 0 0 24205 27 42 
1912 27803 2599 30402 2558 1513 4071 0 0 0 34473 39 42 
1913 39299 2471 41770 2751 1696 4447 0 0 0 46217 49 40 
1914 16666 1823 18489 980 1407 2387 0 0 0 20876 24 21 
 
 
REDSTAR LINE PHILADELPHIA SERVICE  
 
















Total Total WB  EB 
1899 4366 270 4636 0 0 0 0 0 0 4636 24 22 
1900 4951 363 5314 0 0 0 0 0 0 5314 20 20 
1901 4243 312 4555 0 0 0 42 5 47 4602 18 19 
1902 5853 254 6107 0 0 0 0 0 0 6107 23 21 
1903 7554 251 7805 0 2 2 0 0 0 7807 23 23 
1904 2034 260 2294 0 0 0 0 0 0 2294 21 21 
1905 0 0 0 543 20 563 0 0 0 563 8 5 
1906 0 0 0 793 801 1594 0 0 0 1594 21 23 
1907 0 20 20 0 847 847 0 0 0 867  26 
1908 0 0 0 0 882 882 0 0 0 882  22 
1909 0 0 0 1359 929 2288 0 0 0 2288  25 
1910 0 0 0 1441 871 2312 0 0 0 2312  23 
1911 0 0 0 1381 730 2111 0 0 0 2111  24 
1912 0 0 0 1677 601 2278 0 0 0 2278  26 
1913 0 0 0 1795 673 2468 0 0 0 2468 26 24 
1914 0 0 0 617 363 980 0 0 0 980 17 15 
 
 
                                                 
908 In 1902 the Line also opens a monthly service to Galveston the annual carryings balancing between 
2300 and 13500 WB and between 800 and 1100 EB. Just as HAPAG right before the war, a service to 
Boston and Philadelphia is opened.  
 532
WHITE STAR LINE BOSTON SERVICE  
 














Total Total WB  EB 
1903 489 210 699 96 41 137 105 18 123 959 4 2 
1904 15822 5088 20910 2146 1053 3199 2073 1361 3434 27543 27 25 
1905 11117 3678 14795 2382 1258 3640 2761 1842 4603 23038 23 24 
1906 13507 4373 17880 2630 1235 3865 2651 1651 4302 26047 23 25 
1907 13554 5261 18815 2082 1151 3233 2026 1670 3696 25744 19 19 
1908 6862 5823 12685 1386 746 2132 1558 1293 2851 17668 18 18 
1909 5499 1834 7333 0 0 0 775 634 1409 8742 11 11 
1910 11282 3672 14954 2270 800 3070 1732 1294 3026 21050 20 20 
1911 8760 3826 12586 1931 546 2477 1481 987 2468 17531 17 17 
1912 8433 2646 11079 2685 1564 4249 679 524 1203 16531 17 18 
1913 9799 3716 13515 4668 3262 7930 41 77 118 21563 19 19 


































C) Mediterranean services to New York unless specified 



















Total Total  WB EB 
1905 0 5907 5907 0 0 0 0 0 0 5907 0 50 
1906 0 7749 7749 0 0 0 0 0 0 7749 0 50 
1907 0 10308 10308 0 0 0 0 0 0 10308 0 48 
1908 0 9287 9287 0 0 0 0 0 0 9287 0 49 
1909 0 5288 5288 0 0 0 0 0 0 5288 0 49 
1910 0 1987 1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 1987 0 46 
1911 0 4484 4484 0 0 0 0 0 0 4484 0 41 
1912 0 4416 4416 0 0 0 0 0 0 4416 0 39 
1913 0 3844 3844 0 0 0 0 0 0 3844 0 40 
1914 0 1295 1295 0 0 0 0 0 0 1295 0 28 
 




















Total  Total  WB EB 
1899 13696 971 14667 0 0 0 14 6 20 14687 28 23 
1900 14764 1266 16030 0 0 0 38 13 51 16081 25 24 
1901 16084 2133 18217 0 0 0 68 27 95 18312 33 24 
1902 26144 3777 29921 0 209 209 87 55 142 30272 33 22 
1903 26601 7289 33890 0 0 0 90 90 180 34070 32 20 
1904 15026 12199 27225 0 0 0 130 103 233 27458 28 25 
1905 21129 4051 25180 0 0 0 215 50 265 25445 25 15 
1906 25835 6678 32513 0 0 0 261 105 366 32879 26 22 
1907 21833 9024 30857 0 0 0 263 78 341 31198 25 22 
1908 2704 6475 9179 0 0 0 54 53 107 9286 14 13 
1909 11531 2085 13616 0 0 0 164 50 214 13830 19 13 
1910 11264 3347 14611 0 0 0 154 66 220 14831 19 19 
1911 8560 6631 15191 0 0 0 141 40 181 15372 18 18 
1912 9160 4865 14025 0 0 0 120 48 168 14193 18 16 
1913 15416 2972 18388 0 0 0 143 45 188 18576 19 19 






















Total Total  WB EB 
1904 4276 5142 9418 54 12 66 62 9 71 9555 8 8 
1905 4106 2069 6175 71 35 106 54 23 77 6358 12 19 
1906 14254 4199 18453 195 66 261 241 46 287 19001 35 27 
1907 16577 9669 26246 941 240 1181 441 106 547 27974 31 29 
1908 2472 11411 13883 1640 683 2323 353 282 635 16841 32 34 
1909 19297 5347 24644 3176 858 4034 691 520 1211 29889 38 34 
1910 16940 5108 22048 3260 938 4198 819 775 1594 27840 36 31 
                                                 
909 Launched a limited service to New Orleans in 1908. 
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1911 11140 8481 19621 2547 496 3043 421 382 803 23467 32 32 
1912 20968 15730 36698 3514 1091 4605 670 629 1299 42602 36 31 
1913 13750 11310 25060 5822 1333 7155 724 659 1383 33598 38 31 
1914 9108 3969 13077 4371 685 5056 160 347 507 18640 22 16 
 




















Total Total  WB  EB 
1904 4312 1599 5911 25 14 39 21 23 44 5994 12 11 
1905 6814 2267 9081 223 32 255 47 27 74 9410 12 11 
1906 6400 3160 9560 130 27 157 84 32 116 9833 12 12 
1907 6474 4525 10999 333 108 441 235 157 392 11832 13 12 
1908 608 3861 4469 167 125 292 190 197 387 5148 12 12 
1909 3088 2053 5141 233 176 409 362 274 636 6186 12 12 
1910 1296 87 1383 247 80 327 303 138 441 2151 12 12 
 




















Total Total  WB EB 
1903 240 3428 3668 0 0 0 74 166 240 3908 1 3 
1904 0 15237 15237 0 151 151 0 850 850 16238  18 
1905 39388 4423 43811 1432 203 1635 578 1108 1686 47132 24 19 
1906 50363 8674 59037 2451 471 2922 1059 2009 3068 65027 27 24 
1907 54105 14048 68153 3039 1051 4090 1156 2108 3264 75507 30 27 
1908 13823 16636 30459 1646 965 2611 877 2784 3661 36731 27 24 
1909 38755 5072 43827 3215 876 4091 981 3111 4092 52010 24 24 
1910 41930 5947 47877 3574 645 4219 967 3321 4288 56384 26 22 
1911 20118 11744 31862 1480 390 1870 196 2068 2264 35996 25 23 
1912 31854 10224 42078 3723 621 4344 1351 3207 4558 50980 28 27 
1913 37205 20187 57392 7344 1502 8846 2089 5511 7600 73838 32 33 
1914 10513 9080 19593 6746 665 7411 1424 3390 4814 31818 28 24 
 
DOMINION LINE  
 














Total Total  WB EB 
1902 14018 3602 17620 647 162 809 360 937 1297 19726 14 14 
1903 17765 3265 21030 1064 184 1248 715 1900 2615 24893 21 19 
 
 
                                                 
910 The Spanish Line seemed to have worked together with the Cunard Line, but after 1910 it stopped 
taking Italian or Greek passengers. 
911 These are the figures of the Cunard Fiume service. Westbound steerage passengers were counted 
Continental passengers here represented in Bold while the rest were considered Mediterranean. From 19°9
onwards the eastbound passengers are divided in Continentals and Mediterranean; 1908 includes 10 022 
continentals, 1909 3836; 1910, 4777; 1911,7033; 1912, 5875. For 1913 and 1914 the total passengers for 
both services are given 
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Total Total  WB  EB 
1899 14121 1804 15925 0 0 0 24 26 50 15975 26 23 
1900 15648 1257 16905 0 0 0 26 77 103 17008 23 11 
1901 14157 694 14851 0 0 0 23 9 32 14883 28 10 
1902 21617 4262 25879 0 0 0 77 74 151 26030 27 13 
1903 25029 8987 34016 0 0 0 168 255 423 34439 29 17 
1904 17225 12150 29375 0 0 0 96 87 183 29558 28 19 
1905 30178 8035 38213 0 0 0 157 173 330 38543 33 21 
1906 31757 12306 44063 0 0 0 210 272 482 44545 34 23 
1907 29569 17316 46885 0 0 0 248 241 489 47374 33 27 
1908 6315 21596 27911 0 0 0 371 455 826 28737 25 29 
1909 18287 6520 24807 33 0 33 486 505 991 25831 38 29 
1910 20853 10159 31012 317 77 394 720 670 1390 32796 38 33 
1911 13399 13434 26833 771 497 1268 447 860 1307 29408 40 39 
1912 25802 17185 42987 2017 1280 3297 690 1080 1770 48054 42 42 
1913 36786 12780 49566 3214 2003 5217 1037 1332 2369 57152 45 44 
1914 15189 13395 28584 2209 1813 4022 1122 1559 2681 35287 45 45 
 




















Total  Total  WB EB 
1903 0 14379 14379 0 0 0 0 0 0 14379 0 59 
1904 0 14599 14599 0 0 0 0 0 0 14599 0 54 
1905 0 11700 11700 0 0 0 0 0 0 11700 0 54 
1906 0 15966 15966 0 0 0 0 0 0 15966 0 60 
1907 0 19787 19787 0 0 0 0 0 0 19787 0 61 
1908 0 21651 21651 0 0 0 0 0 0 21651 0 67 
1909 0 11214 11214 0 0 0 0 0 0 11214 0 67 
1910 0 13749 13749 0 0 0 0 0 0 13749 0 78 
1911 0 16251 16251 0 0 0 0 0 0 16251 0 77 
1912 0 17964 17964 0 0 0 0 0 0 17964 0 80 
1913 0 8935 8935 0 0 0 0 0 0 8935 0 61 
 






















Total Total  WB EB 
1899 2540 3519 6059 0 0 0 424 1672 2096 8155 5 6 
1900 2477 20 2497 0 0 0 0 0 0 2497 4 1 
1901 10815 844 11659 0 0 0 0 0 0 11659 18 13 
1902 12706 2753 15459 248 19 267 187 348 535 16261 17 11 
1903 17828 5568 23396 727 68 795 194 467 661 24852 16 15 
1904 12535 10947 23482 246 55 301 646 940 1586 25369 17 18 
1905 15215 6699 21914 655 42 697 824 1477 2301 24912 20 21 
 536
1906 24338 6887 31225 1757 250 2007 1207 2645 3852 37084 23 26 
1907 21479 16850 38329 2589 1248 3837 1579 2976 4555 46721 23 25 
1908 3822 9670 13492 885 740 1625 514 1556 2070 17187 12 12 
1909 16442 2928 19370 2688 1179 3867 1072 2059 3131 26368 20 20 
1910 16469 5718 22187 1796 848 2644 1140 2066 3206 28037 17 17 
1911 8288 9817 18105 2874 853 3727 924 2018 2942 24774 15 16 
1912 12486 8307 20793 2830 823 3653 981 2328 3309 27755 14 15 
1913 16011 6002 22013 4809 1108 5917 1460 1968 3428 31358 16 16 






















Total Total  WB EB 
1900 4378 3584 7962 0 0 0 378 1914 2292 10254 7 8 
1901 4487 3151 7638 0 0 0 442 1524 1966 9604 7 9 
1902 1642 1316 2958   0 152 1181 1333 4291 3 6 
1903 1447 1026 2473 0 0 0 217 515 732 3205 2 3 
1904 566 591 1157   0 94 739 833 1990 1 2 
1905 218 723 941 166 0 166 97 919 1016 2123 1 2 
 
 




















Total Total  WB EB 
1907 3563 2299 5862 0 0 0 190 85 275 6137 3 3 
1908 998 5088 6086 0 0 0 226 207 433 6519 6 6 
1909 6518 4107 10625 112 351 463 423 24 447 11535 9 9 
1910 11439 4087 15526 378 327 705 1119 280 1399 17630 13 13 
1911 5737 5444 11181 0 707 707 2113 198 2311 14199 13 13 
1912 8568 4342 12910 1144 389 1533 1053 253 1306 15749 11 11 
1913 3800 4591 8391 992 511 1503 443 265 708 10602 7 7 
 
 




















Total Total  WB EB 
1908 3073 3680 6753 0 312 312 595 349 944 8009 8 6 
1909 14137 1115 15252 0 0 0 890 163 1053 16305 18 8 
1910 10990 3779 14769 304 111 415 758 510 1268 16452 17 17 
1911 8115 6373 14488 1289 806 2095 255 218 473 17056 18 14 
1912 8935 7279 16214 729 753 1482 319 199 518 18214 10 10 
1913 12824 4245 17069 923 615 1538 111 204 315 18922 12 11 
1914 3352 9723 13075 940 473 1413 119 137 256 14744 13 13 
                                                 
912 Or Italia Societa di Navigazione a Vapore, was founded by HAPAG to operate line between Italy and 
South America. In 1906 it sold its shares to Navigazione Generale Italiana that used the ships on the New 




















Total  Total  WB EB 
1908 112 8299 8411 0 0 0 3 36 39 8450 1 9 
1909 8239 2369 10608 0 0 0 164 219 383 10991 18 18 
1910 10104 3268 13372 70 12 82 340 152 492 13946 17 17 
1911 6054 7006 13060 429 239 668 22 59 81 13809 13 18 
1912 5395 2794 8189 221 57 278 48 18 66 8533 8 8 
1913 8583 2222 10805 422 50 472 19 17 36 11313 10 9 
1914 3316 3758 7074 363 111 474 17 11 28 7576 9 9 
 
 




















Total Total  WB EB 
1901 13532 3709 17241 202 228 430 296 157 453 18124 14 13 
1902 20167 5588 25755 28 0 28 452 349 801 26584 22 22 
1903 31172 10162 41334 0 0 0 786 444 1230 42564 26 21 
1904 18894 13968 32862   0 671 401 1072 33934 23 20 
1905 32476 5319 37795   0 768 387 1155 38950 29 22 
1906 28938 6040 34978 156 73 229 780 486 1266 36473 24 19 
1907 29822 11993 41815 254 181 435 1278 675 1953 44203 26 25 
1908 5049 9674 14723 0 180 180 738 408 1146 16049 13 13 
1909 18656 3695 22351 145 72 217 1269 421 1690 24258 18 14 
1910 20520 5339 25859 0 0 0 2317 1067 3384 29243 21 21 
1911 13376 9375 22751 1457 411 1868 849 651 1500 26119 17 17 
1912 15308 5233 20541 1638 486 2124 123 199 322 22987 10 9 
1913 21011 6798 27809 1763 672 2435 104 405 509 30753 14 14 



















Total Total  WB EB 
1912 454 1073  48 33    12   3 3 
1913 3357 1048  115 37  3 10   6 6 
1914 1945 2027  126 43  5 13   6 7 
 


















Total  Total  WB EB 
1905 568 613 1181 0 0 0 0 0 0 1181 1 1 
1906 19958 6053 26011 0 0 0 203 68 271 26282 14 14 
1907 26355 10354 36709 0 0 0 314 134 448 37157 20 20 
1908 5902 9426 15328 0 0 0 224 91 315 15643 13 13 
1909 17564 2867 20431 0 0 0 481 230 711 21142 20 20 
1910 14721 6933 21654 28 1 29 482 225 707 22390 20 20 
1911 7501 6984 14485 493 159 652 0 53 53 15190 15 15 
1912 19851 8429 28280 1809 595 2404 217 292 509 31193 18 18 
1913 26060 6547 32607 1978 805 2783 137 158 295 35685 18 18 


















Total  Total  WB EB 
1912 347 878 1225 21 13 34 0 0 0 1259 2 3 
1913 1154 257 1411 44 21 65 4 0 4 1480 2 2 
1914 601 798 1399 71 60 131 4 0 4 1534 3 3 
 



















Total Total  WB EB 
1907 15862 8424 24286 0 0 0 595 349 944 25230 14 13 
1908 4899 15541 20440 564 284 848 491 591 1082 22370 13 14 
1909 18496 4591 23087 119 125 244 1468 624 2092 25423 18 19 
1910 14968 6005 20973 89 207 296 1498 607 2105 23374 19 18 
1911 8542 4177 12719 102 410 512 1244 149 1393 14624 14 13 
1912 7116 4428 11544 0 0 0 652 376 1028 12572 7 8 
1913 19762 4189 23951 0 0 0 1268 492 1760 25711 14 14 
1914 4984 7563 12547 728 54 782 1163 443 1606 14935 12 12 
 




















Total Total  WB EB 
1909 5968 2715 8683 273 228 501 122 54 176 9360 6 6 
1910 7513 2919 10432 800 423 1223 10 171 181 11836 8 8 
1911 5473 4120 9593 727 413 1140 137 253 390 11123 9 9 
1912 11113 6622 17735 2528 903 3431 169 236 405 21571 12 11 
1913 2572 3896 6468 560 550 1110 196 190 386 7964 5 6 
1914 5559 4727 10286 1262 836 2098 564 242 806 13190 11 11 
 
 




















Total Total  WB  EB 
1899 8835 1981 10816 0 0 0 76 48 124 10940 11 11 
1900 17263 4724 21987 0 0 0 285 265 550 22537 18 18 
1901 24660 7091 31751 68 49 117 465 429 894 32762 27 26 
1902 31445 9697 41142 683 408 1091 606 824 1430 43663 34 30 
1903 27360 10627 37987 972 448 1420 581 769 1350 40757 32 26 
1904 17315 14535 31850 903 538 1441 395 496 891 34182 26 25 
1905 35617 8241 43858 1086 542 1628 508 561 1069 46555 34 27 
1906 38155 7344 45499 997 677 1674 357 376 733 47906 34 25 
1907 34295 13085 47380 1028 633 1661 178 211 389 49430 24 24 
1908 9314 19293 28607 416 305 721 452 391 843 30171 18 17 
1909 35486 6933 42419 946 535 1481 601 600 1201 45101 38 37 
1910 23159 11204 34363 874 859 1733 695 832 1527 37623 24 30 
1911 20067 16611 36678 930 1051 1981 914 717 1631 40290 24 24 
1912 24272 12875 37147 1357 822 2179 547 611 1158 40484 17 17 
1913 29816 11250 41066 2486 1168 3654 381 433 814 45534 17 16 




















Total Total  WB  EB 
1910 6003 223 6226 334 82 416 2 0 2 6644 9 6 
1913 975 120 1095 81 4 85 0 0 0 1180 2 1 
1911 1878 1584 3462 106 105 211 0 0 0 3673 4 4 
1912 1388 1420 2808 49 50 99 12 24 36 2943 6 7 
1913 3432 1728 5160 97 76 173 17 20 37 5370 7 7 
1914 1028 698 1726 53 29 82 1 4 5 1813 3 3 
 




















Total Total  WB EB 
1899 21645 10163 31808 629 10 639 1606 3205 4811 37258 29 31 
1900 27444 13225 40669 1040 0 1040 2187 4752 6939 48648 36 36 
1901 24600 8738 33338 724 0 724 1833 3712 5545 39607 36 38 
1902 29617 11299 40916 747 5 752 2431 3775 6206 47874 40 38 
1903 29576 14165 43741 1512 148 1660 2335 3299 5634 51035 30 30 
1904 22902 28968 51870 3334 1082 4416 2409 3596 6005 62291 31 32 
1905 46613 11905 58518 4907 1524 6431 2886 3946 6832 71781 36 35 
1906 47469 13635 61104 5570 2134 7704 2770 3947 6717 75525 33 33 
1907 45416 19332 64748 7107 3285 10392 3058 3695 6753 81893 38 38 
1908 8536 29436 37972 4138 2278 6416 2624 3471 6095 50483 30 30 
1909 30429 6143 36572 5923 2238 8161 2736 3843 6579 51312 31 33 
1910 32522 12119 44641 6192 3023 9215 3542 4371 7913 61769 37 38 
1911 21746 12311 34057 4960 2265 7225 1996 3463 5459 46741 25 27 
1912 28747 11471 40218 5287 1927 7214 2133 2641 4774 52206 20 20 
1913 33452 12196 45648 6789 2463 9252 2080 2794 4874 59774 21 20 
1914 14455 4079 18534 3016 1209 4225 1254 1876 3130 25889 12 12 
 
PRINCE LINE  
 
















Total  Total  WB EB 
1899 14266 3465 17731 0 0 0 221 377 598 18329 17 16 
1900 13857 3768 17625 0 0 0 246 519 765 18390 17 18 
1901 12455 1592 14047 0 0 0 159 311 470 14517 17 15 
1902 16922 2466 19388 0 0 0 59 61 120 19508 18 15 
1903 16228 5331 21559 0 0 0 93 19 112 21671 19 17 
1904 7937 6453 14390 0 0 0 85 5 90 14480 14 13 
1905 14179 4562 18741 0 0 0 91 3 94 18835 16 17 
1906 15942 5437 21379 0 0 0 92 17 109 21488 16 16 
1907 8683 5808 14491 0 0 0 159 3 162 14653 13 12 




























Total  Total  WB EB 
1907 9314 6767 16081 0 0 0 76 0 0 16081 12 10 
1908 3920 19270 23190 0 0 0 263 230 493 23683 16 17 
1909 14576 2583 17159 0 0 0 266 80 346 17505 15 14 
1910 10594 4608 15202 0 0 0 151 24 175 15377 14 14 
1911 7130 9504 16634 209 180 389 191 17 208 17231 12 15 
1912 17225 7023 24248 1052 344 1396 71 40 111 25755 17 17 
1913 27646 4007 31653 1163 353 1516 81 32 113 33282 16 16 
1914 7990 11231 19221 2338 644 2982 256 79 335 22538 16 16 
 






















Total Total  WB EB 
1903 0 1529 1529 0 0 0 0 133 133 1662 0 1 
1904 14119 8316 22435 1166 100 1266 1214 3222 4436 28137 17 18 
1905 15884 5980 21864 1875 235 2110 1059 2542 3601 27575 15 15 
1906 18733 7788 26521 2227 414 2641 1104 2699 3803 32965 16 16 
1907 17538 8560 26098 2289 604 2893 1153 2962 4115 33106 16 15 
1908 6066 12815 18881 1553 506 2059 1145 2303 3448 24388 15 16 
1909 16096 4622 20718 2627 454 3081 1092 2416 3508 27307 16 17 
1910 11862 4030 15892 2127 619 2746 1316 2647 3963 22601 15 15 
1911 9951 9487 19438 2716 570 3286 909 1711 2620 25344 15 14 
1912 14802 7761 22563 2672 687 3359 909 2019 2928 28850 15 15 
1913 18128 8215 26343 3510 745 4255 1055 2217 3272 33870 14 14 






















Total Total  WB EB 
1904 398 4886 5284 92 101 193 70 422 492 5969 2 4 
1905 17246 7562 24808 2086 230 2316 1035 2697 3732 30856 14 14 
1906 25480 10918 36398 2893 451 3344 1286 3165 4451 44193 15 15 
1907 22938 12120 35058 2750 822 3572 1275 3418 4693 43323 14 15 
1908 4289 12502 16791 1244 486 1730 1193 2967 4160 22681 13 13 
1909 14954 2147 17101 2239 175 2414 984 2384 3368 22883 12 11 
1910 10169 1622 11791 1563 94 1657 803 2428 3231 16679 8 9 
1911 9922 8333 18255 1621 480 2101 723 2235 2958 23314 10 12 
1912 5510 3267 8777 1072 96 1168 416 1827 2243 12188 5 5 
1913 6471 4633 11104 1503 262 1765 583 1996 2579 15448 5 5 





Annex 5: HAL through rates to and from hinterland destinations913 
 
Destination  1893 1895 1900 1907 Destination  1893 1895 1900 1907 
Aachen  1,29  1 Leeuwarden    0,9 
Agram  14,15 11,5 8,4 8,4 Leipzig    3,05 
Alexandria    12 Lille    0,9 
Allenstein    5,3 Mainz  2,31  1,55 
Bajohren    7,15 Mannheim  2,93  1,8 
Basel   3,98  4,55 Marseille    2 
Batoum    16 Milan    3,75 
Belovar    9 Miskolcz    7,55 
Bern   5,2  5,65 Mitrovicza    9,55 
Berlin    3,1 Mohacs    9,6 
Beyrouth    15 Munchen  5,93  4,85 
Brunn    6 Munkacs    8,55 
Budapest 11,95 8,78 7,55 7,55 Myslowitz    5,6 
Bukarest    10,35 Naples    2 
Budweis 9,4 6,52   Oderberg 5,87  5,6 5,6 
Chiasso  8,28  8,35 Oedenburg    6,5 
Chur   6,03  6,7 Ostrowo    4,9 
Coblenz  1,8  1,25 Oswieczim 6,07  5,7 5,7 
Cologne    0,95 Ottolotschin    5 
Constantinople    12 Paris    1,8 
Czernowitz    8,75 Peterwardein    9,55 
Debreczin 13,6 10,18  9 Pilsen  4,91   
Dobricza    10,2 Pireaus    9 
Dusseldorf    0,95 Posen     4,3 
Eperjes 13,6 8,19  7,55 Prostken    6,55 6,55 
Essegg    9,45 Prag  8,95 7,55  4,6 
Eydtkuhnen    6,65 Saloniki    9 
Franfurt a/M    1,75 Samsoun    14 
Fuime  10,79 8,4  Sillein    6,25 
Funfkircken    9,2 Smyrna    9 
Genoa    2 Strassburg    2,9 
Groningen    0,9 Stuttgart  4  2,85 
Grosswardein    9,2 Szegedin 13,6 11,2  8,75 
                                                 
913 The destinations in italic are the boarder control stations. Between 1890 and 1897 the most 
popular through booking points of the company in order of importance were: Vienna, Groningen, 
Mannheim, Mainz, Leeuwarden, Marseille, Berlin, Stuttgart, Ludwigshafen, Basel, Cologne, Trier, Paris, 
Oderberg, Munich, Frankfurt, Strasburg, Crefeld, Posen, Düsseldorf, Aschaffenburg, Heilbronn, Pezsau, 
Dirschau, Leipzig, Kassau, Wurzburg. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226; Letters August 
24 1894; December 6 1895; March 23, 1898; February 6 1900; Circular Zotti  October 1905; HAL rate 
sheet April 12 1907; Uranium Line that rate sheet November 29 1909, the company quoted the same rates 
as HAL 
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Hermannstadt    9,65 Temesvar  13,6 11,6  9,15 
Illowo    5,65 Thorn    4,95 
Innsbruck   5,95 6,55 Tilsit    6,6 
Insterburg    6,35 Trebizonde    15 
Jaffa    14 Triest  12,2 11,3 9,55 9,35 
Jassy    10,15 Tripolis    16 
Kaschau 13,6 7,9 7,9 7,55 Turin    3,65 
Karlstadt   8,4 8,4 Ungvar    8,35 
Klausenburg    9,2 Vukovar    9,5 
Krakau   5,95  Wien  7,18 7,18 6 6 
Kronstadt    9,2 Zombor     9,5 
Linz  10,2 7,6   Zurich  6,34  5,45 


































Appendix 6: New York agents and Agents under bond 1897-1909 
The three lists gathered, one of the New York City agents, Brooklyn and Williamsburg 
and the other two of agents under bond for the New York Territory do not allow drawing 
for reaching conclusions. Not enough is known about how inclusive the second and third 
lists are neither about the true delimitation of the New York territory. Combining the list 
do seem to indicate that the number of agents in New York City strongly decreased over 
the years from 35 in 1897 to 12 and 11 in 1906 and 1909 respectively. Hopefully these 
lists can serve as a stepping stone for further reconstruction of migration networks, the 
importance of which has received an increasing amount f consideration in research.  
 
List of Agents of the Continental Lines in New York City April 10 1897 
 
 
NEW YORK CGT HAPAG HAL  NGL RSL 
S Barasch 74 Ridgeway St.  H N  R 
H. Birdsall, 187 West St. F H N L R 
H. Bischoff & Co, StaatsZeitung Bldg F H N L R 
F. Brodsky & Co 1331 2md Ave F H N L R 
F. Budzynski, 122 Cedar St.  H N L R 
Geo Deffas, 240 East 79th St.  H N L R 
Falck & Co, 26 Canal St. F H N L R 
A. Falck & Co 127 Bowery St. and 156 East 125th St   F H N L R 
C. Foucart, 37 Desbrosses St.   H N L  
A. Germansky, 30 Canal St.  H N   
M Hauser & Co, 370 Grand St.  H N L R 
S. Jarmulowsky, 54 Canal St.  H N L R 
A. Johnson & Co, 27 Broadway F H N L R 
A. Kass, 78 Essex St.  H N  R 
J Keller, 117 Charlton St. F H N  R 
J. Kellerman, 49 Norfolk St.  H N  R 
M. Kobre, 40 Canal St  H N L R 
Hugo Lederer, 58 Ave B  F H N L R 
W. Leuman, 18 Greenwich St.   N  R 
Peter McDonnell, 2 Batterey Place  F H N L R 
Markel Bros, 94 Canal St.  H N L R 
Missler & Krimmert, 106 West St.  F H  L   
M. Muller, 1 Broadway F H N L R 
O. Ott, 6 Greenwich St.   N  R 
E, Pflugi, 130 Greenwich St. F  N  R 
A. Ragette, 2662 Third Ave  H N  R 
I. Rosenberg, 92 East 14th St F H N L R 
J. Rosenbaum, State Bank, 378 Grand St.  H N L R 
M. Rosett, 66 Greenwich St. 167 Stanton St. F H N L R 
J. Rosuck, 6 Market St.  H     
P. Rovnianek & Co, 25 Avenue "A"  H N L R 
L. Scharlach & Co, 362 Grand St. F H N L R 
A. Schleisinger & Son, 350 East Huston St.  H N  R 
H. Schnitzer, 141 Washinton St. F H N L R 
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H. Tamsen, 52 Avenue "A"  H N L R 
Zwilchenbart, Gasser & Co, 61 Greenwich St. F H N L R 
Mandel & Baros, 157 Rivington St.  H N L  
Total 17 34 35 26 33 
BROOKLYN/WILLIAMSBURG   H N   
Bernheim 646 Broadway  H N   
Epstein, 78 Graham Ave.  H N   
Grochowski, 49 Grand Str  H N   
Kellerman, Thatford & Belmont, Aves Brownsville  H N L R 
Koch, 48 Broadway  F H N L R 
Lehrenkrauss & Sons, 379 Fulton St. F H N L R 
Scheldt, 180 Graham Ave F H N L R 
Schultz, 194 Ewen St. F H N   
Siems, 131 Greenpoint Ave F H N L R 




List of agents under Bond in New York Territory September 21st 1906 
 
 
Agent  Locality  Bond  Agent  Locality  Bond  
Antonio Andretta  Hartford Ct 500 C. Litchman Trenton, NJ 500 
Jos Bolcar  Passiac NJ 500 I. Lewin New Haven, Ct. 500 
Max Beuchler  Bridgeport Ct  500 M. Leibschutz Louisville, Ky 500 
M. Blitzstein Philadelphia 500 B. Litchman Amsterdam, NJ 500 
Bowie & Co Bridgeport O. 1000 V. Luczkowiak Dunkirk, NY 500 
Stephen Berleczky Barberton O. 500 H. Labowicz New Haven, Ct. 500 
Chas Bicsak Garfield NJ 500 Adolf Mandel NY 500 
Jos Bolcar  Boonton NJ 500 Markel Bros.  NY 500 
S. Barasch  NY 500 E. Mantel Indianapolis, Ind 500 
S. Bronstein & Son Baltimore 500 A. Mitro Lorain, O. 500 
G. Dziadick Derby, Ct 500 A. Michalkiwicz Elizabethport, NJ 500 
Davis & Hurwitz Syracuse, NY 500 R. Melville Toronto, Can 3000 
A.V. Dzubay  South Fork, Pa 500 E. Nierenstein Hartford Ct 500 
Deutsch Bros. NY 1000 H. Norton Vanderbilt, Pa 500 
Erdelyi & Weiner Donora, Pa  500 G. Oroszy Lorain, O. 500 
Jos. Emory Wilmington, Del 500 G. Prince Rochester, Pa  500 
H. Epstein Brooklyn, NY 500 Bela Pucky Colombus, O 500 
B. Ewnowitch Middletown, Ct 500 A. Pirhalla Jessup, Pa 500 
A. Friedman Passiac NJ 500 E. Prokocimer Newark, NJ 500 
M. Friedman  Luczerne, Pa 500 
Polowe, Mogilewsky & 
Werner NY 1000 
M. Fodor 
New Brunswick, 
NJ 500 J. Rizsak Passiac NJ 500 
S. Fleischhaker Rochester, Pa  500 N. Rizsak Carteret, NJ 500 
E. Germanus Newark, NJ 500 P. Rovnianek & Co NY 1000 
A. Grochowski & Co Brooklyn, NY 500 C. Rainke Philadelphia, Pa 500 
A. Greenbaum Barberton O. 500 N. Rizsak South-Carteret, NJ 500 
B. Gross Cresson, Pa 500 J. Rojewski Camden, NJ 500 
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T. Garbinsky  Auburn, NY 500 J. Reichman Mt Pleasant, Pa 500 
M Gordon Hartford Ct 500 A. Rudewick Freeland, Pa 500 
M Greenwald Rondout, NY 500 M. Rakowsky Conshohocken, Pa 500 
M. Gross  Avoca, Pa 500 J. Rizsak South-Bethlehem, Pa 500 
M Hirsch Seymour, Ct 500 N. Rizsak Carteret, NJ 500 
S.Holzmans & Sons Johnstown, Pa 500 W. Sawa Wilkes-Barre, Pa 500 
P. Harbula Ambridge, Pa 500 J. Simon E.Toledo, O 500 
M. Hahn Brooklyn, NY 1000 L. Sirotiak  Yonkers, NY 500 
Aaron Hurwitz Brooklyn, NY 500 F. Sakser  NY 500 
L. Hyman Carbondale, Pa 500 C. Scheid NY 500 
P. Hegedus & Co Wet Seneca, NY 500 L Sabow Chrome, NJ 500 
Aaron Hurwitz Scranton, Pa 500 M. Sameth  Yonkers, NY 500 
M & L Jarmulowsky NY 1000 W. Szetela Thompsonville, Ct 500 
J. Jacob Canton, O. 500 J. Schneider Providence, RI 500 
Jubelirer Bros. New Salem, Pa 500 F. Savage Durya Borough, Pa 500 
S. Kiernozycki Plymouth, Pa 500 P. Szewczyk Niagara Falls, NY 500 
Max Kobre NY 500 F. Szetela Adams, Mass 500 
S. Kohan NY 500 A. Spiro & Co Ansonia, Ct  500 
Emil Kiss NY 500 J. Tonkay Jacobs Creek, pa 500 
E. Kaplan Syracuse, NY 500 B. Trilecz Canonsburg, Pa 500 
T. Knoblauch Reading, Pa 500 J. Tomcsanyi Homestead, Pa 500 
M. Korlath Scalp Level, Pa 500 W. Teitelbaum Johnstown, Pa 500 
S. Keltonik 
Ponxsutawney, 
Pa 500 F. Trudnowski No. Buffalo, NY 500 
A. Klein Martins Ferry, O. 500 A. Ujhelyi S. Lorain, O 500 
K. Kazemekas Waterburry, Ct 500 M Walenk Scranton, Pa 500 
Krumholz & Zeisler Trenton, NJ 500 L. Warady Trenton, NJ 500 
Abraham Kass NY 500 Zaruba & Durish Clarcksburg, W-Ver 500 
A. Klein Yonkers, NY 500 A. Zemany Windber, Pa 500 


















List of Agents under bond in New York Territory January 5 1909 
 
Agent  Locality  Bond  Agent Locality Bond  
Jos Bolcar  Passiac NJ 500 S. Holzmans & Sons Johnstown, Pa 500 
Max Beuchler  Bridgeport Ct  500 P. Harbula Ambridge, Pa 500 
M. Blitzstein Philadelphia 500 J. Haarhay Philadelphia, Pa 500 
Stephen Berleczky Barberton O. 500 I. Herz Philadelphia, Pa 1000 
Jos Bolcar  Boonton NJ 500 A. Horbal Derby, Ct 500 
F. Burszinski Buffalo, NY 500 Aaron Hurwitz Brooklyn, NY 500 
J. Beda Duquesne, Pa 500 P. Hegedus & Co Wet Seneca, NY 500 
J. Beler Johnstown, Pa 500 M & L Jarmulowsky NY 1000 
J. Bertok Toledo, O 500 J. Jacob Canton, O. 500 
S. Blaustein Baltimore 500 S. Jex Mt Pleasant, Pa 500 
T. Coon Wharton NJ 500 J. Jacobson Reading, Pa 500 
I. Cherokowick Gilberton, Pa 500 F. Jagocki Brooklyn, NY 1000 
I Csisarik Duquesne, Pa 500 Jubelirer Bros. New Salem, Pa 500 
G. Dziadick Derby, Ct 500 S. Kiernozycki Plymouth, Pa 500 
Davis & Hurwitz Syracuse, NY 500 S. Kahan NY 1000 
Deutsch Bros. NY 1000 Max Kobre NY 1000 
O. Dobrovolsky Barnesbore, Pa 500 E. Kaplan Syracuse, NY 500 
Erdelyi & Weiner Donora, Pa  500 T. Knoblauch Reading, Pa 500 
B. Ewnowitch Middletown, Ct 500 H. Korn Brooklyn, NY 1000 
L. Esiner Trenton, NJ 500 M. Korlath Scalp Level, Pa 500 
M. Fikete Norton, Va 500 K. Kazemekas Waterburry, Ct 500 
F. Fritsche Long Island City, NY 500 M. Katzander Stockertown, Pa 500 
S. Fischgrund Wilmerding, Pa 500 V Kubelka & Co NY 1000 
A. Friedman Passiac NJ 500 Herman Kirch NY 1000 
M. Friedman  Luczerne, Pa 500 J. Karabinus Martins Creek, Pa 500 
M. Fodor New Brunswick, NJ 500 S. Keltonik & Co Conemaugh, Pa 500 
S. Fleischhaker Rochester, Pa  500 J. Kovacs Brooklyn, NY 1000 
S. Fleischhaker Beaver Falls, Pa 500 C. Kristupek Ambridge, Pa 500 
L. Friedl Mingo Junction, O 500 I. Kline Niles, O 500 
E. Germanus Newark, NJ 500 M. Kosiolek Niagara Falls, NY 500 
A. Grochowski & Co Brooklyn, NY 1000 J. Kiss S. Bethlehem, Pa 500 
A. Grochowski & Co Jamaica, NY 500 Krumholz & Zeisler Trenton, NJ 500 
A. Greenbaum Barberton O. 500 A. Klein Yonkers, NY 500 
B. Gross Cresson, Pa 500 E. Lenartowicz Central Falls, R.I. 500 
S. Glick Clinton, Pa 500 Lipschutz & Wurzel Philadelphia, Pa 500 
J. Goodman Manayunk, Pa 500 W. Lucas Minnersville, Pa 500 
S. Goodman Coatsville, Pa 500 N. Lusher Montreal, Can 1000 
T. Garbinsky  Auburn, NY 500 C. Litchman Trenton, NJ 500 
M Gordon Hartford Ct 500 I. Lewin New Haven, Ct. 500 
D. Gordon Patterson, NJ 1000 B. Litchman Amsterdam, NJ 500 
P. Green  Bridgeville, Pa 500 V. Luczkowiak Dunkirk, NY 500 
M Greenwald Rondout, NY 500 Adolf Mandel NY 1000 
F. Gross Buffalo, NY 1000 F. Mekszrunas Manayunk, Pa 500 






Agent  Locality  Bond  Agent  Locality  Bond  
J. McDonald Harrisburg, Pa 500 J. Radziwon Buffalo, NY 500 
G. Matyas Treskow, Pa 500 V. Rozuk Newark, NJ 1000 
C. Marz Elizabeth, NJ 500 S. Ramonat Shenandoah, Pa 500 
L. Markowitz Buffalo, NY 500 A. Romanosky Lawrence, Ma 500 
Markel Bros.  NY 1000 J. Simon E.Toledo, O 500 
Markel & Rosen Brooklyn, NY 1000 D. Simon Mansfield, Pa 500 
A. Miernicki Shenandoah 500 F. Sakser  NY 500 
E. Mantel Indianapolis, Ind 500 E. Sameth  Perth Amboy, NJ 500 
A. Mitro Lorain, O. 500 L Sabow Chrome, NJ 500 
A. Michalowicz Elizabethport, NJ 500 J. Schneider Providence, RI 500 
A. Michalowicz & 
Pankuch Elizabeth, NJ 500 E. Schwartz Pottstown, Pa 500 
E. Nierenstein Hartford Ct 500 Stone & Zujawski 
Northampton, 
mass 500 
H. Norton Vanderbilt, Pa 500 J. Samley Pittston, Pa 500 
J. Nagy Toledo, O 500 J. Slabinski Plains, Pa 500 
A. Neubauer Brooklyn, NY 1000 B. Sharfman Hartford Ct 500 
H. Oppenheim NY 1000 E. Shurgot Philadelphia, Pa 500 
W. Oliwiecki Niagara Falls, NY 500 Sanditz & Traurig Waterburry, Ct 1000 
G. Oroszy Lorain, O. 500 Steiner Bros Kensington, Pa 500 
Bela Pucky Colombus, O 500 F. Savage Durya Borough, Pa 500 
A. Pirhalla Jessup, Pa 500 J. Tomcsanyi Homestead, Pa 500 
E. Prokocimer Newark, NJ 500 J. Torok Martins Ferry, O. 1000 
N. Papp Cleveland, O 500 H. Torbet Dillonvale, O 500 
K. Papp Rankin, Pa 500 J. Tetlak Cleveland, O 500 
A. Pamer Akron, O 500 M. Tafel Butler, Pa 500 
S. Payer Pottstown, Pa 500 E. Trochanowski Mt Camel, Pa 500 
J. Pacowsky Ford City, Pa 500 M. Tulenczik Toronto, O 500 
Pollak Bros Lyndora, Pa 500 A. Ujhelyi S. Lorain, O 500 
F. Prelewicz North Tonawanda, NY 500 A. Ujhelyi Klyria, O 500 
J. Rizsak Passiac NJ 500 C. Voelker Atlantic City, NJ 500 
J. Rizsak Wharton NJ 500 V. Willus Jerset City NJ 500 
P. Rovnianek & Co NY 1000 V. Willus Kingsland, NJ 500 
C. Rainke Philadelphia, Pa 1000 S. Wills Auburn, NY 500 
N. Rizsak South-Carteret, NJ 500 M. Woll Lebanon, Pa 500 
J. Reichman Scranton, Pa 500 J. Whitelaw Akron, O 500 
J. Recke Punxsutawney, Pa 500 Williams & Namanyi Wet Seneca, NY 500 
A. Rudewick Freeland, Pa 500 M Walenk Scranton, Pa 500 
M. Rakowsky Concshohocken, Pa 500 L. Warady Trenton, NJ 1000 
J. Rizsak South-Bethlehem, Pa 500 S Yasik Wilmington, Del 500 
J, Riszak Alpha, NJ 500 Zaruba & Durish Clarcksburg, WV 500 
N. Rutsek South Carteret 500 A. Zemany Windber, Pa 500 







Appendix 7: Advertisements of the HAL in American Newspapers 
 
The advertising expenses of the Line are predominantly for cabin passage (see Part III 
chapter II, 4.3) If not specified the add was placed all year. If only for six months this 
usually covered the period from March till September, 4 months from April 15 till August 
15. The figures in bold represent the contribution of the Holland America Line for joint 
advertisements with other lines in that particular newspaper.  
 
American newspapers, location and duration 1894  1897 1903 1907 1910 1913 
Dutch Papers        
De Nederlander, Chicago 50 40 40    
De Volkstem, De Pere Wisc 40 40 40 40 40 40 
De Wachter, Grand Rapids Mich  25 25 25   
De Standaard, Grand Rapids Mich 65 65 60 60 60 60 
De Gids, Grand Rapids Mich  28 28 28 28 28 
De Gids, De Pere Wisc   20 20   
De stem des volks, Grand Rapids Mich  40     
De Vryheidsbanier, Grand Rapids Mich 40 40     
De Calvinist, Grand Rapids, Mich      37 
Onze Standaard, Green Bay Wisc 60 60 60    
De Hollandsch-Belgische Amerikaan, de Pere    60   
Onze Toekomst, Chicago   36 36 36 36 
De Hope, Holland Mich  60 60 60 60 60 60 
De Grondwet,Holland Mich  60 60 60 60 60 60 
De Hollander, Holland Mich 16      
De Hollandsche Amerikaan, Kalamozoo, Mich  60 40 60 60 60 60 
De Volksvriend, Orange City Ia 40 40 40 40 40 40 
De Vrye Hollander, Orange City    48 48 48 
De Telegraaf, Paterson N.J. 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Het Oosten, Paterson, NJ    60 30 30 
Pella's weekblad    25 25 25 25 
Sioux Centre Nieuwsblad    25 25 25 25 
The Holland American, Rochester, NY    60 60 60 
Boston       
Beacon 6m/6m/ /-/ 21.67 24.37     
Globe / 4m/4m / /12m  40 32  182.5 250  
Herald /4m/4 m/ /12m  32 32  273.8   
Transcript /4m/4m / /12m 76.8 72.8  138.1 138 312 
Journal /4m/4m/ /-/ 43.2 43.2     
Boston Christan Science Monitor /////6m      390 
Boston City Directory     5.85 4  
Boston Satchel Guide     15  
Chicago ill       
Stoelkers Guide  39 39     
Chicago Record Herald 6m/ 6 m/6m/4m/4m/4m 81.9 56.6 100 100 90 90 
Chicago Tribune  6m/6m/ /12 m 95.55 98.35 375.3 417 403 461 
Chicago Freire Presse   240 240 240 240 240 
Illinois StaatsZeitung 329      
Interocean/ 5m  52.5     
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American newspapers, location and duration 1894  1897 1903 1907 1910 1913 
New York        
Amerikanische Schweizer Zeitung    65 65 65 
Badische Landes Zeitung /-/ /6m/12m    25 25 50 
Courier des Etats Unis  100 100 164.8 199.8 181 173 
Brooklyn Eagle    200.75 219 164 165 
NY Herald 750 883.75 912.5 850 821 1551 
NY Herald Directory    120 120 120 120 
NY Evening Mail & Express /6m/6m/6m/6m/6m 91.2 96 243 156 210 211 
NY Eveming Post 241.6  312 300 337 655 
NY Staatszeitung 256.5 256.5 256.5 225 208 208 
NY Sun /-/6m/6m/6m/6m   343.53 366 409 386 
NY Tribune /6 m/6m/6m/6m/6m 136.8 144 182 180 246 246 
NY Times /6m/ 6m/ 6m/6m/12m 138.5 144 300.3 274.5 328 659 
Steam and Sail 120      
US. Post  222.3     
Pittsburg       
Volksblatt 100 100     
Commercail Gazette 6m / - / 6m   62.5  54.6   
Pittsburgh Dispatch -/-/6m/-/6m/12m   196.04  31 91 
St Louis       
Anz. Des Westens 120 130 100 100 100 100 
Globe Democrat  6m/6m/6m/4m/12m   103.95 165.45 258.6 107 501 
Globe /8m     152  
St Louis Amerika (joint with RSL)     75 75 
Herold des Glaubens Amerika    25   
Struckhoff's special advertisment      50 
Washington        
Washington Evening star 6m/6m/4m/4m/-/ 60.5 45.37 61.1 34.67 35  
Washington Post 6m/6m/4m/4m/-/ 80.67 57.2 46.8 39 39  
Washington DC Star//////4m      62 
Washington Times 25.4      
Sentinal 6m  50     
Other       
Albany Argus   76.44    
Baltimore Sun/ 6m/6m/ 6m/6m/6m  52.5 57.2 81 95 164 
Bridgeport Standard / 6m/6m     82 82 
Buffalo Express 12m/6m/6m/12m   271.05 46.8 55 103 
Buffalo Commercial 6m/6m/6m    23.4 31 43 
Cambridge, Mass, Harvard monthly/6m  12     
Charleston News and Courrier   30    
Cincinatti/ Freire Press 83.34 100 100 100 100 100 
Cleaveland Leader /6m   182    
Colombus Dispatch /-/6m/4m/4m/4m   65.52 75 98 97 
Detroit Free Press /-/ /4m/4m/4m    108 136 180 
Fresno Democrat    18   
Hartford Courant /-/6m/6m/6m/6m   30 30 51 52 
Indianapolis News /-/6m/4m/4m/4m   117 132 147 160 
Kansas City Star /6m   149.76    
La Incha, Havana 4m   172    
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American newspapers, location and duration 1894  1897 1903 1907 1910 1913 
Las Novedades 100      
Los Angeles Times     75 218 
Meriden Record /////6m/6m     33 33 
Milwaukee/ Herald    70 70   
Minneapolis Journal /-/6m/6m   128.4 23.4   
Minneapolis Tribune ////6m/6m     96 94 
Montreal Gazette   92.4 48   
Montreal La Presse ///6m/6m      103 131 
New Heaven Journal & Courrier /-/ /6m/6m/6m    28 28 40 
New Orleans Times Democrat /-/6m/4m/6m/6m    110 70 70 70 
New Orleans Picayune /-/ / 4m/6m/6m    70 70 94 
New Heaven Leader -/-/6m/-/-/-/   33.75    
Norfolk Public Ledger /-/ / 3m/ 3m/3m   81 36 33 33 
Omaha Beach /6m   176.4    
Philadelphia Ledger /6m /6m/ 4m/4m /4m   163.8 323.4 160 158 156 
Philadephia Record //// 4m/4m     128 156 
Providence Journal //6m/6m/6m/6m   81.5 93.45 115 153 
Rochester Democrat Chronicle -/-/6m/-/-/-   118.86    
Saint Paul Pioneer Press & Dispatch 6m/6m/6m   109.2 29.28 94 125 
San Francisco Call    37.44 37 225 
San Franciso Chronicle    62.4 62 187 
San Francisco Democrat     60   
San Francisco Argonaut    48.75   
Springfield Republican /-/6m/6m/6m/6m   48 48 55 55 
Syracuse Herald -/6m/-/-/-/   87.36    
Troy Record N.J. /3m / /-/  14.18     
Utica Herald Dispatch /6m   37.25    
Viginian Pilot /-/ / 3m/3m/3m    33 33 33 
Winnipeg Free Press /6m      140 
Winnipeg Telegram      100 
Miscellaneous       
American Golf   180    
Annual Report Netherlands Chamber of 
Commerce    13 20 20 
Badischer Volksfest Verein    25 25 25 
Bischoff Calendar  10  25 25 25 
By Rail and Water       75 
Calender Morgen Journal   95    
Cooks Guide / Traveller's  Gazette  125 125 150 150 150 
Courier de France   12     
Detroit Journal   64.25    
Der Deutsche in Amerika   100    
Dutch Fare Program   50    
Eendracht maakt Macht   10 10 10 10 
Glas Naroda   35    
Guide Franco Americain   50 50 50 50 
Grosser NY Burger & Bauer Calendar    45 45 45 
Hotel America   30    
Kartford Lampoon   12.5    
Kawkab American  25 150     
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American newspapers, location and duration 1894  1897 1903 1907 1910 1913 
Liedich's Traveller's Guide      100 
L'union Francaise   10    
Medical Record   200    
medical Times   180    
Minneapolis Beuer & Bauer Kal    30   
Nederlandsche Stamdag Programma      25 
Ocean Sailings      50 
Oldenburg Verein Journal    10 10 10 
Old World Tourist Guide   30    
Plastic Catalogue    15   
Photo Era      125 
Schweizer Calendar   50    
Stockler's Guide   39    
Szabadszag Calendar    275 250  
Toronto Art Club Catalogue    20   
Traveller's & Shipper's Mail Guide    39  39 
Union Chretienne des Jeunes Gens    12 25  
US Tobacco Journal   250    
Women's Art Association of Canada     20 20 
Yale Courant   25    
Extra Minneapolis   234    
Extra advertising Steamship Rotterdam   502.2     
Total  3714.43 4582.8 9183.2 7867 8066 10983 
 
 
 
